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The trouble began when I got hooked on a linguistic puzzle two and a half years ago: 
why is not there a word nand in everyday speech to express the combined meanings of 
not and and? It would have been a plausible and useful word, given the existence of nor 
for the combination of not and or. In slightly more technical terms: why do we need 
two separate words in everyday natural language to express the combination of a 
negation and a conjunction? 
 
The terminology used – words, negation, conjunction – indicates that an answer had to 
be sought in an area where linguistics and logic meet. But that is a sizeable area. 
Linguistics and logic are among the oldest branches of systematic inquiry and their 
connection much analyzed. Moreover, both are probably more highly formalized than 
any other field in the humanities. Small wonder then that it turned out to be much easier 
to state the problem than to come up with a viable solution, let alone find a way to 
present it in readable format.     
 
While I took great pleasure in trying to figure out what the lexical gap was about, it was 
an arduous task to streamline my findings, and that is an understatement. There will 
doubtless remain imperfections and I deplore my state of ignorance more than ever.  
Yet I entertain some hope that the result of the energy invested offers a useful 
perspective on an algebraic aspect of our shared cognitive capacities.  
 
In a way, the topic of this study is that of one of the earliest sciences in history – logic, 
so that the material that bears on my concerns is virtually endless.  I have therefore 
made a selection purely in terms of the problem I sought to solve and the theoretical 
hypotheses I wished to develop. In view of that, it is quite well possible that the line 
taken deviates in a number of ways from what is standard.  Thus I believe Neo-Gricean 
pragmatic analyses pull too many aspects of “hard” semantics into the rather soft and 
weakly formalized realm of pragmatics. Yet, it is no less true that much of what I try to 
do here is highly influenced by Laurence Horn's (1989) work.   
 
When Willy Vandeweghe (to whom I am very grateful for the reference) pointed out 
the centrality of Löbner’s “Wahr neben Falsch” (1990) to my topic, I noticed that a 
number of ideas I had been working on – a two-relational asymmetry hypothesis and 
the emphasis on negative trafficking between operators – are central to his study.  But 
there are several interesting differences between the analyses. Thus, the reduction of 
the Boethian square to two relations is initially executed in Aristotelian terms rather 
than by means of negation. More importantly, I  trace all negative approaches to 
standard logical operator relations (including Sheffer’s stroke, Löbner’s duality 
squares, Seuren’s (2002, 20-21) bitriangular “improved square” and my own proposal) 
back to  C.S. Peirce’s (1989 [1880]) original negative approach in “A Boolean algebra 
with one constant”. An enriched and cognitively more realistic version thereof not only 
lends support to the asymmetry first postulated by Löbner but provides a plausible 
further theoretical anchoring for it. In addition, it leads to a changed perspective on 
other parts of his duality approach.  It is in these respects that the present proposal 
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intends to lend support to Löbner’s seminal work, but also to build on it and suggest 
modifications.       
 
I am convinced that if there is originality and value to the cocktail served, it is in no 
small measure because the giants on whose shoulders I have chosen to stand – 
including George Boole, Sylvain Bromberger, Noam Chomsky, Jeffrey S. Gruber, Jerry 
Fodor, Sebastian Löbner, Charles S. Peirce, Bertrand Russell, Pieter A.M. Seuren – 
have provided me with the best of its ingredients. I am thinking of Boole’s algebra and 
his assertion that logic is not just a formal system, but an empirical inquiry into “the 
constitution of the human intellect”, Bromberger’s emphasis on “what we know we 
don’t know”, Chomsky’s minimalism, internalism and view of language as both a 
formal system and a branch of psychology, Fodor’s language of thought, Löbner’s 
duality squares and phasal quantification, Gruber’s concept of configurationality, 
Peirce’s emphasis on the irritation of doubt and its stimulation “to action until it is 
destroyed”, and Bertrand Russell’s link between disjunction and cognitive perplexity or 
doubt.   
 
I take great pleasure in giving special mention to Jeffrey S. Gruber and Pieter A.M. 
Seuren, whose influence on my thinking has been enormous.  Over the years, Jeffrey 
Gruber has been a constant source of fresh thinking and spiritual depth, a real teacher 
who patiently gave me new ideas, inspiration and encouragement.  Pieter Seuren’s 
work on valuation space analysis, discourse semantics and cognitive logic has shaped 
my own ideas and influenced me more than anything else.  I first encountered the 
*nand-puzzle in his work, and as it turns out also several of the tools I needed to solve 
the riddle. Pieter has given very generously of his time and was always ready to 
comment on (often very rough) draughts.  His keen eye was sure to detect errors or 
omissions, his learnedness and wisdom the source of many pieces of good advice. I 
have benefited from his generosity and friendship over many years in more ways than 
words can express.   
 
The first draft of the first fragment of this thesis contained the mystically sounding 
claim that cognitive logic is an entirely negative affair underlyingly and that this should 
somehow provide a solution to the *nand problem. I have tried to think that initial idea 
through to the end and have attempted to develop new concepts and visual 
representations of my own making where needed. My feeling was that the empirical 
pattern which showed itself was so systematic it would have been lacking in courage 
not to follow the facts directly to where they led me. My main hope is that the triadic 
logic of the mind that has come out of those explorations will shine through.   
 
The second chapter is relatively conservative in its approach. Its main claim is that the 
Boethian Square of Oppositions can be taken to pieces more radically than often 
thought: it is not a square, nor a triangle, but no more than two primitive relations 
which constitute a Cartesian coordinate system. Though the model will be given the 
outlook of such a coordinate system from the outset, it especially in chapters 4 to 6 that 
the full meaning of this choice will transpire. 
 
In chapter three the two basic logical relations that remain – namely contradictoriness 
(CD) and entailment (ENT) – are tied to lexical items rather than to propositions.  If 
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there is some back and forth trafficking in my argumentation from the lexical to the 
propositional level, it is simply because properties of the latter are well-explored and 
hence easier to work with.   
 
Chapter four raises the question why logical calculi were traditionally defined in terms 
of Aristotelian logical entailment and not in terms of the other foundational relation of 
the system, namely contradictoriness and its associated operation of negation.  A 
proposal is made to decompose the lexical meaning of logical operators in negative 
terms along lines first proposed by Charles Saunders Peirce.  This results in a system of 
three basic operators per calculus, all of which are complex compositions on the basis 
of a single negative operator.  It is this Peircean-style novelty which will provide a 
theoretical explanation as to why the pivot is necessarily more basic than the other 
operators.  A comparison will be drawn with Löbner’s duality approach. 
 
Chapter five provides further evidence for the pivotal status of logical operators in the 
Boethian I-corner (or, some, etc.) and the ways in which such pivots differ from the 
corresponding non-pivotal pairs.  Both the core semantic content of pivots and 
modification thereof by contextual factors will be addressed. The most striking 
difference that will emerge is the chameleonic semantic variability of I-corner 
elements.   
 
Chapter six describes the modifying effects of context and stress on the comparatively 
‘light’ lexical semantic structure of pivots.  It introduces a distinction between two 
lexically different types of pivots and illustrates the differences between them by means 
of a comparison of the indefinite article a and the pronoun any.    
 
The conclusion will begin with a brief summary of the trajectory traversed, after which 
a solution will be proposed for the *nand-puzzle.  
 
To my knowledge, the psychological conception of set demarcation in chapter 3, the 
relation which is established between Boole and Peirce and the details of the specific 
decomposition of chapter 4 break virgin ground and are consequently highly 
exploratory. On the whole, however, there is one general line that will keep popping 
up: attention to language provides strong evidence for viewing the foundations of logic 
as a cognitive system internally represented in the human mind. It will be clear that an 
attempt to describe the core lexical meaning of propositional and predicate calculus 
operators in terms of such patterns of thought and language imposes strong limitations 
on the hypothesis space. There being strong evidence in favour of the mentalist stance, 
however, the limitations were not artificial hurdles, but rather indispensable constraints.  
Awareness of them forced me to distill what I sincerely hope to be a useful way of 
looking at old questions. The core conclusion of the study is that a single negative 
operator makes its presence felt in several areas of the computational system of human 
language, including the lexical semantics of logical operators.  
 
A stylistic consequence of the omnipresence of one operator and one small algorithm is 
that everything in this narrative hangs very tightly together. Though it was a tall order 
to translate a complex web of interrelated ideas into a single linearized string, the 
numerous revisions have hopefully made the end-result accessible, structured and 
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sufficiently formalised. In this latter respect, I have adopted Jackendoff’s (1997: 4) 
position that “the proper formalization of a theory [is] a delicate balance between rigor 
and lucidity: enough to spell out carefully what the theory claims, but not too much to 
become forbidding.” As much as is needed to see clearly, but nothing beyond that.   
 
As I have reached the end of my explorations and anachronistically write these opening 
lines, I wish to thank all those who have been supportive along the way.  I will first of 
all single out those whose help and/or direct influence or reactions have been crucial: 
Sjef Barbiers, Hans Bennis, Sylvain Bromberger, Noam Chomsky, Jan Ceuppens, 
Norbert Corver, Wim de Geest, Marcel den Dikken, Johan de Schryver, Berty 
Goudriaan, Jeffrey Gruber, Dirk Ghysels, Anja Jacobs, Lysbeth Jans, Jan Koster, Jan-
Frans Lindemans, Danny Masschelein, Filip Noë, Isabelle Peeters, Joël Rooms, Drea 
Maier, Pieter Seuren, Colette Storms, Tom Toremans, Jeroen van Craenenbroeck, 
Viviane van Dessel, Ignace Vandewoestyne, Martine Van Goubergen, Mark van 
Hoecke, Henk Van Riemsdijk, Katrin Naert, Philip Vermoortel, Walter Verschueren, 
Emma Vorlat, Jan-Wouter Zwart.   
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 1 NEITHER *NAND NOR *NALL – ON THE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EX-LOGIC AND IN-
LOGIC 
 
1.1 An empirical problem and an internalist perspective 
 
What sparked off this study is surprise at a peculiar hole in the lexicalization of logical 
operators in natural language, observed by numerous scholars (Horn 1972, 1989: 252-
267; Levinson 2000: 69-71; Seuren 2002: 21, n. 6).  In probably all languages of the 
world there are single-item lexicalizations for the standard universal and existential 
quantifiers, in English the words all and some, respectively. Single lexicalizations for the 
negation of the existential quantifier, no or none in English, are also attested in many, 
though by far not all languages of the world (Horn 1972 ch. 4; 1989: 254).  Yet, there 
never is a single-item lexicalization for the negation of the universal quantifier, for which 
the nonce-word *nall could be coined, the putative lexical counterpart of the 
syntactically complex phrase not all. 
 
(1)  
 
all *nall 
some no(ne) 
 
The question is: what is it about language that militates against single-item lexicalization 
of this logical operator? Put differently: why cannot the grammatical syntactically 
complex constituent not all be expressed as the morphologically complex lexical item 
*nall or as a monomorphemic word? 
 
Lest it might be thought that this lexicalisation gap is purely accidental, another 
paradigm can be provided proving that the problem is systematic (cf. Horn 1972, chapter 
4; 1989: 252-266; Levinson 2000: 69-71). The set I have in mind concerns the 
propositional operators of conjunction and disjunction. In probably all languages of the 
world these are lexicalized as single lexical items, in English the words and and or, 
respectively.  In addition, many languages – though not a majority – have a lexicalization 
for the negation of the disjunction ‘not (P or Q)’, in English: (neither)…nor.  No 
language, however, appears to have a lexicalized expression for the negation of the 
conjunction ‘not (P and Q)’.  For usage in special contexts, a nonce word has been 
devised to refer to this case: *nand. 
 
(2) 
 
and *nand 
or (neither…) nor 
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The parallellism between this paradigm and that of the quantifiers above is 
straightforward.  The question then becomes: what do these two paradigms have in 
common and why is it that one of the four logically possible lexicalisations is blocked?  
 
To find a solution to the conundrum, we shall try to describe in detail the lexical 
meaning properties of a number of logical operators. Our interest is, first of all, in these 
words as lexical items with their own lexical meanings, but in addition also in the 
semantic relations between them.  
 
The lexical items under analysis are all so-called logical constants, i.e. elements that 
allow for the automatic, formal derivation of logical consequences when used in 
sentences. 
 
Of the following pair of sentences, for instance,  
 
(3) a.  P: All flags are green 
b.  Q: Some flags are green 
 
the first logically entails the second (or, in formal notation P ├ Q): whenever P is true, Q 
must of necessity also be true, on account of the meanings of the logical constants all 
and some involved in P and Q.  A caveat is in order however.  The claim that there is 
logical entailment between P and Q can only be upheld when the logical constants have 
existential import, i.c. when the set of flags is nonnull.  The problem empty F-sets cause 
for entailment can be illustrated by means of the following pair, where the set of 
trespassers may remain empty forever, in which case a. does not entail b: 
 
(4) a.  All trespassers will be prosecuted. 
 b. Some trespassers will be prosecuted.1 
 
For the time being, this problem will be shoved under the carpet, but only for reasons of 
gradual build-up. The issue will be addressed in chapter 4 and a solution will be shown 
to be available which saves entailment.  
 
The term logical constants expresses the view that within the logical system the status of 
all and some is different from that of the other elements in the sentences (flags, green), 
which play no immediate role in the formal computation of entailments and can therefore 
be replaced by predicate letters: whether the sentences above are about flags being green 
or tomatoes being red is immaterial.  It is not on the latter predicates, but on the logical 
constants and their meanings that the formal computation turns.  Since the nature of this 
system of computation will be crucial to our solution of the problem posed above, I shall 
first of all introduce the logical notions I need. This will involve a look at (i) the 
workings and architecture of Aristotle’s Predicate Calculus and the way it treats certain 
logical properties of simple sentences, and (ii) an excursion into the Stoics’ propositional 
                                                          
1 Actually, the problems caused by trivial operators for classical APC are more serious than just 
the collapse of these entailments. Of all the logical oppositions only the contradictoriness 
relationships all flags are green vs. not all flags are green and some flags are green vs. no flags 
are green remain valid as these pairs of propositions cannot be jointly true or jointly false.  
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calculus and its account for logical properties of compound sentences, i.e. sentences 
consisting of “two or more coordinated main clauses” (Quirk et. al. 1985: 987)2.  As their 
features are introduced, they will be looked at with a minimalist eye. The primitive 
relations and categories will be sized down to a very sparse set. A parallelism between 
the two calculi will be exploited to show that the *nand- and the *nall-problem are two 
manifestations of the same lexical gap. In the process, it will be illustrated that the 
lexicalisation puzzle is much more general and widespread than illustrated so far in this 
chapter (cf. Horn 1989, Löbner 1990).  A solution to the problem will therefore have to 
be stated at a level that spans the different calculi. 
 
The logical, lexical and epistemological properties of the operators discussed in this 
study lead to the conclusion that logical intuition as expressed in natural language is 
grounded in properties of the mind, a position also defended in Macnamara (1986), 
Seuren (1998), Ludlow (in prep.). This makes our analysis a mentalist one, which takes 
natural logic to be a psychological phenomenon, a component of natural language. This 
mentalist perspective subscribes to Chomsky’s (1986: 21-24) general outlook on 
language. The basis for language in human beings is the existence in the brain of a 
component called the “language faculty”, a component which is “dedicated to language 
and its use” (Chomsky 2000: 77). The initial state of that component is “determined by 
biological endowment” and “so similar across the species that we can reasonably abstract 
to the initial state of the language faculty, a common human possession” (Chomsky 
2000: 78) labelled Universal Grammar (UG).  Under the partly triggering, partly shaping 
influence of the environment, UG grows until a fairly stable state is reached “at about 
puberty”. That mature state “is a computational (generative) system” which Chomsky 
calls an I-language, where I is chosen “to suggest that the conception is internal, 
individual, and intensional (in the technical sense; that is, the characterization of a 
function in intension).” (Chomsky 1995: 6). In other words, I-Language is the steady 
state of a person’s (= individual) mentally represented (= internal) linguistic knowledge 
(= intensional), a computational system which characterizes “an infinite class of 
linguistic expressions, each a certain array of phonetic, structural, and semantic 
properties” (Chomsky 2000: 78) 
 
This technical concept of language as an instance of I-language stands in contrast with E-
language, which is a construct “understood independently of the properties of the 
mind/brain” (Chomsky 1986: 20): external(ized), social and extensional3. Descriptive 
linguistics and behavioural psychology, which reigned supreme in the first half of the 
twentieth century, have operated with such concepts of EX-language (Chomsky 1986: 
19; Botha 1989: 69). So has structural linguistics, witness Bloomfield’s definition of 
language as “the totality of utterances that can be made in a speech community”.    And 
many leading analytic philosophers (Burge, Dummett, Putnam) take the externalist, anti-
individualist position that language is a social object existing “independently of any 
                                                          
2 The lexical items that function as propositional calculus operators (and, or, (neither)…nor) are of 
course not restricted to compound sentences, e.g. John is in Paris and Mary is in Spain, but figure 
also in all kinds of other complex phrases (NP: Mary and John; AP: bright and beautiful; VP: sing 
and dance, etc.) in which their semantics can hardly be completely disjoint from that in the 
propositional calculus.  
3 Since the labels I and E  will be needed for another contrast later on, I will use IN-Language and 
EX-Language for the Chomskyan contrast from here onwards. 
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particular speakers”, an object of which individual speakers only have a “partial, and 
partially erroneous, grasp”. (Dummett 1986).  For the purpose of naturalistic inquiry into 
the nature of language, EX-notions are, however, in many ways problematic: there is no 
possible delimitation of languages, regiolects and dialects as natural categories or 
idealisations independent of choice and interests.  
  
In terms of Chomsky’s definition of language, it will be clear that the logic envisaged 
here is a psychological IN-logic rather than a mind-external EX-Logic. Historically, this 
psychological perspective on logic is not unprecedented. Upon Hegel’s death in 1831, 
for instance, idealistic philosophy lost ground and the success of the natural sciences 
gave rise to a positivistic, naturalistic shift in philosophy. This fostered “the viewpoint 
that the ideal of the knowledge and the justification of the empirical sciences holds for 
philosophy as well.” (Kusch 1995:2) Accordingly, the study of the Kantian a priori “was 
(…) taken to be an enquiry into what is psychologically or physiologically prior to 
whatever humans obtain as material knowledge, and thus a topic for the physiologists 
(like von Helmholtz), or the psychologists (like Wundt).”  (Kusch 1995:2)  And logic, as 
seen from this new naturalistic perspective in logic, came to be treated as a branch of 
psychology.  Thus, Mill (1979: 359) wrote that logic is  
 
“not a science distinct from, and co-ordinate with Psychology.  So far as it is 
a science at all, it is a part, or branch, of Psychology; differing from it, on the 
one hand as the part differs from the whole, and on the other, as an Art 
differs from a Science.”    
Mill (1979: 359) 
 
But the internalist approach to logic of Mill, Erdmann, Lipps, Sigwart, etc. was gradually 
pushed to the background not long after George Boole (1815-1864) had proved in his 
seminal essay The Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1847) and in The Laws of Thought 
(1854) that classical logic could be treated purely with algebraic terminology and 
operations. Boole himself was still very explicit in mentioning the link between logic 
and the mind: in the first sentence of The Calculus of Logic (Boole 1848: 183) his stated 
aim is “the application of a new and peculiar form of Mathematics to the expression of 
the operations of the mind in reasoning”4.  But his success5 in discovering those 
mathematical laws may have been instrumental in deflecting attention from the 
                                                          
4 Cf. Grattan-Guinness (1982) and Devlin (1997: 72), who states: “Were he alive today, he would 
undoubtedly refer to himself as a cognitive scientist, a term that was first used in the early 1950s”. 
Though Boole doubtless holds views with a “psychologistic air”, Richards (1980) argues that his 
position is not subject to “the criticisms of psychologism” and thereby differs from Mill’s.  While 
both agree “that the general Laws of Nature are inductive inferences” (Richards 1980: 29), Boole 
(pace Mill) contends that this is not the case with the Laws of thought, the knowledge of which 
“does not require as its basis any extensive collection of observations”, but “clear apprehension of 
a single instance” (Boole 1854 [1958]: 4). This is because of “the ability inherent in our nature to 
appreciate Order; and the concurrent presumption, however founded, that the phenomena of 
Nature are connected by a principle of Order’ (Boole 1854 [1958]: 403; from Richards 1980: 29). 
In sum, while Boole is a cognitive scientist in search of the laws of thought, he rejects 
psychologism: “the central feature of psychologism – the limitation to the subjective nature of our 
knowing – is not present in the work of Boole.” (Richards 1980: 30)  
5 Bertrand Russell said “Pure mathematics was discovered by George Boole in a work which he 
called the Laws of Thought (1854)” (Russell 1918 [2004]: 57). 
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individual human being’s intellect. It was his algebraic Laws, more than the underlying 
features of Thought which commanded attention. Boole himself never stopped believing 
the mathematical laws were determined by the structure of the mind. But in spite of his 
argumentation, some of his contemporaries and logicians after him gradually traded in 
the complexities of thought and everyday language for the purity of mathematics. And 
since it was primarily mathematicians and mathematically oriented philosophers like 
Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) who took symbolic logic 
further after Boole, the trend towards mathematicisation and depsychologisation 
deepened (Seuren 2002).  A thorough understanding of the reasons for the shift requires 
a more detailed description than I can here provide of the so-called psychologism 
dispute, which stretched from the 1880s to the 1920s and as a consequence of which the 
antipsychologism of Frege and Husserl came to hold sway (Kusch 1995). But the 
following summarizes the core of the matter. First and foremost, there was the judgment 
that attempts to tie the laws of logic to the mind destroys the revered objectivity of logic 
and hence endangers all knowledge claims. To counter the danger Frege worked out 
arguments to establish that the laws of logic are not temporal and are hence different 
from psycho-physical events.  This led to the theory that Gedanke (thoughts) belong to a 
“dritte Reich”6 outside the physical and the mental, a realm of non-physical entities 
which it would be ill-taken to construe as empirical. This brings us to a second argument: 
the naturalist turn that had begotten the view of logic as a branch of psychology was 
outspokenly empiricist, so that arguments against empiricism were taken to affect the 
validity of the former as well. And no doubt partly because psychology was still in its 
infancy, what caught the eye about the workings of the psyche was not its systematicity, 
but rather that it was often illogical, full of false starts, error-prone. And natural language 
seemed to reflect that volatile character.  Thus, Frege “started from the assumption that 
natural language is a defective instrument, and that what the logician needs is not a 
theory of the working of natural language but a theory of the working of an improved 
language which could ideally replace it, and, for the most rigorous scientific purposes, 
may actually do so.” (Dummett 1981: 585). In other words, Frege’s interest was only in 
a “logically perfect language” useful for science and he considered natural language” too 
"imperfect" to merit much attention” (Chomsky 1996: 46). Actually, “not only imperfect, 
but even “in principle incoherent,” Dummett argues” (Chomsky 1993a: 27). On the 
whole, logic was to be kept far from the irregularities of what Russell referred to as 
common language and cognitive questions7, even if most of its central problems had 
originally been raised at some point in the development of classical natural-language-
based logic (cf. Kneale & Kneale 1962).  Natural language analysis and logic got 
separated and were for a long time seen as completely divergent scientific endeavours. 
 
Boole, it should be stressed, never gave up his conviction that the basis of logic is 
ultimately to be found in “the constitution of the human intellect”. Towards the end of 
his life he actually expressed some dissatisfaction with his Laws of Thought and intended 
to revise it:  
                                                          
6 Frege’s name for this Platonic realm is obviously rather unfortunate in view of later political 
developments. Ironically, it so happened that when Karl Popper basically adopted a similar realm 
in his own exercise of ontological pluralism, he called it “Third World”, a name which for its 
connotation he later traded in for “World 3” (at the suggestion of John Eccles).  
7 Russell  spoke of “the fundamental principles of logic known under the quaint name of ‘laws of 
thought’” (Russell 1908 [1956]: 63; italics mine). 
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“what he had in mind was a development of his epistemological views rather 
than any alteration of the formal side of his work. In these papers he 
mentions in particular a distinction between the Logic of Class (i.e. his 
calculus of logic) and a higher, more comprehensive logic that cannot be 
reduced to a calculus but may be said to be ‘the Philosophy of all thought 
which is expressible in signs, whatever the object of that thought’. 
     (Kneale & Kneale 1962: 406) 
 
While Kneale & Kneale still deplore this move in 1962 and contend Boole was on a 
wrong track, it seems more correct to conclude that Boole was never blinded by the 
undeniable elegance and truth of his formal calculus. He realised and rightly concluded 
that depsychologized mathematical logic, though doubtless a valuable stepping stone, 
was only part of the story; that a logic which permanently drops any reference to the 
processes of the mind and remains restricted to the logical operator part of the lexicon is 
bound to be limp. It leaves far too many possible thoughts and mind-internal categories – 
however shady – unaccounted for, including “Homeric gods, relations, chimeras and 
four-dimensional spaces” (Russell 1903 [37]: 449).  
 
“Both these studies [of Logic and Probabilities, DJ] have also an interest of 
another kind, derived from the light which they shed upon the intellectual 
powers.  They instruct us concerning the mode in which language and 
number serve as instrumental aids to the processes of reasoning; they reveal 
to us in some degree the connexion between different powers of our common 
intellect; they set before us what, in the two domains of demonstrative and 
probable knowledge, are the essential standards of truth and correctness, - 
standards not derived from without, but deeply founded in the constitution of 
the human faculties.”  
(Boole 1854 [1958]: 2) 
 
The importance and value of such an internalist perspective are defended against those 
who believe the main relevance of the system is its practical value: 
 
“These ends of speculation yield neither in interest nor in dignity, nor yet, it 
may be added, in importance, to the practical objects, with the pursuit of 
which they have been historically associated. To unfold the secret laws and 
relations of those high faculties of thought by which all beyond the merely 
perceptive knowledge of the world and of ourselves is attained or matured, is 
an object which does not stand in need of commendation to a rational mind.”  
(Boole 1854 [1958]: 2-3) 
 
To be fair to Russell, it should be said that he too made a “psychologistic” turn after 
having been a staunch antipsychologist for years.  According to Monk (1996: 518-519), 
the change of opinion occurred sometime in 1918: 
 
“Russell says: ‘A proposition is just a symbol’, and, as the theory of 
symbolism is fundamentally psychological, it follows that the nature of logic 
cannot be fully understood outside a study of psychology. The implications 
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of this ‘psychologistic’ line of thought were to become increasingly manifest 
to Russell over the coming months and would loom ever larger in his 
philosophical work of the next few years, but, in essence, it was already there 
in ‘Lectures on Logical Atomism’”  
(Monk 1996: 518-519)  
 
A description of logical constants in his later work testifies to this change and provides a 
good anchor for our own analysis:  
 
“It is obvious that ‘the book is somewhere in the room’ cannot be a 
judgement of perception; you cannot perceive somewhere, you can only 
perceive there.  But a judgement of memory is different.  You may 
remember ‘I saw the book when I was in this room’, or something of that 
kind.  You may remember saying ‘Oh there’s that book’ while you were in 
the room.  Or you may have a purely verbal memory of saying ‘I see I did 
put that book on a shelf’.  These, however, are only the grounds for your 
judgement, they are not an analysis of it. 
   The analysis of such a judgement must be essentially similar to that of a 
disjunction.  There is a state of mind in which you perceive ‘the book is in 
this place’, another in which you perceive ‘ the book is in that place’, and so 
on.  The state of mind when you judge ‘the book is somewhere in the room’ 
contains what all these have in common, together with perplexity.” 
(Russell 1940 [1969]: 86) 
 
I fully agree where he concludes that “in the case of a judgement about some, as in 
disjunction, we cannot interpret the words except in reference to a state of mind.” 
(Russell 1940 [1969]: 86). In what follows, this internalist stance with crucial 
dependence on “states of mind” will be adopted throughout, and its scope will be argued 
to include not only the logical operators themselves, but also the core logical relations of 
contradictoriness and entailment that connect them into a single paradigm of 
semantically cognate lexical items.  
 
A major consequence of viewing logic as a psychological phenomenon – a natural logic8 
– is  that its study is empirical science.  Chomsky’s (1980: 211) and Lenneberg’s (1967) 
conclusion about mentalistic linguistic theories carries over seamlessly: 
 
“Lenneberg was quite right to take the trouble to emphasize that ‘the 
discovery and description of innate mechanisms is a thoroughly empirical 
procedure and is an integral part of modern scientific inquiry’ and to insist 
that there is no room here for dogmatism or a priori doctrine.” 
Chomsky (1980: 211) 
 
Natural logic is not a given thing, but has to be discovered. Consequently, existing logic 
should not be accepted as it stands if it does not fit the empirical evidence provided by 
language and cognition.  This may be an uncommon position, but I see no alternative: 
theories have to be tailored to empirical data and not vice versa.  So wherever it looks as 
                                                          
8 This term is used by Sanchez Valencia (1991) and in Ludlow (in prep.). 
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if language is too messy for logic, I proceed on the assumption that it is more accurate to 
say that the architecture of existing logic is too much of a Procrustean bed for the facts of 
language.  I hope that will not be interpreted as lack of reverence or interest in existing 
theories, but as an attempt to contribute something of value to empirical linguistic and 
cognitive science.  
 
In Aristotle’s logical system, logical constants were considered to be different in nature 
from the other elements in the sentences and were introduced syncategorematically, i.e. 
by stipulation and without categorial status. For most of the time since, this did not 
change. Thus, we find such a syncategorematic introduction of the logical constants in 
Montague’s “The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English” and also (p. 
57) still in Dowty et al.’s (1981: 56-61) Introduction to Montague Semantics, for 
instance, with separate definitions (p. 60) for the attainment of truth in a model. As it is 
our intention to analyse the logical constants as regular words, i.e. as natural language 
lexical items, which after all they are, a different line will be taken.  
 
In essence, I shall defend the view that logical constants are best regarded as semantic 
predicates, a proposal which is not new (cf. McCawley 1967, Barwise and Cooper 1981).  
For the operators all and some, for the negation operator not and for quantifiers more 
generally (including most, more than half, etc.), such an approach was provided and 
formalized in the theory of Generalized Quantifiers, whose study was initiated by the 
Polish logician Andrej Mostowski (1957) and came to fruition in Barwise and Cooper 
(1981) and a lot of linguistic and logical work since.9 I shall analyse and, or and 
(neither…)nor along the same lines. 
 
In a nutshell, an empirical puzzle and a theoretical hypothesis define the contents and 
structure of this study. The empirical challenge is to provide an account why neither 
*Nand nor *Nall are possible as ordinary lexical items in natural language. To meet that 
challenge, the theoretical position developed is that logic as operational in natural 
language is in its basics an innate part of our mental make-up, i.e. it constitutes an IN-
logic.  To underpin the latter view, two main theses are defended and worked out:  
 
There is an isomorphism between the structure of logical calculi, the lexical-
morphological properties of logical operators and a number of their epistemological 
properties. 
This isomorphism can be accounted for in terms of the semantic properties of logical 
operators in the mental natural language lexicon.   
 
1.2 Nand and *nand are two: EX-Logic versus IN-logic 
 
Before setting out on the first leg of our journey through the realms of propositional and 
predicate logic in chapter 2, a few words to sharpen the abovementioned notion IN-logic 
and to set it off against the concept of EX-Logic. The difference between them can once 
more be introduced by considering the lexicalisation gap.  One aspect of the latter is that 
while *nall does not exist at all, the story for *nand is different.  Though it is not attested 
                                                          
9 For a recent overview, see Keenan (2002) 
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as an ordinary or natural word, it is listed in dictionaries10 as a specialised term in the 
context of logic (the NAND function – also called Sheffer stroke) and electrical 
engineering (digital circuits: the NAND-gate).  The hypothesis worked out in this 
dissertation is that the non-existence of a natural language item *nand reflects a 
constraint of the IN-logic inherent in natural language.  The existence of the specialised 
term nand must then be taken to mean that it belongs to a different realm, provisionally 
called EX-Logic, a branch of consciously crafted science.   
 
The crucial difference between the two is in the mode of acquisition: IN-logic, like 
natural language, has an innate basis and its expressions grow or mature naturally in the 
acquisition process, without conscious interference or literal learning.  EX-Logical 
concepts, like specialised terms more generally, are artefacts created by conscious 
processes of reflection and artificial learning which transcend the bounds of what is 
innate and acquired naturally.  It is in terms of the distinction between natural, non-
monitored mental processes in natural language acquisition on the one hand and 
artificial, monitored and consciously controlled mental activity in science – Chomsky’s 
(1993a: 33) “Science Forming Capacity” – that the difference between IN-logical *nand 
and EX-Logical nand can be made sense of.  The two elements belong to different 
realms of lexical knowledge, with the natural realm more restricted than that of 
artificially created extensions. 
 
In sum, there is a difference between IN-Logic (natural (Ludlow (in prep.)) or informal 
logic) and scientific EX-Logic (or formal, symbolic logic). The former is part of natural 
language and does not permit *nand.  Nor does it permit self-entailments such as If Mary 
is ill then Mary is ill for instance, which indeed sound unnatural. EX-Logic, for its part, 
sheds such concerns with naturalness and intuitive common sense by putting certain 
cognitive constraints of IN-language aside, a standard case of idealization for scientific 
purposes. This is why in EX-Logic – both in the context of the hardware transistor 
implementations which are called logic gates and in the context of Sheffer’s stroke – 
nand can function as a perfectly fine technical term and there is no ban on unnatural 
entailments11. 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 E.g. The Free On-line Dictionary of Computing (http://smac.ucsd.edu/cgi-
bin/http_webster?nand): NAND Not AND. The {Boolean} function which is true unless both its 
arguments are true, the {logical complement} of {AND}: A NAND B = NOT (A AND B) = (NOT 
A) OR (NOT B).  
11 Note that that there is a corresponding distinction between  
IN-mathematics, overlapping with ordinary language (lower,  natural (cf. Honda & O’Neill 1993;  
Devlin 2000) or informal mathematics (Ginsburg 1977), including Dehaene’s number sense 
(Dehaene 1997; Butterworth 1999), and  
EX-mathematics, which departs from common sense and certainly looks rather different from 
ordinary language, with its esoteric symbols, axioms, theorems, etc. (higher, scientific, advanced, 
formal mathematics).  
Devlin (2000) distinguishes between natural mathematics and formal mathematics: the former he 
calls “formalized common sense”, while the latter is characterised by formal definitions which 
tend to go against common sense.   
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(5)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our concern is clearly IN-logical. In order to explain why *nand is impossible as a 
natural lexical item and as part of IN-logic, the nature of the latter will have to be 
determined first.  This issue will be addressed in chapter 2 already, in whose first part the 
*nall/*nand-puzzle will be placed against the background of Aristotle’s Predicate 
Calculus and the Stoics’ propositional calculus. In the second part, these traditional 
calculi will be reduced to their IN-logical foundations: a two-dimensional structure with 
two basic relations of contradictoriness and entailment and three operators: and, or, nor 
for the propositional calculus; all, some, no(ne) for the predicate calculus. The third 
chapter zooms in on the two relations.  They will be looked at not only from a logical 
angle, but also from a set-theoretic and a Boolean algebraic perspective.  In chapter four, 
contradictoriness and entailment will each be linked to a ‘dynamic’ operation, namely 
negation and conjunction respectively, of whose workings they are arguably the ‘static’ 
end-result.  These operations will then be restated as complex notions built from a single 
negative operator.  The latter will then be called upon to set up a lexical decomposition 
of the three lexicalised operators.   
 
The most important consequence of this decomposition is that one of the lexicalised 
operators in each calculus, namely or in the propositional calculus, some in the predicate 
calculus is necessarily semantically less complex than the two others.  Chapters 5 and 6 
will adduce as much empirical evidence as possible for this “anchoring” of an 
asymmetry hypothesis first proposed in Löbner (1990).  In that context, an 
epistemological perspective will be sketched which highlights the role of the different 
logical operators in the acquisition and expansion of world knowledge. This will secure 
the conclusion that the only viable logic for natural language is a triadic cognitive IN-
logic.  
 
 
 
Natural 
Language  
“lower” 
IN-logic 
 
“higher” 
EX-logic 
EX-L IN-L 
Logic  
   
nand *nand 
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2 FROM THE BOETHIAN SQUARE TO A TWO-
DIMENSIONAL CARTESIAN COORDINATE 
SYSTEM 
 
2.1 The Predicate Calculus and the Propositional Calculus 
 
2.1.1 Aristotle’s Predicate Calculus (APC) 
 
The quantifier words all, some and no are probably among the best-studied lexical items 
in western history ever since the invention of logic, when they were introduced as  
logical constants in Aristotle’s predicate calculus (APC). On the basis of these items, a 
conception of truth and falsity, the distinction between subject and predicate and some 
additional axioms, Aristotle established entailment relations between sentences like the 
following, and logicians after him elaborated on his findings.  The table below makes a 
distinction between logic and natural language. This should not be taken to imply that 
they are disjoint systems. This work is full of indications they are not. The distinction is 
drawn because some combinations of semantic logical operators, namely NOT-SOME in 
(9) and (13), are not realized as not some at the linguistic surface, but come out as the 
surface word no: 
 
(6)  
 
Logic Natural language  
 (7) [su ALL flags] are[pr green]  [su All flags] are[pr green]  
(8) [su SOME flags] are [pr green] [su Some flags] are [pr green] 
(9) NOT [su SOME flags] are [pr green] [su No flags] are [pr green] 
(10) NOT [su ALL flags] are [pr green] [su Not all flags] are [pr green] 
  
(11) [su ALL flags] are NOT [pr green] [su All flags] are not [pr green] 
(12) [su SOME flags] are NOT [pr green] [su Some flags] are not [pr green] 
(13) NOT [su SOME flags] are NOT [pr green] ? [su No flags] are not [pr green] 
(14) NOT [su ALL flags] are NOT [pr green] ? [su Not all flags] are not [pr green] 
 
All of the propositions above consist of a subject and a predicate. Both in logic and 
linguistics these notions are hybrids, so a few definitions are indispensable. In 
Aristotelian usage, subjects are reference objects, i.e. the entities referred to in the real 
world, rather than linguistic expressions. That is no longer common: subjects are now 
viewed as syntactic constituents which are used to select reference objects (rather than 
are them). So by subject, I mean syntactic subject.   The bracketed predicate in the 
examples above (green) does not include functional categories and their syntactic 
features (here are), which is why it is often referred to as a lexical predicate. This use of 
the term predicate is the one we adhere to, but it is different from most versions of 
traditional grammar, where the predicate is a grammatical function defined as the sum of 
all those parts of a clause which are not included in the subject. Let us refer to this latter 
predicate as the syntactic predicate. In our examples the syntactic predicate is [pr are 
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green] rather than just [pr green]12.  The lexical category contained in the subject term 
(i.c. flags) will also be called a lexical predicate, which means that lexical predicates can 
be used (a) in a syntactic predicate to select a property which will be assigned “to a given 
entity in such a way that the assignment is true or false” (Seuren 1998, 304) or  (b) in a 
syntactic subject to select a correct reference object. Seuren (1998, 304) calls the former 
a lexical predicate in propositional use, the latter a lexical predicate in referential use or 
term predicate. 
 
(15)  
 
all                X are                                      Y 
term predicate predicate in propositional use 
 
Looking at the structure of the propositions in (6), we note that all have at least an 
affirmative quantifier in the subject term13. In addition, negation can be added to the 
subject terms ((9), (10), (13), (14)) or to the lexical predicates in propositional use ((11)-
(14)). The former type of negation is called external sentence negation or outer negation  
and results in a statement contradicting the affirmative one (for instance, (10) vs. (7)): 
the truth of the one entails the falsity of the other. Negation of the lexical predicate in 
propositional use, on the other hand, is called internal predicate negation or inner 
negation and leads to contrary statements. Such statements cannot, for Aristotle, both be 
true at the same time, but they can both be false at the same time. While it is impossible 
that all flags are green and not green at the same time, it is possible for both statements 
to be false at the same time, namely in a state of affairs when some (or not-all) flags are 
green.  
 
Examples (7)-(14) illustrate the well-known fact that there are a number of discrepancies 
between natural language and logic as traditionally conceived. First of all, on the logical 
side not is placed outside the subject term in (9), (10), (13) and (14), though constituency 
tests clearly show that in natural language not is included in the syntactic subject 
constituent. Aristotle’s choice is probably due to the sentential scope of this kind of 
negation and to the fact that it is independently possible in his logic to negate the lexical 
predicate inside a subject (all not-flags). In no example is it clearer that the negation is 
part of the syntactic subject in natural language than in (9) and (13), where NOT SOME 
is spelled out as a single word no (cf. above). This indicates that the surface realisation 
and the underlying logical representation of a lexical item need not be identical. While 
no is not morphologically complex, its meaning structure does contain two elements.  
A second surface difference between natural language and logic concerns internal 
negation ((11)-(14)).  Horn (1989: 226) makes the following observation, which he 
                                                          
12 At the surface, it is not always possible in language to disentangle the lexical predicate and 
functional features. In runs, for instance, the third person singular present tense ending is attached 
to run-, and it is only the latter element which can be classified under the heading lexical predicate. 
But since functional features are introduced into the derivation as separate heads, it is possible to 
preserve the definition of lexical predicate as given. 
13 Aristotelian logic does not deal with singular statements, i.e. statements with subject terms 
without quantification, whether definite descriptions (the queen) or proper names (Mary). Nor is it 
able to deal with syntactic predicates containing other quantifier words than negation, like read 
many books, for instance.  
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attributes to Jespersen (1917: 86 ff.): “there is a tendency – often disparaged as 
‘illogical’ – for an apparent universal negation ({all/every}…not) to be read as a negated 
universal (not…{all/every})”, as in: 
 
(16)  All that glisters is not gold  
(Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice; Horn 1989: 226) 
 
Though this phenomenon is a telling example of the discrepancy between logical 
representations and linguistic expressions at the surface, it is tangential to our present 
discussion. The interpretation of internal negation that we have in mind for the present 
discussion is the one in which not does not have scope over all.  
 
Since the relations Aristotle observed hold independent of the choice of concrete lexical 
predicates, predicate letters can be used in what follows:  ALL F are G. 
Aristotle noticed entailment relations between sentences (9) and (11) and sentences (8) 
and (14). As a matter of fact, (11)-(14) are each equivalent to one of the statements in 
(7)-(10):  
 
(17) 
 
(7) ≡ 
(13) 
[su ALL flags] are [pr green] ≡ NOT [su SOME flags] are NOT [pr green] 
(8) ≡ 
(14) 
[su SOME flags] are [pr green] ≡ NOT [su ALL flags] are NOT [pr green] 
(9) ≡ 
(11) 
NOT [su SOME flags] are  
[pr green] 
≡ [su ALL flags] are NOT [pr green] 
(10) ≡ 
(12) 
NOT [su ALL flags] are  
[pr green] 
≡ [su SOME flags] are NOT [pr green] 
 
To state the equivalences between these expressions formally, modern notational devices 
will be used for the quantifiers (∀ for ALL, ∃ for SOME , ¬ for NOT) and an additional 
symbol ! to spell out the implicit AFFirmative complement of NOT. What is irrelevant 
will be suppressed.  
 
(18) 
 
Example numbers Formulas  Example numbers Formulas 
(7) 
 
(13) 
!∀!    
≡ 
¬ ∃ ¬ 
 (9) 
 
(11) 
¬∃! 
≡ 
! ∀ ¬ 
(8) 
 
(14) 
!∃! 
≡ 
¬ ∀ ¬ 
 (10) 
 
(12) 
¬∀! 
≡ 
! ∃ ¬ 
 
To calculate the equivalences or conversions, it suffices to switch the logical predicates: 
¬ becomes ! and vice versa, ∀ becomes ∃ and vice versa. The relevance of these 
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conversion tables to this chapter will become clear further on, when the so-called 
NAND-function is discussed. 
 
In view of these equivalences, the conclusion must be that there are in essence only four 
proposition types, given that we end up with four pairs of each time two equivalent 
propositions. Furthermore, the expressions in boldface are more common in natural 
language, i.e. there seems to be a preference for (i) fewer negatives over more negatives; 
(ii) external negation over internal negation.  
 
(19) 
 
 Affirmative statements Negative statements 
Universal 
statements 
(7) [su ALL flags] are[pr green] (9) [su NO flags] are [pr green] 
Particular 
statements 
(8) [su SOME flags] are [pr green] (10) [su NOT ALL flags] are  
[pr green] 
 
Centuries after Aristotle, Boethius (480-524) formalised this insight in his Square of 
Oppositions. He gave labels to each of the four basic sentence types: (1) = A, (2) = I 
(from AffIrmo, “I affirm”) on the affirmative side of the square; (3) = E and (4) = O on 
the negative side (from nEgO, “I deny”), and indicated the entailments: 
 
(20) 
(7)   A           contraries      E   (9) 
  
 
 
 
      (8)   I        subcontraries      O   (10) 
 
For two sentences P and Q, the relations in the square can be described as follows14: 
 
(21) 
 
Relation Description  Example 
Contradictories P and Q can neither be both 
true nor be both false at the 
same time 
P: All flags are green – Q: Not all 
flags are green 
P: Some flags are green – Q: No 
flags are green 
Entailment Whenever P is true, Q must 
also be true 
Subaltern affirmative: P: All flags 
are green ├15 Q: Some flags are 
green 
                                                          
14 The doctrine stems from Aristotle (De Interpretatione 6-7, 17b.17-26 and Prior Analytics I.2, 
25a.1-25) (Stanford Encyclopedia of Knowledge: http://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/square/). The 
first diagram is from the second century BC and attributed to Lucius Apuleius (c.124–c.170), 
author of Asinus aureus (The Golden Ass or The metamorphoses). (Londey & Johanson 1984, 
Franklin 1999). 
contra- 
dictories
!∀! 
!∃! 
¬∃! 
¬∀! 
entailment  
(subaltern affirmative) 
entailment  
(subaltern negative) 
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Subaltern negative: P: No flags are 
green ├ Q: Not all flags are green 
Contraries P and Q cannot both be true 
at the same time, but may be 
both false at the same time 
P: All flags are green – Q: No flags 
are green 
Subcontraries P and Q cannot both be 
false at the same time 
though they may be both 
true at the same time 
P: Some flags are green – Q: Not all 
flags are green 
 
2.1.2 Thomas Aquinas and the O-corner 
 
In comments on Aristotelian logic, Thomas Aquinas (1224/25-1274) mentioned the 
special feature of the O-corner hinted at in the introductory paragraph of the present 
study: 
 
(22)  
 
“In negativis autem non est aliqua dictio posita, sed possumus accipere, non 
omnis; ut sicut, nullus, universaliter removet, eo quod significat quasi 
diceretur, non ullus, idest, non aliquis, ita etiam, non omnis, particulariter 
removeat, in quantum excludit universalem affirmationem.” 
[80398] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 10 n. 13 
http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/cpe.html 
 
For the particular negative (the O-corner), ‘there is no designated word, but 
“not all” [non omnis] can be used.  Just as “no” removes universally, for it 
signifies the same thing as if we were to say “not any”, [i.e. ‘not some’], so 
also “not all” removes particularly inasmuch as it excludes universal 
affirmation.’ 
(Aquinas, In Arist. De Int., lesson 10, in Oesterle 1962 : 82-83; also in Horn 
1989: 253) 
 
Horn (1972, chapter 4; 1989: 252-262) and Levinson (2000: 69-71) – like Saint Thomas 
– observe that for some reason the O-corner (cf. example (10) in (19)) seems to resist 
simplex lexicalisation by means of a single word. In (19), for instance, the O-corner has 
[not all flags] are [pr green].  One might try to attribute this gap to the composite nature 
of the underlying logical representation ¬∀. However, that cannot be the right answer 
since the logical representation of the E-corner is complex too (¬∃) and yet can be 
realised as a single word (no) in a number of languages, albeit often a bimorphemic one 
(no-thing, no-body, n-ever, etc.) (Löbner 1990: 95). So the question is: why cannot the 
derivational morphological process yielding such E-corner forms as  none, nothing, etc. 
generate similar bimorphic forms for the O-corner? We would expect O-corner forms 
such as *nall, *neverything on a par with none, some, but the fact is that there are none 
                                                                                                                                               
15 ├ is the symbol for logical entailment, ENT an alternative abbreviation: P├ Q = P ENT Q = P 
entails Q. As indicated earlier, we temporarily restrict our attention to the non-trivial use of 
operators (with existential import for affirmative quantifiers, which was the usual classical 
opinion).  The empty F-class problem will be tackled in chapter 4. 
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available in natural language. And if a reason can be found for the absence of that kind 
of derivational morphological process, why is suppletion not a valid alternative? That the 
gap is not accidental but systematic is shown in the following list of different types of 
quantifiers (23) supplemented with corresponding examples from Dutch (24):  
 
(23) 
 
 affirmo  nego 
∀ ¬∃ 
 1a.  all 1c. none 
THING 2a. everything, all  2c. nothing 
BODY 3a. everyone, everybody  3c. noone, nobody 
TIME 4a. always, (for once and for) 
all  
4c. never 
PLACE 5a. everywhere 5c. nowhere 
A 
TWO THINGs 6a. both 
E 
6c. neither 
∃ ¬∀ 
 1b. one, some, any 1d. *n-all 
THING 2b. something, anything  2d. *n-everything 
BODY 3b. someone, anyone, 
somebody, anybody  
3d. *n-everyone 
TIME 4b. sometime(s), ever  4d. *n-always 
PLACE 5b. somewhere, anywhere) 5d. *n-everywhere 
I 
TWO THINGs 6b. either16  
O 
6d. *n-both 
 
(24) 
 
 affirmo  nego 
∀ E ¬∃ 
 1a'. al, allemaal 1c'. geen17 
A 
THING 2a'. alles 
 
2c'. niets 
                                                          
16 In on either side of the road, the disjunctive meaning of either is restricted to the inclusive part 
of the disjunction, thus making the meaning similar to that of both, which is also distributive. 
17 Etymologically, this form is a combination of the negative particle neg- (cf. Du. niks ('nothing'), 
German nicht) and the indefinite article -een ('one') 
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BODY 3a'. alleman, iedereen 3c'. niemand 
TIME 4a'. altijd 4c'. nooit 
PLACE 5a'. overal 5c'. nergens 
TWO THINGs 6a'. beide 6c'. (geen van beide) 
 
WAY 7a'. alleszins18 (completely, 
fully, in all respects in every 
way) 
7c'. geenszins (by no means, 
not at all, in no way) 
 8a'. allerlei (all sorts/kinds 
of) 
8c. generlei 
(no…what(so)ever, at all) 
∃ O ¬∀ 
 1b'. een, sommige(n) 1d'. *n-al, *n-allemaal 
THING 2b'. iets 2d'. *n-alles 
BODY 3b'. iemand 3 d'. *n-alleman, *n-
iedereen 
TIME 4b'. soms, somtijds, ooit 4 d'. *n-altijd 
PLACE 5b'. ergens 5 d'. *n-overal 
TWO THINGs 6b'. (een van beide) 6 d'. *n-beide 
WAY 7b'. enigszins (somewhat, a 
little, rather, slightly, in a 
way) 
7 d'. *n-alleszins 
I 
 8b'. enigerlei 
(any…(what(so)ever)) 
 
8d'. *n-allerlei 
 
The problem at hand cannot be that the semantic content of the O-corner is inexpressible, 
given that syntactic combinations such as not all / niet alle, not everyone / niet iedereen, 
not always / niet altijd capture the intended meaning unproblematically. So the real 
question is: why can the combination of a negation and a universal quantifier never be 
realised as a single lexical item? But before we have a stab at that problem, let us 
mention a few similar data which over the years have been added to the pile (cf. Horn 
1989, Löbner 1990). 
 
2.1.3 The Propositional Calculus 
 
There is a well-known relationship between the logical operators ∀and ∃ of Aristotle’s 
predicate calculus (APC) and the operators ∧ (and) and ∨ (or) in the Stoics’ 
propositional calculus (e.g., Reichenbach 1947: 92).  Take the universe of objects to 
consist of two entities a and b and let G be a lexical predicate in propositional use. With 
                                                          
18 There is also the elative veelszins which, according to Van Dale means: 1.“veelal” (“often”), “in 
vele gevallen of omstandigheden” (“in many cases or circumstances”); 2. “op meer dan een wijze” 
(“in more than one way”), “in meer dan een opzicht” (“in more than one respect”). 
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x a lexical variable ranging over the two entities, the following parallel emerges between 
an APC with a lexical variable ranging over two entities (APC2) and the propositional 
calculus (PROPC). 
 
(25) 
 APC2 PROPC 
(i)        ∀xG(x)   ≡ G(a)∧G(b) 
(ii)       ∃xG(x)    ≡ G(a)∨G(b) 
(iii)      ¬∃xG (x)  ≡ ¬(G(a))∧¬(G(b)) 
 
With a and b flags and G the property green, (i) all flags are green iff flag a and flag b 
are both green; (ii) some flag is green iff flag a is green, or flag b is green, or flag a and b 
are both green, and (iii) no flag is green iff it is not the case for a or b that they are green, 
in other words: it is not the case that a is green and it is not the case that b is green either. 
 
Similar results can be obtained when the lexical variable ranges over three entities (or 
more), but working with three entities (or more) would merely require recursive use of ∧ 
and ∨ and consequently would not add anything new to conclusions arrived at on the 
basis of a single use of the propositional operators.  
 
The existence of a close relationship between APC and PROPC is also illustrated by the 
fact that the conversions of the Predicate Calculus noted in (18) and repeated here are 
matched by analogous equivalences in the PROPC, which go by the name of De 
Morgan’s Law. It suffices (i) to replace the universal quantifier ∀ by the conjunction ∧ 
and the existential quantifier ∃ by the disjunction ∨ and (ii) to realize that in PROPC, 
internal negation amounts to narrow scope negation of each of the arguments of the 
binary propositional operator.  Thus, De Morgan’s Law of b is easily obtained.   
 
(26) a. APC conversions: 
!∧!    
≡ 
¬ ∨ ¬ 
!∨! 
≡ 
¬ ∧ ¬ 
¬∨! 
≡ 
! ∧ ¬ 
¬∧! 
≡ 
! ∨ ¬ 
 
b. De Morgan’s Law (abbreviated like the APC conversions and in more usual 
format): 
Abbreviated !∧!    
≡ 
¬ ∨ ¬19 
!V! 
≡ 
¬ ∧ ¬ 
¬V! 
≡ 
! ∧ ¬ 
¬∧! 
≡ 
! ∨ ¬ 
Usual 
format 
P∧Q 
≡ 
¬ (¬P ∨ ¬Q) 
P V Q 
≡ 
¬ (¬P ∧ ¬Q) 
¬(P V Q) 
≡ 
¬P ∧ ¬Q 
¬(P ∧ Q) 
≡ 
¬P ∨ ¬Q 
 
                                                          
19 ¬ ∨ ¬, with external and internal negation, is short for ¬ (¬p ∨ ¬q) 
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In view of the parallellism just described between the predicate calculus and 
propositional calculus, it is not surprising that the lexical gap noted earlier with respect 
to predicate calculus operators carries over to the new set of operators, where the O-
corner once again cannot be lexicalised as a single word. While “some languages (albeit 
a minority) provide a simple lexicalisation for the E value of joint denial” (Horn 1989: 
256), “no language seems to have a conjunctive root nub, with the property that A nub B 
means “not both A and B”” (Zwicky 1973: 477): 
 
(27) 
affirmo  nego  
A ∧ 
and 
E ¬∨ 
nor 
I ∨ 
or 
O ¬∧ 
*nand / *nub 
 
This observation is valid only for everyday natural speech, where nobody uses nand to 
express the combination of ideas that flag a is not green, or flag b is not green, or neither 
is green. As mentioned in §1.2, however, the term nand did arise in twentieth century 
logic and came to be used in the context of efforts to reduce truth-functional connectives 
to a short list of primitive connectives. It was originally named for the American logician 
Henry M. Sheffer as the Sheffer stroke or, in modern terminology, NAND function20. It 
is now common coin in digital logic, more specifically in the context of the hardware 
transistor implementations which are called logic gates, one of which is the NAND-gate.  
It will be clear that this usage is restricted to a specialised field and has no direct bearing 
on the question why the word is absent in everyday language. Yet, its existence does 
serve to prove that the gap in everyday natural language is not to be resolved in terms of 
complete inaccessibility. Our view is that a solution can be found in terms of the relation 
between cognitive logic and lexicalisation. As the term from digital logic shows, 
Boëthius’ O-corner with all its entailment relations is real in the sense that its logical 
properties are perfectly expressible (where that is useful for practical purposes) by 
predicating the atomic logical predicate not over and and coining a single lexical item 
like Zwicky’s nub or Sheffer’s nand if desirable for that complex predicate. So, the 
question remains, why can the O-corner not be lexicalised in a way similar to the other 
corners?  To close in on the problem by exclusion, we shall first have a look at the 
properties of the lexical items in the other three corners. 
 
2.2 Relations 
 
2.2.1 Three hubs and two relations  
 
Why are the sets of lexicalisable items studied here – namely, {all, some, no} and {and, 
or, (neither…)nor} – triads?  The hypothesis defended here is that this is not accidental, 
but attributable to a deep fact: logic as the formal calculus of entailments is built on one 
                                                          
20 Actually, C.S. Peirce (1989 [1880]) had already been aware in 1880 (in a paper titled by Peirce’s 
editors A Boolean Algebra with One Constant) that a single connective sufficed for the expression 
of all truth-functional connectives, an analysis which will be taken up in chapter 4.  
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pivotal lexical item and two basic relations, whose effects at the level of entire 
propositions are entailment and contradictoriness respectively21. The former relationship 
is illustrated in (28), the latter in (29), where R contradicts Q. 
 
(28) P: All flags are green 
Q: Some flags are green 
 
(29) Q: Some flags are green 
 R: No (= NOT-SOME) flags are green 
 
The two relations are both applied to a single item X, which we shall call the pivot – in 
the predicate calculus this item is some. Since the relations are different from one 
another, application of them to a single pivot means that two more items Y (all)  and Z 
(no) are needed to establish the complete basic set-up of logical constants and logical 
relations. At the level of propositions containing the logical constants, the corresponding 
effects are that (i) the Y-proposition logically entails the X-proposition (or Y-prop├X-
prop) and (ii) the Z-proposition contradicts the X-proposition (or Z-prop CD X-prop).  
 
There is much to be said for the view that this essentially two-dimensional set-up is 
already implicit in Aristotle’s calculus inasmuch as he claimed that categorical 
propositions can be characterized by their quantity and by their quality. These are clearly 
two dimensions, and they match the abovementioned two relations: the entailment-leg of 
the logical fork indeed represents a distinction in quantity (universal P vs. particular Q) 
whereas the contradictoriness-leg represents a distinction in quality (affirmative Q vs. 
negative R). In an optimally economic conception, the least that is required is all that is 
available, which results in a system with no more than these two dimensions and hence 
three focal points: (1) a pivot, (2) an entailer, i.e. an item with which the pivot is related 
by the lexical counterpart of entailment, and (3) the contradictor, i.e. an item to which 
the pivot is related by the lexical counterpart of contradictoriness. 
 
(30) a.  abbreviations22: 
All F is G  is written as ALL   (or Y) 
Some F is G  is written as SOME   (or X) 
No F is G  is written as NO  (or Z) 
                                                          
21 The first study to propose an asymmetry-model based on a pivotal “Type 1”-operator, was 
Löbner (1990: 105). Differences between the present proposal and Löbner’s analysis will surface 
in § 2.2.5.2 as well as in chapter 4, where the relations and operator meanings are spelled out in 
detail. These differences concern (i) the relationship between the some and all, which I will argue 
is more complex than Löbner assumes; (ii) the lexical structure of all; (iii) the status of O-corner 
lexicalisations, which are considered marked by Löbner, impossible by me; (iv) the status of 
negation, (v) the ultimate reason why some is basic. In sum, while the model proposed here has the 
basic architecture of Löbner’s and additional evidence will be sought for it, there are several 
interesting differences.  
22 Since the intrinsic meanings of the lexical items in question have not yet been described, we 
here illustrate their meanings and the relations between them indirectly, namely in terms of 
sentences in which they are used, with all other constituents kept constant.  That is the rationale 
behind the abbreviations.  Further on, we shall see that the relations obtain between (the meanings 
of) the lexical items themselves as much as between the propositions in which they are used. 
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b. calculus relations 
 
 
Y 
ALL 
entailer 
 
 
 
 
├ 
QUANTITY 
 
X 
SOME 
pivot 
 
 
 
 
CD 
QUALITY 
 
Z 
NO 
contradictor 
 
This would of course immediately exclude *NALL from the set of focal points of the 
logical system, as can be seen in (31) below when we superimpose the triad and its 
relations on Boethius’ Square of Oppositions, with the pivot encircled and the two other 
hubs and the basic quantity and quality relation in boldface. 
 
Some further assumptions about the nature of lexicalisation will of course be required to 
link non-focality in the logical system to non-lexicalisability as a single word in natural 
language. But as a preparatory step before the issue of lexicalisation itself can be 
addressed, it is useful first to make the argument about the triadic basis of the logical 
system stick. This means that it has to be shown that all types of logical relations in APC 
other than those between the focal points, namely CD between all and not all, ENT 
(entailment) between no(ne) and not all, contraries and subcontraries, are defined in 
terms of a combination of the basic entailment and contradiction relation operating on 
some. If that can be done, it will follow that those other relations plausibly are not 
primitives, not part of the minimal logical toolkit.  
 
(31) 
  (1)   A: ALL  contraries  E :  (3) NO(NE) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 (2)   I: SOME subcontraries O :  (4) not all /  *NALL 
 
 
 
CD CD 
├  entailment  
(subaltern neg.) 
entailment     ├ 
(subaltern aff.) 
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2.2.2 Primitive and derived elements of the Square of Oppositions 
 
The present reduction of the Square of Oppositions starts from the informal 
characterisations of the relations in the square given above for two sentences P and Q, 
with those we take as basic for the present derivation in boldface: 
 
(32) 
 
Relation Description  Example 
1. Contradictories (i) P and Q can neither be 
both true nor be both 
false at the same time 
P: Some flags are green – Q: No 
(=NOT SOME) flags are green  
 
2. Entailment (i) Whenever P is true, Q 
must also be true 
Subaltern affirmative: P: All 
flags are green ├ Q: Some flags 
are green 
3. Contradictories (ii) P and Q can neither be 
both true nor be both 
false at the same time 
P: All flags are green – Q: Not 
all flags are green 
4. Entailment    (ii) Whenever P is true, Q 
must also be true 
Subaltern negative: P: No flags 
are green ├ Q: Not all flags are 
green 
5. Contraries P and Q cannot both be 
true at the same time, but 
may be both false at the 
same time 
P: All flags are green – Q: No 
flags are green 
6. Subcontraries P and Q cannot both be 
false at the same time 
though they may be both 
true at the same time 
P: Some flags are green – Q: Not 
all flags are green 
 
Since Aristotle devised his logic as a formal calculus of entailments, we shall here first 
describe and derive all relations in terms of that concept.  Its definition was given above: 
 
(33) logical entailment:  
P ├ Q : whenever P is true, Q must of necessity also be true.  
 
The first of the two foundational relations of the predicate calculus is CD between some 
and no(ne). In terms of entailment, CD can be formalised as follows and applied to the 
relation between SOME and NO(NE): 
 
(34) 
 
Definition In terms of entailment:  
For every sentence X, ¬X is the 
contradictory of X 
X  ├ ¬¬X 
 SOME ├ ¬¬SOME (i.e. ¬NO(NE)) 
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One additional law that has be assumed is the Law of Contraposition. The contents of 
this law is that an entailment relation may be inverted, on condition that both terms of 
the relation are negated: if X  ├ Y, then also ¬Y  ├ ¬X.  Seuren (1998: 308) explains it 
as follows: 
 
“Intuitively, this is easily understood: X  ├ Y means ‘in all cases where X is 
true, Y is also true’.  Now suppose Y is false, and ¬Y therefore true.  In such 
a case X cannot be true, since if it were true, Y would also be, in virtue of X 
├ Y.  Given that there are only two possibilities, ‘true’ or ‘false’, for both X 
and Y, it follows that, if X  ├ Y, in all cases where ¬Y is true, ¬X is also 
true, hence ¬Y  ├ ¬X.”                                                      (Seuren 1998: 308) 
 
This results in the following full formal statement of CD in terms of entailment and its 
application to the relationship between SOME and NONE: 
 
(35) 
 
Definition In terms of entailment: Law of Contraposition 
X  ├ ¬¬X ¬¬¬X  ├ ¬X 
or ¬X  ├ ¬X 
For every 
sentence X, ¬X is 
the contradictory 
of X 
SOME ├ ¬NO(NE)  
 
(¬NO(NE) ≡ ¬¬SOME) 
NO(NE) ├ ¬SOME)  
 
(NO(NE) ≡ ¬¬NO(NE) ≡ 
¬¬¬SOME) 
 
Admittedly, a certain degree of complexity (namely, an accumulation of negatives) is 
caused by the choice to state such definitions as (35) in terms of Aristotle’s entailment 
relation. There is no other option, however, since only deductive reasoning, i.e. 
reasoning in terms of entailment, guarantees that the truth of a conclusion follows 
necessarily from the truth of the premises. (As has been well-known since Hume (1748 
[1993]), induction cannot attain to that level.) 
 
The second foundational relation of the system is the subaltern affirmative entailment 
relation between ALL and SOME, as in:   
 
(36) P: All flags are green ├ Q: Some flags are green 
 
This relationship has the following definition – with the effect of the Law of 
Contraposition added in an additional column: 
 
(37) 
 
Definition In terms of entailment: Law of Contraposition 
For all sentences ALL and 
SOME, ALL entails 
SOME 
ALL  ├ SOME ¬SOME  ├ ¬ALL 
or NONE  ├ ¬ALL 
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2.2.3 Deriving the rest of the Square23 
 
The four primitives detailed above – (i) the pivot operator SOME,  (ii) the relation CD 
between the pivot SOME and NO(NE), (iii) the entailment relation (ENT =├) from ALL 
to SOME, and (iv) the Law of Contraposition – suffice to derive all relations in the 
Square. 
With ALL and entailment from ALL to SOME introduced into the system, application of 
the primitive operation negation to ALL introduces a new element ¬ALL into the system 
and yields the relation CD between the two, thus deriving relation 3. of (32).  
As already indicated, application of the Law of Contraposition to the entailment relation 
between ALL and SOME, derives the subaltern negative between NO(NE) and the 
newly introduced item ¬ALL, i.e. relation 4. in (32): 
 
(38) 
 
Basic relation: 
Subaltern affirmative 
Law of Contraposition Derived relation: 
Subaltern negative 
ALL  ├ SOME  ¬SOME (= NO(NE))  ├ ¬ALL 
 
Relation 5. of (32), the relation between ALL and NO(NE) is derived by defining 
contraries as: 
 
(39) For all sentences X and Y: X and Y are contraries iff X ├ ¬Y and hence, by 
contraposition  Y  ├ ¬X 
 
ALL and NO(NE) are thus contraries since by primitive (iii) above ALL (X) indeed 
entails ¬NO(NE) (¬Y; = SOME) and by contraposition NO(NE) (Y) entails ¬ALL (¬X) 
(cf. relation 4). 
 
Relation 6. of (32), finally, the relation subcontraries between SOME and ¬ALL is 
derived as follows: 
 
(40) For all sentences X and Y: X and Y are subcontraries iff ¬X ├ Y and hence, by 
contraposition  ¬Y  ├ X 
 
This makes SOME and ¬ALL subcontraries, given that by the derived relation 4. 
NO(NE) (¬X; = NOT-SOME ) indeed entails ¬ALL and by primitive (iii) ¬¬ALL (¬Y; 
= ALL) entails SOME (X). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 Thanks to Pieter Seuren for crucial help with this section. 
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 A: ALL       5. CONTRARIES E :  NO(NE) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
  I: SOME   6. SUBCONTRARIES    O :  (4) not all / *NALL 
 
 
One of the consequences of the present reduction of the logical system, the most 
important one in terms of the puzzle that started this quest, is that the O-corner is the 
only one which cannot be defined directly in terms of a single operation on the pivot (cf. 
Löbner (1990: 106)). According to Löbner (1990: 106) it is this need for two derivational 
steps to the O-corner which makes for increased processing complexity and resulting 
semantic markedness. This status is at least consonant with O-corner operators’ non-
accessibility for lexicalisation as a single word.  In other words, the net is clearly closing. 
Yet, I believe it would be wrong to assume that this is all there is to the account. 
Processing complexity wil be argued to be a necessary, but not a sufficient feature to 
explain the non-existence of *nand and *nall.  The ambition of this study is to prove that 
such lexical items are blocked as a matter of semantic incongruity, not complexity: they 
are arguably not just semantically marked, but semantically impossible lexical items24.  
Still, as a step in the right direction, the idea that it is impossible to get from the pivot to 
O in one fell swoop is crucial: the semantic incongruity of *nand and *nall in natural 
language will indeed be shown to be due to an intermediate hub between the pivot and 
the O-corner.  
 
2.2.4 Extension of the results to the propositional calculus 
 
The triad {and, or, (neither…)nor}, can be dealt with in the same vein as the predicate 
calculus operators. 
 
(41) a. John is in the garden and Peter is in the garden (P∧Q) 
 b. John is in the garden or Peter is in the garden (P∨Q) 
 c. Neither John is in the garden, nor Peter is in the garden (¬(P∨Q)) 
 
Sentence (41) a. logically entails sentence (41) b.: whenever a. is true, b. must of 
necessity also be true, on account of the meanings of the logical constants and and or 
involved in a. and b.. Sentence c., for its part, is the contradictory (or negation) of 
sentence b. 
                                                          
24 Recall that I restrict my attention to the predicate calculus, the propositional calculus and 
number, where O-corner lexicalization is completely barred (Horn 1972).  Löbner (1990: 89) 
argues that there are lexicalised Type 4 (=O-corner) expressions in other domains. If so – and I 
have at present no reason to doubt the correctness of the assumption – I do not see how that can be 
harmonized with my findings for the operators studied here.  
3. CD 1. CD 
2. ENT     ├ 
(subaltern aff.) 
4. ENT     ├ 
(subaltern neg.) 
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(42)  a.  abbreviations: 
P∧Q  is written as  AND (or Y) 
P∨Q  is written as  OR (or X) 
¬(P∨Q)  is written as  NOR (or Z) 
 
b. calculus relations 
 
 
Y 
AND 
entailer 
 
 
 
 
├ 
QUANTITY 
 
X 
OR 
pivot 
 
 
 
 
CD 
QUALITY 
 
Z 
NOR 
contradictor 
 
Given this parallellism, all relations in the corresponding Square can once again be 
derived from the primitive pivot OR, CD between OR and NOR, the entailment relation 
from AND to OR, and the Law of Contraposition, exactly as in the previous section, 
same primitive relations, definitions and all. 
  
(43) 
A: AND        5. CONTRARIES  E :  NOR 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   I: OR      6. SUBCONTRARIES     O :  (4) not and / *NAND 
 
 
 
(44)  
 
Relation Description  Example 
1. Contradictories (i) P and Q can neither be both 
true nor be both false at the 
same time 
P: John is in the garden or 
Peter is in the garden – Q: 
Neither John is in the 
garden, nor Peter is in the 
garden 
3. CD 1. CD 
2. ENT     ├ 
(subaltern aff.) 
4. ENT     ├ 
(subaltern neg.) 
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2. Entailment (i) Whenever P is true, Q must 
also be true 
Subaltern affirmative: P: 
John is in the garden and 
Peter is in the garden ├ Q: 
John is in the garden or 
Peter is in the garden 
3. Contradictories (ii) P and Q can neither be both 
true nor be both false at the 
same time 
P: John is in the garden 
and Peter is in the garden – 
Q: It is not the case that 
John is in the garden and 
Peter is in the garden 
4. Entailment    (ii) Whenever P is true, Q must 
also be true 
Subaltern negative: P: 
Neither John is in the 
garden, nor Peter is in the 
garden ├ Q: It is not the 
case that John is in the 
garden and Peter is in the 
garden 
5. Contraries P and Q cannot both be true at 
the same time, but may be 
both false at the same time 
P: John is in the garden 
and Peter is in the garden – 
Q: Neither John is in the 
garden, nor Peter is in the 
garden 
6. Subcontraries P and Q cannot both be false 
at the same time though they 
may be both true at the same 
time 
P: John is in the garden or 
Peter is in the garden – Q: 
It is not the case that John 
is in the garden and Peter 
is in the garden 
 
The definitions of the basic relations applied to the propositional system are: 
 
(45) contradictoriness (CD): 
 
Definition In terms of entailment: Law of Contraposition 
For every sentence X, 
¬X is the 
contradictory of X 
OR ├ ¬NOR  
(¬NOR ≡ ¬¬OR) 
NOR ├ ¬OR)  
(NOR ≡ ¬¬NOR ≡ ¬¬¬OR) 
 
 (46) entailment (├ , ENT): 
 
Definition In terms of entailment: Law of Contraposition 
For all sentences AND 
and OR, AND entails 
OR 
AND  ├ OR ¬OR  ├ ¬AND 
or NONE  ├ ¬AND 
 
With AND and entailment from AND to OR introduced, application of negation to AND 
introduces ¬AND and yields the relation CD between the two, thus deriving CD relation 
3.  
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(47)  
 
3. Contradictories (ii) P and Q can neither be 
both true nor be both false 
at the same time 
P: John is in the garden and 
Peter is in the garden – Q: It is 
not the case that [John is in the 
garden and Peter is in the 
garden] 
 
As already indicated, application of the Law of Contraposition to the entailment relation 
between AND and OR, derives the subaltern negative entailment relation between NOR 
and the newly introduced item ¬AND, i.e. relation 4. : 
 
(48) 
 
Basic relation: 
Subaltern affirmative 
Law of Contraposition Derived relation: 
Subaltern negative 
AND  ├ OR  ¬OR (= NOR)  ├ ¬AND 
 
Relation 5., the relation between AND and NOR is derived by defining contraries as in 
(39) above (for all sentences X and Y: X and Y are contraries iff X ├ ¬Y and hence by 
contraposition  Y  ├ ¬X).  AND and NOR are thus contraries since by the primitive 
subaltern affirmative entailment relation between AND and OR,  AND (X) indeed 
entails ¬NOR (¬Y; = OR) and by contraposition NOR (Y) entails ¬AND (¬X) (cf. 
relation 4). 
 
Relation 6. of (32), finally, the relation subcontraries is the same as in (40), namely: for 
all sentences X and Y: X and Y are subcontraries iff ¬X ├ Y and hence, by 
contraposition  ¬Y  ├ X. This makes proposition calculus operators OR and ¬AND 
subcontraries: by the derived relation 4., NOR (¬X; = NOT-OR ) indeed entails ¬AND 
and by the primitive subaltern affirmative entailment relation (between AND and OR) 
¬¬AND (¬Y; = AND) entails OR (X). 
 
While the parallellism between the sentences in (28) and (29) on the one hand and those 
in (41) on the other was already observed by the ancient Greek inventors of logic, the 
present analysis adds to their insight the claim that the predicate calculus and the 
propositional calculus can be reduced to two primitive relations (CD and ENT). Since 
these relations operate on a single pivotal operator, the core calculus ends up having as 
primitives:  
a. the two axes (the relations);  
b. the primitive operator we have called the pivot (such as  or c.q. some); 
c. two more focal points: the entailer (and, c.q. all) and the contradictor (nor, 
c.q. no(ne))  
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All the rest is derived: contraries, subcontraries, etc. This turns the Boethian Square into 
a much leaner birelational system, in effect a 2D Cartesian Coordinate System, with the 
pivot in the I-corner as the postulated “origin” of the calculus25. 
 
(49) 
Logic as a  2D Cartesian Coordinate System 
Two relations : 
the contradictoriness axis and the entailment axis 
                  
                  A :                             E :   
                  and                nor 
                  all                   no(ne) 
  
 
 
          2.  ├ 
          ENT         
                 
    
      I:                                   O: 
                  or               *nand 
         some                  *nall  
 
 
2.2.5 Comparison with alternative models 
 
2.2.5.1 Triangular models 
 
The present system is not only different from Boethius’ Square of Oppositions, but also 
from a number of proposals in the literature in which the square is reduced to a triangular 
system of relations instead of to a 2D Cartesian Coordinate System: De Morgan’s (1858: 
121) “trichotomy”; Jespersen’s (1924: 324-325) “tripartitions”; Horn’s (1989: 253) 
“three-cornered square” and Seuren’s (2002, 20-21) bitriangular “improved square”. 
 
De Morgan and Jespersen achieve their reduction from a Square to a Triangle not by 
eliminating O, but rather by collapsing I and O into a single complex operator I&O: 
exclusive or (= or-but-not-and) c.q. strong some (= some-but-not-all). In the words of 
Jespersen (1924: 324): “It should be noted that some (something, etc.) is here taken in the 
ordinary meaning it has in natural speech, and not in the meaning logicians sometimes 
give it, in which it is the positive counterpart of no (nothing), and thus includes the 
possibility of all” 
                                                          
25 The reference to the Cartesian notion of  “origin” is intended.  The origin of a two-dimensional 
Cartesian coordinate system is the point of intersection, where the x axis (abscissa or horizontal 
axis ox) and the y-axis (ordinate or vertical axis oy) meet. (Descartes 2001 [1637], Mazur 2003: 77 
ff; Aczel 2000: 122-129).  In chapters 4 and 6 (esp. §  6.3.1.3) other reasons for calling the present 
system a Cartesian coordinate system (or Cartesian plane) than the fact that it has two axes will be 
fleshed out.  
1. CD 
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(50)  
Logic as a Trichotomy/Tripartition Triangle 
One relation : 
contraries 
                  
                  A :                                    E :   
                  and          nor 
                  all                          no(ne) 
  
 
 
                 
                          
    
 
     
                   I&O: 
                  Or-but-not-and               
         Some-but-not-all                    
 
This proposal is characterized by the illusion of theoretical good news and the reality of 
empirical bad news.  Let us consider them in turn. 
 
On the theoretical side, it certainly looks advantageous to be able to cut the relations 
down to a single one, namely contrariness.  To illustrate that the three corners are indeed 
thus related, recall the informal and formal definition of contraries given above and 
applied here to the corners A, E and I&O:  
 
(51) Informal definition: P and Q cannot both be true at the same time, but may be 
both false at the same time 
 
 
What should be and is ruled in by the 
definition of the relation “contraries”: 
cases where P and Q are not both true at 
the same time, but may be both false at the 
same time 
What should be and is correctly ruled out. 
A, ¬I&O, ¬E It is not the case that there is 
nobody in the garden, nor that 
some-but-not-all are in the 
garden, but it is the case that 
all of them are in the garden 
*¬A, I&O, E *Not all of them, but both 
none of them and some-
but-not-all are the garden. 
¬A, I&O, ¬E Neither all of them, nor none 
of them is in the garden: 
some-but-not-all are. 
*A, ¬I&O, E *All of them and none of 
them, but not some-but-
not-all of them are in the 
garden. 
Contraries Contraries 
Contraries 
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¬A, ¬I&O, E Neither all of them, nor some-
but-not-all of them are in the 
garden: none are. 
*A, I&O, ¬E *Not none of them, but 
both all and some-but-not-
all of them are in the 
garden. 
  *¬A, ¬I&O, ¬E *Not all of them, not 
nobody, nor some-but-not-
all are in the garden. 
  *A, I&O, E All of them, none of them 
and some-but-not-all of 
them are in the garden 
 
(52) Formal definition: For all sentences P and Q: P and Q are contraries iff P ├ ¬Q 
(and hence, by contraposition  Q  ├ ¬P) 
 
Applied to the three corners, this yields – correctly given the nature of the focal points – 
the following entailments. 
 
(53)  
A ├ ¬ I&O I&O ├ ¬ A 
A ├ ¬E E ├ ¬A 
I&O ├ ¬E E ├ ¬I&O 
 
But the neatness of this result should not cover up an immediate theoretical problem: all 
the above definitions are stated using the symbols ├  and ¬, i.e. this version of 
Aristotle’s calculus is stated in terms of truth and falsity (the relation between which is 
CD, realized by the operation negation ¬) and entailment (├).  These are of course 
precisely the correlates of the two relations of the 2D Cartesian Coordinate System.  So 
in the trichotomy analysis either these relations are still presupposed – but no longer 
represented in the triangle – or a way has to be found to define contrariness without 
recourse to them.  As far as I can tell, the latter is an impossible task.  But if the former 
obtains and CD and ENT indeed still belong to the primitives of the system, then a  2D 
Cartesian Coordinate System, which does not have contrariness in its stock of primitives 
is to be preferred on grounds of economy.  
 
But let us suppose that a way could be found to define contraries without recourse to CD 
or ENT. Then there is still an insurmountable empirical problem for the 
Trichotomy/Tripartition proposal: it cannot accommodate simplex I operators such as 
inclusive or and weak some, though – contrary to what Jespersen seems to think – these 
are clearly attested in “natural speech”, if only the context is properly chosen: 
 
(54) a.  Have you talked to John or Bill? (=inclusive or: “John, or Bill, or both”) vs. 
 b. Mary talked to John or Bill (= exclusive: “but not to John and Bill”) 
 
(55)  a.  There are some linguists sick (= weak, cardinal) 
 b.  Some linguists are tall (= strong, quantificational: “but not all”) 
 
Specifically, in contexts where knowledge is incomplete simplex I is needed and cannot 
be eliminated in favour of I&O. Thus, in interrogative (54) a. there is doubt as to how 
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many talking events have taken place. And in stage-level predication (55) a. there is 
uncertainty which proportion the set of sick linguists represents relative to the set of all 
linguists.  Jespersen is apparently not aware of this systematicity.  De Morgan, for his 
part, is: 
 
“This point is clearly recognized by De Morgan. Writing sixty years before 
Jespersen, he warns that the TRICHOTOMY apparently possible to one with 
complete knowledge must yield, in a logic based on the imperfectly 
epistemic human condition, to the classical four-way opposition (with 
qualitative and quantitative axes) mapped out in the Square [of Boethius, 
DJ]” 
Horn (1989: 219; boldface added, DJ) 
 
A problem that besets all remaining triangular systems is that they invariably have at 
least three primitive relations, namely one per side of the triangle, rather than being fully 
slimmed down to the minimum of two relations.  That holds true for Horn’s three-
cornered square: 
 
(56) 
Logic as a Three-Cornered Square (Horn 1989: 253) 
three relations : subaltern, contradictories and contraries 
                  A                                           C    
                                      
  
 
 
                 
                          
    
                      
     
 
                   B 
                                  
A= A-corner, B = I-corner, C = E-corner 
 
Consider also the bitriangular representation below, which is Seuren’s (2002, 20-21) 
Improved Square for the Predicate Calculus. His revision is based on the linguistic 
consideration that the Boethian Square fails to represent the role of negation in the 
system properly (Seuren’s notation is ¬ for external negation, * for internal negation). 
Instead of a single Square, his revision of the Square results in a combination of two 
logically analogous triangles (with ¬I = E).    
 
 
 
 
 
subaltern contradictories 
contraries 
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(57) 
Symbols Natural language 
A [su All flags] are[pr green] 
I [su Some flags] are [pr green] 
¬I [su No flags] are [pr green] 
 [su Not all flags] are [pr green] 
A * [su All flags] are not [pr green] 
I* [su Some flags] are not [pr green] 
¬I* ? [su No flags] are not [pr green] 
 ? [su Not all flags] are not [pr green] 
 
(58)  
marks equivalence [our ≡, DJ] 
    (1)  A   ¬I*      I* (3)    
  
 
 
 
 
     ├                                                                                          ├ 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
          (2)    I       ¬I         A *  (4) 
 
 
This diagram is already much more in line with the linguistic facts than Boethius’ Square 
in that like a 2D Cartesian Coordinate System it is based on three focal points (A, I, ¬I (= 
E-corner)). A first difference, however, is that they are used twice to improve the square. 
Moreover, the set of basic relations has not been reduced to ENT(A, I) and CD(I, E). 
More specifically, the set of primitives still includes the hypothenuse relation of each 
triangle, namely C (contraries), as well as SC (subcontraries).  This also means that in a 
triangle of relations no corner is more prominent than any other26.  A 2D Cartesian 
                                                          
26 In Seuren’s bitriangular Square, one might attribute the pivotal role of I to the fact that it enters 
into 3 relations (ENT, CD, SC), which is one more than the two other corners of each triangle.  A 
problem with that solution, however, is that there is something strange about the O-corner (I*) in 
the “negative triangle” of Seuren’s system if you look at it from language’s end: why can we use 
NOT ALL people are in the garden for that corner at all? The system would predict it to be blocked 
in favour of SOME people are NOT in the garden, at least on the assumption that there is an 
isomorphism between the lexicalised forms and the symbolisations of the corners of the improved 
square.  
C 
CD 
C 
CD 
SC 
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Coordinate System is different. It straightforwardly assigns a pivotal role to one of the 
corners (i.c. the I-corner) as the only focal point on which both of its two basic relations 
operate.   
 
 (59)  
 
a. Logical Triangle b. 2D Cartesian Coordinate System 
Three relations: 
contradictoriness, entailment, contraries 
Two relations: 
contradictoriness and entailment 
Three focal points: A, I, E Three focal points: A, I, E, 
One pivot: I 
            A :  all         
 
 
        
             2.  ├ 
             ENT   
    
 
  
     I: some                    E :  no(ne) 
                 A :  all 
  
 
        
          2.  ├ 
           ENT   
          
 
     
                   I: some                 E : no(ne) 
                   PIVOT                   
 
So if independent linguistic facts and further logical and lexical analysis can be shown to 
lend support to the hypothesis that the I-corner is pivotal, that will at the same time be 
evidence favoring a 2D Cartesian Coordinate System over any triangular approach. 
 
As regards the O-corner lexicalisation puzzle, Seuren claims that his “Improved Square 
also solves a (quasi-)problem raised by Horn (1972, 1989: 252-67) and Levinson (2000: 
69-71)”, namely the *nall-problem.  He notes that “although their observation appears to 
be correct, the Improved Square shows that the problem is imaginary: it is  merely an 
artifact of the deficient way Boethius formalized APC.  The Boethian O-corner has lost 
its place to the three quantifier expressions all, some and no” (Seuren 2002: 21-22, fn. 6).   
 
While triangular and 2D Cartesian Coordinate Systems certainly stand a greater chance 
of bringing us closer to a solution to the O-corner problem, Seuren’s conclusion is too 
rash, however.  Though his bitriangular scheme is a linguistically better representation of 
the facts than Boethius’ Square, the same basic triad of  lexicalisatons with which he sets 
his bitriangle up, namely all (=A), some (=I)  and negation (=¬), could in principle have 
given rise equally as well to an alternative bitriangular scheme similar to the one in (57). 
The corresponding triad of lexicalisations would then be all, some, nall, while none 
would be turned into the eliminated corner of the original Square.  Instead of an O-corner 
problem, this set-up – which  no principle forbids – would predict an E-corner problem 
instead of an O-corner problem.  It would make none lose its place among the 
lexicalisable quantifier expressions, contrary to linguistic fact (see (60)). 
 
Of course, the fact that we use the basic triad of lexical items all, some/one, no(ne) rather 
than all, some, nall, indicates that Seuren’s (57) is superior to (60), but that  empirical 
1. CD 
1. CD 
3. C 
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fact does not answer the question why. The inadequacy of the theoretical alternative (60) 
from the same basic stock of primary lexicalisations (all, some, n-) still has to be 
established. We shall call this problem the “pivot anchoring” problem. The strategy 
adopted in the present study fares better than Seuren’s proposal in this respect: by 
reducing the set of basic relations to two and providing not just empirical evidence but 
also a theoretical explanation for the pivotal status of the I-corner item among the hubs, 
the I-corner will get “anchored” as the pivot or Cartesian origin of the whole system. The 
two remaining focal points are then introduced by the basic relations.  In the context of 
such an anchored system, fewer questions have to be answered to establish that the 
lexicalisable corners, which relate directly to the fixed pivotal one, are categorially 
different from the non-lexicalisable one, which does not.  
 
(60) 
(1)   A              ¬A  I*  (3)   
  
 
 
 
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       (2)    I   ¬A*              A* (4) 
 
2.2.5.2 The First Asymmetry Model 
 
Löbner  (1990) was the first to propose an asymmetry model which takes the I-corner 
operator (across several calculi) as the most unmarked and semantically basic operator of 
a square.  This is expressed in his “These zur Typenasymmetrie”: 
 
(61) These zur Typenasymmetrie 
“Als der unmarkierte Fall ist Typ 1 [the pivot, DJ] relativ zu den anderen 
Typen semantisch elementar.  Die bedeutung der übrigen ergibt sich aus der 
des Typs 1 durch konzeptuelle Operationen, die den Effekt von N[egation], 
S[ubnegation] oder D[ualnegation] haben, und ist damit komplexer als die 
Bedeutung des Typs 1.” 
(Löbner 1990: 105) 
 
SC 
CD 
CD 
C 
SC 
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To construct the other corners from the pivot, he appealed to different forms of negation, 
essentially exploiting all the possibilities of outer and inner negation27 (cf. the 
conversions of (18)).   
 
(62)  
 
 Type of Negation External 
negation 
Internal 
negation 
Quantifier (e.g. 
of Predicate 
logic, but 
extendable to 
other calculi) 
Type 1 – pivot  
(e.g. some) 
 - - ∃x fx 
Type 2 – entailer  
(e.g. all) 
Dual negation28 
(=Dualnegation) 
+ + ¬ ∃x ¬fx 
(≡ ∀ by (18)) 
Type 3 – contradictor  
(e.g. no) 
Outer negation 
(= Negation) 
+ - ¬ ∃x fx 
Type 4 – O-corner 
operator (e.g. *nall) 
Inner negation 
(=Subnegation) 
- + ∃x ¬fx 
(≡¬∀ by (18)) 
 
Moreover, since “any random order combination of two kinds of negation is equivalent 
to the third kind” (Smessaert 1991: 264), Löbner postulates that inner negation is a 
combination of dual and outer negation, hence derived.  
 
(63)  
 
Inner negation ≡ Outer negation of dual negation 
∃x ¬fx ≡ ¬ (¬ ∃x ¬fx) 
 
By doing this, he creates relational asymmetry in his duality square by reducing the 
primitive relations to Dual Negation and Outer Negation. On the further assumption that 
(outer) negation is conceptually more complex than dual negation, a markedness 
hierarchy is established among the quantifiers: Type 1 – the pivot – is the least marked, 
Type 2 (entailer) is derived from it by dual negation and is therefore less marked than 
Type 3 (contradictor), which is derived by outer negation. Type 4, finally, the 
combination of dual and outer negation (or vice versa) applied to the pivot, is the most 
marked type of the “duality square”, as it is the only operator which can only be derived 
in two steps from the pivot (cf. (64) below).  
                                                          
27 The parallel definition of the four truth-functions of the propositional square in terms of two 
primitive ones (in casu I-corner disjunction and negation) was provided in Russell and Whitehead 
(1910-13)’s Principia Mathematica and in Russell (1919, [2000]: 148) and can also be culled from 
the definitions of or (∨), and (¬∨¬), nor (¬∨), *nand (∨ ¬) in (26) above. Löbner’s proposal 
(like ours) generalizes over different types of quantifiers; those of predicate logic are used for 
exemplification of the duality square relations in this context. 
28 The dual of an operator is “the outer negation of its inner negation (or vice versa)” (Westerståhl 
2005: 5) 
ON THE NEGATIVE LOGIC OF NATURAL LANGUAGE 
 
37
 
Now, if two independent proposals converge on the same architecture, the question is 
whether the later one takes the issues further. I believe that in a number of ways it does.  
 
(64)  
Two primitive relations : 
Dual negation and outer negation 
                  
                  Type 2:                              Type 3:   
                  ¬ ∃ ¬     ¬ ∃  
                  all                          no(ne) 
  
              
            Dual  
        negation        
      
                 
 
        
      Type 1:                          Type 4: 
                  ∃                 ∃ ¬ 
         some                  *nall  
 
First of all, beyond the arguments provided by Löbner (in terms of aspectual particles 
such as already, still, no longer, not yet) there is a stronger and more immediate reason 
why inner negation cannot belong to the class of primitives if outer negation does. Just 
try to take inner and outer negation as the two primitive relations and consider the square 
of oppositions for the propositional calculus.  
 
(65)  
Alternative primitive relations 
inner negation and outer negation? 
                  
                  Type 2:                              Type 3:   
                  ¬(¬ P ∨¬ P)                       ¬(P∨P) 
                  Pand P                    P nor P 
  
                 
                   
                  
      
                 
 
        
      Type 1:                          Type 4: 
                  (P∨P)                (¬P∨¬P) 
         P or  P                   P nand P  
Outer 
negation 
Outer 
negation 
Inner 
negation 
Inner 
negation 
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It is easily seen that with an identical choice of propositions, inner and outer negation 
can no longer be held to be two separate categories: they coincide since Type 3 ¬(P∨P) 
and Type 4 (¬P∨¬P)  are both equivalent to ¬P, so that the relation between Type 1 and 
Type 3 and the relation between Type 1 and Type 4 become indistinguishable.  
 
No such problem befalls the pair dual negation – outer negation if these are selected as 
primitives. They remain separate relations under the same identical proposition 
conditions: Type 1 and Type 2 remain each others duals, as do Type 3 and Type 4: 
applying inner and outer negation to the one still results in the other. Type 1 and Type 3, 
for their part, remain each other’s outer negations, as do Type 2 and Type 4.  In sum, 
dual and outer negation (like their counterparts entailment and contradictoriness in our 
proposal) are separate categories throughout, as desired if they are real primitives. 
 
Aside from additions like the above argument, the most important differences between 
Löbner’s approach and mine are that outer negation, dual negation and the pivot itself 
will be subjected to decomposition with the same means as everything else in the Square 
and will thereby all be identified as non-primitives built from a single operator.  
 
2.3 Conclusion: Main Questions 
 
Aside from solving the *nand-riddle, our aim is to bring to light an isomorphism 
between the relational structure of logical calculi, the semantic-cognitive properties of 
logical operators and their lexical-morphological realizations. To reach that goal, 
Boethius’ Square has been reduced to a 2D Cartesian coordinate system in this chapter.  
A detailed analysis of each element of the resulting system will be undertaken in 
stepwise fashion in the chapters to come.   
 
Chapter 3, first of all, will focus on the two basic relations. The following questions will 
be answered: 
 
1. What are the properties of the relation of contradictoriness (CD) in a formal 
calculus of entailments in natural language? 
2. What are the properties of the relation of entailment (ENT) in a formal calculus of 
entailments in natural language? 
 
Since these two primitive relations are arguably predicated on a pivotal operator, the next 
question that imposes itself, the central one of this study, is: 
 
3. What are the main semantic features of the element which functions as the pivot 
of a formal calculus of entailments in natural language? How does it differ from the 
other two hubs? How does it acquire pivot status? 
 
An exhaustive answer to this question, based on an analysis of several pivots (or, either, 
some, any, a, etc.), will be undertaken in chapters 4, 5 and 6.  But there is one 
characteristic which must be emphasized here, since it will provide scaffolding for the 
analysis of the two relations (CD and ENT) in chapter 3.  Specifically, the most 
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distinctive feature of pivots is that they invariably signal indeterminacy29 and 
tentativeness: when you say that there are some men in the garden they are in Russell’s 
terms still “ambiguous”, some men or other.  In the propositional calculus, the pivot or 
also introduces a new, second possibility and by widening the hypothesis space it too 
introduces an element of uncertainty: John is in the garden or Peter is in the garden 
indicates that the speaker is still in doubt. Note that there is no absolute lack of 
knowledge, but rather partial knowledge: the men may be ambiguously some or other 
men, but they are nonetheless men; and it may be John or it may be Peter who is in the 
garden, but the speaker is convinced that there is at least someone in that garden. “Every 
disjunction which is not logically exhaustive (i.e., not such as ‘A or not-A’) gives some 
information about the world, if it is true; but the information may leave us so hesitant as 
to what to do that it is felt as ignorance” (Russell 1940 [1969]: 82), a sense which 
Bromberger (1992) describes as “what we know we don’t know”.  If there were no such 
hub of partial ignorance in the logical system and if that plausibly entailed that we could 
not experience or know we are ignoramuses, we neither could nor would feel the urge to 
do something about it. Nor could we draw a mind-internal distinction between worse and 
better knowledge. There could be no drive to cure my ignorance if I were not somehow 
aware of it, had no way of being perplexed by it30.  
 
These observations about the pivot I-corner square well with epistemological 
assumptions expressed by Charles Saunders Peirce’s (1839-1914) on “The Fixation of 
Belief” (Peirce 1877) and the irritation of doubt: “We generally know when we wish to 
ask a question and when we wish to pronounce a judgment, for there is a dissimilarity 
between the sensation of doubting and that of believing.” “Belief guides our desires and 
shapes our actions”; consequently, “doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which 
we struggle to free ourselves”.  The only modification I would propose is that this feeling 
of dissatisfaction is only as acute as Peirce’s explanation suggests in contexts where truth 
is the prime concern, as in science. There are many other contexts – both very general 
everyday pragmatic situations as more specific ones such as when one is reading a novel, 
for instance – where the search for truth and general knowledge is not relevant. 
 
This notion of partial knowledge with a remaining element of indeterminacy makes 
pivots different from the two other corners, where no such doubt remains: Peter is in the 
garden and Quentin is in the garden expresses (positive) certainty that they both are 
(twice value 1: 1 1). From the equivalence of the propositional calculus PROPC and the 
two-object universe predicate calculus APC2 explained in section 2.1.3, it follows that all 
men are in the garden expresses positive certainty (universal) in APC2. The same 
conclusion of expressed certainty – though this time negative – holds for neither Peter is 
in the garden nor Quentin is in the garden (value 0 for both: 0 0) and its APC(2) 
counterpart no man is in the garden respectively. The difference is represented in the 
following integrated truth table for and (∧), inclusive or (∨) , and nor (¬∨) 
 
                                                          
29 Cf. the observation about “knowledge is incomplete”-indeterminacy and De Morgan’s reference 
to the “imperfectly epistemic human condition” made in the context of the pivotal operators in (54) 
and (55) above. 
30 What’s true for me, is equally true for others, not only in daily life but also in the context of 
scientific research: thus “…ignorance can also define and determine the value of scientific 
contributions" (Bromberger 1992: 112). 
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(66) 
 
PROPC  Truth table 
P      Q 
  mind 
  ∧ (P  Q)  1      1   + certainty A-
corner 
 1      0  ?  doubt I-
corner 
  ∨ (P  Q) 
 0      1      
 ¬∨ (P  Q)   0      0   - certainty E-
corner 
 
Our guiding common sense assumption about actual reality is that something is the case 
(+) or is not the case (-). What is deemed impossible is that something is simultaneously 
the case and not the case at the same time (the Law of Contradiction), or in an unstable 
state of indecision (?)31.  Consequently, the I-corner indeterminate state of mind (?) is 
plausibly conceived of as a Peircean dissatisfied state “from which we struggle to free 
ourselves”.  There is an epistemological drive away from the I-corner. I shall return to 
these semantic differences and their epistemological consequences in chapter 4 and 
sketch the role of indeterminacy as one of the triggers for searches for certainty and 
knowledge of the type expressed by entailers and contradictors.  The essence of the 
special position of pivots in natural logic and epistemology will however be sufficiently 
clear from this brief exposé to move on.  
 
 The perspective sketched here makes sense only if natural logic is an internalist affair. 
Direct evidence in favour of that position is that uniquely cognitive, mind-internal 
aspects – such as the experience of partial ignorance (?) – play a pivotal role in the basic 
architecture of the logical system.  But the radical internalist will go further and maintain 
that it is only, by formal mind-internal contrast with such partial ignorance (?) that A-
corner and E-corner propositions, which affirm what is (+) or is not (-) the case 
respectively, manage to appear to be independent of individual psychology and mind-
external. This effect might well be the equivalent in language and thought of the 
suppression of the sense that one is looking at a photograph when one says “that is my 
mother” instead of “that is a picture of my mother” (cf. Jackendoff 1983). It is likely that 
such suspension of attention to representationality is easier to get with a photograph than 
with, say, a painting in which the idiosyncratic individuality of the painter is more 
dominant.  
 
In view of its mentalist linguistic aspirations, our analysis cannot afford to sidestep a 
detailed description of the internal semantic features of the focal points of the system as 
lexical items in the mental natural language lexicon, each with their own properties (cf. 
(59)b.).  This will be the sum and substance of chapter 4.  
 
                                                          
31 The quantum world is not common sense. 
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In chapter 7, finally, the discussion will bring us back to the fourth and final question, 
which rephrases the O-corner problem that started the whole quest in terms of the design 
and constraints of the natural language lexicon.   
 
4. What is the precise nature of the condition on lexicalisation which excludes 
*nand and *nall and what is its relation to the calculus? 
 
The latter question, a more precise formulation of the original puzzle, will be kept on the 
backburner till the final sections of this study. That is not done for rhetorical reasons, but 
simply because no answer is within reach as long as the first three questions have not 
been solved.  Moreover, while the empirical puzzle is easy to grasp and so general that 
the pattern jumps out, its theoretical import is comparatively smaller than that of the 
answers to the other questions raised above. The latter provide the theoretical substance 
of the present study. It is therefore advisable not to let the final destination become the 
sole focus of interest or  the source of impatience or irritation along the way. While a 
solution to question 4. may well be the icing on the cake, most of the tasty ingredients 
have gone into the cake itself. So let’s have that cake and eat it too.  
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3 THE TWO RELATIONS OF THE 2D CARTESIAN 
COORDINATE SYSTEM  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, Boethius’ Square of Oppositions was reduced to two 
foundational relations: contradictoriness and entailment. In the history of linguistics and 
philosophy, the study of these two notions has filled many tomes. Not only is it far 
beyond my abilities to detail the history of those discussions and reconstruct the past, it 
is also far beyond the scope of this work to address more than a modest bit of the issues 
brought up.  My aim will be primarily to supplement the logical perspective on 
contradictoriness and entailment with a set-theoretic perspective and an analysis in terms 
of Boolean algebra. This will bring to light that Boole’s views on set-demarcation are 
very helpful tools for a theory which seeks to describe logical operators as ‘normal’ 
lexical items in the natural language lexicon. It will also help determine that 
contradictoriness and entailment are properties of an internalist nature, whose cognitive 
foundations it is hard if not impossible to deny. 
 
3.2 Contradictoriness 
 
The foundation for a good understanding of the relation of contradictoriness is the Law 
of Contradiction (LC)32,  Aristotle’s rule that ‘the same thing cannot at the same time 
both belong and not belong to the same object and in the same respect’ (Met. 1005b19-
23). He claims it is ‘the most certain principle of all’ of his logic of opposition, which 
has the status of a primitive or axiom for which no proof can be provided and none 
should be asked. In this section, I study the nature and position of this principle within 
the set of axioms of Aristotle’s logic  and represent the set-theoretic conception of its 
contents. In line with my internalist goals, I shall then try to underpin the claim that LC 
is a cognitive constraint. 
 
3.2.1 The Law of Contradiction in Logic 
 
The most commonly cited form of the principle is the propositional calculus version 
from Russell and Whitehead (1910-13)’s Principia Mathematica: 
 
(67)  ¬ ( p ∧ ¬p)   
 
It expresses that nothing can be the case and not be the case at the same time, hence also 
that no sentence P can be true and false simultaneously.  
 
(68) a. Not both: all men are mortal and not all men are mortal 
 b. Not both: snow is white and snow is not white 
 c. Not both: Adam begat Seth and Adam did not beget Seth  
(Mates 1965 [1972]: 87-88) 
 
                                                          
32 Also referred to as the Law of Noncontradiction or the Principle of Contradiction 
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A term-based version more faithful to the original phrasing of the principle, is provided 
by Rescher (1969: 149) and Geach (1972 [1980]: 74-75) and mentioned in Horn (1989: 
20):  ¬∃x (Px ∧ ¬Px), or its equivalent ∀x ¬ (Px ∧ ¬Px).  Yet another version (Barnes 1969; 
Lear 1980; Horn 1989: 20) as a statement of second-order predicate logic, is: (∀P) (∀x) ¬ 
(Px ∧ ¬Px). 
 
3.2.2 Contradiction, Sets and Predicates  
 
According to George Boole, the Law of Contradiction and much of logic more generally 
are in an important respect about classes and set theory, a point which will be clarified 
and elaborated in this section. Boole considered this finding the core of his insights when 
he developed what he called his Logic of Classes and it points to an issue whose 
consideration will be helpful in discovering the nature of lexical items, including the 
predicates studied here, namely the precise nature of a set.  Spending time on such a 
basic notion may sound like idle pedantry, but that is a mistaken impression for a 
number of reasons. First, as Russell wrote: “to distinguish this notion from all the 
notions to which it is allied, is one of the most difficult and important problems of 
mathematical philosophy.” (Russell 1903 [1937]: 67)  Mathematical philosophy not 
being our concern, some of those problems can be avoided, but some aspects of the 
definition of a set are nonetheless relevant.   Second, a central element of the present 
study is a proposal about set demarcation as a cognitive procedure.  In particular, a set-
theoretic perspective on what occurs when a lexical item is dug up from our lexical 
competence and activated for use will be worked out (see esp. chapter 4). Consequently, 
it is important to be clear about a number of set-theoretical preliminaries.  To that end, 
the next sections will be devoted to (i) what sets and their members are (3.2.2.1), and (ii) 
how the notion of a set enters into the natural language concept of a lexical predicate 
(3.2.2.2).  
 
3.2.2.1 Aspects of Sets and their Members 
 
A core property of sets or classes is that their existence is fundamentally cognitively 
mediated.  To appreciate this point, consider the following situation. Imagine you want 
to travel abroad by plane and pass the customs officer who asks you to prove who you 
are.  You cannot just tell him to have a good look at you, ‘because this is who I am’. This 
direct, object-oriented, single-level approach will not wash. Instead, what you have to do 
is go about it in what looks like a roundabout way: you have to produce your identity 
card, in essence a description of the unique properties that characterize you.  For the 
customs officer, you will have proved your identity if you are the unit set, i.c. the person, 
matching the description on that card. The description on the card is clearly not a person 
itself, it is an object at a different level than the object it serves to identify. It is the 
search procedure the customs officer uses to identify you, if all is well it is a series of 
conditions which singles you out as the sole element of the set it denotes.  
 
Generally speaking, a set may be defined as (a) a description or concept and (b) a 
collection of all those and only those entities to which the description or concept applies. 
The collection is the “field of applicability of a concept” (Langer 1967: 116) known as 
the extension of that concept. The class-concept or “range of applicability of a concept” 
which is needed to determine the extension is sometimes referred to as the class in 
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intension. Though one can rightly maintain that the substance of the class is its 
extension, it is nonetheless equally true that the latter owes its demarcation and hence its 
existence as a class to the intensional cognitive filter. The latter is called cognitive, 
because as is clear from the identity card example, the description is in terms of words 
and thoughts (and probably also a pictorial representation). 
 
“We cannot take classes in the pure extensional way as simply heaps or 
conglomerations. If we were to attempt to do that, we should find it 
impossible to understand how there can be such a class as the null-class, 
which has no members at all and cannot be regarded as a “heap”; we should 
also find it very hard to understand how it comes about that a class which has 
only one member is not identical with that one member.  I do not mean to 
assert, or to deny, that there are such entities as “heaps”.  As a mathematical 
logician, I am not called upon to have an opinion on this point.  All that I am 
maintaining is that, if there are such things as heaps, we cannot identify them 
with the classes composed of their constituents.”  
(Russell 1919, [2000]: 183) 
 
With the intension-extension pair in one’s armoury, the concepts of a null-set and a unit 
set make sense: the null set is the class whose intensional range is defined in such a way 
that the field of applicability it selects is empty, nothing at all is left. Suppose the identity 
card above had stated that its bearer has red hair and is bald.  These conditions being 
contradictory, not a single person can match the description and the extension set defined 
by the intensional description is consequently the null-set. The unit set, for its part, is the 
class whose intension yields a field of applicability consisting of a single element, as is 
normally the case with an ID.33 Sets in this sense, this much is clear, are radically 
different from the “heaps” or conglomerations that collectors are interested in.34   
 
Observe that the demarcation procedure sketched above is crucially a matter of 
exclusion: each of the descriptive statements (the intension) on the identity card (to 
continue with that example) excludes a large section of possible elements, which is why 
it is possible to end up with an empty set as the extension.  The notion exclusion is a 
negative one, an insight which will prove highly relevant when we turn to a description 
of the intensional meaning of the logical operators. The extension itself, is what remains 
– if anything – after the intension has done its exclusionary work. The extension itself is 
consequently not itself negative. 
 
An important feature of the information on the card which the customs officer uses to 
check my identity, is that it consists of a series of so-called propositional (or 
‘characteristic’) functions. Eyes: blue; nationality: Belgian, etc. are taken by the customs 
officer to contain a substitutional variable: x has blue eyes; x is Belgian, etc.  It is by 
                                                          
33 The two-level nature of a set also explains why class-membership (the relation ‘is an element 
of’: ε) is different from the relation of part to whole, an insight due to the Italian mathematician 
and logician Giuseppe Peano (1858 - 1932). Part-whole is a single-level transitive relation: a piece 
of a wedge of cake is a piece of the cake. Not so for ε: “Socrates is a man, and men are a class, but 
not Socrates is a class” (Russell 1903, [1937]: 19). 
34 One would question the sanity of someone who stated that he wanted to become a collector of 
empty sets.  
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rotating the variable over its range, in this case by replacing the variable by me – in the 
form of a percept of me – that the officer determines whether I am indeed the unit set of 
elements whose substitution for the x’s, invariably results in a true proposition. The 
reference to ‘percept’ in this description points at a problem with extensions.  The ‘real’ 
extension ‘an sich’ is unattainable in principle (Kant (1787 [1933])) and can therefore 
only indirectly – if at all – be the extension the set is about.  But even what the customs 
officer sees when he looks at me, the percept, is not the extension called up by the 
intensional description. The latter is rather itself still in the mind of the customs officer, 
which is why it gets the label IN(ternal/intensional)-extension in the scheme below35.  It 
is when this IN-extension has the experiential property ‘out-thereness’36 expressing a 
match with a  percept, that it is not felt as purely intensional37. This analysis creates a 
natural place for virtual, nonexisting intensional objects such as Pegasus or Sherlock 
Holmes or the nonexistent cat that I have just painted (cf. Seuren 2001a, 227).  Though 
there is felt to be no EX-extension and hence no percept in those cases38, there is still the 
feeling that when talking about Sherlock Holmes, we are not just referring to a name, but 
to an entity (person), even if in a fictitious referential framework.  The notion of IN-
extension provides the category that is needed to accommodate such virtual entities, 
which according to Meinong (1904) have “being” but not “existence”.  While we are 
confident that the difference between real and virtual entities is an ontological difference, 
the only way we have of being aware of that difference is by experiencing the former as 
having a reference value in the world as perceived, while the latter are felt to lack such a 
value.  What is the case in the real world an sich is inaccessible. 
 
(69) 
 
DJ Customs officer 
Real/actual EX-
extension 
Percept IN-extension Intension 
Real or actual field of 
applicability 
Perceptual 
representation/ 
experience of the 
actual field of 
applicability 
Field of 
applicability called 
up by the set 
description 
Range of 
applicability of 
the set description 
 
3.2.2.2 Of Sets and Predicates 
 
As is well-known from model-theoretic semantics, another name for a characteristic 
function is ‘predicate’. It is not surprising, therefore, that the abovementioned distinction 
extension-intension, which has a very long pedigree in the philosophical tradition, first 
                                                          
35  For the same conclusion, but for different reasons, cf. Seuren 2001, 227. 
36 “That is, “out-thereness” is as much a mentally supplied attribute as, say, squareness.” 
(Jackendoff 1983: 26) 
37 Pure “out-thereness” characterizes the monsters that haunt someone’s dream, which are 
experienced as ‘real’ for as long as the dream lasts. 
38 It is of course possible to erect a statue for the virtual entitity Sherlock Holmes, in which case 
the abstract virtual entity is given a material form.  But even in that case, what is perceived as 
being there in EX-extension is experienced as a representation of a virtual person, not as an actual 
person. 
ON THE NEGATIVE LOGIC OF NATURAL LANGUAGE 
 
47
arose in the context of predicates rather than in that of sets, which are a relatively recent 
invention. But the convergence is auspicious, in that the above description of the 
demarcation of sets carries over seamlessly to predicates and the way they ‘(s)elect’39 the 
individuals, relations and situations in the real world that they are about. This 
connection, which ties the set-theoretic notions elaborated above to natural language 
predicates, is the topic of this section. It brings the notion of a set and the undeniably 
linguistic-cognitive notion of a predicate together, thus paving the way for a fully 
elaborated IN-language perspective on set demarcation, the Law of Contradiction (LC 
and contradictoriness. 
 
Adoption of John Venn’s (1834-1923) set-diagrams leads to the following representation 
of how a predicate G “(s)elects” a set of individuals, thus dividing a universe of 
discourse in two, into what is G and what is not G.  Suppose G = Greenlander; then the 
universe of possible individuals IND - divides into two classes: the set of individuals 
who are Greenlanders G and its complement set G (here equivalently represented as ¬G 
(= not-G)), the set of individuals who are not Greenlanders: 
 
(70) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These two sets are complementary: they have no members in common – their 
intersection is the empty set ø: G ⋂ ¬G = ø –, but divide the universe between them – 
their union is the universe class IND: G ⋃ ¬G = IND.  And this is where the Law of 
Contradiction kicks in again. The property of having no members in common is none 
other than the set-theoretic version of the term-based version of LC,  ¬∃x (Gx ∧ ¬Gx): 
there is no individual who is both a Greenlander and a non-Greenlander.  The opposition 
between the two classes G and ¬G is one of quality: the members of G all have the 
quality Greenlander; the members of  ¬G lack it. From this perspective, what LC 
expresses is that an individual cannot both have a quality and not have it at the same 
time. The function of each predicate (hence, as I would claim, each lexical item) is thus 
to regulate set membership by isolating members from nonmembers; and what LC adds 
to that is the stipulation that there can be no individual that straddles the fence by 
belonging both to G and to ¬G. Each actual individual ia either is an element of the class 
of individuals described by the predicate G, in which case ia has value 1 for G: it is a 
Greenlander; if ia is not an element of G and is consequently a member of ¬G, it has 
value 0 for G, it is not a Greenlander. 
 
To arrive at a precise definition of the class ¬G, Augustus de Morgan (1847) added a 
distinction between the total universe of individuals IND and a subset thereof, the 
universe of discourse. Kneale & Kneale (1962: 408) describe the latter as follows: “not 
the totality of all conceivable objects of any kind whatsoever, but rather the whole of 
                                                          
39 This refers to Boole’s (1847) use of the term “elective symbol” for this operation. 
G 
¬G 
IND 
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some definite category of things which are under discussion.” From a lexical perspective, 
this distinction is motivated by the insight that it is unrealistic to assume that the 
substitutional variable of a characteristic function Greenlander (x) rotates over all 
possible individuals of the entire universe IND of individuals (including such individuals 
as shoe, painting, potty…).  A more realistic conception takes the function to rotate over 
a designated subset of IND.  But then the question arises how the nature of that subset is 
determined in given cases and how that knowledge is represented.  A first part of the 
answer to these questions is that the notion universe of discourse has to be stripped of its 
association with discourse and that which is “under discussion”.  Instead, it should be 
tied to lexical knowledge, more specifically to lexical presuppositions.   
 
To see this, consider the following sentences: 
 
(71) a. x is a Greenlander 
b. x is not a Greenlander 
 
Our expectation with respect to (71) is that if x is not a Greenlander, s/he may be a 
Belgian or an Englishman, etc. but normally not a shoe.  This is captured if it is assumed 
that the lexical item Greenlander carries the lexical presupposition that its subject term is 
human.  As is well-known, presuppositions remain constant under negation40, so that not 
just (71)a, but also (71)b presupposes that x is human.  Put differently, one of the 
selection restrictions of Greenlander is that its argument is +HUMAN.  It is this feature 
of the predicate Greenlander which determines the limited universe over whose 
individuals the substitutional variable of the characteristic function Greenlander (x) 
rotates.  In other words, selection restrictions are responsible for the fact that what De 
Morgan calls the universe of discourse is a subset of the entire universe of individuals 
IND, in this case the set characterized by the propositional function human (x). 
 
On the whole, this means that in the Greenlander-case ¬G (= G, the complement of G; 
or in Boolean algebra 1-G, where 1 stands for the universe), has two parts: the 
presuppositional inner complement of non-Greenlandic humans ¬Gp (= De Morgan’s 
universe of discourse), and the non-presuppositional outer complement ¬G¬p, comprising 
the set of individuals which are neither Greenlandic, nor even human.41 
 
(72)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40 At least under “non-metalinguistic” (Horn 1989) or “minimal” (Seuren 2002) negation. 
41 This analysis is a transfer of Seuren’s valuation space interpretation of negation from 
propositions/situations to predicates (Seuren 2002: 30).   
G 
¬Gp 
¬G¬p 
IND p  
IND¬p+ p  
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The role of the non-presuppositional outer complement shows in sentences involving the 
cancellation of a well-known presuppositional category.  Take Russell’s well-known 
example: 
 
(73) The present king of France is not bald 
 
This sentence exemplifies an existential presupposition42 (there is a presnt king of 
France) due to the lexical predicate bald and the most straightforward interpretation is 
one that preserves that presupposition, hence which locates the present king of France in 
the presuppositional inner complement of bald. But sentence (74) illustrates that the 
present king of France being or not being a member of the set denoted by bald does not 
exhaust the set of possible situations compatible with the sentence The present king of 
France is not bald.  It is also possible that there simply is no king of France, which 
would locate him in the non-presuppositional outer complement of bald. This is 
evidenced by the coherence of asserting the second part of the sentence alongside the 
first. 
 
(74) The present king of France is NOT bald – there is no king of France 
 
Analogously, if one said: my shoe is NOT a Greenlander, that would only make sense as 
an instance of the radical kind of falsity illustrated in (74) and referred to as 
presupposition-cancelling by Seuren (2001b: 338).  Horn (1989) analyses these examples 
as cases of metalinguistic negation. 
 
Note that our leading assumption is that the set-theoretic properties involved are 
associated with the lexical items of natural language as selection restrictions and are 
hence part of their IN-meaning. That this is the proper perspective is not hard to prove: 
with a designated change of lexical predicate, the presupposition of existence disappears, 
which proves the link lexical item-presupposition. Witness the following sentence pair: 
 
(75) a. Unicorns aren’t bald 
 b. Unicorns do not exist  
 
While one of the readings of (75) a. presupposes existence of the subject unicorns due to 
the selection restrictions of bald, replacing the latter predicate by exist has the 
consequence that the presupposition of existence is no longer available. (The fact that 
exist does not presuppose existence is not strange: if existence were already presupposed, 
there could be no point in asserting it anymore.) 
 
Since under the present conception presuppositions are generated by a predicate’s 
preconditions, e.g. the semantic predicate bald, or the abovementioned Greenlander, it is 
preferable to define the inner complement ¬Gp  and the outer complement ¬G¬p on the 
latter rather than on propositions. This decision reflects our general strategy to remove 
from syntactic levels properties which are more likely tied to lexical items. Their effect 
will automatically percolate to the propositions composed from them anyway. And from 
                                                          
42 That the present king of France isn’t bald has an existential presupposition is maintained by 
Frege and Strawson, but not by Russell himself.  
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an internalist viewpoint too, it is better to encode presuppositions as part of the lexical 
knowledge stored for a predicate in long-term memory than as features of online 
constructed propositions/sentences only. 
 
3.2.3 From predicates to propositions  
 
A set-theoretic approach is not only possible for sets of individuals in IND elected by a 
term predicate, but has further relevance for natural language: it is also applicable to the 
sets of situations in  SIT in which a given proposition is true, a perspective that is the 
focus of this section. 
 
(76) 
Language Set-theory 
term predicate sets of individuals in IND 
proposition sets of situations in SIT 
 
Take the proposition P: John is in the garden. Analogous to the manner in which the 
predicate king (s)elects a set of individuals, this proposition does not directly present, but 
rather represents or describes a set of possible situations as its IN-extension43. If the 
actual situation is an element of that set because it matches the description given, the 
sentence is true, i.e. an accurate description of the actual situation in the outside world I 
wanted to refer to. The IN-extension of P, the set of possible situations in which P is 
true, is called the valuation space of P, represented as /P/ (Van Fraassen 1971, Seuren 
1998: 331, Seuren et al. 2001).  
 
(77) ‖P‖ =  /P/  
 
The main difference with our identity card is that while a good identity card is designed 
to single out a person as the extension of its description, i.e. is a description of a unit set 
of individuals, sentences single out situations as their extension, mostly a larger set than 
the unit set. There are many Johns and many gardens in the world, and the description is 
equally correct for all of them if the containment relation expressed by in applies to them 
in the right way. This is why the notion ‘element of’ is crucially required for the calculus 
of truth: if the actual situation is an element of the class of possible situations in which 
the proposition is true, the sentence is true; if not, it is false.  
 
(78) a. When P is true, the actual situation sa ε /P/ 
 b. When P is false, the actual situation sa ∉ /P/, i.e. sa ε /P/, the complement of 
/P/ 
 
                                                          
43 The Fregean assumption that the extension of a proposition is a truth value is not followed. Note 
that the Fregean conception drives a strange wedge between extensions in the universe IND of 
individuals and the universe SIT of situations anyway. If the IN-extension of book is a set of 
possible books and not a reference value, then the IN-extension of a phrase two books is most 
naturally characterized as a set of possible pairs of books, and the IN-extension of the still larger 
constituent P: John bought a book as a set of possible P-situations, rather than as a truth value.  
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Here too, it is possible to represent by means of Venn diagrams how the sentence P 
“(s)elects” a set of situations as its IN-extension, thus dividing the universe of discourse 
– here the universe  SIT of all possible situations – in two, into what is /P/ and what is 
/not-P/.  Suppose /P/ = /John is in the garden/; then the universe SIT of all possible 
situations - divides into two classes: /P/, the set of situations where P is true; and /¬P/ (= 
/not-P/), the set of situations in which ¬P is true, which equals /P/, the set of situations 
where P is false, i.e. the complement of /P/ in SIT: 
 
(79) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this case, the property of having no members in common (the intersection is the empty 
set ø: /P/ ⋂ /P/= ø) represents the propositional version of the Law of Contradiction: ¬ ( 
p ∧ ¬p). 
The function of propositions is consequently analogous to that of each predicate, viz. to 
regulate set membership by isolating member situations from nonmember-situations. 
Each actual situation sa either is an element of the class of situations described by the 
proposition P, in which case sa has truth value 1 for P; if sa is not an element of /P/ and is 
consequently a member of /P/ , it has truth value 0 for the proposition P, it is not a 
situation belonging to /John was in the garden/. 
 
3.2.4 A set-theoretic definition of contradictoriness 
 
Having availed ourselves of Boole’s and Van Fraassen’s mode of representing sentences 
or propositions and the situations they denote in set-theoretic terms, that tool can now be 
applied to the types of sentences which are the real focus of our interest and are repeated 
here44. 
 
(80) 
 
Entailment Contradictoriness 
P: All flags are green 
Q: Some flags are green 
Q: Some flags are green 
R: No (= NOT-SOME) flags are green 
 
To represent an individual proposition such as P: All flags are green, we can simply 
adopt the notation /P/ to refer to its valuation space and then just set up a scheme as in 
(79). Similar valuation schemes can be set up for Q and R. Going one step further, 
nothing now prevents us from generalizing over all sentences with the same logical 
                                                          
44 The section that follows is based on Seuren et al. (2001) up to the extension of the analysis to the 
propositional calculus. 
/P/ 
/P/ SIT 
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affirmative-universal format as P and set up a valuation space representation with 
predicate letters instead of flags and green, i.e. for all F is G. The same can be done for 
Q: some F is G and R: no F is G. To do this, the same abbreviations will be used which 
were introduced earlier, but this time enriched with the slashes indicating that what is 
intended is valuation spaces, i.e. sets of all possible situations in which the proposition 
(type) in question is true. 
 
(81)45 
/All F is G/    is written as /ALL/    
/Some F is G/    is written as /SOME/   
/No (=not-some) F is G/   is written as /NO/   
 
(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that SIT is not to be interpreted as the total universe of situations, but only those 
where F and G are defined. In other words, /ALL/ is defined in terms of parameters46.  
Valuation diagram (81) (a) subdivides the universe  SIT into /ALL/, the set of situations 
where a sentence All F is G (whatever the concrete content of F and of G) is true – and 
its complement /ALL/ , the set of situations in which All F is G is false. 
Diagram (81) (b) does the same for /SOME/ and its complement /SOME/.  For any 
sentences X and Y, the relation CD, i.e. X contradicts Y or X is a contradictory of Y, can 
therefore be defined as in Seuren (2002: 27): 
 
 
 
                                                          
45 As before, the bars over the labels in the shaded areas represent the complement-set-symbol. 
46 So F and G are not predicate variables, since that would in all cases yield trivial sets, namely: 
(a) ∃x ∃y, ∀z, z ε X → z ε Y  
(b) ∀x ∀y, ∀z, z ε X → z ε Y  
(c) ∀x ∃y, ∀z, z ε X → z ε Y 
(d) ∃x ∀y, ∀z, z ε X → z ε Y 
 
 
/ALL/ 
/ALL/ SIT 
/¬SOME / 
 = /NO/ 
/¬SOME/     
    = /NO/ 
SIT 
/SOME/ 
/SOME/ SIT 
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(82)  Contradictoriness or CD: 
For all sentences X and Y: 
CD(X,Y) iff /X/ is the complement of /Y/, or: /X/ = /Y/  
 
Since the set of situations in which Some F is G is false is the same as the set of 
situations in which No (= not-some) F is G is true, (b) and (c) can be integrated. Thus, 
/NO/ being the contradictor (= NOT-SOME) of /SOME/, (b) and (c) can be collapses and 
the shaded complement-backgrounds can be dropped. Each of the spaces in the diagram 
is now stated as the set of situations in which a proposition (type) is true, not in terms of 
being a space that is a complement of something else: the inner space is the area 
containing precisely the situations where /SOME/ is true,  the outer space the area 
containing precisely the situations where a sentence /NO/ (= NOT-SOME) is true  
 
(83) 
(b) and (c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The same valuation space analysis extends to the propositional calculus in view of the 
proposition types and relations below.   
 
(84) 
 
Entailment Contradictoriness 
P∧Q:  John is in the garden and Peter is 
in the garden  
P∨Q: John is in the garden or Peter is in 
the garden 
P∨Q:  John is in the garden or Peter is in 
the garden  
¬(P∨Q): Neither John is in the garden, nor 
Peter is in the garden 
 
Enriching the abbreviations introduced earlier with a valuation space interpretation by 
means of the formal slashes-device and taking P and Q as variables rather than the 
concrete sentences of (84), we get: 
 
(85) 
/P∧Q/  is written as  /AND/  
/P∨Q/  is written as  /OR/ 
/¬(P∨Q)/ is written as  /NOR/ 
 
yielding the following diagrams: 
 
 
 
/SOME/ 
SIT /¬SOME/     
    = /NO/ 
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(86)  
(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here (b) and (c) give us a clear indication of the existence of a relation between 
operations and morphemic realization: /¬OR/ is configurationally more complex than its 
contradictory /OR/, which is matched by bimorphemic vs. monomorphemic 
lexicalisation on the morphological side (Löbner 1990: 95).  The fact that language 
occasionally wears semantic complexity on its morphological sleeves like this bodes 
well for our hope to solve the lexicalisation puzzle why *nand (and *nall) is impossible. 
If indeed there exists a link between underlying semantic structure and material 
morphological realization as suggested by (b) and (c), looking for an abstract logical or 
semantic solution to the material absence of a particular conceivable lexicalisation is a 
wise road to take. The isomorphism of the logical structure, meaning and morphology of 
operators postulated in this study has the advantage that the three can serve as mutual 
correctives and checks. 
 
And once again (b) and (c) can be integrated to yield a valuation space diagram with 
only areas defined positively in terms of truth, not falsity. /¬OR/ (= /NOR/) comes out of 
this as the contradictor of /OR/ (and vice versa), as required: 
 
(87) 
(b) and (c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/OR/ 
SIT   /¬OR/     
    = /NOR/ 
/AND/ 
/AND/ SIT 
/OR/ 
/OR/ SIT 
/¬OR / 
 = /NOR/ 
  /¬OR/     
    = /NOR/ 
SIT 
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Having arrived at an adequate representation of CD in terms of valuation space diagrams 
and an integration of (b) and (c), we conclude this section with a remaining question: is it 
possible to relate the (a) and (b) diagrams of (81) and (85) and the sets of situations 
contained in them as well? The answer is yes, but that brings us to the section on the 
second relation on which logic revolves: entailment. 
 
3.3 Entailment  
 
This section is devoted to the second basic relation of the calculus alongside CD, namely 
entailment. First of all, in 3.3.1. the existing notion will be illustrated and a brief 
overview will be given of some definitions proposed in the literature.  In 3.3.2., the 
concept will be looked at from the perspective of  Van Fraassen’s (1971) and Seuren’s 
(1998: 331, Seuren et al. 2001) valuation space analysis of predicate logical operators 
and an extension of their proposals to the propositional calculus will be proposed. Third, 
in 3.3.3. entailment as a set-theoretic property will be looked at from an internalist 
cognitive perspective, tying it in with the internalist view on set demarcation and CD 
developed above.  First, it will be illustrated that it is a relation which does not only 
affect propositions with logical constants (which could in principle still be maintained to 
constitute an EX-logic) but propositions with more ordinary lexical items from the 
natural language lexicon as well.  This I take to confirm the general idea that in the study 
of natural language and its natural logic, logical constants are to be treated as regular 
lexical items like the rest of the natural language lexicon. The fact that entailment 
extends to the latter is then not unexpected. A second internalism issue – to be treated in 
3.3.4. – concerns the concept of entailment itself, namely the existence of “unnatural” 
entailment relations such as (88), which the standard definition cannot exclude: 
 
(88) a.  P: Some rhinoceros is not a rhinoceros   entails   
b.  Q: Some senile professor has pink stockings 
 
P being a necessary falsehood (contradiction), it entails any sentence (e.g. Q), since 
whenever P is true, Q is also true. This leniency of standard entailment is felt as a defect 
from the viewpoint of cognitive reality and natural language intuitions, which brand the 
entailments in question as unnatural. So, somehow the ill has to be cured in IN-logic. 
Evidence will indicate that the solution is to be sought in an informativeness constraint 
on natural language.  
 
3.3.1 Definitions of entailment 
 
Contradictoriness (CD) as defined above is a matter of set demarcation.  It represents 
Aristotle’s fundamentum divisionis, dividing a universe into what is /G/ and what is /not-
G/, thus delineating a set.47 The second leg of the twin foundations of logic, the relation 
known as entailment, does not involve one set, but two (Zwarts 1986).  
 
The core example of entailment introduced before was the following pair: 
 
                                                          
47 CD and entailment being defined as relations between sentences/propositions, we keep working 
with valuation spaces. 
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(89) a. P: All flags are green 
b. Q: Some flags are green 
 
Leaving aside the cases relevant to the existential import problem for the time being (i.e. 
the empty F-class case to be dealt with in chapter 4), the first logically entails the second: 
whenever P is true, Q must of necessity also be true.  In set-theoretic terms, this can only 
mean that the valuation space /P/, which equals /ALL/ (cf. (81) above) is a subset of /Q/, 
i.e. /SOME/. This yields the following diagram, which shows very clearly that logical 
entailment is a quantitative relation between two sets: 
 
(90) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is a variant of the diagram in Seuren (2002: 26), but there are a number of 
differences in perspective: on the basis of the architecture of the Cartesian Coordinate 
System outlined earlier and the operations perspective there is a logically hierarchical, 
procedural structure to the diagram proposed here: its outlook is the result of applying 
operations to the basic pivot which generate the relation CD between pivot and 
contradictor and entailment from entailer to pivot at the propositional level.  That 
stratified conception, with set demarcation of the valuation space of /SOME/ conceived 
of as cognitively less complex than that of its contradictory and entailer, is the new 
perspective suggested by our valuation space version of Löbner’s asymmetry hypothesis. 
A further novelty is that I take this diagram to define the relationships on the logical 
operators qua lexical items, i.e. on what will be defined as lexical proposition types with 
parameters F, G rather than on propositions with lexically filled argument positions, such 
as all flags are green.  Specifically, the lexical items in question will take the form of 
two-place higher order predicates, i.e. as predicates over pairs of sets (here F and G), 
which is the standard Generalized Quantifier Theory (GQT) conception (cf. Barwise & 
Cooper 1981, Keenan and Stavi 1986, Zwarts 1983, Van Benthem 1986). A final 
difference with Seuren (2002) is that the approach will be proved to extend to the logical 
constants of the proposition calculus. 
 
In set-theoretic terms, the quantity relation expressed by entailment is set inclusion 
(/ALL/  ⊆ /SOME/). What it does, is regulate inferential transitions between sets and 
subsets (Ladusaw 1980, Zwarts 1986). In this respect a caveat is in order. Sets are 
complex constructs, i.e. intension-extension pairings, and not non-cognitive purely 
external physical things. Consequently, set-inclusion “does not mean just the same thing 
as “inclusion” of (say) one box in another” (Langer 1967: 135). Rather, it is a relation 
between two cases of set-membership, and its definition is therefore in terms of the IN-
extensional elements of the two sets: 
 
/SOME/  /¬SOME/ 
      =  /NO/ 
/ALL/ 
SIT 
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(91) a. /P/ ⊆ /Q/  ≡def  ∀x: x ∈ /P/ → x ∈ /Q/,  
or stated more generally with variables instead of valuation spaces: 
 b. X  ⊆ Y  ≡def  ∀x: x ∈ X → x ∈ Y   
 
Set X is included in set Y (or: set X is a subset of set Y) is equivalent by definition to the 
proposition that all members of set X are also members of set Y. 
 
Some alternative names for entailment have been in use (necessitation, for instance), and 
the concept has over the years been expressed with other formal notation symbols than 
those given above.  A staple: 
 
(92) a. A necessitates B if and only if whenever [in any situation or possible 
world in which] A is true, B is also true. (Van Fraassen 1968: 138) 
b. (p ⇒ q) ≡ ∼ poss ( p & ∼ q) 
“if p entails q, then it is not logically possible for both p to be true and not-q 
to be true and conversely” (Lyons 1977a: 165) 
 
These definitions are, however, not fundamentally different and a definition in set-
theoretic terms seems an adequate formal statement. 
 
3.3.2 Valuation spaces of logical operators and entailment 
 
Entailment was visualised earlier by means of a valuation space diagram for predicate 
calculus operators – cf. (93) a.  The analysis will now be extended in that the same 
pattern will be shown to characterize the valuation space diagrams of propositional 
operators, as in (93) b. 
 
(93) 
a. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
That (93) is an accurate representation of the valuation spaces of the propositional 
operators and (∧), or (∨) and n-or (¬∨), can be proved in terms of the truth-functional 
properties of the operators in question. These properties are well-understood and have 
not changed (notational devices aside) since they were first invented twenty-three 
centuries ago48: 
 
 
                                                          
48 Polish notation is used, with the operators at the beginning. This will make it easier to conflate 
the three columns below. 
/SOME/  /¬SOME/ 
      =  /NO/ 
/ALL/ 
SIT /OR/  /¬OR/ 
     =  /NOR/ 
/AND/ 
SIT 
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(94) 
 ∧   (P    Q) ∨  (P    Q) ¬  ∨ (P   Q) 
(a) 1       1     1  1     1     1  0    1   1   1 
(b) 0       1     0  1     1     0  0    1   1   0 
(c) 0       0     1  1     0      1  0    1   0    1 
(d) 0       0     0  0     0      0  1    0   0    0 
 
To bring the tables and the set-inclusions obtaining between the different columns closer 
to the valuation space diagram (93), we modify representation (94).   To begin with, 
observe that in (94) the possible situations have been repeated three times in the truth 
tables given.  On the assumption that they form a single paradigm, a more economical, 
single-column representation can be set up, from which the repetitiveness is removed. In 
that representation, all shaded cells, whose truth value is invariably 0, have to be gone. 
The reason is that we are setting up a valuation space diagram, which by definition 
contains nothing but situations with value 1, i.e. situations in which given expressions 
are true (the IN-extension or valuation space of P is the set of possible situations in 
which P is true). This leaves two further steps to be taken, namely the integration of the 
white parts of the leftmost and the rightmost column into the middle column. The truth 
value of these white parts is invariably 1, so they cannot be left out from the diagram. As 
far as the rightmost cell is concerned, the operation is very simple.  With the shaded  cell 
of the middle colum removed, the white nor-area ¬(P∨ Q) can be straightforwardly 
mapped onto the emptied area of the middle column (= 95 a). The final step consists in 
superimposing the white area of P ∧ Q onto that of  P ∨ Q, as indicated in (95 b).  
 
(95) 
 
∧   (P    Q) ∨    (P    Q) ¬  ∨ (P   Q) 
1       1     1  1      1     1  0    1   1   1 
0       1     0  1      1     0  0    1   1   0 
0       0     1  1      0      1  0    1   0    1 
0       0     0  0      0      0  1    0   0    0 
 
 
 
 
Taking away the heading row of the representation and representing the meaning of the 
operators by means of the white areas only, we get (96) 49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49 Note that ¬  ∨ is taken together as a single operator in (96), so that of the third subtable in (95) – 
the one for nor (¬  ∨) – only the first column of values (in boldface) is relevant for the 
construction of (96), not the one under the disjunction symbol ∨.  
a 
b 
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(96)  
∨ (P  Q) 
    
 ∧ (P  Q)   1     1     1  
   1     1     0  
   1     0      1  
¬∨ (P  Q)    1     0      0  
 
Observe that step b in (95) was different from step a in that it resulted in overlap.  As 
(96) shows, the P ∧ Q rectangle indeed blocks off the inclusive part of the  P ∨ Q  
placemat. Yet that effect of step b is auspicious. The resulting overlay squares well with 
the fact that there are two ways to view the meaning of disjunction ∨: there is the 
inclusive interpretation (P or Q or both) which you literally get underlyingly, namely 
when the small overlay of conjunction is ignored. And then there is the exclusive 
interpretation (P or Q, but not both), which is what results when the overlay conjunction 
blocks off the ‘both’ part of inclusive ∨, leaving only the exclusive part of the 
disjunction accessible. 
 
The presence of two arguments P and Q which and, or and nor invariably require is 
already evident from the two rightmost columns of truth values in the table itself, so that 
the paradigm can be further simplified. The boldface values 1 can be left out too, since a 
valuation diagram by definition contains only situations for which given expressions are 
true, i.e. have value 1.  Repetition of the boldface values is therefore unnecessary. 
Adding the usual valuation space slashes and interpretation, we get:  
 
(97)                                      ∨ = /OR/      
    
 ∧ =/AND/          1     1  
          1      0  
          0      1  
¬∨= /NOR/          0       0  
 
The result is now a kind of “placemat” arrangement, a set-theoretic construct with 
rectangular Venn-diagrams, which shows that the IN-extension set of /AND/ is entirely 
included in that of /OR/ (meaning that /AND/ entails /OR/) – it lies on top of /OR/ and 
covers part of the placemat of /OR/.  
 
Conflating the truth table representation and the valuation space diagram is now easily 
done. 
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(98) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given the definition of CD, is is possible to add two more labels in the two diagrams, 
namely those of the categories */NALL/ and */NAND/, which do not exist as lexical 
labels: 
 
(99) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the I-corner spaces /SOME/ and /OR/ are indeed pivotal, then these diagrams suggest 
two possible ways to look at the absence of *nall and *nand in natural language.   
One way is to assume with Löbner (1990: 106) that the O-corner item (his “Typ 4”) can 
only be reached in two procedural steps (“zwei ableitungsschritte”) away from the pivot 
(“Typ 1”), namely via /AND/ (c.q. /ALL/) and then to /NAND/ (c.q. /NALL/). Entailers 
(/AND/, /ALL/) and contradictors (/NOR/, /NONE/), for their part, are only one step 
away from the pivot.  This makes Typ 4 the most marked option (“am markiertesten”).  
The second way to address the O-corner problem accepts the two-step hypothesis, but 
claims that the second step is not just marked, but impossible. This is due to the way in 
which the pivot is basic in the system: specifically, its meaning will be argued to be a 
/SOME/  /¬SOME/ 
      =  /NO/ 
/ALL/ 
SIT 
/¬ALL/ /¬ALL/ 
/OR/ 
   1 0 
   0 1 
  /¬OR/ 
     =  /NOR/         0  0 
/AND/ 
  1  1 
SIT 
/OR/  /¬OR/ 
     =  /NOR/ 
/AND/ 
SIT 
/¬AND/ /¬AND/ 
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presuppositional subpart of the meaning of the A-corner entailer. The effect is that the 
boundary between the pivot (/OR/, /SOME/) and its E-corner contradictor (/NOR/, 
/NONE/) – bold in Venn-diagram (100) – remains an inviolable substrate, whatever 
operator one tries to compose.  
 
(100)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/I/ = pivot (/OR/, /SOME/) 
/A/ = entailer (/AND/, /ALL/) 
/E/ = contradictor /NOR/, /NONE/ 
/O/= /NAND/, /NALL/ 
 
 
 
 
 
If so, O-corner items, which denote the complement of /A/ and hence break through the 
/I/-/E/ boundary, are not just marked, but impossible as natural lexical items. It is the 
latter conception that I have been led to by the facts that will be detailed in the rest of 
this study50.   
  
3.3.3 Natural entailment 
 
Our interest is in natural language and hence also in a natural rather than EX-logical 
conception of entailment. On the one hand, this means that the definition given so far 
will have to be constrained to bar entailments which from an ordinary language 
viewpoint are considered unnatural, such as P├ P, e.g.  from Mary is ill it follows that 
Mary is ill. This issue will be addressed  in 3.3.4. From a different perspective, however, 
the definition given so far is too narrow and will have to be relaxed.  That is what will 
be done in the present section.  
 
3.3.3.1 Logical entailment and semantic entailment 
 
The pair of sentences All flags are green – some flags are green involves propositions 
with logical constants (all, some).  The distinguishing feature of propositions with 
logical constants is that a formal calculus is available for them, allowing for the 
computational derivation of the entailment relations.  The type of entailment involved is 
therefore called logical entailment and was defined above as a set-inclusion relationship 
between valuation spaces (see (91)):  
 
(101)   Logical entailment 
For all sentences X and Y,  X ├ Y iff /X/  ⊆ /Y/   
 
                                                          
50 The impossibility of O-corner items – though not in terms of the presupposition hypothesis – is 
also defended by Barwise and Cooper (1981).   
/I/  /E/ 
/A/ 
SIT 
/O/ /O/ 
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But logical entailment is not all there is to entailment in natural language. Entailment 
also affects propositions with ordinary lexical items other than logical constants, e.g. 
father and male in the following pair of sentences: 
 
(102) a. P: John is a father 
b. Q: John a male 
 
P entails Q in the sense that whenever P is true in a situation, Q is also true in that 
situation. To represent this formally, valuation space modelling in the universe of 
possible situations SIT can once again be used, with /P/ the set of possible situations in 
which the proposition John is a father is true, and /Q/ the set of possible situations in 
which the proposition John is a male is true.  Venn diagram (103) adequately represents 
the inclusion relation, since there are Johns who have no children, for whom assertion Q 
is true, but P is not. 
 
 (103) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I adopt Seuren’s (1998: 302) term semantic entailment for these entailment relations 
“based on one’s intuitive understanding of the meanings concerned” only, thus keeping 
them terminologically separate from logical entailment in “a formal calculus enabling 
one to derive the entailment automatically in virtue of the logical constants and the 
structure of the entailing statement or statements” (Seuren 1998: 302).  
 
Semantic entailment can easily be defined in set-theoretic terms and valuation spaces 
since aside from the extension from logical constants to other vocabulary nothing 
changes: 
 
(104)  Semantic entailment51 
For all sentences X and Y,  X ╞ Y iff /X/  ⊆ /Y/   
 
                                                          
51 The systematicity of extra-logical semantic set-inclusion relationships and hierarchies has been 
recognized ever since the birth of logic. It is also central to the discussion of monotonicity in the 
medieval part of logic called topics, including such topics as ‘what is predicated of the species is 
also predicated of the genus’, which ‘can explain the validity of the inference a man walked ergo 
an animal walked’. (Sánchez Valencia 1994: 2). What is involved here is clearly an entailment 
relation induced by extra-logical vocabulary (man, animal): the set of possible situations in which 
A:a man walked is true is a subset of the set of possible situations in which B: an animal walked is, 
hence A semantically entails B.  
For a more recent plea to broaden the discussion from logical particles to extra-logical vocabulary, 
cf. Katz (1972: 186).     
/Q/ 
/P/ 
SIT  
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The symbol used in definition (104) (╞) is different from the logical entailment-symbol 
(├) used earlier in the text.  This is to mark that semantic entailment (╞) is a more 
general notion than its subspecies logical entailment (├).  
 
3.3.3.2 Lexical “entailment” between predicates 
 
As stated, in (102) the valuation space /P: John is a father/ is a subset of /Q: John is a 
male/.  This set-inclusion at the level of the valuation spaces of propositions correlates 
with a set inclusion relationship between the IN-extensions of the lexical items father 
and male.  Thus, the set of possible individuals denoted by the “superordinate” lexical 
predicate father (= “MALE PARENT”) is a subset of the set of individuals denoted by 
the “subordinate” lexical predicate male (the terms are taken from Katz 1972: 192). This 
pattern indicates that in many cases the source of semantic entailment at the 
propositional level is a corresponding meaning inclusion relationship at the lexical level.  
In the case at hand, the lexical item father is conceptually more complex (a conjunction 
of MALE and PARENT), hence imposes more conditions on possible individuals than 
male, and hence its extension set is a subset of that of male.   
 
Since set-inclusion works no different in the universe of individuals IND than in the 
universe of situations SIT52, I see no principled reason not to try to extend the concept of 
entailment to set inclusion at predicate level, starting from the following concept of “IN-
extension inclusion”53.   
 
(105)  IN-extension inclusion 
For all predicates X and Y,  X ╞ Y iff  
the IN-extension of X  ⊆ the IN-extension of Y   
 
The term “IN-extension” is used because valuation space analysis is not available for 
predicates54.  But let us try to find a solution to the problem. Valuation space modelling 
                                                          
52 Take A to be the set of inhabitants of Antwerp: {x:A(x)} and B the set of inhabitants of 
Belgium: {x:B(x)}. Since all inhabitants of Antwerp are inhabitants of Belgium, but not vice 
versa, the relation between the two sets is one of inclusion. Each actual individual ia either is an 
element of the class of individuals described by the predicate A, in which case ia has value 1 for 
the function A: it is a person living in Antwerp; if ia is not an element of A and is consequently a 
member of ¬A, it has value 0 for A, it is not a person living in Antwerp. Second, each actual 
individual ia either is an element of the class of individuals described by the predicate B, in which 
case ia has value 1 for B: it is person living in Belgium; if ia is not an element of B and is 
consequently a member of ¬B, it has value 0 for B, it is not a person living in Antwerp.  The result 
is exactly the same kind of diagram as those representing set-inclusion/entailment relations 
between propositions with logical constants in SIT. 
53 The problem with Katz’s (1972: 192) term “meaning inclusion” is that not all cases of lexical 
entailment are really due to meaning inclusion. Wednesday lexically entails weekday (If it’s 
Wednesday it’s a weekday ( but not the other way round)), yet there is no meaning inclusion: the 
concept WEDNESDAY does not include a subconcept WEEKDAY.  The cases that interest us in 
this study are however all cases where I argue there is meaning inclusion, so the Katzian choice of 
terminology would be harmless. 
54 The same problem arises if one wants to define the CD relation of (82) on lexical items rather 
than full propositions. Though the attempted transfer from the propositional level to the lexicon is 
not crucial to make the decompositions of chapter 4 go through, it is briefly taken up here, mainly 
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was introduced by van Fraassen (1971), Seuren (1998: 331), Seuren et al. (2001) as a 
theory for propositional languages and possible situations in the universe SIT.  Attempts 
to transfer it to lexical predicates, for instance the lexical item bald, face the difficulty 
that these are propositional functions of type <e, t>, which cannot get a valuation space 
analysis, since the latter is about the set of possible situations in which a proposition is 
true.  Since the function involved contains a variable of type e, however, it still has to 
rotate over the range of the variable. Only after replacement of the variable by the name 
of a member of its range is there a proposition for which the set of possible situations in 
which it is true can be determined.  A possible avenue would be to consider the valuation 
space of the predicate bald to be the union of all sets of possible situations in which a 
proposition with bald is true when the variable is replaced by the name of a member of 
its range. This is a rather convoluted way of putting it however. Instead of multiple 
substitution and taking the union of the resulting spaces for each substitution, a proposal 
which has the same effect is to assume that the lexical representation of bald does not 
contain a variable of type e, but rather a generalized quantifier55.  It is a variable of this 
type (<e,t>,t>) which is required to make a valuation space analysis possible.  The 
question then is which generalized quantifier?  Montague employed numerically 
subscripted pronouns he0, he1, … for this purpose, but it seems much more logical to 
choose an indefinite pronoun, namely (at least) one<<e,t>,t> (not accidentally the pivot of 
IN-logic).  Depending on the selection restrictions imposed by a given predicate 
(+PERSON or + PHYSICAL OBJECT, for instance), the meaning of the generalized 
quantifier amounts to AT LEAST ONE PERSON or AT LEAST ONE THING.  This 
yields the following representations for bald: 
 
(106) a. BALD as a concept: λx[BALD(x)] type <e,t> 
λx<e>[BALD(x)]   type <e,t> 
b. Bald as a word:  λQ[Q(BALD)]  type <<e,t>,t>, t> 
λQ<<e,t>,t>[Q<<e,t>,t> (BALD)]  type <<e,t>,t>, t> 
λQ<<e,t>,t> [Q<<e,t>,t> ( λx<e>[BALD(x)])] type <<e,t>,t>, t> 
 
The advantage of this perspective is that the word bald need not be considered a function 
from individuals to propositions, but is rather a function from generalized quantifiers to 
propositions, for which valuation is possible. 
 
(107) /(ONE) BALD/<<e,t>,t>, t> 
 
The valuation space of this proposition type is then the set of possible situations in which 
(at least some-) one (or other) be bald is true56.  
 
Observe that the relationship between the valuation space of such a proposition type and 
that of a full proposition in which the lexical predicate is used, is one of set-inclusion or 
                                                                                                                                               
to stress that logic should be primarily stated at the lexical level and even deeper at the level of the 
Language of Thought rather than at the clausal or sentential level only. 
55  Cf. also Montague’s (1973) view that language has no basic expressions of type <e>. Note that 
in type theory, if you have an expression of type <e>, by lifting you also have <<e,t>,t>– a 
theorem in the Lambek calculus. 
56 The infinitive is used not to let tense constrain the determination of the relevant space. 
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entailment: the set of situations in which the proposition John is bald, for instance, is 
true (= /JB/), is a subset of the set of situations in which the proposition type /(ONE) 
BALD/, with the generalized quantifier (at least) one, is true (= /B/). 
 
(108) /(ONE) BALD/  :  /B/ 
/JOHN IS BALD/  :  /JB/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The fact that /(ONE) BALD/ is a proposition type warrants the use of valuation space 
analysis.   Importantly, it constitutes “stable” meaning stored in the lexicon, while /JB/ 
does not. As opposed to lexical items, whose properties are stored in long-term memory, 
/JB/ and complete propositions in general are the creative result of the operation of free 
combination rules on lexical information57.   
 
Lexical entailment can now be defined as: 
 
(109)  Lexical “entailment”  
For all predicates X and Y,  X ╞ Y iff  /(ONE) X/  ⊆ / (ONE) Y/   
 
If valuation space modelling can thus be exploited in the lexicon, it yields a taxonomic 
categorization, with not only relations between superordinate or “entailed” and 
subordinate or “entailing” sets (e.g. male, boy; Katz 1972: 192), but also between sets 
and their “contradictories” (human, non-human), sets and their “contraries” (human, 
inhuman : with many values in between), etc.  
 
All in all, the conclusion of the present section is that natural entailment is a broader 
concept than just logical entailment, namely semantic entailment. Moreover, the most 
natural place to encode the inferential set-subset relations that trigger entailment at the 
level of the proposition is the level of the lexical predicate (lexical “entailment”).  
                                                          
57 For this view on syntax, cf. the whole generative syntax tradition and for an antecedent in 
traditional grammar, cf. Otto Jespersen’s Philosophy of Grammar (1924), in which he states that 
besides those things in language which are formulaic (and often irregular) in character, there are 
also "free expressions", built on the basis of a "notion of (...) structure" ( Jespersen 1924:19) which 
guides the speaker in "framing sentences of his own". These expressions always "show a regular 
formation." (Jespersen 1924:24). This idea of rule-governed freedom, of creativity of language use 
requires not only this “notion of structure”, the syntactic computational system, but also a resource 
of stored information for the syntactic computational system to work on, the lexicon.  As far as the 
latter is concerned,  “(…) apart from the phonetic features that are accessed by articulatory-
perceptual systems, the properties of an expression that enter into language use are completely 
drawn from the lexicon: the computation organizes these in very restricted ways, but adds no 
further features; that is a considerable simplification of earlier assumptions, which would, if 
correct, require considerable rethinking of the “interface” between the language faculty and other 
systems of the mind.” (Chomsky 2000: 123).   
SIT  
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3.3.4 Unnatural entailment 
 
The present section further illustrates the usefulness of valuation spaces for the 
description of the relations of IN-logic. At the same time, however, it introduces a notion 
of discourse informativeness, whose effect is to filter out a set of linguistically unnatural 
entailments which an unconstrained application of semantic entailment still fails to 
eliminate.  Next, it will be argued that a generalized version of informativeness is active 
at a much earlier level than that of discourse: it arguably constrains syntactic 
concatenation and the composition of complex lexical items, a point which will prove 
relevant in the next chapter.   
 
Recall that the set-theoretic definitions of entailment in (104) and  (105) – here repeated 
as (110) and (111), respectively – identify the concept as a matter of set-inclusion: 
 
(110)  Semantic entailment 
For all sentences X and Y,  X ╞ Y iff /X/  ⊆ /Y/   
(111)   Lexical entailment / IN-extension inclusion 
For all predicates X and Y, X ╞ Y iff  
the IN-extension of X  ⊆ the IN-extension of Y   
 
However valuable they may be, these definitions – focusing on semantic entailment to 
begin with – still look  insufficiently restrictive from the viewpoint of natural language 
and natural IN-logic: (110) posits entailment-relations between certain sentences for 
which it strains natural linguistic intuition to claim that the one sentence “follows” 
logically from the other.  Consider the following entailments: 
 
(112)  Ex necessarie falso sequitur quodlibet:  
a necessary falsehood (contradiction) entails every sentence 
P: Some rhinoceros is not a rhinoceros  ├  Q: Some senile professor has pink 
stockings 
(113) Identical propositions 
P: John was in the garden  ├  P: John was in the garden 
(114)  Verum sequitur ad quodlibet:  
a necessary truth (tautology) is entailed by every sentence. 
P: Julius Caesar was a (wo)man  ├ Q: A rose is a rose 
 
The example in (112) illustrates a first kind of cognitively unnatural entailment: a 
contradiction entails everything. Since the contradiction is never true, the entailment 
relation holds trivially.  
The  “self-entailment” or improper entailment found in (113) fits the definition of 
entailment given in (110) above, since whenever the first P is true, the second P is also 
true, which is all the definition is interested in to establish entailment. Yet, spelling out 
such an entailment sounds unnatural in natural language: what could be the point of 
saying that it follows from P that P? In (114), it does not matter to the entailment 
relationship whether the entailer-sentence is true or not. The entailed sentence being a 
necessary truth, i.e. a sentence that is true in all possible situations, the status of the 
entailer-sentence cannot affect the entailment-relation, which obtains in any case.   
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In EX-logic, such unnatural entailments are little cause for concern. As it is our goal, 
however, to contribute to a model of a cognitively realistic logic, i.e. one which is not at 
variance with natural language intuitions about the nature of logical relations, a way has 
to be found to explain the unnaturalness of such entailments.    
 
3.3.4.1 Informativeness 
 
For (112) and (113) this solution will be sought by generalizing a condition for 
pragmatic well-formedness for discourse, which was formulated by Scharten (1997: 65) 
in an incremental semantic framework.  For concreteness’ sake, I shall first introduce 
some discourse data which the condition is designed to handle. Then I shall introduce 
Scharten’s definitions and propose an improved version thereof. That version will be 
shown to solve the unnatural entailments problem of (112) and (113).  
 
The following pair of examples illustrates that discourse is conjunctive (or, to state it in 
algebraic terms: multiplicative): 
 
(115) a. John was in the garden (= A).  Mary came in (= B). 
 b.John was in the garden and Mary came in. 
 
The set of possible situations in which A∧B is true is a proper subset of the set of 
possible situations in which A alone is true: /A/⋂/B/ is a proper subset of /A/. 
 
Now compare the previous pair with the next one: 
 
(116) a. ??John was in the garden.  John was in the garden. 
 b. ??John was in the garden and John was in the garden. 
 
This pair illustrates that in multiplicative systems like discourse, there is a requirement at 
work which demands what might be called information increase.  Each new sentence 
should add information: 
 
(117)  Information Increase Requirement:  
 An utterance P uttered in discourse context C must be informative in C 
 
Scharten’s version of the requirement is the following principle: 
 
(118) pragmatic principle 
A discourse is well-formed if every successive utterance is informative with 
respect to its context 
 
She gives the principle – inspired by Van der Sandt’s (1982: 185) discourse acceptability 
conditions and Seuren’s (1985: 274) notion of informativeness – further flesh by means 
of the following formal definition of the notion informative (Scharten 1997: 64).  
 
(119) Definition  
 An utterance P is informative in the context C iff 
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 /C+P/ is a proper subset of /C/  and /C+P/ ≠ the empty set ø 
 
In this definition, the valuation space of P is symbolized as /P/, and the result of updating 
a context C with P is written as C+P.  This latter convention might lead to confusion, 
however. In contrast with what Scharten’s use of the +-sign suggests, updating C with P 
has the effect of intersecting /C/ and /P/, which in Boolean terms is a matter of 
conjunction, i.e. multiplication (= x) in his algebra, rather than addition (= +).58 
 
An improved set-theoretic version of the definition of informativeness is consequently: 
 
(120)  Informativeness 
An utterance P is informative in the context C iff 
CP, i.e. /C/⋂/P/ is a proper subset of /C/ and /C/⋂/P/ ≠ the empty set ø59 
 
The exclusion of the empty set as the extension of the conjunction of /C/ and /P/ 
“expresses the condition that in any discourse inconsistencies should be avoided” 
(Scharten 1997: 64). 
 
To illustrate how the notion informative works, let /C/ be /John is dead/. When asserting 
this sentence, one asserts that the actual situation sa is a member of the extensional set 
/C/ of possible situations in which C is true. Next we add the utterance P:John was 
murdered, whose valuation space is /P/.  This new utterance is informative if the class of 
situations to which the combination /C/⋂/P/ is simultaneously applicable is a proper 
subset of the set of possible situations to which /C/ is applicable. In the example given 
that is the case, since not everyone who is dead was murdered. If, however, upon uttering 
P the set /C/ of situations in which C is true is unchanged, P is not informative in C.  
Such a context can be created by turning the examples above around, i.e. by letting C be 
John was murdered and P John is dead.  This time P is not informative in discourse 
context C, since /C/⋂/P/ = /C/, hence violates the proper subset condition.    
 
But note that a sentence spelling out an entailment relation John was murdered, hence 
John is dead has precisely the structure in which the last uttered clause is not informative 
relative to the first. Since the sentence is perfectly fine, however, spelling out an 
entailment relation is better looked upon as the identification and spelling out of a 
context presupposed for an utterance P, so that informativeness applies as always – P is 
informative in C: 
 
(121) P: John was murdered, hence C: John is dead  
 
                                                          
58 The symbol +, for its part, is the sign of the operation of aggregation or addition, corresponding 
to disjunction, the operation for which language uses the expression (either)…or. Thus the class of 
things which are either x or y, the union of x and y, is represented by x + y.   
59 Note the similarity between this discourse notion and the (lexical/propositional) notion of 
entailment (similarity, not identity): /C/⋂/P/ is a proper subset of /C/ means that /C/⋂/P/ entails 
/C/.  Entailment is a bit looser than informativeness in that it requires inclusion (⊆), but not proper 
inclusion (⊂). 
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The pragmatic requirement of contextual information increase provides a solution to the 
unnaturalness of the entailment in (112). P being a contradiction and the valuation space 
of P being empty, the intersection of /P/ and the valuation space of any proposition one 
chooses (quodlibet) as context C will always yield the null set.  In terms of 
informativeness, the result is always Ø (the valuation space of a contradiction: true in no 
situation at all; the empty valuation space), hence noninformative, which I take to be the 
source of the unnaturalness of the entailment:  
 
(122) 
 
Ex (necessarie) falso sequitur quodlibet 
P :Some rhinoceros is not a 
rhinoceros  ├   
C: Some senile professor 
has pink stockings 
/P/= Ø /C/⋂Ø   = Ø, hence P is not 
informative in context C 
 
The same informativeness approach correctly marks (113) (=(123)) as unnatural: 
 
(123)  
 
Identical propositions 
P: John was in the garden  ├   
C: John was in the garden 
/C/ = /P/ /C/⋂/P/ = /C/, hence P is not 
informative in context C 
 
This time, the intersection /C/⋂/P/ fails to be a proper subset of /C/, hence 
informativeness is once again violated.  The fact that this type of  “self-entailment” or 
improper entailment is as EX-logically impeccable as ex necessarie falso sequitur 
quodlibet entailments, but ruled out as unnatural in natural language by the same 
informativeness principle, indicates that the latter is a most useful tool.   
 
Finally, an account has to be found for the unnaturalness of verum sequitur ad quodlibet 
entailments. In such cases, it does not matter to the entailment relationship whether the 
entailer-sentence is true or not. The entailed sentence being a necessary truth, i.e. a 
sentence that is true in all possible situations, the status of the entailer-sentence cannot 
affect the entailment-relation, which obtains in any case.  That is a problem, however, 
since the entailment is felt to be unnatural in natural language. Moreover, the account 
developed above for ex (necessarie) falso sequitur quodlibet and identical propositions 
does not work straighforwardly for these verum sequitur ad quodlibet cases, since /C/, 
the extension of the necessary truth, is 1 (= the universe SIT), of which any P (except 
another necessary truth or contradiction) is a nonnull proper subset. This means that the 
pattern satisfies (120).  
 
(124)  
 
Verum sequitur ad 
quodlibet 
P: John is in the garden├   C: A rose is a rose 
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Verum sequitur ad 
quodlibet 
/C/ = SIT /C/⋂/P/ = /P /, hence P is informative in /C/ 
 
However, with a minor modification this case can be dealt with.  Assume that for any 
discourse there is an initial "default" context Ci, whose extension is SIT.  Before 
anything is said, no possible situation has been excluded yet – note the negative 
perspective again – and hence the set of possible situations in which the initial zero 
discourse context Ci is true, is the universe SIT.  On that basic assumption, a rose is a 
rose in verum sequitur ad quodlibet entailments is the first P uttered within the initial 
context Ci.  However, the intersection of /P/ and /Ci/ is not a subset of /Ci/ and 
consequently the tautology is not informative.  
 
(125)  
 
P: A rose is a rose ├  Ci  
/Ci/ = SIT /Ci/⋂/P/ = /Ci/, hence P is not informative in /Ci/ 
 
By economy, the context C in verum sequitur ad quodlibet sentences is superfluous: 
uttering P: John is in the garden in the context of C: a rose is a rose is no different in 
terms of informativeness to uttering P directly in context Ci, which is the more 
economical, hence doubly more natural option. The overall pattern turns out to be that 
natural entailments are those involving propositions which can be informative. 
Necessary truths and contradictions are the two types of propositions that cannot. 
  
On the whole, it turns out to be possible to make cognitive sense of unnatural entailment 
relations and explain the nature of the unnaturalness involved if entailment is dealt with 
in function of properties of valuation spaces and discourse informativeness.  The latter 
provides means to rule out unnatural entailments and its connection with the language 
user’s cognition is obvious.   
 
3.3.4.2 Informativeness generalized 
 
There are reasons to believe that there is a well-formedness or economy principle like the 
following which constrains concatenation at other levels than discourse alone. 
 
(126) well-formedness principle 
A constituent is well-formed in an existing context if it is informative with 
respect to that context 
 
What I have in mind is a generalized notion of informativeness, for which it suffices to 
replace the word “utterance” of (120) by “constituent”: 
 
(127)  Constituent Informativeness 
A [consequent] constituent P is informative in the [precedent] context C iff 
CP, i.e. /C/⋂/P/ is a proper subset of /C/ and /C/⋂ /P/ ≠ the empty set ø 
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A first reason to believe that this concept of incremental informativeness is well-taken, is 
that the precedent-consequent asymmetry it introduces is instantiated in the head-
nonhead difference in syntactic phrases.  In modifier-head constructions, such as skilful 
violinist for instance, the extension of the head violinist is the precedent context C whose 
intersection with the extension of the consequent modifier skilful, i.e. P, has to result in a 
proper subset of C for P to be informative in the complex constituent.   
 
But more importantly, as the decomposition of the entailers all and and in the next 
chapter will show, there too a precedent-consequent asymmetry internal to their meaning 
can be observed: a basic pivotal meaning will function as the presuppositional context C 
and a further semantic specification will narrow down the extension to that of a more 
restrictive, hence more informative fully-fledged entailer.  This generalized concept of 
constituent informativeness will be further motivated in § 4.2.5 and 4.4.5.160.   
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
The general conclusion of this chapter is that the two relations of the 2D Cartesian 
Coordinate System are core features of IN-logic.  The latter is far more comprehensive 
than just an analysis of the features of logical constants at the expense of other lexical 
items.  The two relations are best stated at the level of such lexical items, from where 
their properties percolate and play a role at the higher levels of phrases, clauses, 
sentences, discourse.  An attempt has been made in this chapter to define the two 
relations in logical, set-theoretical and algebraic terms.  While CD is at the root of set 
demarcation, entailment concerns inferential relationships between two sets. In a 
linguistic setting, entailment is subject to a further condition of procedural economy 
called informativeness: 
 
(128) a. A naturally entails B iff A is informative in the context B 
b. A naturally entails B iff the IN-extension of A is a proper subset of the IN-
extension of B and the intersection of A and B is not the null set 
 
The procedural-dynamic aspect of the informativeness requirement is the source of 
asymmetry. New constituents have to be informative relative to old ones. In that sense, 
informativeness imposes a constraint which has a narrowing effect on the set of natural 
entailments. While the definition of entailment need not be modified and remains stated 
in terms of set inclusion, the effect of the added constraint of informativeness is to rule 
out the unnatural cases, namely those involving the null set, the universe set and 
improper set inclusion.  
 
At this point, however, a new question arises. The classical logical calculi were stated in 
terms of only one of the two relations described in this chapter, namely as calculi of 
entailments.  But why?  Given the at least equally foundational role in our 2D Cartesian 
Coordinate System of the relation of contradictoriness, I shall now explore whether a 
                                                          
60 An important caveat is that constituent informativeness as formulated here only pertains to the 
entailment (set-subset) leg of the logical system. It is not valid for the quality leg (i.e. 
contradictoriness; set-complement). For instance: if consequent sentence negation takes a 
precedent (non-referential) clause as its argument, then the intersection  of /S/ and /NOT (x)/ is 
clearly not a nonnull subset of S.  
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shift from the classical approach in terms of entailment to an approach in terms of CD 
and more specifically its linguistic expression negation would not be a promising option 
from the perspective of natural logic.  The next chapter is devoted to showing that such a 
move indeed opens new perspectives and brings the format of the calculus closer to the 
reality of natural language expressions. 
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4  THE 2D CARTESIAN COORDINATE SYSTEM AND 
TWO OPERATIONS IN  PRELEXICAL SYNTAX 
 
4.1 From Propositional and Lexical Relations to Prelexical Operations 
 
The relations of the Square of Oppositions were reduced to two foundational ones in 
chapter 2, namely contradictoriness (CD) between the I-corner and the E-corner and 
entailment (ENT) from the A-corner to the I-corner respectively.  The basic relation of 
contradictoriness CD (I, E) was shown to generalize over CD (OR, NOR) and CD 
(SOME, NONE); the relation of entailment ENT (A, I) over ENT (AND, OR) and ENT 
(ALL, SOME)61. In the third chapter, it was argued that the relations in question can be 
stated on lexical items as proposition types. 
 
Within the system of relations, the definition of CD turned out to be more complex than 
that of entailment, with an accumulation of negatives:   
 
(129) 
For every sentence X, ¬X is the 
contradictory of X 
OR ├ ¬NOR  
(¬NOR ≡ ¬¬OR) 
 
The second foundational relation, namely the subaltern affirmative entailment relation 
between AND and OR, was simpler to state. 
 
(130) 
For all sentences AND and OR, 
AND entails OR 
AND  ├ OR 
 
The reason behind this difference is simple: the definition of the two basic relations as 
well as the derivation of all other relations in the Boethian Square has always been 
carried out in terms of entailment, not in terms of CD.  Since the relation between AND 
and OR is itself an instance of entailment, it is not surprising that it was easier to state in 
terms of entailment than CD. 
 
But why was that choice made? The main answer is that the analysis has always been 
carried out in Aristotelian terms. His system is one of deductive reasoning, which is the 
method for arriving at particular (I-corner) from universal (A-corner) truths, in other 
words, in terms of entailment.  History has shown that compared to inductive reasoning 
– which generalizes from particular to universal truths, i.e. from I to A –, deduction is the 
only way to guarantee that the truth of a conclusion follows necessarily from the truth of 
the premises.  Yet, setting up all definitions in terms of the relation of entailment at the 
                                                          
61 Actually, as has long been recognized for the Boethian Square, ENT (A, I) and CD (I, E) are not 
restricted to the operators of the predicate calculus and the propositional calculus but have more 
instantiations, e.g. ENT (2, 1) and CD (1, 0);  ENT (necessity, possibility) and CD (possibility, 
impossibility); ENT (affirmative, question) and CD (question, negation).  Cp. Löbner ‘s (1990: 78-
89) duality groups, which generalize over  the standard operators of predicate and propositional 
logic, epistemic and deontic modality, aspectual adverbs (already, still, yet, no longer) and  
aspectual verbs (begin, continue, cease). 
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level of full sentences turns out not to do justice to a number of detectable internal 
properties of the lexical items that figure in logical systems.  Since the third chapter led 
to the conclusion that CD and ENT are best stated on lexical items in the natural 
language lexicon, detectable morphological and semantic features of lexicalised 
operators cannot be ignored. Thus the CD relation between propositions with (either…) 
or and (neither…) nor  
 
(131) a. Either Mary is in Paris or Jill is in Paris 
 b. Neither Mary is in Paris nor Jill is in Paris 
 
is in essence based on a single morphological feature, namely the negation morpheme -n.  
In this chapter, it will be argued that it is not accidental that the negative operator ¬ is 
the only symbol beyond ├ which was used in the definitions of (129) and (130). 
Specifically, a cognitively realistic description of logical primitives has to be carried out 
in negative terms entirely, more specifically in terms of negative operations internal to 
the conceptual structure of logical operators, and only derivatively in terms of entailment 
relations at sentence level. This does not mean that the latter become any less real. Their 
continued – but derived – existence guarantees that the traditional results are not lost.   
 
The proposal that will be made is to postulate that the relations CD and ENT are not 
primitives, but effects at the lexical, syntactic and discourse level of deeper operations in 
prelexical syntax.  More specifically, the processes that generate those effects are two 
operations in the internal, prelexical syntax of logical operators as lexical items, namely 
negation (NON) and conjunction (ET62) respectively. One of the arguments for 
postulating the former as the operation behind CD is the abovementioned presence of 
negation in the internal structure of nor, which is at the root of a CD relation between 
OR- and NOR-propositions (cf. Löbner 1990: 95; further arguments will be provided in 
4.5 and in chapter 5). Logical and semantic arguments will lead to the postulation of the 
operation conjunction as the prelexical correlate of ENT.   
 
These two operations themselves, however, are still not primitives yet.  They are variants 
of a single negative operator (as originally proved by C.S. Peirce (1989 [1880])), which 
implies that it is possible in principle to account for the internal semantic composition of 
the propositional operators and, or, nor and not in terms of a single underlying negative 
operator.  The precise nature of the operator in question will be presented in § 4.4, as will 
the formal structure of its variants, the two operations NON and ET.  It is the latter 
which are used to compose the semantic concepts of A-corner entailers and E-corner 
contradictors, all lexical items.  
 
The required shift in perspective from the propositional and lexical relations CD and 
ENT to the operations NON and ET in the Language of Thought and prelexical syntax 
will be set out in six parts.  Since our analysis is a set-theoretic approach to the extension 
of propositional operators in terms of valuation spaces, 4.2 will be devoted to the way in 
which sets in general are demarcated according to George Boole.  In particular, a law 
proposed by him to derive the logical Law of Contradiction will be described.  It will be 
                                                          
62 Latin labels are used to stress the status of the operators as universals.  The underline is used to 
mark that they are abstract, i.e. non-lexicalisable and below conscious awareness. 
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argued that Boole’s algebraic approach to sets is cognitively real and can be stated at the 
lexical concept level.  It thereby becomes a feature of IN-logic. A core property of 
Boole’s approach to set demarcation is its invariably binary nature, even for simple sets. 
In 4.3, that property of strict binarity will be shown to be a core feature of C.S. Peirce’s 
derivation of all propositional truth functions from a single binary, negative truth 
function as well, hardly an accident.  While Peirce’s analysis is again stated at the level 
of propositions, 4.4 will illustrate that a modification of his analysis turns his derivation 
into a psychologically realistic description of the internal semantic structure of 
propositional operators as lexical items. The proposal will then be extended to predicate 
calculus operators.  In 4.5 and 4.6, empirical evidence for the decomposition analysis 
will be gathered. The data given will provide evidence that the two relations CD and 
ENT are indeed correctly viewed as the products of the prelexical operations of negation 
(NON; 4.5) and conjunction (ET; 4.6) respectively.   
 
An important feature of the present analysis, which it shares with generalized quantifier 
theory, Löbner’s duality approach and Seuren’s logic of thinking, is that logical relations 
between operators are lexically encoded.   Consequently, the laws of logic somehow 
have to be transferred from the level of sentences in which operators are used to the level 
of the Language of Thought and the conceptual semantic structure inside the lexical 
items that operators represent. That this transfer is possible is due to the fact that the 
lexical items in question are proposition types (cf. 3.3.1. and 3.3.3.2)63. Thus the lexical 
item or, for instance, has two variable positions, say P and Q, in the lexicon, which are 
substituted in syntax by propositional constants to yield the complex propositions on 
which the propositional calculus is traditionally defined.  It is for this reason that laws 
whose effect can be observed at sentence level, can be traced back to the level of the 
internal conceptual structure of the operators themselves.  It is in this respect that the 
reader is asked to constantly keep in mind that where theories are invoked that were 
originally stated at the level of full sentences or propositions, the aim is invariably to 
translate their content into generalizations about lexical items. The motivation for this 
transfer is always the same: the entailment relation at the propositional level between, 
say, All F are G and Some F are G can only be due to the difference in semantic 
contribution between the words all and some, all other things being equal in the 
propositions at hand.  Since lexical items, not creative sentences, are the linguistic 
elements which are stored in long-term memory anyway, most properties are most 
naturally stated at the lexical level.  Predicating the generalisations on entire sentences is 
not a valid alternative: the latter involve free choice of lexical items and are therefore 
novel and mostly fleeting creations (stereotyped expressions aside). This word of caution 
is intended to make sure that if I should not have sufficiently stressed this general line in 
one place or another, it is nonetheless constantly intended.    
 
Since Löbner’s duality approach is the closest relative of my revised Peircean approach, 
an overview of the main differences between the two will be given in 4.8.  Their effect is 
to radicalize his asymmetry hypothesis, but to reject the idea that the number of steps in 
the derivation of an operator can explain the *nand/nall gap. 
 
                                                          
63 If they were not propositional, a valuation space analysis could not be adopted. 
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4.2 Sets in Boolean Algebra 
 
4.2.1 The Boolean Logic of Classes 
 
In this section, a cognitive perspective on set demarcation needed for a decompositional 
approach to lexical operators will be elaborated. Its main focus is a law discovered by 
George Boole, namely his so-called Law of Duality. This law enabled him to derive the 
Law of Contradiction (LC) and the set-theoretic fact that it is impossible for an 
individual to be both a member and a non-member of a set. As Aristotle and the whole 
tradition after him had proclaimed that LC is an axiom for which no proof can be 
provided, Boole’s analysis and his claim that LC can be derived is of great importance 
for the relation of contradictoriness of our 2D Cartesian Coordinate System. Moreover, it 
wil help us identify a single binary operator behind all set demarcation, including that of 
the sets denoted by logical operators as lexical items in the natural language lexicon. 
Boole combined a set-theoretic conception of “election” by means of a predicative 
elective symbol G with the idea that successive operations of election are analogous to 
multiplication in an algebra of the numbers 0 and 1. This is the basis of the Boolean 
Logic of Classes, some aspects of which will now be set out.  
Boolean logic works with a number of variables x, y, z and two constants (1 and 0).  The 
symbol 0 represents the null set. The symbol 1, or unity, is taken “to represent the 
Universe [in casu, the universe of individuals IND, DJ] (…) comprehending every 
conceivable class of objects whether actually existing or not, it being premised that the 
same individual may be found in more than one class, inasmuch as it may possess more 
than one quality in common with other individuals.” (Boole 1847: 15). “The symbol x 
operating on any subject comprehending individuals or classes” selects “from that 
subject all the X’s which it contains” (Boole 1847: 15).  The Universe 1 is thereby 
divided in two subsets: x and (1-x).  
 
(132) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If from the result x of this first operation we select the y’s, the outcome of these two 
operations in succession, represented by x x y, or xy, will be the class of things which are 
both x’s and y’s. In Boolean algebra, successive selection is a case of multiplication, in 
set-theory the equivalent of this operation is the intersection of x and y. From a logical 
perspective, successive selection of two sets is a case of conjunction. Such successive 
selection will play a crucial role in the system to be developed (cf. 4.2.2.) and can be 
represented as follows: 
 
(133) a. 
 
  
 
x 
1-x 1  
x y 
1  
xy 
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b. 
 Logic set-theory algebra 
conjunction intersection multiplication Successive 
selection: 
x and y 
x ∧ y x ⋂ y x x y,  or  xy 
 
4.2.2 Double Selection of the Same Set: a Cognitive Double-check? 
 
The relevance of this system to the Law of Contradiction is that Boole uses his algebra to 
prove that “what has been commonly regarded as the fundamental axiom of metaphysics 
is but the consequence of a law of thought, mathematical in its form” (Boole 1854: 50). 
He does this by first observing that repetition of the same operation of election does not 
alter the result: selecting the x’s and then from the result of that selecting again all the 
x’s merely gives the class of x’s.  Thus 
 
 x x = x, or x2 = x 
 
This algebraic equation is called Boole’s “Law of Duality”, one of his fundamental laws 
of thought. He shows how the Law of Contradiction is a consequence of this law in the 
following terms: 
 
“Let us write this equation in the form 
 x2 - x = 0, 
whence we have 
 x (1 – x) = 0;         
both these transformations being justified by the axiomatic laws of 
combination and transposition (II.13).  
[ Stepwise, we get the derivation: (a) x2 - x = 0; (b) x2  = x; (c) 0 = x - x2; 0 = 
x (1 – x), which is of course identical to x (1 – x) = 0 as in Boole’s text, DJ] 
 Let us, for simplicity of conception, give to the symbol x the particular 
interpretation of men, then 1 – x will represent the class of “not-men” (Prop. 
III.)  Now the formal product of the expressions of two classes represents 
that class of individuals which is common to them both (II.6)  Hence x (1 – 
x) will represent the class whose members are at once “men,” and “not men,” 
and the equation (1) thus expresses the principle, that a class whose members 
are at the same time men and not men does not exist. In other words, that it is 
impossible for the same individual to be at the same time a man and not a 
man. Now let the meaning of the symbol x be extended from the representing 
of “men,” to that of any class of beings characterized by the possession of 
any quality whatever; and the equation (1) will then express that it is 
impossible for a being to possess a quality and not to possess that quality at 
the same time.  But this is identically that “principle of contradiction” which 
Aristotle has described as the fundamental axiom of all philosophy.”  
             (Boole 1854: 49) 
 
Since each and every set obeys this set-theoretic version of the Law of Contradiction, we 
adopt Boole’s insight and interpret it in cognitive terms as meaning that whenever a set x 
is demarcated at the prelexical concept level, this is done by (s)electing x twice at the 
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same time, a double procedure (134) (a) that will be called twin selection  and which, 
given the identity of the two selections, results in a single overlay representation (134) 
(b) in the mind if all is well. That is the only way to guarantee or check that no element 
is at the same time inside and outside a set, i.e. the set-theoretic version of the Law of 
Contradiction. Twin-selection is represented by means of Venn diagrams in (134). 
 
(134) 
(a) operations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xx 
 
 
(b) resulting representation 
 
 
 
 
= x  
 
Selection of x takes place twice in (134) a : xx. Since the second selection yields 
precisely the same result as the first, its result cannot differ from the application of the 
first selection. The intersection of the first and second selection of x consequently results 
in x itself, as in (134) b. Boole’s equivalence of xx and x above was represented by 
letting the two results of the selections in the twin selection operation map into a single 
set x, thus visualising that the intersection xx after twin selection, equals x itself. In sum, 
selecting the same x twice, results in a cognitive representation (b) in which the products 
of the two selections are conflated by intersection. 
 
The numbering of the two selections as selection 1 and selection 2 crucially does not 
imply temporal or logical ordering.  The fact that the two selections are presented in 
sequence is purely a matter of convenience and the numbering is added merely for ease 
of reference. In actual fact, twin selection as operational in the Language of Thought is 
simultaneous and unordered64. The two selections not being temporally or logically 
ordered, the resulting representation we actually get is the output of the twin selection 
procedure, i.e. the single, integrated representation of (134) (b).  
 
An important distinction to be drawn at this point concerns the level at which LC is 
observed.  When Boole claims that a class NMAN whose members are at the same time 
men and not men does not exist, this is to be taken as an expression of the law of duality 
and LC at the level of the internal semantic structure of concepts. At this level, there is 
                                                          
64 This claim will be further motivated in 4.2.5. below. 
X 
1 
X 
X X 
 
 Twin Selection 1 1 
    AND 
Mapping (conflation) 
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no conscious control or awareness, so that the law is inviolable and hence makes it 
totally impossible to construct such a set. It therefore also precludes the formation of a 
natural lexical predicate nman with such conceptual content.  In syntax, however, it is 
possible to construct a sentence which as a whole expresses a violation of LC: 
 
(135) Johni is a man and Johni is not a man.  
 
Though this sentence is still experienced as a contradiction, it is nonetheless possible to 
construct it and interpret it.  The difference between LC at the concept level and at the 
level of full propositions then is that at the former it is the inviolable law described by 
Boole above, while at the latter it is a violable law that is here honoured in the breach. 
 
4.2.3 Extending Twin Selection to Selection of Different Sets 
 
The above argument in favour of twin selection of the same set X to demarcate a single 
set was indirect, namely the fact that it enabled Boole to derive the Law of Contradiction 
as a law of thought rather than to have to postulate it as a metaphysical axiom. That was 
a major result and one may wonder why it has not had a greater influence. The likely 
answer is that skeptical readers may have questioned the validity of adopting this 
hypothesis because the mapping leading to the integrated representation  of (134) (b) 
involves two instances of the same set, resulting in conflation and a representation 
constituting just a single set.  Why select the same set twice to end up with a single one? 
Well, for those for whom the derivation of LC is not convincing enough as a validation 
for this kind of cognitive double-check procedure, we are now at a juncture where an 
additional argument can be provided in favour of twin selection for the demarcation of 
sets. This is achieved by broadening the perspective from successive selection of the 
same set (= same-selection) to successive selection of two different sets X and Y (= 
different-selection).  The latter involves exactly the same binary selection procedure used 
earlier, the only difference being that it takes two different sets as input.  
 
 (136) 
(a) operations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
(b) resulting representation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
1 
X Y 
 
 Twin Selection 
1 
Mapping (conflation) 
X Y XY 
1- (X+Y) 
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To understand what 1-(X+Y) denotes in this diagram, it is to be noted that Boolean 
algebra has two binary operations, namely multiplication and addition, defined as 
follows (and explained below the box):  
 
(137) 
addition: (1) a + 0 = a multiplication: (1’) a x 0 = 0 
 (2) a + 1 = 1  (2’) a x 1 = a 
 (3) a + a = a  (3’) a x a = a 
    
That multiplication in Boolean algebra corresponds with intersection in set-theory will 
already be clear from the derivation of the Law Of Contradiction in terms of the Law of 
Duality (a x a = a) above. Addition, for its part, corresponds with union in set theory: the 
union of set a with the universe 1, for instance, equals the universe 1 (cf. (137)-(2): a + 1 
= 1); the union of a and a is  the set a itself (cf. (137)-(3): a + a = a).  In view of this, 
X+Y denotes the union of X and Y and 1-(X+Y) the complement thereof, i.e. everything 
that is neither in X nor in Y in (136) (b). 
The effect of generalizing twin selection from same-selection to different-selection and 
considering not just multiplication/intersection but also addition/union of the two 
selections is that the resulting diagram can represent different types of sets and the 
relationships between them as a single integrated whole, as follows.   
 
(138)                         ⋂ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The reason why this is advantageous is that these three types of complex sets reintroduce 
the extension sets of the lexical items forming the three hubs of propositional logic, 
namely and (conjunction ∧), or (disjunction ∨) and nor (the negation of a disjunction 
¬∨), this time in set-theoretic guise.     
 
(139) 
 logic set-theory algebra 
disjunction Union Addition OR 
X∨Y X ⋃ Y X+Y 
conjunction intersection Multiplication AND 
X∧Y X ⋂ Y XxY 
negation of 
disjunction 
complement of 
union 
universe minus 
addition 
NOR 
¬ (X∨Y) X ⋃ Y 1-(X+Y) 
1 
X Y 
⋃ 
XY 
1- (X+Y) 
⋃ 
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The assumption of twin selection with different sets and the resulting diagram thus yield 
the triadic logical structure outlined earlier.  The integrated diagram expresses the 
independent intuition that the three focal propositional operators form a single paradigm 
of semantically related items.   
 
(140)        ∧ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, it also identifies disjunction (∨) as less restrictive (hence arguably 
semantically less complex) than the two other operators: three cells are compatible with 
its description, whereas only one cell is compatible with conjunction (∧) and one with 
joint falsehood (¬∨). 
 
It would have been possible in principle to add 1-(XxY), i.e. the complement of the 
intersection of X and Y in (138) and the corresponding negation of the conjunction in 
(140). At this point, where no lexicalisation constraints have been introduced yet, it is 
not yet clear why such O-corner items are not possible lexical items in everyday natural 
language.  It will be necessary to develop the linguistic and cognitive side of the analysis 
further to gain ground.   
 
Note finally that in correspondence with the commutative laws of addition and 
multiplication in algebra (a+b = b+a; axb = bxa), symmetry has to be assumed to 
characterize the basic triad of operators (X∨Y≡ Y∨X; X∧Y ≡ Y∧X; ¬(X∨Y) ≡ ¬(Y∨X)). 
This means that twin selection does not care about the order of selection (a point that will 
be further elaborated in § 4.2.5). This in turn excludes implication from the basic kit of 
operators, as it is antisymmetric and therefore does care about order. In view of our 
triadic perspective on natural logic, that is a welcome result. Moreover, implication is 
easily convertible into a combination of the basic operators: X → Y  ≡ ¬X∨Y.   
 
4.2.4 The Law Of Contradiction  
 
On the whole, it turns out that there are two cases of twin selection which can be ruled 
out by the informativeness condition (127).  First of all, there is the contradiction x(1-x). 
In this case, mapping leaves nothing at all after integration by means of intersection of 
the information provided by the two selections.   
 
(141) X (1-X) = 0 X ⋂ X = ø 
1 
X Y
¬∨ 
∨ 
XY 
1- (X+Y) 
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This situation represents the effect of contradictory sets on twin selection at the level of 
the internal structure of concepts. The latter module is arguably below the level of 
conscious control and maybe even awareness (except in the artificial context of scientific 
study when we try to approach them).  It cannot therefore give rise to conscious toying 
and constitute an inviolable substrate. I take this to mean that at this level no violation of 
informativeness is possible, so that no contradiction is allowed or possible either. This in 
turn predicts that there cannot be natural lexical items whose conceptual structure is 
internally contradictory, such as *nman or *nwhite, with the contradictory internal 
meaning structures [[MAN]&[NON-MAN]] and [[WHITE]&[NON-WHITE]] 
respectively. This seems to be correct. 
 
The other case that is barred as a natural predicate is the universal predicate, which is the 
result of twin-selection of the universe 1. Once again informativeness, which imposes a 
nonnull proper subset condition on the output of twin selection relative to the input 
universe 1, rules these cases out as natural predicates.65  
 
Regarding the difference between inviolable application of constraints in certain modules 
as opposed to others, consider the following. Since lexical selection and concrete use of 
syntactic concatenation rules (e.g. the fact that Merge is appealed to, say, 137 times in a 
particular derivation) are bound to involve conscious choice, laws of thought which 
cannot be violated in the Language of Thought module can if so desired be contravened 
in syntax.  Consequently, syntactic phrases in violation of informativeness and with a 
contradictory meaning - e.g. non-white white and Peteri is not Peteri – can be produced 
(even though similar violations at the level of the internal structure of concepts are not 
possible).  Such constructions are still clearly felt to be contradictory and thus testify to 
the reality of the abovementioned law of contradiction in the Language of Thought. Yet, 
they can nonetheless be produced, in my view precisely because from the lexicon up into 
syntax we are in the realm of conscious choice of lexical material, so that IN-logic is 
from here on observed in the breach as much as in the observation66. The importance of 
recognizing this difference between violability of rules from the lexicon up into syntax 
and inviolabity of rules in the Language of Thought module is considerable in that it 
solves a problem that has beset psychological IN-logic for a very long time. At least 
since Kant it was recognized that there is a problem with viewing logic as a set of hard 
and fast rules in the mind.  The reason is that such a conception would leave no room for 
the undeniable fact that logical rules are so often broken in reasoning.  In the modular 
conception developed here, however, these two features (namely “hard and fast rules” 
and “broken in reasoning”) are no longer incompatible. If logical rules are hard and fast 
and inviolable in the underground realm of the Language of Thought, that suffices to be 
able to conclude that logic is in the mind. And if conscious, free choice is indeed 
involved in lexical selection, syntactic concatenation and discourse, then lexical selection 
                                                          
65 The present observation that all trivial predicates (the empty predicate and the universal 
predicate) are barred broadens Zwarts’ (1983: 38-39)  (and Westerståhl’s (1985)) condition that 
trivial determiners which make any sentence in which they are used true (the universal determiner) 
or false (the empty determiner) cannot exist. 
66 Note that the dividing line is not claimed to be between word and phrase, but between lexicon 
and syntax.  This is because of the existence of formulaic stereotyped phrases.  The existence of 
collocations also indicates that the boundary is rather fuzzy.   
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restrictions and logical laws can be broken in those realms and ungrammaticality and 
contradictions can be produced. They are still recognized as such because of the hard and 
fast underground Laws of Thought, yet conscious choice and free concatenation make 
the construction of such violations of logical laws possible. In sum, in a modular system 
as here envisaged, the Kantian paradox for psychological IN-logic evaporates. 
 
4.2.5 Twin Selection is Unordered Simultaneous Selection 
 
An important specification has to be added to Boole’s axiomatic Law of Duality, namely 
a requirement of simultaneity of selection within twin selection. The Law then states 
more accurately that (s)electing the same set twice at the same time systematically yields 
the same result as a single selection of that set, from which it follows algebraically that 
x(1-x) = 0, which in turn entails that it is impossible for an element to be at the same 
time inside and outside a set. The qualification ‘at the same time’ is crucial due to the 
fact that a set is invariably a pairing intension–extension and extensions may change 
over time: kings of the Belgians had a different field of applicability in 1990 than it has 
since Albert II became king on August 9, 1993. The extension involved, it should be 
noted, is once again IN-extension: for someone who only learned about Albert II’s 
accession to the throne one week after it happened, the IN-extension during that week 
was still the same as before – and even then it may have been incomplete for lack of 
knowledge of all Belgian kings before Albert II.  Since for many uses of the selection, 
that difference has no implications, specific knowledge about all the actual individuals 
comprised in the extension is not a precondition for use of the symbol.  Actually, if such 
strictness were imposed, absolute knowledge would be a precondition for speech and 
thought and silence would be the predictable result: the meaning of ‘book’ would change 
with every new publication, a conclusion which is patently false. In this sense, the 
existence of IN-extensions, which are conceptual, idealized, hypothetical and fallible 
(but corrigible), is crucial and inescapable. But their corrigibility and changeability over 
time does of course make the instantaneous conception of twin selection crucial in 
Boole’s derivation of the Law of Contradiction.  Note that the claim that twin selection is 
simultaneous entails that it is necessarily an operation without internal sequential order 
(there is no “successive” selection (as Boole had it), but simultaneous selection). 
Specifically, internal to twin selection the informativeness requirement (§ 3.3.4.1), which 
is the principle that imposes order, does not hold.  The reason is that the definition of 
informativeness (see  (120) in § 3.3.4.1 and (127) in § 3.3.4.2) is predicated on a 
difference between a precedent context and a consequent  constituent: 
 
(142)  Informativeness 
 A [consequent] constituent P is informative in the [precedent] context C iff 
 CP, i.e. /C/⋂/P/ is a proper subset of /C/  and /C/⋂/P/ ≠ the empty set ø 
 
Given that the two sets selected in Boole’s twin selection are necessarily selected 
simultaneously,  no difference between precedent and consequent can be established and 
hence informativeness cannot apply.  
 
The properties of simultaneous selection and lack of order extend to all the variants of 
twin selection to be described below (including negation  NON and conjunction ET). As 
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mentioned earlier, all these notions are part of the Language of Thought and hence 
operate below conscious awareness and choice.   
 
4.2.6 Why Twin Selection? Why Exclusion? 
 
One might wonder with Boole why his deduction of the Law Of Contradiction is so 
crucially dependent on twin selection of the same set, and not on triple or quadruple 
selection, for instance.  Boole senses this is a fundamental question about our cognition, 
but has no real answer to it other than the observation that only twin selection yields the 
right results algebraically.  Our hypothesis runs as follows: set demarcation is – as I 
argued § 3.2.2.1 – a matter of exclusion of all that does not belong to it. As stated there, 
exclusion crucially involves negation.  Now, C.S. Peirce (1989 [1880]) proved that all 
propositional truth functions, including the unary truth function negation, can be derived 
from a single underlying negative binary truth function, namely the so-called joint 
falsehood function (neither…) nor (= ¬∨). This is the hypothesis that will be embraced 
in § 4.3.  I will argue that the latter claim is not only correct in EX-logic, but that 
cognition employs the same negative, binary operator to demarcate sets and hence also to 
generate the extension sets of surface operators of the lexicon. This is once again a 
transfer of insights at the level of propositions to the lexical level of propositional 
functions and their internal semantic structure.  If correct, the necessity of Boolean twin 
selection identified above is a corollary of the binary nature of the basic Peircean 
operator which governs all set demarcation – arguably the only primitive propositional 
operator our cognition works with. The fact that the Law Of Contradiction as a Law of 
Thought can only be derived on the basis of twin selection thus for the first time finds a 
natural explanation.  This issue will be returned to when the reduction of all 
propositional truth functions to the underlying joint falsehood function has been 
established. 
 
On the whole, the Boolean concept of set-demarcation developed so far, namely (a) by 
twin selection and (b) by exclusion is a wide-ranging and important notion in IN-logic. 
First of all, it is too close to the Peircean hypothesis that all propositional operators can 
be derived from a single  a binary, negative operator for the relationship to be accidental. 
Actually, the double link – twin ≈ binary and exclusion ≈  negative – between the two 
theoretical proposals has a mutually reinforcing effect. And another effect of linking 
them is that the properties of set demarcation (twin selection, negative exclusion) as 
introduced above need not be postulated as primitives of xx = x, but can be argued to 
derive from the negative, binary nature of the underlying primitive operator itself. 
Furthermore, since Boole proved that LC can be derived if twin selection and his Law of 
Duality are adopted, his derivation of the Law Of Contradiction via twin selection can 
ultimately be tied to the Peircean underlying operator as well. This derivation of a whole 
cluster of properties from those of a single axiomatic underlying truth function is the 
core of the present chapter.  
 
4.3 Peirce’s negative disjunctive truth function  
 
In this section, a basic negative truth function with the value of nor, i.e. ¬(P∨Q), will 
initially be used as the basic ingredient of a purely EX-logical decomposition analysis of 
the binary propositional truth functions (and, or, nor).   The analysis in question was 
ON THE NEGATIVE LOGIC OF NATURAL LANGUAGE 
 
85
proposed by C.S. Peirce, and all that will be added to it in this section is (i)  as didactic 
as possible a presentation of its contents and (ii) a notation system that makes that 
content more accessible. Once that is done, the stage is set for the next section, in which 
Peirce’s EX-logical analysis will be modified to yield a cognitively realistic IN-logical 
system at the prelexical level rather than a purely EX-logical system at sentence level.   
 
4.3.1 Getting the NEC of it – A single primitive truth function 
 
The present attempt to decompose propositional operators does not have to start from 
scratch. In EX-logic, it has been known for over a century that the truth-functions and, 
or, nor and not are not all independent, but can be related to one another by reduction to 
elements that underly all of them. “There is no great difficulty in reducing the number to 
two”, wrote Russell (1919, [2000]: 148). In his and A.N. Whitehead’s Principia 
Mathematica (1910-1913) the two chosen were negation and disjunction. 
 
(143)67 
 
A AND ¬(¬P∨¬Q) ¬(P∨Q) NOR E 
I OR P∨Q   
(equivalent to ¬¬(P∨Q)) 
¬P∨¬Q *NAND O 
 NOT ¬P   
 
Taking into account the equivalence of the two formulas for OR, it can be upheld that all 
operators can be reduced to a formula involving negation and disjunction. 
A reduction to negation and conjunction (rather than disjunction) is equally as feasible: 
 
(144) 
 
A AND P∧Q 
(equivalent to ¬¬(P∧Q)) 
¬P∧¬Q NOR E 
I OR ¬(¬P∧¬Q) ¬(P∧Q) *NAND O 
 NOT ¬P   
 
Comparing this reduction to the previous one, we note that the common denominator is 
negation, from which it is plausible to conclude that if further reduction of propositional 
operators should be possible, it would probably also involve a negative operator. This 
prominence of negation is not accidental. First of all, it is common coin in logic that two 
negatives make a positive, a toggle which is crucial if one wishes to be able to somehow 
switch from the negative operators NOR and NOT  (and NAND) to the positive 
                                                          
67 The labels from Boethius’ Square of Oppositions (cf. chapter 2) are added: A = universal 
affirmative, I = particular affirmative, E = universal negative and  O = particular negative (from 
nEgO, “I deny”). I use the same labels for the truth functions as defined in § 2.2.4: (i) P∧Q is 
written as AND, (ii) P∨Q is written as OR, (iii) ¬(P∨Q) is written as NOR, etc. In § 4.4, 
valuation space bars will be used around the operators to shift to my own lexical-item based 
cognitive analysis: from there on, the operators are therefore to be viewed as lexical items (i.e. 
propositional functions) again: /AND (P,Q)/, abbreviated into /AND/.  
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operators AND and OR,  and then back by means of a single toggle.  No similar results 
can be achieved if one starts from a positive corner: two positives do not make a 
negative. Secondly, there is a close association between the idea that there is a basic 
negative operator and our earlier observation that set demarcation (CD) and inferential 
relations between sets (entailment) involve set exclusion, which is itself a negative 
notion. The link can be shown by means of Venn-diagrams.  Take the formulas for NOR 
and AND in (143), repeated here as (145)a., and compare them with the equivalent set-
theoretic diagrams in (145)b. To bring out the parallellism between the two, one 
auxiliary device has been added in (145)b., namely a number of bars to mark the subsets 
of the rectangular universe SIT that are excluded (shaded).  
 
(145) a. 
 
NOR AND 
¬(P∨Q) ¬(¬P∨¬Q) 
 b.         
 
Note how the number and scope of the bars in the excluded areas of the Venn-diagram 
match precisely the number and scope of the negatives in the logical formulas: NOR has 
a single negation spanning its two terms which are correspondingly shaded in the Venn-
diagram, AND has a negation for each of its terms and the wide scope negation over the 
two negated terms is an instruction to exclude everything that is not-P or not-Q. That 
means excluding anything that is in the complement of P or the complement of Q, in all 
resulting in the shading of three cells in the diagram. 
 
Since logic and set-theory are plausibly alternative modes of looking at the same objects, 
this one-on-one relationship between the application of a negative operator and the 
exclusion of cells is no coincidence. In what follows, I shall try to prove for all 
propositional operators that the exclusion of subsets (cells) from the Universe SIT of 
possible situations that the rectangular Venn-diagram represents, is none other than the 
set-theoretic equivalent of the application of a single negative operator in logic. 
 
Since Peirce (1989 [1880]), Sheffer (1913) and Nicod (1917), it has indeed been 
appreciated that the logical vocabulary can be made even more economical than 
achieved in (143) and (144) above: all operators can be generated from a single basic 
truth function. As Boethius’ square has two negative corners, there are in principle two 
viable negative candidates for the status of single basic truth function: (i) Peirce’s joint 
P Q P Q 
SIT SIT 
P Q 
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falsehood68 function, represented as P↓ Q, read as ‘neither P nor Q’, ‘NOR (P,Q)’; and 
(ii) incompatibility, i.e. the Sheffer (or Nicod) stroke, represented as P І Q, read as ‘not 
both P and Q’ or NAND (P,Q).  As Peirce and Sheffer proved, both can be made to work 
and derive the whole set of propositional operators if the matter is looked at from a 
purely logical viewpoint69. 
 
The claim worked out here is that logical operators in natural language are based on a 
single, underlying operator too and that of the two candidates which ‘divested’ EX-logic, 
i.e. logic unconstrained by internalist mentalist considerations, provides, Peirce’s joint 
falsehood operator is the one which turns out to be cognitively and linguistically real. 
This is why I shall now focus on Peirce’s system and present the way he derives all the 
operators from ‘joint falsehood’ NOR.  
 
4.3.2 The joint falsehood operator nor and the Peirce’s decomposition of 
propositional operators 
 
In Peirce’s nor-system, the joint falsehood operator ↓ is a single binary operator whose 
meaning is identical to that of the E-corner operator complex ¬∨ (i.e. “nor”; in algebraic 
terms: (1-(P+Q))). But to be able to translate and decompose the whole operator system 
of (143) into Peirce’s system, a few more tools are needed over and beyond merger of 
¬∨ into ↓. First of all, there is a problem with negation (as in ¬P) to  be solved. Given 
that negation is a single-term operator while ↓ is binary, the single-term expression has 
to be somehow converted into a two-term expression.  Peirce’s solution is to exploit the 
Law of Tautology, according to which P  and P∨P are equivalent expressions. This 
allowed him to expand ¬P into the equivalent expression ¬(P∨P), so that he could 
consequently translate ¬(P∨P) into P ↓ P by application of merger. Second, to translate the 
standard formula for disjunction P∨Q, which contains a disjunction symbol but cannot be 
input to merger in the absence of negation, Peirce appealed to the Law of Double 
Negation, according to which every proposition is the complement of its complement: 
P∨Q is thus equivalent to ¬¬(P∨Q). This brings in negatives so that merger becomes 
possible and the translation procedure can proceed (as detailed below). Finally, to 
convert P∧Q, which lacks both negation and disjunction, De Morgan’s Law was appealed 
to, yielding the equivalent expression ¬(¬P∨¬Q)), ensuring the presence of both negation 
and disjunction.  
 
With these four tools – merger of ¬∨ into ↓, the Law of Tautology, the Law of Double 
Negation and De Morgan’s Law – Peirce arrived at the following translation of the two-
operator negation-and-disjunction system into the single-operator NOR-system, a most 
remarkable achievement:  
 
 
                                                          
68 Horn (1989: 256) uses joint denial, but in order not to mix categories, we shall not use the 
speech act category denial. 
69 For the historical record it is worth emphasizing that Sheffer's (1913) reduction of the 
propositional logic to a single connective was much later than Peirce’s (1880). Whitehead and 
Russell apparently were not aware of Peirce’s achievement, since they stated in the second edition 
of Principia Mathematica that Sheffer’s stroke was the most important development in logic since 
the first edition of their work.  
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(146) 
 
 Tools used Conversion steps 
NOR    
Merger 
¬(P∨Q) 
P ↓ Q 
NOT  
Law of Tautology 
Merger 
¬P  
¬(P∨P) 
P ↓ P 
OR  
Law of Double Negation 
Merger 
Law of Tautology 
Merger 
P∨Q 
¬¬(P∨Q) 
¬ (P ↓ Q) 
¬ ((P ↓ Q) ∨ (P ↓ Q)) 
(P ↓ Q) ↓ (P ↓ Q) 
AND  
De Morgan’s Law 
Merger 
Law of Tautology (twice) 
Merger 
P∧Q 
¬(¬P∨¬Q)) 
¬P ↓ ¬Q 
¬ (P∨P) ↓ ¬ (Q∨Q) 
(P ↓ P) ↓ (Q ↓ Q) 
NAND  
De Morgan 
Merger 
Tautology 
Merger 
Tautology ( 4 times) 
Merger (4 times) 
¬( P∧Q) 
¬(¬(¬P∨¬Q))) 
¬(¬P ↓ ¬Q) 
¬(¬P ↓ ¬Q) ∨ (¬P ↓ ¬Q) 
(¬P ↓ ¬Q) ↓ (¬P ↓ ¬Q) 
(¬(P∨P) ↓ ¬(Q∨Q)) ↓ (¬(P∨P) ↓ ¬(Q∨Q)) 
((P ↓ P) ↓ (Q ↓ Q)) ↓ ((P ↓ P) ↓ (Q ↓ Q)) 
 
 
Admittedly, these much more elaborate formulas look rather cumbersome. After 
explaining why such elaborateness is not really a problem and actually even to be 
expected in underground computation I will argue that  there is nonetheless a way of 
improving on Peirce’s notation which makes the formulas more palatable and 
transparent.  
 
Cumbersome elaborateness need not be a problem for a computational system. This is 
because elaborateness of output expressions and complexity of the rule set should not be 
confounded. If by making expressions more elaborate the rule set (algorithm) can be 
made simpler (one operator instead of two), that may well be a desirable result under a 
modular conception of the linguistic system. Recall that it is our goal to recast the 
Peircean analysis into a proposal about the internal lexical structure of operators.  From 
that perspective, a simpler rule set can be conceived of as the minimalist computational 
system active below conscious awareness. The forms (PF-features) in the lexicon will 
then have a crucial function of their own, namely to link the elaborate output products of 
the underlying computational system with a less elaborate and fast retrievable formal 
representation.  This encapsulates the underlyingly elaborate representation and gives the 
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whole a separate address and set of PF-features in the lexicon70. Many lexical items can 
thus be seen as a trade-off:  the concepts they embody are underlyingly elaborate but 
computationally simpler. In the lexicon, however, the elaborate semantic routines are 
stored as a whole and matched with a compact PF-feature set which makes direct, single-
address retrievability of the lexical item and its complex conceptual content possible for 
the purpose of lexical selection.   
 
Independent of these considerations, Peirce’s notation can be made a bit more palatable 
and transparent. To get rid of all the burdening brackets, it is possible to use a bar to 
represent the NOR-operator71.  
 
(147) 
 
Two-operator 
notation 
Peirce’s single-operator notation Single-operator bar notation 
NOR NOR NOR 
 
¬ (P ∨ Q) 
 
 
(P ↓ Q) 
 
P  Q 
 
Extending over the two terms in their scope, bars do not only express scope more clearly, 
they also automatically bring out hierarchical relationships in complex expressions with 
more than one bar, as the table below reveals. They thus have the same advantage over 
Peirce’s notation that tree-diagrams, with their visualisation of vertical hierarchy 
relationships, have over labelled bracketing in syntax72: 
 
(148) 
 Peirce’s notation bar notation 
 
NOR  
 
P ↓ Q 
 
 
P   Q 
 
NOT  
(N(E)-) 
 
P ↓ P 
 
 
P   P 
 
OR 
 
(P ↓ Q) ↓ (P ↓ Q) 
 
 
 P   Q      P   Q 
                                                          
70 Thus a lexical item such as kill can be viewed as a lexical encapsulation (with a separate 
address) of computationally more elaborate prelexical cause -become-not-alive. 
71 This brings back the bars used in the Venn-diagrams of (145)b., though this time they (more 
appropriately) represent ↓ rather than its subconstituent ¬ alone. The bar-notation introduced here, 
which I was taught by Jeffrey Gruber, will become a crucial help when a link will be established 
between logical expressions and syntactic trees.  
72 Thanks to Jeffrey Gruber for long discussions and e-mailinteraction, in which he tended towards 
nand as the basic operator, whereas I have chosen to defend and work out the claim that it is nor 
which is cognitively basic.  The different sides we took have forced me to state my arguments 
more clearly and have therefore been an enormous help. 
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AND 
 
(P ↓ P) ↓ (Q ↓ Q) 
 
 
 P   P       Q   Q 
 
NAND 
 
((P ↓ P) ↓ (Q ↓ Q)) ↓ ((P ↓ P) ↓ (Q ↓ Q)) 
 
 
  P   P       Q  Q          P   P        Q  Q 
 
4.4 Modification of Peirce’s NOR: the need for the cognitive set-operator NEC 
 
What will be proposed is that the internal semantic structure of lexicalised propositional 
operators is determined by the prelexical equivalent of the negative operator in question. 
I will from this point on use the Latin label NEC (instead of NOR) for the basic cognitive 
operator. The Latin is once again used to stress the status of the operator as a universal in 
the Language of Thought; the underline to mark its non-lexicalisable status and the fact 
that it is below conscious awareness.   
 
4.4.1 Why modify Peirce’s analysis? 
 
Peirce’s derivation of all propositional operators from the basic joint falsehood operator 
NOR is an EX-logical one and is not intended as a representation of operations in the IN-
logic of cognition. To turn his system into a cognitively realistic one, a number of 
changes will be made.   
 
First of all, the basic operator Peirce used will be taken to represent a cognitive one, 
whose activity is to be located, however, at the cognitive underground level of 
conceptual structure (or prelexical syntax) in the Language of Thought73.   
 
Correspondingly, Peirce’s derivation will be transferred from the level of full sentences 
to that of the internal semantic structure of lexical items.  In view of this, the bar-code 
patterns developed in § 4.3.2 will be taken to constitute the core part of the internal 
semantic make-up of propositional operators as lexical items.  A consequence of this is 
that the means by which the bar-code patterns are created, namely the cognitive operator 
NEC  and its two variants NON and ET, are not to be identified with surface operators in 
the lexicon. Multiple applications of the cognitive operators are required to yield surface 
operators. In other words, the lexical items expressing negation (n(e)-, not) an 
conjunction (and) will be shown to be more complex than the primitive operators NON 
and ET that enter into them. 
 
                                                          
73 In scientific study and hence in scientific language, however, such computation can be made 
explicit.  This is precisely what is attempted here. Since natural language and scientific language 
are qualitatively different in that the latter invokes the science forming faculty SFF, the attempt 
made here to make operations and representations in prelexical syntax explicit does not undermine 
or contradict the claim they are below awareness in natural language (cf. chapter 2).  That 
prelexical syntax is considered compatible with the Language of Thought hypothesis may sound 
strange, since they are usually pitted against each other.  The claim they are nonetheless 
compatible is because the operations that constitute prelexical syntax remain below awareness, so 
that its products – the concepts – are, as Fodor claims with regard to his Language of Thought 
hypothesis, atomic for computation in the more strictly linguistic modules of grammar. 
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Arguably, the complexity of the logical calculus hubs that are composed with NEC and a 
few other basic rules belongs to our cognitive biological endowment, which would 
explain the automatic nature and inaccessibility to conscious modification in natural 
language acquisition.   
The changes that a cognitive IN-logical reinterpretation of Peirce’s system will 
necessitate, will be based both on detectable semantic properties of existing logical 
operators in IN-language and the structure and format of linguistic lexicalisations 
thereof.  The upshot of the whole analysis will be that the triad of binary operators of the 
propositional calculus are composite items built from a single negative disjunctive 
operator, as is the fourth lexical operator not. For each propositional operator there will 
be argued to be a parallel operator in the predicate calculus. 
 
4.4.2 The meaning of lexical operators 
 
So let us analyse which operations occur at the prelexical level and how the logical triads 
are derived. The first operator that will be decomposed is the propositional calculus pivot 
or.  The result obtained will then be applied to the predicate calculus pivots (any/some, 
either, at least one).  Next, the contradictors and entailers of each of these two calculi 
will be treated. To see what has to be arrived at, recall the proposition calculus, set-
theoretic and algebraic operations which the three corners of the 2D Cartesian 
Coordinate System are traditionally held to represent and the corresponding Venn-
diagrams. 
 
(149) 
 logic set-theory Algebra 
conjunction intersection multiplication A-corner 
(and) X∧Y X ⋂ Y XxY 
disjunction union Addition I-corner 
(or) X∨Y X ⋃ Y X+Y 
negation of 
disjunction 
complement of 
union 
universe minus 
addition 
E-corner 
(nor) 
¬ (X∨Y) X ⋃ Y 1-(X+Y) 
 
entailer 
intersection 
and 
/P/ ⋂ /Q/ 
 
pivot 
union 
or 
/P/ ⋃ /Q/ 
contradictor 
complement of union 
nor 
/P/ ⋃/Q/ 
 
 
 
/P/ /P/ /P/ /Q/ /Q/ /Q/ 1 1 1 
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4.4.3 Pivots 
 
This section is in two parts.  The first part concerns the propositional calculus pivot or, 
while the second is devoted to predicate calculus operators. 
 
4.4.3.1 The Propositional Calculus Pivot ORincl (P,Q) 
 
As illustrated by Venn diagram (149), the propositional pivot that will be described is the 
inclusive variant, which is taken to represent the basic lexical meaning – a standard 
position in logic.   
 
4.4.3.1.1 The universe SIT of possible situations 
 
In the lexical meaning ORincl (P,Q), P and Q are to be seen as variables for any 
propositional constants which the lexical item or could take as argument.  So, the 
extension of or, i.e. /OR (P,Q)/, is the set of all possible situations in which P or Q is 
true, with P and Q any choice of propositional constants.  But how is such a disjunctive 
set demarcated in human cognition? 
 
Set demarcation always happens within and hence starts from a universe of possible 
members (in Boolean algebraic terms = 1). In the case of the propositional calculus pivot 
ORincl (P,Q), the universe in question is the universe SIT of possible situations. 
 
(150)  
 
 
Given the twin-selection hypothesis, this universe is structured in 4 cells. Indeed, recall 
that the valuation space diagram for the propositional operators was related to truth 
tables by means of a placemat-construction in chapter 2 and in § 3.3.2.  Given the two-
argument nature of the operators (P and Q, P or Q, P nor Q) and the two values true and 
false, the number of possible value combinations for any P and Q (assuming they are 
different) is 2n = 22 = 4. 
 
(151)  
 
 
S4 S3 S2 S1 
P Q 
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
SIT 
SIT 
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It is this Boolean algebra structure which is the domain on which the negative operator 
NEC will carry out its operations. It is therefore also against the background of this 
universe that the extension of ORincl (P,Q) is delineated. From this universe of possible 
situations (151) – the domain of the set demarcation function – no situations have been 
excluded yet at the initial stage, nor have any been activated yet: everything is selectable, 
nothing selected yet. The fact that no cells have been excluded is represented by means 
of the underlined value 1? for those cells, as in the following diagram.  The question 
mark merely serves to indicate that the 1-value is still hypothetical, that the elements of 
the relevant cell are selectable, but have not been selected as actual members yet. 
 
(152) 
 Stage 0. 
Universe 
SIT 
= 1 
P 
 
Q 
 
cell 
structure 
of the 
universe 
SIT value 
1 1 S4 1? 
1 0 S3 1? 
0 1 S2 1? 
0 0 S1 1? 
 
Activation of the extension set of ORincl  is executed by means of an exclusion procedure 
operating on stage 0. in (152).  Since set demarcation starts from the entire universe (in 
Boolean algebraic terms = 1) all of whose situations are in principle selectable (1?), set 
delineation is necessarily a negative procedure, a matter of downsizing the domain in 
question to the proper subset of actual members of the target set. The present description 
makes it clear how crucial the negative conception is. The only way to reduce the set of 
possible members SIT to the intended subset of actual members is by eliminating – a 
negative procedure – the possible members that do not fit the requirements.  In algebraic 
terms this amounts to subtraction (1 -…). Subtraction is the only viable option, since 
starting from 1, a positive operation such as addition  would be pointless: it would result 
in 1 + (P+Q) = 1, given that the union of the universe and a subset always still equals the 
universe and hence constitutes a non-productive or noninformative operation: nothing 
gets eliminated74.  
As indicated, the underlined positive values 1? in diagram (152) signal that the elements 
of the cell in question belong to the set of possible members of ORincl: they are the 
elements under consideration for set demarcation. But though they are part of the 
domain, the elements of 1? cells do not yet represent the ultimately activated range of 
actual members of the set, i.e. the set of  selectees (=Sel).  As long as no exclusion 
occurs and we are still at the initial (non-activated competence) stage (0.) of the system, 
the boxes in the diagram still have a light shading, indicating that actual selection still 
has to get started. This stage can also be represented by means of the following Venn-
diagram.  
                                                          
74 Cf. two negatives make a positive, but two positives don’t make a negative. 
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(153) 
 
 
4.4.3.1.2  The basic operator NEC 
 
The sole operator of the whole system is the foundational binary, twin-exclusion 
operator NEC, which is used to set the cell exclusion-procedure in motion. It represents 
the basic subtractive (=negative-disjunctive) operation. Initial application of NEC is the 
first step of a two-step exclusion procedure to determine the complete valuation space of  
P∨Q, i.e. ORincl. The definition of the operation is: 
 
(154) Step 1. : application of NEC, whose definition and properties are the following: 
 
NEC (X,Y) 
Logic  
X , Y  ?    X   Y 
Set-theory  
/X/, /Y/  ?    /X/ ⋃ /Y/ 
Algebra X, Y  ? (1 – (X+Y)) 
 
As soon as NEC becomes active and the exclusion procedure (1-…) gets going, we use a 
bold non-underlined 0 as the exclusion value of the affected cells, denoting actual 
exclusion. The latter is represented in diagram by darker shading of the relevant cell(s). 
What is not excluded remains selectable as before, which is what the question mark in 
cell S1 at stage 1. and in the corresponding description (z  ∈ Sel?) expresses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S4 S3 S2 
S1 
P Q 
1? 1? 1? 
1? 
SIT 
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(155)  
 0. 
Universe 
SIT 
= 1 
1. 
(1?-
(P+Q))75
 
P 
 
Q 
 
cell 
structure 
of the 
universe 
value Value 
1 1 S4 1? 0 
1 0 S3 1? 0 
0 1 S2 1? 0 
0 0 S1 1? 1? 
 
 
As the diagram shows, application of NEC results in stage 1. and has the effect of 
excluding all cells with a 1 value for P or Q, i.e. cells S2-S4.  The relevant operation 
subtracts the initial value of the relevant cells from the universe of discourse: 1- 1?, 
which leaves exclusion value 0 as the exclusion value of the relevant cells at stage 1.76  
The meaning that would be expressed if this stage were expressible is that any situation z 
that belongs to S2-S4 does not belong to the set of selectees, i.e. z  ∈ S2-S4 → z ∉ Sel.77  
In the Venn-diagram, this exclusion results in darker shading of the corresponding cells.  
 
(156) 
 
The status of S1, for its part, has not been affected by the exclusion operation and hence 
remains lightly shaded. In other words, at this stage S1 is still as before a set of possible  
but not actual members of the set that is being demarcated (value 1? in the table, as 
before).  For any x in S1, it is not clear yet whether it does or does not belong to the set 
of selectees: if x is an element of S1, is it an element of Sel? Formally: z  ∈ S1 → z  ∈ 
Sel? 
                                                          
75 The question mark has no influence on the nature of subtraction.  While it will always be used in 
the cells S1-S4 of further diagrams, it will be suppressed in the heading descriptions of the stages, 
which will in all diagrams to follow be shortened to the simpler and more traditional format (1 -
(P+Q)). 
76 There is of course a difference between the two numbers in this subtraction 1-1.  The first 
represents the whole domain of discourse, i.e. Universe SIT, while the second is a positive value 
for a subset of that Universe only.  Still, carrying out the algebraic subtraction as indicated is 
harmless, since the output value 0 is also restricted to the relevant subset: 1-1=0. 
77 The variable z is used to refer to situations in SIT. 
z  ∈ S2-S4 → 
z ∉ Sel 
z  ∈ S1 → 
 z  ∈ Sel? 
S4 S3 S2 
S1 
P Q SIT 
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Due to (i) the undetermined nature of S1 and (ii) the fact that no elements have been 
positively identified as selectees, no set has been demarcated yet and hence this level 
cannot be lexicalised as a lexical predicate.  Since the point of the set demarcation 
procedure is to determine the set of selectees for ORincl positively, i.e. the z’s that are 
elements of Sel, this can therefore only be an intermediate stage in the procedure.  But it 
is a necessary stage nonetheless, if exclusion is, as I claim, all that is available qua 
operation. 
 
4.4.3.1.3 Same-selection NEC: NON 
 
For the next step (step 2.) in the demarcation of ORincl, NEC has to apply once more. 
However, the variant that is needed is a specific one, namely ‘same-selection’ NEC, i.e. 
the form of NEC which takes twice the same argument.  First, the general definition and 
format of this variant of NEC will be given, after which it will be applied to the stage 1. 
output in (155) to yield the second and final step in the demarcation of the extension of 
ORincl. 
 
As said, the type of NEC that has to apply at this point is the one that takes the same 
input argument twice.  This operation, same-selection NEC, is none other than the 
operation of negation, which will be referred to as NON (in set-theoretic terms: the 
complement set rule).   
 
(157) 
NON 
Logic  
X ?    X      X 
Set-theory  
/X/ ?  /X/ ⋃ /X/ 
Algebra X ? (1- (X + X)) 
 
In derivational operation mode, this rule can be described as an application of NEC to an 
input by copying that input and taking the original and the copy as its two identical 
arguments, resulting in a binary same-selection configuration. Though this operation gets 
a separate name (NON) for the sake of terminological differentiation, it is just one of the 
cases that NEC covers, so it does not represent a new axiomatic entity or primitive in the 
system. 
 
An important aspect of this rule which still has to be added, is that because of the identity 
of the two arguments, they can be conflated into a single one. There are two ways of 
representing conflation: either one of the arguments is bracketed in the formula (and 
indicated by means of boldface square brackets […]) or it is deleted.   
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(158) 
 
Conflation Algebra NEC bar-code 
  
(1-(X+X)) = (1-X) 
 
X   X       ≡     X [X]    ≡    X 
 
 
Note that conflation as described here corresponds with the negative version of the Law 
of Tautology for Disjunction as expressed in the logical equivalence ¬(P∨P) ≡ ¬P in 
(146). An alternative name for conflation would consequently be Negative Law of 
Tautology for Disjunction. As opposed to NEC (and its variant NON) it is not an 
operation, not part of the procedural side of the system, but a property of the resulting 
representation whenever same-selection occurs. 
 
When enriched with this notion of conflation, NON comes out as: 
 
 (159) 
 
NON 
 Description of the rule 
Logic  
X ?    X      [X] 
 
 
X ?    X 
Set-theory  
/X/ ?  /X/ [⋃ /X/] 
 
/X/ ?  /X/ 
Algebra X    ? (1- (X [+ X])) X    ? (1- (X)) 
 
In sum, the operation of negation NON can be described as application of NEC to an 
input by copying the input, placing the resulting two identical arguments under the NEC-
bar which has scope over both of them and resulting in conflation of the two arguments, 
indicated by bracketing or deletion of one of them. 
 
Let us now apply this rule (with conflation included) to the output of step 1. in the 
demarcation of the extension of ORincl: 
 
(160) 
 
Step 2.: application of NON to stage 1. 
 Description of the rule 
Logic  
P   Q  ?    P    Q      [ P    Q] 
Set-theory  
/P/ ⋃ /Q/ ?  /P/ ⋃ /Q/ [⋃  /P/ ⋃ /Q/] 
Algebra (1 – (P+Q)) ? (1- ((1 – (P+Q)) [+ (1 – (P+Q))]) 
 
This results in /ORincl/ as the union of /P/ and /Q/, algebraically (1-(1-(P+Q)), cf. (161)  
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(161) 
 
ORincl algebra Bar-code  
 
bracketed deleted bracketed deleted  
conflation  
(1-(1-(P+Q)) [+ (1-(P+Q))]) 
 
(1-(1-(P+Q)))  P   Q    [P   Q] 
 
 P   Q     
 
As is indicated by these formulas, the end-result is derived in two negative-disjunctive 
steps, as represented in flowchart (162) and the corresponding Venn-diagram sequence 
(163): 
 
(162) 
 
 Stage 0. 
Universe 
SIT 
= 1 
Stage 1. 
(1-(P+Q)) 
 
Stage 2. 
(1-(1-(P+Q)) [+ 
(1-(P+Q)))] 
P 
 
Q 
 
cell 
structure  
of the 
universe 
value Value value 
1 1 S4 1? 0 1 
1 0 S3 1? 0 1 
0 1 S2 1? 0 1 
0 0 S1 1? 1? 0 
 
       [or] 
(163) 
 
Stage 0. Stage 1. Stage 2. 
 
 
 
Stage 0. Stage 1. Stage 2. 
z  ∈ S1-S4 → z  ∈ Sel? z  ∈ S2-S4 → z ∉ Sel 
z  ∈ S1 → z  ∈ Sel? 
z  ∈ S2-S4 → z  ∈ Sel 
z  ∈ S1       → z ∉ Sel 
 
At Stage 2., the members of all cells of the universe are positively specified as being 
elements of Sel (1) or not being elements of Sel (0), so that the set has been demarcated 
[or] 
S4 S3 S2 
S1 
P Q 
S4 S3 S2 
S1 
P Q P Q 
S1 
S3 S4 S2 
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by being both set off against its complement (0 value: z  ∈ S1 → z ∉ Sel) and selected 
(1 values: z  ∈ S2-S4 → z  ∈ Sel). No indeterminacy – in the form of underlined values 
– remains and the PF- features of the union of the 1-cells are drawn in, i.e. lexicalisation 
of the set as [or] (square brackets indicate lexicalisation).78 The set boundary between 
the selectees and the non-selectees, i.e. Aristotle’s fundamentum divisionis, has thus 
been established. The non-selectees are those possible situations for which direct 
expression by non-negative propositions is not available. The actual selectees are the 
elements of S2-S479. At this point, the lexical predicate or propositional function can be 
spelled out as or, a lexical item with two variable arguments P and Q which have to be 
instantiated in syntax, i.e. filled with a choice of two concrete propositional constants to 
yield a regular or-proposition. 
 
Let us look at the bracket part in (164), in which the lexical item or is used, and see how 
its interpretation draws on the abovementioned lexical properties of or: 
 
(164) If [P: John is in the garden or Q: Bill is in the garden], I’m satisfied. 
 
The (inclusive) lexical meaning of or determines that the set of selectees is the union of 
set of possible situations in which P is true (S3), the set of possible situations in which Q 
is true (S2) and the set of possible situations in which both P and Q are true (S4).  It is to 
be noted in this respect that what is singled out by the disjunction P or Q is the set of 
selectees S2-S4, not a particular situation.  There is not one situation which is singled out 
as the one being referred to, as being actual.  Rather than actually selecting a situation, 
the two-stage process of set-demarcation cuts away all situations that are not compatible 
with the description P or Q. All the possible situations which are compatible with P or Q 
are therefore selected, not just a single referent situation. Depending on the context, the 
meaning will remain that way or be narrowed down from all possible situations 
compatible with P or Q to a single referent. In (164), the conditional context is one in 
which the bracketed constituent remains non-referential (“P or Q or both”) and 
                                                          
78 For didactic purposes, this set demarcation procedure can be likened to the negative-positive 
process in photography.  The Universe SIT is like the photosensitive film before use, on which any 
picture can in principle be produced, but none has been yet. NEC results in a negative image, 
which is comparable to exposure of a film to light which makes the areas exposed opaque on the 
negative. Reapplication of NEC (i.c. the same selection variant NON), finally, returns a positive 
copy. In photography, this second step means that the dark areas of the negative translate into light 
areas on the final representation, while the areas which have not been darkened on the negative, 
become dark in the negative-to-positive stage. In set-demarcation, the excluded areas become the 
selected ones at this stage, and those that had been neither selected nor deselected in the first step, 
become excluded, yielding the fully demarcated set. 
79 A point which will not be worked out or explained in detail in the text deserves mentioning 
because it is likely to be of use to formal semanticists.  The two-step set demarcation procedure 
systematically cuts a (selectable) Boolean algebra down to a (selected) join semilattice (with the 
bottom S1 cut off). (For definitions and a very clear account of lattice theory, consult Szabolcsi 
(1987)).  Szabolcsi (1987: 5) points out that:  “Mathematically, meet semilattices and join 
semilattices are the same thing, only the relation is inverted.  Linguistically, it may be interesting 
to note that while there are many applications for join semilattices, I do not know of applications 
of meet semilattices.”  If the set demarcation procedure outlined in the text is as general a 
procedure as I claim, the fact that join semi-lattices are so common constructs in semantics, but 
meet semi-lattices apparently play no role, finds a natural explanation.   
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represents the basic inclusive meaning of or described by the set-demarcation process 
outlined above.   
 
(165) 
 
It is only in the act of referring in referential contexts such as affirmatives that this 
lexical meaning with a complete set of selectees is narrowed down to a single, referential 
selectee, the actual situation: 
 
(166) John is in the garden or Bill is in the garden 
 
Though it is not clear yet to the speaker which of the two propositions P and Q is the true 
one, the affirmative context does impose referentiality, i.e. there is a single, referential 
selectee. Consequently, the inclusive part of the original reading (“both P and Q”) is no 
longer available.  There is a single, actual situation that obtains, and it is either P, or Q, 
but not both. In other words, the affirmative context imposes the exclusive disjunctive 
reading for or.  Viewed this way, the negative-subtractive set demarcation device always 
selects a number of candidate referents by excluding all the rest, but whether any of the 
candidates left will be selected as the actual referent is determined by other factors than 
the lexical meaning of or. 
 
4.4.3.1.4 Set-demarcation and characteristic functions 
 
One of the advantages of the two-step negative operation based on a single operator 
outlined in 4.4.3.1.1-4.4.3.1.3 is that it decomposes the set-demarcating concept 
characteristic function (cf. § 3.2.2.1 and § 3.2.2.2) into a composite two-step function 
and hence eliminates it as a primitive, a valuable reduction that supports the analysis. Let 
us clarify this point. A description of the notion characteristic function (as a primitive) is 
provided by Seuren (1998: 341), who uses the expression ‘x < 5’ to illustrate it: 
 
 “The extension of the expression ‘x<5’, or ║x<5║, is the set of those 
numbers whose names, when substituted for x, result in a true proposition. 
 
For x<5 this is the set {0,1,2,3,4}” 
 
“…defaultwise, ‘x<5’ expresses a propositional function, a function from the 
variable range, in this case the set of natural numbers, to propositions with a 
truth value, since for each natural number name put in the position of the 
substitutional variable there is a truth value.  Any function from a set of 
objects X to truth values is a propositional function.  If we use the symbol 
‘1’ for truth and ‘0’ for falsity, ║x<5║constitutes the following infinite 
propositional function, expresses by ‘x<5’: 
S4 S3 S2 
S1 
P Q 
or 
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(40)  ║x<5║ = {<0,1>, <1,1>, <2,1>, <3,1>, <4,1>, <5,0>, <6,0>, <7,0>,  
<8,0>,…} 
 
Other names for a propositional function are characteristic function and 
predicate. The former name is used since the function delivers the value ‘1’ 
for a subset Y of X, hence characterizes Y.  In the context of linguistic 
expressions, our context, the preferred name for “a function from a set of 
objects X to truth values” is predicate”                             (Seuren 1998: 342). 
 
If our negative deselection perspective on set-demarcation (as introduced on the basis of 
the lexical predicate or) is correct, two negative subtractive steps and hence stages are 
invariably required to identify a set positively.  If so, this must be taken to apply to x<5 
and its extension as well, with stage 0. and stage 1. once again abstract and underground 
due to their unselected 1? values.  
 
(167)  
 
Stage 0. Universe = 
variable 
range = set of 
natural 
numbers 
= {<0,1?>, <1,1?>, <2,1?>, <3,1?>, <4,1?>, <5,1?>, <6,1?>, 
<7,1?>, <8,1?>,…} 
Stage1. 1-{x | x<5} = {<0,0>, <1,0>, <2,0>, <3,0>, <4,0>, <5,1?>, <6,1?>, 
<7,1?>, <8,1?>,…} 
Stage2. 1-1-{x | x<5} = {<0,1>, <1,1>, <2,1>, <3,1>, <4,1>, <5,0>, <6,0>, <7,0>, 
<8,0>,…} 
 
On the whole, this must be taken to mean that the set-demarcating concept characteristic 
function is really the same composite two-step function based on a single operator that 
was employed for or and can hence be eliminated as a primitive. 
 
Notice also the parallel between the two-step subtraction process described here to 
demarcate a set and the equivalence expressed by the logical law of double negation : 
¬¬G ≡ G. The former part of this equivalence is the logical expression of the two 
subtractive stages in the process of set demarcation, the latter the set thus demarcated. 
The fact that this law thus immediately falls out if the negative-subtractive version of set 
demarcation proposed in this chapter is adopted, is a strong argument in the latter’s 
favour. 
 
4.4.3.2 The predicate calculus pivots EITHER, ANY and AT LEAST ONE 
 
The purpose of this section is to show how the bar-code pattern behind the meaning of 
the propositional calculus pivot plays a role in the realm of the predicate calculus as well.  
It can there be used to characterize the shared aspects of the meaning of the predicate 
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calculus pivots EITHER, ANY and AT LEAST ONE80.  The analysis proposed here 
exploits a similarity between different calculi. In particular, the parallelism between 
PROPC and APC2 that has been mentioned a number of times suggests that a semantic 
description of or should not be completely dissociated from its APC2 counterpart either. 
Consider the following set of sentences, the first with the propositional pivot or and the 
second and third with the corresponding APC2 operator either and with F the restrictor 
term and G the matrix term: 
 
(168)  a. I do not think that [ [flag1] is [green]] or [flag2] is [green]]  – 
 b. I do not think that [ [either flag] is [green]] 
 c. I do not think that [ [either F] is [G]] 
 
A crucial assumption is that the denotation of bare semantic predicates such as flag does 
not just include all individual flags but also all the possible groups made up of those 
individuals81. Consider the following examples: 
 
(169) a.  I haven’t not seen either flagincl. (neither the one, nor the other, nor both) 
b. I haven’t seen [ [flag1] orincl [flag2]]. (neither flag1, nor flag2, nor both) 
c. Have you seen either flagincl? Yes, I have seen both/one of them. 
d. Have you seen [ [flag1] orincl [flag2]]? Yes, I have seen both/one of them. 
 
In the non-referential negative and interrogative contexts (169) a. and c., the singular 
bare semantic predicate flagincl does not apply to individuals only, but also to pluralities 
(both). In other words, the lexical meaning of flag is not exclusively singular, but 
“inclusive” in that it denotes subsets of all possible cardinalities of the set of flags, 
except the null set, i.e. it denotes sets of cardinality│≥ 1│ (“at least one”). The universe 
being restricted to two individuals in APC2, this inclusive interpretation brings in only 
one possible group with a cardinality beyond that of the individuals in the case at hand, 
namely { flag1,  flag2}. 
 
(170) 
   flagincl (│≥ 1│) 
flag-s (=│2│) { flag1,  flag2}  
    
flagexcl  (=                
‘precisely 1’) 
{flag1} {flag2}  
     
 
In sum, in (169) a. and c. either ranges not only over the individual flags but also over 
the pair of individuals which is part of the denotation of its restrictor term F. 
 
                                                          
80 The reading of either and any dealt with here is its particular existential reading in negative and 
interrogative contexts: Have you met either/any of my colleagues?  Quasi-universal interpretations, 
as in either man can tell you that (~“both”) and any man can tell you that (~“every”) will be 
treated in chapter 6. 
81 This conception is inspired by Chierchia (2003), but differs from it in that Chierchia restricts the 
group interpretation to the morphological plural (i.c. flags) and does not view singularities as 
singleton sets.  These differences are not crucial to the point made here. 
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A description of the underlying similarity between PROPC and APC2  can then be 
brought out if  (i) the Universe SIT of possible situations is replaced by the universe IND 
of individuals (comprising no more than two individuals of the restrictor type in the case 
of APC2) and (ii) the two arguments of the APC2-operator are  Flag1 and Flag2, rather 
than the propositional constants P and Q of the PROPC. This makes EITHER (Flag1, 
Flag2) structurally analogous to ORincl (P, Q) and results in the following two-step 
derivation82.   
 
(171) 
 
 0. 
universe 
IND 
= 1 
1. 
(1-(F1+F2)) 
 
2. 
(1-(1-(F1+F2)) [+ 
(1-(F1+F2)))] 
F1 
 
F2 
 
cell 
structure  
of the 
universe 
value Value value 
1 1 S4 1? 0 1 
1 0 S3 1? 0 1 
0 1 S2 1? 0 1 
0 0 S1 1? 1? 0 
 
               [either] 
 
Under the present conception, the meaning of either flag is characterized (both 
provisionally and informally) as “flag 1 (S3), flag 2 (S2) or flags 1 and 2 (S4) (with the 
cardinality of the extension of flag equal to 2)”.   
 
Next, the difference between APC2 and APC in general is a matter of the extending the 
domain of quantification from two entities (F1, F2) to larger domains of quantification 
(Fx, Fy) by introduction of variables: I don’t think that any flag (x) or other (y) is green, 
i.e. neither a random flag x nor any other flag y.  
 
(172)  a. I do not think that [ [flagx] is [green]] or [flagy] is [green]]  – 
 b. I do not think that [ [any flag] is [green]] 
 c. I do not think that [ [any (Fx, Fy)] is [G]] 
 
Correspondingly, the meaning of any idea (with idea the restrictor term) in: 
 
(173) Do you have any idea how this problem could be solved? 
 
can be characterized as: “idea x (S3), idea y (S2) or any plurality of ideas (S4)”. Here 
too, the meaning of the NP incorporates the feature “at least one” and the denotation of 
                                                          
82 The fact that EITHER (x,y) is binary, does not make it a transitive predicate with subject-object 
difference like HATE (x,y). Note that it is like ORincl (P, Q) in this respect (as it should be): the 
binary nature of ORincl (P, Q) does not imply that its arguments are in a transitive subject-object 
relationship either.  
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the restrictor predicate idea is inclusive, fitting the cardinality description│≥ 1│. In a 
universe with three ideas a, b and c, for instance, this yields: 
 
(174)  
 
     ideaincl (│≥ 1│) 
  {abc}    
idea-s (=│≥ 2│) {ab} {ac} {bc} (s4)  
      
ideaexcl  (= 
‘precisely 1’) 
{a} {b} {c} (s2-s3)  
      
 
A corresponding example with (at least) one and its cardinality description│≥ 1│is the 
following conversation: 
 
(175) (about bagles) Have you eaten one yet? – Yes, I’ve even eaten two/three/four/… 
 
Given (171), the pivotal meanings characterized informally in this section – either, any, 
and (at least) one – are suggested to have the same binary negative-disjunctive substrate 
as the propositional pivot or  (cp. (171) with (162)).  In bar-notation, this means: 
 
(176) 
 
EITHER , ANY, ONE  
Algebra Bar-code  
 
bracketed deleted Bracketed deleted 
 
(1-(1-(Fx+Fy)) [+ (1-( Fx+Fy))]) 
 
(1-(1-( Fx+Fy))) 
 
Fx  Fy  (Fx Fy) 
 
Fx Fy     
 
The analysis proposed here can be improved to fit the relational perspective (Zwarts 
1983, Van Benthem 1986, De Hoop 1992: 4) on Generalized Quantifiers. The latter 
views quantifying determiners D (i.e. any,none, all,both,etc …) as two-place higher order 
predicates, i.e. as predicates over pairs of sets R(estrictor) and M(atrix predicate):  
 
(177) a.  Any F are G 
 b. ANY (F, G) 
 c. D (R, M).  
 
Thus, the extension of at least one flag is the set of all sets of individuals X such that the 
cardinality of the intersection of the extension of flag and X is equal to or larger than 1. 
 
(178) a.║at least one flag║= {X ⊆ I : │║flag║ ⋂ X │ ≥ 1} 
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b.║either flag║= ║at least one flag║ iff │║flag║│ = 2, otherwise undefined83. 
 
Using lambda notation and the predicate labels R(estrictor) and M(atrix) – which are 
variables for elements in the universe of properties such as flag, green,… –  to write the 
denotation of such generalized quantifiers, the formulas for at least one and at least one 
flag are: 
 
(179) at least one 
 a. λRλM [│ R ⋂ M │ ≥ 1] 
 b. λRλM ∃x [ R(x) ∧ M(x)] 
 
 
(180) at least one flag 
 a. λRλM [│ R ⋂ M │ ≥ 1] (║flag║)    > 
 b. λM [│║flag║  ⋂ M │ ≥ 1] 
 c. λRλM ∃x [ R(x) ∧ M(x)] (F)     > 
 d. λM ∃x [ F(x) ∧ M(x)] 
 
Using the negative-disjunctive binary bar-notation instead, this perspective yields the 
following denotations for either flag, any flag, at least one flag84: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
83 These formalisations are notational variants of those in De Hoop (1992: 4). When a quantifier 
phrase can only be interpreted under certain conditions (in casu the restriction of the cardinality of 
the extension of F to 2) the interpretation function is partial (De Hoop 1992: 4). De Hoop’s (1992: 
4) description of the meaning of an either F phrase and ours share the feature that both postulate a 
close relationship between either F and at least one F. The only difference between them is that in 
the case of either F the cardinality of the extension of F equals two. 
84 This representation incorporates the claim that an existential ∃x F(x) is really created from a 
binary distributive disjunction structure (Fx or Fy).  My formalization is probably imperfect, since 
x and y occur as free variables in the bar-code and I am not sure which operator I should insert to 
bind them.  In any case, the formalisation that is required would be of the type that also takes care 
of one or other in one or other flag, which also expresses existential quantification over flags by 
means of a distributive disjunction.  My best guess is that the binder is the set of flags itself: 
compare They talked to one another, in which they is the binder set of its token-distinguished but 
type-identical members as denoted by the distributive structure one another. Similarly, in one or 
other flag, the words one and other are token-distinguished, but instantiate the same type flag.   
In any case, the main claim behind the proposal should be clear from the text: the negative-
disjunctive means used for the propositional calculus operators is at the root of the formalisation of 
the predicate calculus operators as well.  This hypothesis will be further supported by the analysis 
of PROPC and APC contradictors and entailers, where the parallellisms are too striking to be 
accidental.  
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(181)  
 
EITHER flag , ANY flag, AT LEAST ONE flag 
bracketed deleted 
 
    λM  Fx M  Fy M     (Fx M  Fy M) 
 
λM  Fx M   Fy M 
 
That the bar-notation can be transferred from the propositional calculus (and the 
situations denoted by the propositional constants) to the predicate calculus (and the 
individuals that are quantified over in restrictor phrases) evinces the generality of the 
underlying system in terms of NEC and of the Boolean algebra within which it operates. 
It will be argued in chapter 5 that the algorithm can be generalized further and underlies 
the singular-plural distinction and the natural number scale.  
 
The descriptions given for the internal semantic structure of propositional calculus and 
predicate calculus pivots have all been “inclusive” cases, i.e. those for which S4 is part 
of the interpretation.  As was pointed out with respect to the exclusive, referential 
reading of (166), exclusive or (= or but not and) and hence also the “exclusive” reading 
of the corresponding predicate calculus pivot some (but not all) need special provisions 
if the set of selectees is to be narrowed down from S2-S4 to the exclusive denotation S2-
S3.  These additional constraints will be gone into in more detail and given a formal 
characterization in chapter 5.  For the time being, the attention will remain focused on 
the inclusive interpretation of pivots, which is the most basic one. It is the latter meaning 
which enters into the meanings of contradictors, taken up in the next section. 
 
4.4.4 Contradictors 
 
In this section, the bar-codes for contradictors and the way they derive from pivotal 
meanings will be outlined. The descriptions shed light on the nature of negation and on 
the concept of a characteristic function, which is a complex rather than a primitive 
notion.  
 
4.4.4.1  The proposition calculus contradictor NORincl (P,Q) 
 
As its morphology betrays, the proposition calculus contradictor nor is derived from or. 
The compositional semantics of nor will therefore be based on that of the pivotal 
semantic predicate ORincl (P,Q). Since ORincl (P,Q) is a stage 2. item (in bar code it has 
two bars), we take spelled out (182) (represented by square brackets) as input 
 
(182) 
 
OR (P,Q) [or] algebra bar-code 
  
(1-(1-(P+Q)) 
 
 P   Q       
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and apply the rule NON (i.e. same-selection NEC, cf. (159)), yielding the stage 3. (hence 
triple-bar) lexical item nor: 
 
 
(183)  
 
N-OR  
[nor] 
algebra bar-code  
 
bracketed deleted bracketed deleted  
 
(1-(1-(1-(P+Q))) 
[+ (1-(1-(P+Q))))] 
 
(1-(1-(1-(P+Q))) 
 
 P   Q      [P   Q] 
 
 P   Q       
 
The diagram in (184) shows that the effect of NON is to reverse all the values of stage 2. 
ORincl: 
 
(184) 
 0. 
Universe 
SIT 
= 1 
1. 
(1-(P+Q)) 
 
 
2. 
(1-(1-(P+Q)) 
[+ (1-(P+Q)))] 
3. 
(1-(1-(1-
(P+Q))) [+ (1-
(1-(P+Q))))] 
P 
 
Q 
 
cell 
structure 
of the 
universe 
value value value  
1 1 S4 1? 0 1 0 
1 0 S3 1? 0 1 0 
0 1 S2 1? 0 1 0 
0 0 S1 1? 1? 0 1 
 
        [or]   [n-[or]] 
 
As in the case of ORincl at stage 2., the members of all the cells of the universe are 
positively specified at stage 3. as being elements of Sel (=1) or not being elements of Sel 
(=0), so that the set has been demarcated by being both set off against its complement (0 
values: z  ∈ S2-S4  → z ∉ Sel) and selected (1 values: z  ∈ S1 → z  ∈ Sel).  
Consequently, lexicalisation as [n-[or]] can occur. The resulting Venn-diagram is: 
 
(185) 
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From the perspective drawn above, a number of features of natural language negation 
fall in place.   
First of all, linguistic negation in the form of a negative lexical item (morpheme or word) 
invariably takes a lexicalised argument at stage 2. to apply to. This is due to stage 1. 
being indeterminate and non-expressible (z  ∈ S1 → z  ∈ Sel?), so that two further steps 
are required to attain a lexicalizable stage for the negative. 
 
(186)  
 
Stage 0. Stage 1. Stage 2. Stage 3. 
    
 
 
Stage 0. Stage 1. Stage 2. Stage 3. 
z  ∈ S1-S4 →  
z  ∈ Sel? 
z  ∈ S2-S4 →  
z ∉ Sel 
z  ∈ S1→  
z  ∈ Sel? 
z  ∈ S2-S4 →  
z  ∈ Sel 
z  ∈ S1       →   
z ∉ Sel 
z  ∈ S2-S4 →  
z  ∉  Sel 
z  ∈ S1       → 
z ∈ Sel 
 
That lexicalised negative forms are only attainable at stage 3. in our model confirms the 
general intuition that negatives are literally marked as opposed to affirmatives and that to 
negate, there has to be something to be negated. 
 
“With respect to the vocal sound, affirmative enunciation is prior to negative 
because it is simpler, for the negative enunciation adds a negative particle to 
the affirmative.” 
(Thomas Aquinas, commentary on Aristotle, De Interpretatione,  
in Oesterle 1962: 62; cited from Horn 1989: 154) 
 
S4 S3 S2 
S1 
P Q 
[n-[or]] 
S4 S3 S2 
S1 
P Q 
S4 S3 S2 
S1 
P Q 
[or] 
P P Q Q 
S1 S1 
S3 S3 S4 S4 S2 S2 
[n[or]] 
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“The fact that affirmatives are unmarked and negatives are linguistically 
marked is completely correlated with the finding in this study and previous 
studies that affirmatives are psychologically less complex than negatives.” 
(Just and Carpenter 1971: 248-249; cited from Horn 1989: 154) 
 
This is entirely in agreement with our view that a third 1-…-step is required to get 
beyond stage 2. (a lexicalised argument) to a lexicalisable complement not-X  of 
lexicalised X (i.c. or).  
 
Secondly, the fact that negation has the semantic force it has, namely 1-…, ties in well 
with the fact that 1-… (exclusion) is the only operation on values available in the whole 
system anyway, which is turned to both to demarcate an expressible set X itself (in two 
steps) and its expressible complement (by means of a further step).   
 
4.4.4.2 The contradictor NOT (P,P) 
 
For the derivation of the propositional operator not, exactly the same three stage-analysis 
is required as for n(e)-. This time, the argument of the negative is a single proposition 
however. The two lower bars are therefore supplied by a propositional constant P: 
 
(187) 
 
 
NOT 
 
 
 
  P        P    
 
≡ 
 
  
    P 
 
(188)  
 
 0. 
Universe 
SIT 
= 1 
1. 
(1-(P+P)) 
 
 
2. 
(1-(1-(P+P)) 
[+ (1-
(P+P)))] 
3. 
(1-(1-(1-
(P+P))) [+ (1-
(1-(P+P))))] 
P 
 
P 
 
cell 
structure 
of the 
universe 
value value value  
1 1 S2 1? 0 1 0 
0 0 S1 1? 1? 0 1 
 
        [P]     [NOT (P)] 
 
As mentioned above, all lexicalised forms of negation (word-internal, phrasal or 
sentential) need a linguistic argument (morpheme, phrase, clause), which is semantically 
a fully demarcated set (i.e. a stage 2. representation) to operate on.  
 
(189) a. word-internal negation: [n-[or]], [n-[ever]] 
 b. phrasal negation: [not [a single book]] was sold 
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 c. clausal negation: Mary is not in Spain  ( [NOT [P: MARY BE IN  
         SPAIN]]) 
 
In this respect, lexicalised negations are more complex than the single bar rule of 
negation NON of (159), which operates at the prelexical level already (to turn stage 1. 
into stage 2.). NON was shown to be crucially able to take non-lexicalised 
representations as input. In sum, negation as a lexical item is lexicalised at stage 3. only 
and is hence more complex than its underground operational counterpart NON (“1-…”) 
at the prelexical level.  Though extensionally equivalent in terms of what they exclude, 
the lexical item has positively identified selectees set off against non-selectees, whereas 
NON is purely exclusionary. It remains indeterminate about any positive values and 
hence non-lexicalisable. 
 
Horn (1989: 257) calls any Peircean type analysis of negation “as unnatural as it is 
elegant, as emerges clearly from the attempt to think intuitively of not p as a shorthand 
for ‘neither p nor p’ or for ‘not p and p’.” But as is often the case in scientific analysis, 
feelings of unnaturalness and elegance are highly deceptive and moreover highly 
dependent on the theoretical framework adopted.  Negation being a propositional 
operator, the fact that it is the only propositional operator with a single argument among 
a series of binary ones cries for an explanation in anybody’s theory. In a system with 
twin selection due to a single underlying binary operator, not only the Law of 
Contradiction can be derived as Boole did, but the derivation of negation in terms of 
same-selection and conflation gives a principled explanation for the fact that it is the sole 
one-term operator of the calculus. It seems to me that same-selection and conflation, 
which are independently needed, thus provide a plausible (though maybe not 
commonsensically intuitive) account85.  
 
Identifying the propositional operators as a unified set – all binary underlyingly – and 
being able to relate them all and derive them from a single category is an instance of 
unification. This means that it is a valuable move to embrace the idea that the joint 
falsehood operator (i.e. NEC) is conceptually primitive (pace Gale 1976: 6; Horn 1989: 
257). Since its adoption gives a principled reason for the one-term nature of negation, the 
cohesion of all propositional operators, and to top it all reduces the number of primitives 
considerably, barring it as a primitive on grounds of purely subjective counterintuitivity 
is unwarranted.  
 
4.4.4.3  The predicate calculus contradictors NEITHER and NO(NE)  
 
To transfer the analysis for NOR (P,Q) to the predicate calculus contradictors, (i) the 
universe SIT of possible situations is once more traded in for the universe IND of 
                                                          
85 An argument for such a Peircean type of account for negation, comes from Wittgenstein (1975: 
11, section 5.1311), who argues that the symbols (“Bezeichnungsweise”) standardly used for 
disjunction and negation conceal the underlying relationship between them: 
 
“Wenn wir von p∨q und ~p auf q schliessen, so ist hier duch die Bezeichnungsweise 
die Beziehung der Satzformen von ‘p∨q’ und ‘~p’ verhüllt. Schreiben wir aber z.B. 
statt ‘p∨q’ ‘p І q. І .p І q’ und statt ‘~p’ ‘p І p’ (p І q = weder p, noch q), so wird der 
innere Zusammenhang offenbar.”  (Wittgenstein 1975: 11, section 5.1311) 
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individuals (comprising no more than two individuals in the case of APC2) and (ii) 
variables over propositional constants P and Q are replaced by the variables x and y over 
sets of individuals denoted by the restrictor term F, e.g. table-setx or table-sety.   
 
By applying NON to (171) and (176), neither table and no table are derived as the 
complements of the sets denoted by either table and at least one table respectively. 
 
(190) 
 
 0. 
universe 
IND 
= 1 
1. 
(1-(x+y)) 
 
 
2. 
(1-(1-(x+y)) [+ 
(1-(x+y)))] 
3. 
(1-(1-(1-
(x+y))) [+ (1-
(1-(x+y))))] 
x 
 
y 
 
cell 
structure 
of the 
universe 
value value value  
1 1 S4 1? 0 1 0 
1 0 S3 1? 0 1 0 
0 1 S2 1? 0 1 0 
0 0 S1 1? 1? 0 1 
 
    [either]/[-at least one]     [n-[either]]/[n-[o(ne)]] 
 
4.4.5 Entailers 
 
The derivation of the semantic content of entailers represents a more radical departure 
from existing analyses than that of pivots.  In this section the compositional semantics in 
bar-codes will be provided for the propositional calculus operator and and the predicate 
calculus operator all.  The codes proposed are the most complex ones in the system in 
terms of elaborateness, i.e. the number of times NEC is applied. They do not add any 
further algorithmic complexity, however, since the only tool used throughout is the 
single operator NEC and multiple use of the same rule only adds to elaborateness, not to 
complexity of the rule system (algorithm). Here I will limit myself to presenting the 
proposal for the propositional and the predicate calculus entailers and provide an 
argument in its favour involving what is known in the predicate calculus as the notion of 
existential import.  This concept will be explained and illustrated and the problem it 
poses will be shown to be solved if the composite structure of entailers as proposed in 
this study is accepted. 
 
4.4.5.1 The propositional calculus entailer AND (P,Q)  
 
The idea guiding our analysis of the 2D Cartesian Coordinate System has been that in 
extensional set-theoretic terms each step in the composition of the meaning of an 
expressible operator must differ from the previous one by a more comprehensive 
exclusion of cells due to the informativeness constraint (§ 3.3.4). In intensional terms, 
this is achieved by adding further specifications in terms of the basic NEC-operator.    
More precisely, I contend that the intensional meaning of  AND (P,Q)  is more highly 
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specified and hence more complex than that of  ORincl (P,Q) : it consists of the meaning 
of ORincl (P,Q) as specified above in terms of NEC and an additional semantic feature to 
be identified. The meaning of ORincl (P,Q) that was identified in our NEC-flowchart 
(162) above, is the inclusive one (‘at least one of P or Q has value 1’). That this property 
can be viewed as part of AND (P,Q) is straightforwardly true: if P and Q is true, i.e. both 
propositions have value 1, then it is necessarily the case that ‘at least one of P or Q has 
value 1’, which makes the following equivalence legitimate.  
 
(191)  P ∧ Q  ≡ [P ∨ Q] ∧  [¬ [¬P ∨ ¬Q]] 
 
P ∧ Q ≡ [P ∨ Q]  ∧  [¬ [¬P ∨ ¬Q]] 
  ‘at least one of P 
or Q has value 1’, 
i.e. 
‘P or Q or both 
have value 1’   
and ‘neither P nor Q have 
value 0’ 
 
The first part of the longer expression is ORincl (P,Q) with its at least one requirement. 
The added second part boils down to the requirement that neither P nor Q have value 0.  
 
Standard analyses have held that the second part alone suffices to get the truth table for 
and.  So why include the meaning of ORincl (P,Q) if  AND (P,Q) can apparently be 
reached in a much simpler, single step  [¬ [¬P ∨ ¬Q]]? 
 
The answer is that if the cognitively realistic negative subtractive derivation on the basis 
of NEC is on the right track, the item AND (P,Q) cannot be reached in one step, contrary 
to what is built into most logical systems.  Let us spell this out: assume first of all that in 
the Language of Thought there is a variant of NEC with two negative arguments ¬X and 
¬Y as input.  The format of NEC specified in (154) does not preclude this possibility.  
This variant of NEC is the general rule of conjunction ET, since its formal structure is 
identical to the traditional way of defining conjunction in negative-disjunctive logical 
terms:  [¬ [¬X ∨ ¬Y]] ≡ X ∧ Y .  
 
(192) 
 
ET (P, Q) = NEC (X, Y) 
Logic  
 
X ,  Y  ?    X   Y 
Set-theory  
 
/X/,  /Y/  ?    /X/ ⋃ /Y/ 
Algebra  
(1-X), (1-Y)  ? (1 – ((1-X)+(1-Y))) 
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Why cannot direct application of this operation to the Universe SIT (i.e., without ORincl 
(P,Q) as prior input) yield the desired result in a single step? The theoretical answer I 
propose and will try to further motivate on empirical linguistic grounds throughout this 
study is that exclusion (1-…) can only apply successfully to an initial cell if there is 
something that can be excluded, i.e. if there is a 1 value for P or Q. This squares well 
with the view that negation needs something positive to operate on.  Let us adopt this 
hypothesis and try to apply ET to the universe SIT.  
 
 
 
(193)  
 
 0. 
SIT 
= 1 
1. 
*(1-((1-P)+(1-Q)) 
 
 
P 
 
Q 
 
cell structure of 
the universe 
value Value 
1 1 S4 1? 1? 
1 0 S3 1? (1? – 1 =) 0 
0 1 S2 1? (1? – 1 =) 0 
0 0 S1 1? *(1? – 0 =) 1? 
 
The result that has to be obtained to get the meaning of AND(P,Q) is (a) exclusion of 
cells S1-S3 and (b) selection of S4. On both counts, however, immediate application of 
ET fails. As the boldface values for P and Q indicate, only S2-S4 contain positive values. 
As there is no positively valued P or Q in S1 for subtraction to yield 1-1=0, sequence 
(193) fails to result in complete exclusion of S1-S3. Specifically, S1 cannot end up with 
a zero value, even though it should to represent the content of the formula (1-((1-P)+(1-
Q)). As far as selection of S4 is concerned: on this count immediate application of ET to 
SIT fails as well: the value of S4 at stage 1. is that of a selectable, not that of a selectee 
yet86. 
ET as described here is as said a conjunctive variant of NEC.  If the above hypothesis 
will prove to be correct, ET is different from the lexicalised conjunction and, just as the 
semantic structure (159) of NON is not to be identified with that of the lexical item not 
of (187) in terms of internal semantic complexity (cf. § 4.4.4.2). This is because ET – 
like NON – is a variant of NEC which is (a) purely exclusionary and hence non-
expressible and (b) impossible to apply directly to the universe SIT because the algebra 
behind NEC-operations (including ET) can only affect initial positive values. 
 
                                                          
86 The force of this theoretical assumption will depend on how many empirical arguments can be 
provided that the meaning of AND(P,Q) indeed necessarily contains that of ORincl (P,Q).  The 
logician will recognize in the latter hypothesis the propositional calculus counterpart of the so-
called property of existential import in the predicate calculus. The more arguments that can be 
provided for some version of the latter property (cf. § 4.4.5.2), the more solid the present proposal 
for the propositional calculus. 
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Initial plausibility for the “affect initial values 1 only” assumption is provided by the fact 
that this is precisely what an ordinary NEC sequence does (cf. (194)): S2-S4 all have at 
least one positively specified (boldface) item P or Q, so that 1? – 1 will yield 0 as 
required. Note that one might even conclude that NEC is what it is precisely because all 
1-… can do is switch all cells with an initial 1 value to 0, which could only be NEC, 
(algebraically: (1-(P+Q))).  
 
(194)  
 
 0. 
SIT 
= 1 
1. 
(1-(P+Q)) 
 
 
P 
 
Q 
 
cell structure 
of the universe 
value Value 
1 1 S4 1? (1? – 1 =) 0 
1 0 S3 1? (1? – 1 =) 0 
0 1 S2 1? (1? – 1 =) 0 
0 0 S1 1? (1? – 0 =) 1? 
 
The problem with the conjunction cell S4 of (193) is solved and the need for positive 
identification of selectees is met if the pivotal meaning OR (P,Q) is taken to be part of 
the meaning of AND (P,Q), basically as specified in (191). One thing has to be changed 
in formula (191), however. If the cognitively real system is the negative NEC-system, as 
I am trying to establish, and it turns on the joint falsehood operator NEC (= ¬∨), then we 
have to apply De Morgan to (191) – repeated here as (195)a. – to turn it into the  NEC-
compatible formula (195)b.:  
 
(195) a. P ∧ Q  ≡ [P ∨ Q] ∧  [¬ [¬P ∨ ¬Q]] 
b. P ∧ Q  ≡   ¬[¬[P ∨ Q] ∨ [¬P ∨ ¬Q]]  
 
Converted to the bar-notation, we then get: 
 
(196)   
 
P   Q       P    Q  
 
 
Since this formula evidently contains two twin selections of P and Q, I shall initially 
consider each of them separately and then determine how they are connected. 
Performing the double-bar exclusion instruction of the first half (i) of the above complex 
formula  
 
(197) 
 
P   Q    
(i) (ii) 
(i) 
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we get the diagram for ORincl (P,Q) with positive identification of selectees in the usual 
two stages.  
 
(198) 
 
 0. 
Universe 
SIT 
= 1 
1. 
(1-(P+Q)) 
 
2. 
(1-(1-(P+Q)) [+ 
(1-(P+Q)))] 
P 
 
Q 
 
cell 
structure  
of the 
universe 
value Value value 
1 1 S4 1? 0 1 
1 0 S3 1? 0 1 
0 1 S2 1? 0 1 
0 0 S1 1? 1? 0 
 
   
Stage 0. Stage 1. Stage 2. 
z  ∈ S1-S4 → z  ∈ Sel? z  ∈ S2-S4 → z ∉ Sel 
z  ∈ S1 → z  ∈ Sel? 
z  ∈ S2-S4 → z  ∈ Sel 
z  ∈ S1       → z ∉ Sel 
 
In the sense that it positively identifies selectees, this can be called the existential part 
Orincl, guaranteeing the existence of selectees, which is the first stepping stone in the 
construction of the meaning of AND (P,Q). 
As opposed to what happened in the transition from ORincl (P,Q) to its contradictor 
NORincl (P,Q), the meaning at stage 2. is not lexicalised this time.  The effect of 
lexicalisation in the case of the or-nor transition was to make the meaning of or available 
for operations which could change that meaning and in effect had it turned into its 
contradictory.  In the case of the transition from ORincl (P,Q) to AND (P,Q), however, the 
meaning of ORincl (P,Q) does not get lexicalised and is thereby kept immune from such 
modification: ORincl (P,Q) remains active as it is and contributes its meaning unmodified 
to the more complex construct AND (P,Q).   
 
This brings us to the second part (ii) of formula (196) 
 
(196) 
 
P   Q     
 
S4 S3 S2 
S1 
P Q 
S4 S3 S2 
S1 
P Q P Q 
S1 
S3 S4 S2 
(ii) 
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which is the application of rule ET of (192) to P and Q, with the purely exclusionary 
effect that is typical of ET.  This yields the following stage 3. addition to the diagram: 
 
 
(199) 
 
 0. 
Universe 
SIT 
= 1 
1. 
(1-(P+Q)) 
 
 
2. 
(1-(1-
(P+Q)) 
[+ (1-
(P+Q)))] 
3. 
(i) (1-(1-(P+Q))) 
[+ (1-(1-
(P+Q))))] 
(ii) (1-(1-P) + (1-
Q)) 
P 
 
Q 
 
cell 
structure 
of the 
universe 
value value value  
1 1 S4 1? 0 1 1 
1 0 S3 1? 0 1 0 
0 1 S2 1? 0 1 0 
0 0 S1 1? 1? 0 0 
 
 
     /OR (P,Q)/  [and] 
 
All in all, to get to AND (P, Q) from ORincl (P,Q):  
(i) the meaning of ORincl (P,Q) is contributed as is and  
(ii) the additional, second instruction is ET (P,Q), i.e. an instruction to exclude 
what is not P, i.c. the cell S2 of Q that is outside P, and to exclude what is 
not Q, i.c. the cell S3 of P (and vacuously also the cell S1 outside both P 
and Q, which is also excluded by (i)). 
 
While (i) positively selects the members of the union of P and Q (S2-S4), (ii) cuts that 
positive selection down to the members of the intersection of P and Q (S4). This results 
in the following Venn-diagrammatic derivation for the lexical item and, which positively 
identifies the selectees in the intersection of P and B: both P and Q have value 1. It does 
so asymmetrically: (i) is prior to (ii) in that the latter is purely exclusionary and therefore 
cannot denote a set without the former (cf. (193)).  
 
(200) 
 
  
 
      /OR (P,Q)/ 
 
S4 S3 S2 
S1 
P Q 
S4 S3 S2 
S1 
P Q P P Q Q 
S1 S1 
S3 S3 S4 S4 S2 S2 
and 
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Stage 0. Stage 1. Stage 2. Stage 3. 
z  ∈ S1-S4 →  
z  ∈ Sel? 
z  ∈ S2-S4 →  
z ∉ Sel 
z  ∈ S1 →  
z  ∈ Sel? 
z  ∈ S2-S4 →  
z  ∈ Sel 
z  ∈ S1       →  
z ∉ Sel 
(i)  the meaning of ORincl 
(P,Q): 
z  ∈ S2-S4 →  
z  ∈ Sel 
z  ∈ S1       →  
z ∉ Sel  
(ii) ET (P,Q) 
z  ∈ S1-S3 →  
z  ∉  Sel 
ergo:    
z  ∈ S4 → z  ∈ Sel 
 
The crucial difference between the conjunctive cell S4 of stage 3. in the above derivation 
(199) and the conjunctive cell S4 of stage 1. in (193) is that the intersection cell S4 is 
now positively identified as representing a set of identified selectees, whereas S1 
remained lightly shaded in (193).  That difference constitutes the contribution of 
postulating that ORincl (P,Q) in (199) is part of the meaning AND (P,Q) of the lexical 
item and: at least one of P and Q has value 1 and hence there are selectees.  Due to the 
further constraint imposed by ET (P,Q) the set of actual selectees is narrowed down to 
elements in the intersection of P and Q.  
  
A final point concerns the nature of the compositional structure 
 
(201)   
 
 
P   Q       P    Q  
 
 
As formulated here in bar-code, it looks as if all is obtained in a single operation since 
there are only two levels of bars. Yet, the double occurrence of the pair P Q and the 
appeal to (i) and (ii) already indicate that something more complex than a single twin 
selection is involved.  If we look at the segmented stage 3. description, 
 
(202)  
Stage 3. 
(i) (contribution of stage 2., i.e. 
the meaning of ORincl (P,Q)) 
z  ∈ S2-S4 → z  ∈ Sel 
z  ∈ S1       → z ∉ Sel  
(ii) (contribution of ET (P,Q) 
(i) (ii) 
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z  ∈ S1-S3 → z  ∉  Sel 
ergo:    
z  ∈ S4 → z  ∈ Sel 
 
it is clear that the latter consists of two separate parts (i) and (ii), the first the contribution 
of ORincl (P,Q), the second the contribution of the exclusionary rule ET (P,Q).  But how 
are these two linked in prelexical syntax?  How is the ergo-conclusion arrived at?  To 
begin with, the relationship between (i) and (ii) cannot be the same as that between stage 
2. or and stage 3. nor.  The latter was the result of the application of NON to stage2.  
The relationship between (i) and (ii), however, is not a set-complement relationship.  
Rather, the two parts (i) and (ii) have to be structurally conjoined (set-theoretically: 
intersected) to yield the final interpretation that  z  ∈ S4 → z  ∈ Sel. Since conjunction 
was most minimally defined as ET above, it is the latter operation by which I claim (i) 
and (ii) are conjoined.  Using (iii) to denote this third component, the complete 
description of the semantic structure AND (P,Q) of the lexical item and is: the 
conjunction (iii) (= ET) of (i) ORincl (P,Q) and (ii)  ET (P,Q). 
 
(203) 
 
 
(i) OR (P,Q) (iii)  ET (ii) ET (P,Q) = AND (P,Q) 
at least one of P and 
Q has truth value 1   
ET neither P nor Q have 
truth value 0 
= AND (P,Q) 
  
Note that (i) is the positive contribution to the set of selectees, its effect being that P or Q 
have a truth value 1, while (ii) is a negative contribution in the sense of being purely 
exclusionary. In negative-disjunctive bar-notation, we get the following elaborate but 
algorithmically optimally simple formula: 
 
(204) 
 
 
 
The upper bar and the two shorter ones immediately below it are the contribution of the 
highest conjunction ET (iii) (cf. the bar-structure in (192)); the lowest two equal bars (i) 
over the first instance of P Q are the contribution of ORincl (P,Q) (cf. the bar-code in 
stage 3. 
 
 
 
 P      Q         P    Q 
 
OR (P,Q)     ET (P,Q) 
AND (P,Q) 
ET 
(i) (ii) 
(iii) 
(i) (ii) 
(iii) 
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(182)); the lowest two levels (ii) over the second instance of P Q represent ET (P,Q) (cf. 
the bar-structure in (192)).  Though elaborate, the resulting structure is very simple, since 
all that is used is NEC and its subvarieties NON and ET. As said before, the latter are 
nothing but instances of NEC with a particular choice of arguments, namely twice the 
same nonnegative argument combined with conflation  in the case of NON (cf. (159)), 
and two different negative arguments in the case of ET (cf. (192)). 
 
The elaborate formula in (204) is logically equivalent to the simpler formula given in 
(201) (as required). This is not hard to establish, given that vertically, two consecutive 
bars with the same scope can be erased whenever they occur (given the law of double 
negation). By erasing the two middle bars over each P Q pair in (204), the complex 
formula of (204) is reduced to the simpler one of (201).  This reduction due to 
extensional equivalence should however not be read as implying that cognition actually 
needs to apply such a reduction. Since it needs to set up the more elaborate formula 
anyway, applying the reduction is additional work that does not change anything 
semantically and is hence superfluous.  The morale of this tale is important: mental 
computation at the level of the Language of Thought is just as automatic and cheap as 
repetitive computer computation. The Language of Thought is good at the same type of 
computation that astounds us in a computer: it has no trouble whatsoever with elaborate 
repetitive patterns as long as the set of rules and primitives is minimal, the rules are 
inviolable and hence their application non-creative.  It is from the natural language 
lexicon upwards, where syntactic on-line computation begins, that there is free choice in 
the use of resources from the lexicon, awareness of rule application and hence ability to 
break the rules.  Consequently, computation in the syntactic module is a radical 
departure from computer computation: it is no longer the cheap, non-creative, boringly 
repetitive, minimalist and elaborate computation of the Language of Thought. From 
lexical selection onwards, creativity, reliance on short term and mid-term memory and 
the attendant need for compactness of expression play an important role. This, I believe, 
is why each lexical item has the structure of a signe: as it is the interface between the 
Language of Thought and syntactic computation, it needs to match a complex semantic 
configuration with a usable label. It is this lexicon with its compactly packed complex 
semantic structures, combined with the syntactic ability to apply the rules of Merge and 
Move to such lexical material which I believe constitute the basis for Chomsky’s 
Creative Aspect of Language Use (CALU)87. They make the crucial difference between 
natural language on the one hand and algorithmically less complex but configurationally 
unwieldy cognitive systems such as nonlinguistic Language of Thought. 
 
                                                          
87 Chomsky himself keeps CALU out of syntax, as he considers the latter to be in its entirety 
abstract and part of the competence system.  Yet, lexical selection clearly involves free choice. 
Moreover, I fail to understand why the particular (necessarily finite) number of times one uses 
Merge and Move in a certain derivation would be entirely abstract.  It seems more natural to 
assume that use of these rules represents concrete action in time (with possibly a lot of that action 
parallel activity of course), hence part of performance.  The lexical items used as well as the 
templates of Merge and Move themselves, however, are part of the competence resources in long 
term memory and called up in the course of the creation of a derivation.  It seems natural to 
distinguish between such knowledge “at rest” (competence) and actual use of that knowledge in a 
creatively formed, hence concrete linguistic structure (performance) in this fashion.  
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4.4.5.2  The predicate calculus entailer ALL  
 
In this section, the bar-code developed for the PROPC entailer and will be transferred to 
the predicate calculus entailer all. This will shed new light on the position I am driven to 
regarding one of the distinguishing features of the predicate calculus entailer all, namely 
that it poses the problem of existential import88. Consider once more the sentence: 
 
(205) All flags are green  - All F are G 
 
Imagine a situation to which this sentence applies, but in which there are no flags.  The 
question then is: is sentence (205) true or false?  These are the only two options in 
Aristotle’s predicate calculus (APC) but whichever is chosen, the calculus collapses. If 
the sentence is taken to be true, it follows by subaltern entailment that some flags are 
green, which in turn entails that there are flags, which is in conflict with the situation 
involved.  If taken to be false, it would follow that some flags are not green, which once 
again entails by existential import that there are flags, counter to fact in the situation at 
hand. “In fact, the whole of APC turns out to have existential import, as it requires the 
non-emptiness of the F-class. Only non-empty predicates are allowed in the F-position.” 
(Seuren 2002: 22) 
 
Seuren (2002: 22) concludes that this  
 
“is fatal for any logic.  For if a logic is, as we have agreed it is, a method for the 
computation of entailments merely on grounds of the semantic definition of the 
logical constants, then it must be irrelevant whether or not there exist, right now, 
any instances of F, be they gnomes or one-hundred-year-old Scots, or black 
swans.”   
 
How has this problem been dealt with? The choices that the history of the discipline 
provides are on the one hand Russell’s Modern Predicate Calculus, on the other hand 
Strawson’s (1952) presupposition approach.  Russell’s solution is a typical EX-logical 
solution: he exploits the set-theoretical fact that the null set is a subset of any set and 
consequently considers examples like (206) true in this world since the empty F-class 
(unicorns) is a subset of the G-class (live in Georgia). 
 
(206) (There being no unicorns, it is set-theoretically accurate to affirm that)  
All unicorns live in Georgia 
 
If given the part between brackets, ordinary speakers would have to acknowledge the 
scientific correctness of what is said, but would probably consider the speaker a bit of a 
“smart aleck” (Abusch & Rooth (2004)) using a clever science trick to be put in the 
right. The feeling is typical of “unnatural” EX-scientific solutions that are surprisingly 
accurate but go against natural intuitions (cf. the discussion about the difference between 
                                                          
88 For a revised version of Aristotelian Predicate Calculus in which the existential import problem 
is solved in the way outlined here, cf. Seuren 2002.  The point of invoking Seuren’s theory, is that 
it can be shown to confirm our bar-code decomposition. Moreover, the bar-code analysis suggests 
an expansion of the proposal to the propositional calculus entailer and. 
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EX-scientific ‘language’ and natural language in chapter 2).  While most valuable for 
scientific purposes and hence of course not to be discarded in that respect, as a 
description of the meaning of natural language all-sentences Russell’s solution is 
problematic. In some cases, such as the following set of examples from Seuren (2002: 
24) it is radically in conflict with natural judgments. If Russell’s approach were right, all 
of these examples would be true in any situation in this world without gnomes (but with 
visitors in c. and d.).  The intuitive  judgments of ordinary speakers are different (marked 
as True or False between brackets behind the examples). 
 
(207) a. All gnomes are fictitious (T) 
 b. No gnome is fictitious (F) 
 c. Some visitors talked with all gnomes (F) 
 d. Some visitors didn’t talk with any gnome (trivially T)         (Seuren 2002: 24) 
  
Aside from this empirical trouble, Russell’s solution demolishes most of the Square of 
Oppositions.  As is well-known, it makes nearly all relations in it invalid: subaltern 
entailments, contraries, subcontraries.  Since so many aspects of the semantics of natural 
language and IN-logic seem to find a natural place in the Square (and have for the larger 
part of two millennia), and since it turns out to be possible to set up a very minimalist 
version of the calculus in terms of a single negative-disjunctive operator, giving nearly 
all of that up because a single problem appears insoluble within its confines, seems 
unwise.  
 
The more so since another option is suggested by the experienced effect of sentences like 
(206) on natural language users. If its bracketed part is not provided and the rest is used 
as a serious assertion, people are likely to react to it as they would to sentences like 
 
(208) The present king of France is bald 
 
whose use has been argued (Strawson 1950; 1952) to involve an assertive part which is 
neither true nor false but “spurious” (or on Seuren’s analysis radically false), the reason 
being that it contains a presupposition that there currently is a king in France, which is 
not realized.  Since the presupposition is not part of what is asserted in the sentence, but 
rather presented as given knowledge on whose foundations the assertive part of the 
sentence builds new information, a gullible listener could easily be taken in by a false 
presupposition. But the attentive listener will realize that there is something wrong with 
what is presupposed, protest and say “but, there is no present king of France”.  In the 
case of the universally quantified sentence, he would analogously react “but there are no 
unicorns”.   
 
One implementation of the presupposition analysis for all is to adopt the assumption that 
its semantic definition incorporates the presupposition. In Strawson’s (1952: 174-176) 
case, this took the form of the proposal that the universal quantifier (and also the) carries 
an existential presupposition. Seuren (2002: 31) modifies this into the proposal to 
“associate with the universal and the existential quantifier in natural language the 
presupposition that the F-class is non-empty.” The advantage of that move (as I interpret 
it on the basis of several of Seuren’s other articles and on other people’s criticism of 
Strawson’s existential presupposition) is that non-emptiness of a class has the advantage 
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of being agnostic about real existence. In this sense, existential import is really is 
misnomer. Take the following sentence: 
 
(209) All gnomes are fictitious 
 
The F-class (gnomes) and the G-class (fictitious) are both sets of intensional, nonexistent 
elements (the use of term elements rather than entities is inspired by the assumption in 
the Russellian tradition that only what has extensional existence can be called an entity).  
The non-emptiness condition here does not require real existence, but merely non-
emptiness of F. The Generalized Quantifier Theory (GQT) conception of quantifiers like 
all looks to me to be operative in the same way here as in sentences with extensional 
predicates and F-classes (e.g. all men are mortal). In both cases, all functions as a two-
place higher order predicate, i.e. as a predicate over pairs of sets.   
 
Only in specific G-predicate settings does the nonemptiness presupposition amount to a 
presupposition of existence, to literal existential import, namely when the G-predicate 
imposes an extensional reading  (Seuren 2002): 
 
(210) All unicorns graze in my father’s meadow 
 
Grazing in my father’s meadow  being an extensional predicate G (i.e. a G-class whose 
elements are existing entities, cf. Seuren 2002), the presupposition that F is non-empty 
can now only amount to the requirement that the elements of the subject set be existing 
entities as well, otherwise they could not possibly be elements of G.  Since unicorns 
represents a set of nonexistent elements and the intersection of F and G can only contain 
existing entities as elements due to the extensional nature of G, the sentence is in breach 
of the presupposition of non-emptiness, which is here a presupposition of existence 
because of the extensional matrix predicate. 
 
A qualification is in order, however. Take the following well-known example: 
 
(211) All trespassers will be prosecuted  
 
Assume that this warning pertains to a given, particular infraction. It is possible that 
there have been no trespassers so far and also that this warning is effective enough to 
keep the F-class empty forever. Yet, there is nothing wrong with this apparent empty F-
class sentence. Note, however, that the nature of the G-predicate is crucial. In (211) there 
is no actual prosecution event but only virtual ones in the future, which means that the 
G-predicate is still intensional, hence does not impose actual existence on all trespassers. 
Compare: 
 
(212) All trespassers were prosecuted  
 
If the F-class is empty in this case where the G-predicate denotes an actual past, we get 
the Russellian "smart aleck" effect again (“there having been no trespassers, it is set-
theoretically correct to say that all trespassers were prosecuted”), betraying a breach of 
presupposition.  
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In light of the crucial role of the extensional vs. intensional meaning of the G-predicate 
in all the cases discussed above, I believe the most accurate approach is to associate with 
the universal and the existential quantifier in natural language the presupposition that the 
intersection of the F-class and the G-class is non-empty, whence non-emptiness of the F-
class follows automatically, even though the nature thereof is then conditional upon the 
nature of the G-class. When the nature of the G-predicate is such that the proposition is a 
future contingent one (cf. (211)), non-emptiness of the F-set is also non-actual89.   
 
When the G-predicate denotes actual rather than potential, future contingent events, 
actual nonemptiness of the F-class follows automatically from the presupposition that the 
intersection of the F-class and the G-class is non-empty. And when a G-predicate is 
extensional, there is a presupposition of existence on top of non-emptiness of the F-class, 
as in (212). When the G-predicate is intensional, there is no presupposition of existence 
(209).  In sum, “existential import” is too narrow a notion and therefore a misnomer for 
the first part of the meaning of entailers.  The presupposition involved is more accurately 
called “F-class non-emptiness” or the “non-empty intersection presupposition”.  
 
Auspiciously, the lexical decomposition analysis proposed here in terms of NEC 
precisely accommodates the presupposition analysis outlined above, without however 
having to stipulate the non-emptiness presupposition separately for predicate calculus 
operators.  Rather, it is a consequence of the more general assumption that the meaning 
of a pivot enters into that of its entailer, more specifically – as we can now add – as its 
presuppositional part. In other words, analogous to the way in which part (i) of the 
meaning of and guarantees the non-emptiness of the set of selectees, the first part (i) of 
the meaning of all embodies the equivalent non-emptiness condition requiring that there 
be at least one F (which is G).  To see the parallel, the template AND (P, Q) (204) for 
and has to be converted into the bar-code for all, whose meaning then comes out as 
follows: 
 
(213) 
“(i) Flagx is Green orincl Flagy is Green, i.e. at least one of Fx or Fy is G 
(iii) ET  
(ii) neither [Flagx is not Green] nor [Flag y is not Green], i.e. there isn’t any 
Flagx or Flag y that is not Green: no Fx or Fy is not G.   
 
                                                          
89 Note the parallelism with the non-actual nature of the NP the candidate who gets the most votes 
in Russell’s well-known example of knowledge by description. Compare his sentence with an 
“actual event” past tense correlate.  
(i) the candidate who gets the most votes will be elected  
(ii) the candidate who got the most votes was elected  
In (i) the actual election winner is not yet known (maybe forever unknown if no election ever takes 
place), in (ii) there is an actual person who answers to the description if the sentence is true. 
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    (FxG = Flagx is Green (with x a variable)) 
 
Though elaborate, this meaning description contains both the specification of non-
emptiness (i) needed for a Strawsonian approach to the “existential import” problem, and 
the universal specification that there is not a single F that is not a member of G (ii). 
Because of the non-emptiness condition, saying that all F are G when there are no F 
violates (i), the presupposition imposed as part of the lexical meaning of all.  
In another imaginable case, namely when the F-set is not empty but infinitely large, part 
(ii) of the meaning of all represents a leap of induction: although not all F can actually be 
checked and found to be members of G, the result up to a certain point may be so 
systematic that the leap of induction as expressed by meaning element (ii) is taken: there 
are no flags that are not green. Finally, (i) and (ii) are joined by means of the conjunction 
ET (iii). 
 
(214) 
 
 
In this representation, the meaning involved is rendered informally in terms of the 
restrictor DP, but it can be given in propositional terms too.  
 
(215) 
 
(i) AT LEAST 
ONE (Fx,Fy) 
(iii)  ET (ii) ET (Fx,Fy) = ALL (Fx, Fy) In terms of 
the restrictor 
DP AT-LEAST-
ONE OF Fx or 
Fy  
ET NO Fx or Fy NOT  = ALL (Fx,Fy) 
In 
propositional 
terms  
at least one of 
(Fx is G) or (F 
y is G) has truth  
value 1   
ET Neither any( Fx is G) 
nor any (F y is G) has 
truth value 0 
= ALL (Fx,Fy) 
 
 
 
stage 3. 
 
 
 
 FxG  FyG        FxG    FyG 
 
AT LEAST ONE (Fx,Fy)     ET (Fx,Fy) 
ALL(Fx,Fy) 
ET 
(i) (ii) 
(iii) 
(i) (ii) 
(iii) 
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4.4.6  Summary of the lexical decomposition analysis  
 
The derivation of logical operator triads from a single negative disjunctive operator has 
brought to light a systematic parallelism between the proposition calculus and the 
predicate calculus, with APC2 the calculus which most clearly evinced the close 
relationship between the two types. 
 
The only tool needed to derive the three hubs of the 2D Cartesian Coordinate System, is 
the nonlexicalisable, binary, negative-disjunctive operator NEC, which comes in three 
varieties: 
1. Different selection NEC (X,Y) > NEC 
2. Same selection NEC (X,X) > NON 
3. Negative input NEC (¬X, ¬Y) > ET 
 
 
1. NEC (X,Y) 
 
X ,  Y  ?    X   Y 
 
2. NEC (X,X) = NON (conflation added) 
 
 
X ?    X      (X) 
 
 
 
X ?    X 
 
3.  NEC (X, Y) = ET 
 
 
X ,  Y  ?    X   Y 
 
The starting point for different selection NEC (P, Q) is a Universe of selectable entities 
which – given two truth values and the binarity of NEC – has the structure of a dyadic 
Boolean Algebra, set-theoretically representable with four cells: 
 
(216) 
 
For same-selection NEC (P, P) i.e. NON (cf. Boole’s Law of Duality), the starting point 
is a more minimal monadic Boolean algebra with only a bottom (00) and a top (11) and 
hence a set-theoretic representation with two cells only. 
 
 
S4 S3 S2 S1 
P Q 
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
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(217) 
 
 
In a twin-selection framework (with two selections, namely different ones P and Q or 
twice the same, P and P) these are the only two possible Boolean algebras to start from90. 
In all other logically possible twin-selection configurations, namely when Q is contained 
in P, P and Q are disjoint, or P is contained in Q, one of the four possible truth value 
combinations for different selection goes missing, so that the starting point for set-
demarcation would fail to be a Boolean algebra:   
 
(218) 
Q contained in P P and Q disjoint P contained in Q 
   
no cell 01 no cell 11 no cell 10 
 
Stage 1. is reached by a first application of NEC to (216) or (217), whose effect is to 
exclude a number of cells.  At this stage, no set is demarcated yet since no cells are 
actually selected, only deselected. The input (stage 0.) and the output (stage 1.) of this 
first application of NEC therefore remain underground. 
 
It is after the second subtractive step, namely at stage 2. of a derivation that the first sets 
are demarcated and expressible meanings surface, namely those of the pivots.  When 
they are  lexicalised and no further morphological operations occur, they represent 
lexical items with pivotal meaning (e.g. or, some/any, either).  Alternatively, they can be 
lexicalised, after which NON turns them into a contradictor lexical item (e.g. or > n-or; 
                                                          
90 There is an uncanny resemblance between the two configurations produced by same selection 
and different selection and the distinction in the later Plato (Theophrastus, Metaphysics vi) 
between two principles, namely the Monad (or: the One) and ‘the Indefinite Dyad’ respectively, 
the latter of which was taken to generate plurality.  For arguments that a four-cell different 
selection Boolean Algebra indeed generates plurality, cf. § 6.4.2.  Plato’s theory prefigures the two 
basic kinds of Boolean algebras that twin selection operates with (cf. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/xenocrates/).  The resemblance is probably no coincidence: there is 
evidence (Grattan-Guinness 1982: 39) that Boole’s conception of his universe as 1 was inspired by 
the idea of ‘the One’, not only in Plato’s version, but also in later Neo-Platonic and more religious 
versions: “The Monism on which he was then instructed […] re-appears in his interpretation of his 
universe 1 in terms of religious thought (1854, 411-416).” (Grattan-Guinness 1982: 39) 
0 0 1 1 
P 
S1 S2 
P 
P P 
Q Q 
Q 
1 1 
0 1 
1 1 
1 0 
1 0 
0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
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one > n-one), whose extension is the complement of that of the corresponding pivot (cf. 
Löbner 1990: 95). A final possibility is that there is no lexicalisation at stage 2. and the 
meaning expressed enters into a larger construct with an ET-conjunction to produce an 
entailer. Analogous to how an earlier proposition P conjoined with a later proposition Q 
is presuppositional for the interpretation of the latter, the pivotal meaning (i) in the 
entailer is presuppositional for the second segment (ii) of its meaning. This is represented 
in the following bottom-up flow-chart for PROPC, which summarizes how (Peirce-
inspired) multiple application of a single operation NEC suffices to generate the cognate 
complex meanings of the lexical items of the propositional calculus operator triad. 
 
(219)  
 
 3. 
 
 
P  Q      P   Q 
   
  
 
P  Q      P  Q 
entailer 
 
 
and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
    
  2. 
 
P   Q 
 
pivot
or 
NON
 
3. 
 
P   Q 
 
contra- 
dictor 
nor 
  NON     
1. 
 
P    Q 
 
 1. 
 
P   Q 
    
ET     NEC     
0. 
Universe SIT 
 0. 
Universe SIT 
    
 
When stripped of the underground stages before stage 2., the pattern that emerges is 
precisely that of the 2D Cartesian Coordinate System with its two relations CD and ENT 
and the operations NON and ET to match respectively.  Observe that these two 
operations both take the pivot meaning as their input to yield the other hubs: the 
contradictor by NON, the entailer by ET. 
 
In the rest of this chapter, as much evidence as possible will be accumulated to prove 
that the relation CD is a natural correlate of the underlying operation of NON  (§ 4.5), 
while ENT from entailer to pivot is a relationship resulting from the application of  ET to 
a pivotal meaning (§ 4.6).  
ET (iii) 
(ii) 
(i) 
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(220)  
 
 3. 
 
 
P  Q       P   Q 
   
  
 
P  Q       P   Q 
entailer 
 
 
and 
all 
both 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
ENT 
 
 
 
   ET (iii) 
    
 2. 
 
P   Q 
 
pivot 
or 
any, one 
either 
NON 
 
3. 
 
P   Q 
 
contradictor 
nor 
none 
neither 
 
 
4.4.7  Prelexical operations and lexical relations  
 
The distinction between the derivational operations perspective (NON and ET) and the 
representational relations perspective (CD and ENT) is in essence a distinction between 
Language of Thought (LOT) process and lexical product, i.e. a difference between 
derivational, dynamic operations in the prelexical language of thought and resulting 
static relations among created representations in the lexicon and the propositions in 
which they are used91. Each of these two is as cognitively real as the other: LOT 
operations on prelexical semantic primitives are processes, and they inevitably lead to 
products, in casu, lexical items.  The latter can therefore be screened to find residual 
features of the primitives and processes that entered into their formation during language 
acquisition (the procedural or derivational perspective) or they can be looked at without 
further attention to their genesis during acquisition, purely to identify the resulting static 
relationships that exist between them in the lexicon and between propositions in which 
they are used (the relations or representational perspective). Surprisingly – to me at 
least – this difference between prelexical process (= operation) and lexical product (= 
representation) correlates with the difference between an inductive and a deductive 
orientation, as can be seen from the directionality of the arrows in the diagrams of (221).  
 
Induction generalizes from particular knowledge to general knowledge in the form of a 
universal statement, while deduction goes in the other direction and arrives at particular 
from universal truths. Now, in the operations perspective on logical operators, the non-
pivotal universal hubs of the system are set up on the basis of the particular pivot, hence 
                                                          
91 See also Löbner (1990: 75), who in a discussion of Horn’s (1973) analysis of the Square draws a 
distinction between the “Operation” of negation and four “Bedeutungsrelationen”, including the 
two mentioned in the text.  
CD 
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inductively oriented. The direction is from particular to universal operators by negation 
and conjunction.  
 
(221) 
 
DERIVATIONAL 
LOT operations NON and ET  
inductive orientation 
REPRESENTATIONAL 
Lexical/propositional relations CD and 
ENT    
deductive orientation 
          
 UNIVERSAL92 
A-corner 
entailer 
and,  
all,  
both 
  UNIVERSAL 
A-corner 
entailer 
and, 
 all,  
both 
   
  
           ET 
 
    
       ENT 
   
 PARTICULAR 
I-corner pivot 
or,  
some/any, 
 either 
 
NON 
UNIVERSAL
E-corner 
contradictor 
nor,  
no(ne),  
neither 
PARTICULAR
I-corner 
pivot 
or,  
some/any, 
 either 
 
CD
UNIVERSAL 
E-corner 
Contradictor 
nor,  
no(ne),  
neither 
 
         
 
But terminological caution is in order. Saying that the orientation is the same as that of 
induction should not be mistaken for the claim that each universal actually involves 
induction from particular knowledge (which is of course false).  Only in certain contexts 
do actual leaps of induction from the particular to the universal occur, more particularly 
when a particular I-corner hypothesis some F are G is checked for a subset93 of all 
possible Fs and the result is so systematically in the affirmative that the speaker leaps to 
the conclusion that the property of being green can be extrapolated from the cases of F 
checked to the the remaining unchecked cases: all F are G.  A leap of induction to an E-
corner universal, for its part, occurs when a provisional particular I-corner hypothesis, 
                                                          
92 Literally speaking, the label “universal” pertains to the quantifiers only, not to the propositional 
calculus operators. Thus,  [P:Mary is in the garden] and [Q: Elisabeth is in the garden] obviously 
does not express that everybody is.  The label can be taken to carry over to and, however, in the 
sense that in the case of P and Q both (= universal) arguments have truth value 1; and in the case 
of E-corner nor, P and Q both (=universal) have truth value 0. In the case of or, on the other hand, 
there is at least one (= existential, particular) of P and Q which has truth value 1.   
93 If the checked subset of F is the null set, the inductive leap is trivial and the checking procedure 
is frustrated from the beginning.  “Whenever the assessment of a sentence must start with a scan of 
an N’ set of a given noun phrase [the F-set, DJ], assessment is stalled if the set is empty.  In this 
case, the sentence is marked as anomalous, empirically irrelevant, or undefined, regardless of its 
semantic interpretation.” (Lappin & Reinhart 1988: 1031)  
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e.g. some F are G, is systematically refuted for each F that is checked for property G and 
a decision is made to stop further checking for remaining Fs whether the particular null 
hypothesis is correct. Instead, an inductive leap is made to the negative universal no F 
are G, given that the outcome of all checking up to that point has been so systematically 
in the negative. As is commonly known, in induction cases the conclusion is not 
deductively valid. 
 
It is with this qualification in mind that it can be claimed that the direction in the logical 
2D Cartesian Coordinate System is from particular to universal operators by negation 
and conjunction. In affirmative predicate calculus contexts, the most basic element is the 
particular truth operator  in the I-corner, i.e. some/any. To derive the universal truth 
operator, conjunction ET has to be applied to the I-corner operator and brings in the 
entailer, i.e. the affirmative universal A-corner (all)). Analogous to the inductive 
direction from I-to-A, one also starts from the particular existential I-corner in negative 
contexts94. On that particular I-corner, which is the locus not only of some, but also of 
existential one, negation operates and introduces the universal operator of the negative 
E-corner, in casu  n-o(ne)). The meanings of these hubs define a lexical set of entailment 
relations enabling deduction at the propositional level, namely entailment ENT from the 
A-corner (all) propositions to the pivot (some) propositions and CD between I-corner 
(some) and E-corner propositions and vice versa.   
 
The system of relations (ENT, CD) is less homogenous than the system of operations 
(ET, NON).  The operations both take the pivot as their input and asymmetrically lead 
away from that pivot. The relations are different in that they do not uniformly take the 
pivot as their input and moreover, while entailment is asymmetrical, CD is symmetrical.  
While this more hybrid nature of the representational system is not problematic for a 
calculus in terms of entailment, the stricter homogeneity and algorithmic simplicity of 
the operations system in terms of NEC does indicate that it is the most likely candidate 
for constituting the algorithmically simple, binary basis of IN-logic. The asymmetric 
pivot-based set-up of hubs is reflected in the greater complexity of the non-pivotal hubs. 
It is these assumptions for which further arguments and evidence will be sought in § 4.5 
and § 4.6. 
 
Similar observations regarding directionality can be made with respect to the 
propositional calculus. Earlier it was observed that the notion of partial knowledge with a 
remaining element of indeterminacy makes pivots different from the two other corners, 
where no such doubt remains. John is in the garden or Peter is in the garden leaves one 
in the dark as to who precisely is in the garden.  John is in the garden and Peter is in the 
garden, however, expresses certainty that they both are, and the same conclusion of 
expressed certainty holds for John nor Peter is in the garden. An epistemological 
correlate of this difference is that we apparently seek truth or fixed belief of the A-corner 
and E-corner type when the doubt and indeterminacy of pivotal I-corner knowledge bugs 
us.  Thus, upon hearing that John is in the garden or Bill is in the garden, we want to find 
out who exactly is.  In other words, I-corner indeterminacy generates the irritation that 
triggers searches for certainty and causal, general knowledge of the type expressed by 
entailers and contradictors (cf. chapter 2).  Thus conceived, I-corner indeterminacy is 
                                                          
94 Negation always needs a prior category that can then be turned into its contradictory. 
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epistemologically prior as the required generator of the irritation and drive to secure 
better knowledge. Analogously, I-corner pivotal meanings are semantically prior and less 
complex than those of entailers and contradictors. 
 
In the system as conceived, process and product are not in conflict: due to modularity, 
the pivot-fleeing orientation in LOT and the deductive orientation of entailment in the 
lexicon and in syntax are both indispensable and part of the same linguistic architecture. 
Even if the pivot meaning enters into those of the two other hubs in prelexical syntax – 
an asymmetry – the three resulting operators in the lexicon are ‘static’ lexical items, i.e. 
stored in long-term memory and extracted from the lexicon in their entirety for the 
purpose of syntactic concatenation. It will be clear that among such lexical elements (all 
of which are proposition types and hence amenable to a valuation space treatment) 
entailment relations can obtain.  Derivatively, entailment relations also obtain between 
larger representations – sentences, discourse – which are created dynamically and 
uniquely in use contexts. Take discourse contexts such as that of (222) by way of 
example, where the symbol > indicates progression in discourse from one stage to the 
next. Each newly introduced proposition (in boldface) represents the new information of 
a new stage in the discourse process.  Old information, that is information introduced at 
an earlier stage of the same discourse, is preserved at later stages.95   
 
(222) 
 
Progression in discourse Entailment relation 
Stage 1: P:John was in the garden >  
Stage 2: P: John was in the garden. (And) Q: 
Mary came in. 
P > P∧Q P∧Q entails P 
 
The choice of P and Q is clearly the creative result of the operation of free combination 
rules on lexical information, i.e. of online construction. Once these representations have 
come into being and the information they introduce stored in a mid-term discourse 
memory – a mental discourse domain D – entailment relations automatically obtain 
between the resulting representations as indicated. 
 
In sum, deduction in terms of entailment relations among proposition types in the 
lexicon and among entire propositions or stretches of discourse does not contradict the 
recognition that the prelexical operations of the logical system turn out to be differently 
oriented. To further substantiate the postulated relationship between CD and NON on the 
one hand and between ENT and ET on the other, additional semantic, epistemological 
and morphological evidence will be provided in § 4.5 and esp. in § 4.6.  
 
4.5  Contradictoriness and Negation NON 
 
Regarding the contradictoriness leg of natural logic, it is empirically obvious that this 
static bidrectional relation between the I-corner and the E-corner needs to be looked 
upon as the end result of a dynamic, asymmetric operation of negation on the I-corner 
(cf. Löbner 1990: 95), witness the following table: 
                                                          
95 This picture of discourse is doubtless an idealisation, but nonetheless useful as it stands. 
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(223) 
 
English Dutch 
Dynamic rule of negation  Dynamic rule of negation 
Input                              output Input                              output 
One  
Ever  
Either  
n-o(ne)  
n-ever  
n-either 
Een  
Iets  
Iemand  
Ooit  
Ergens  
Enerlei  
(ne)geen96 
n-iets 
n-iemand 
n-ooit 
n-ergens 
(ne)generlei 
 
Bidirectional static relation: CD 
 
Bidirectional static relation: CD 
 
The main consequence of accepting an asymmetric rule of negation as the linguistically 
and cognitively real source of CD is that the affirmative input (SOME) is prior to and 
less complex semantically than its negative contradictory (NOT-SOME, i.e. NO(NE)).  
 
4.6 Entailment and Conjunction ET 
 
In this section, the attention will be shifted from negation NEG to conjunction ET. First 
of all, it will be shown that there exists a very general connection between entailment 
and conjunction which exceeds the bounds of logical calculi. Next, semantic reasons will 
be adduced for the postulated relationship between entailment and ET in the 
propositional calculus and the predicate calculus.  
 
4.6.1 Evidence for the connection between entailment and conjunction  
 
That there exists a link between conjunction as an operation and a resulting static 
entailment relation is easy to establish by stepping outside of the domain of logical 
calculi for a moment and reconsidering the discourse example (222) above. Thus, the 
incremental progression in discourse from stage 1: P to stage 2: P (and) Q  in example 
(222) consists in a conjunction (set-theoretically: intersection) of their meanings at the 
point when Q is introduced, an operation which establishes an entailment relation 
between the more complex construct P and Q and the input P of the conjunction 
operation which adds Q : whenever P∧Q is true, P must also be true.  Note the different 
orientations: the dynamic operation conjunction operates on the less complex “old” input  
expression (P) and results in a more complex conjoined expression (P and Q), and the 
entailment relation is thereby created in the opposite direction, from stage 2: P and Q to 
stage 1: P. 
                                                          
96 According to De Vries and de Tollenaere (1991: 141), Middle Dutch (1150-1500) has geen 
(1253) and gein (c. 1220-40) alongside engeen (c.1265-70) and negeen (c. 1237). Cp. Old Saxon 
nigên, Old High German nihhein, from *nih (= Gothic nih and Latin neque, ‘and not’, ‘not even’, 
‘neither…nor’) and *aina- (‘one’).  
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Similar conclusions about the workings of conjunction/intersection can be drawn from 
the entailment relationship obtaining between Q and P (Q entails P) due to a phrasal 
difference in the following example.  
 
(224) a. P: Bill is [DP a doctor]. 
 b. Q: Bill is [DP a young doctor] 
 
While it has been standard since Aristotle to state entailment at the level of the 
propositions, it is clear that the source is to be found at a smaller level, namely the NP 
level, where the NP of the predicate nominal DP of the entailer Q is once again the result 
of a conjunction – an intersection set-theoretically –, this time of the denotations of 
young (x) and doctor(x).  Once again, this results in an asymmetric entailment relation at 
the propositional level in the opposite direction, i.e. from the proposition with the more 
complex DP (young doctor) to that with the less complex DP (doctor): if someone is a 
young doctor, this entails that s/he is a doctor, but the opposite is not necessarily true. 
 
Entailment can also result from a conjunction of information at word-internal level: 
 
(225) a. P: John is a dancer 
 b. Q: John is a tango dancer  
 
The predicate dancer being less highly specified intensionally than tango dancer, there is 
a set-inclusion relationship at the subsentential level – the set of tango dancers is a subset 
of the set of dancers – and correlating entailment from Q to P. 
 
(226) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The point made here about the relationship between semantic entailment at the 
propositional level and meaning inclusion at the level of smaller constituents, was also 
made by Katz (1972: 172):  
 
“The relation of meaning inclusion is the counterpart at the level of 
subsentential constituents of the relation of semantic entailment at the level 
of full sentences.  The including term, superordinate, is the counterpart of 
the entailing sentence, and the included term, subordinate, the counterpart of 
the entailed sentence.”         (Katz 1972: 192)   
 
/P:DANCER (J)/ 
SIT 
/Q: TANGO  
DANCER (J)/ 
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Katz gives a series of subordinate-superordinate pairs by way of example: human-
dilettante; dwelling-cottage, male-boy, digit-index finger, stone-pebble. (Katz 1972: 192) 
 
These observations result in the hypothesis that entailment in logical calculi should also 
be linked to the internal semantics of the subsentential lexical items responsible for the 
relationship at the propositional level.  Thus, the predicate calculus entailment relation P: 
All flags are green ├  Q: Some flags are green is due to a semantic difference at the 
lexical level between all and some, all other things being equal in the sentences.  
Similarly, there is just a single difference between the entailing proposition P and Q and 
the entailed proposition P or Q, namely the lexical difference between or and and. In 
view of the discourse, phrasal and lexical evidence so far, the hypothesis I have adopted 
is that the difference between the lexical items or and and, as well as between all and 
some amounts to a different degree of complexity, with the meaning of the entailer the 
more complex one.  More specifically, the entailer is a conjunction/intersection of the 
meaning of the pivot and an additional semantic specification.  That would explain the 
entailment relations and their direction at the propositional level. 
 
4.6.2 Semantic Evidence for Conjunction ET from the Propositional Calculus  
 
The key question of this section is: is there evidence strong enough to conclude that the 
meaning of the entailer and is indeed more complex than that of or and, more 
specifically, is it the result of a conjunction (ET (iii)) of the meaning of pivot (i) OR 
(P,Q) and (ii) ET (P,Q) as claimed in (203), repeated here? 
 
(227) 
 
 
(i) OR (P,Q) (iii)  ET (ii) ET (P,Q) = AND (P,Q) 
at least one of P 
and Q has truth 
value 1 
ET neither P nor Q 
have truth value 0 
= AND (P,Q) 
  
 
First of all, two theoretical arguments in favour of the complexity hypothesis for and will 
be provided; next, empirical linguistic data will show that complex structure (227) is an 
empirically accurate description of the internal semantic structure of and. 
 
4.6.2.1 Is and more complex than or? 
 
Acquisition facts provide an indication that and may well be more complex than or. 
Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet (1990: 352) note a fact that may sound counterintuitive 
OR (P,Q)     ET (P,Q) 
AND (P,Q) 
ET 
(i) (ii) 
(iii) 
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when first heard: semantically more complex words are quite generally acquired before 
less complex ones: 
 
“Children acquire words like kill and die long before they learn words like 
cause and become.  Of course, the IPC97 CAUSE and BECOME98 predicates 
need not be equated with cause and become; nonetheless, it is striking that 
what we have analyzed as the relatively more complex items semantically 
are apparently more directly salient for children.  It is often said that young 
children, while being attuned to causal relations, lack explicit knowledge of 
abstract notions, like causation, that serve to cross-classify many diverse 
types of events.” 
(Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 1990: 352; italics+underline mine) 
 
This order of acquisition can be made sense of. To begin with, the fact that kill is 
acquired before less complex become even though kill contains the concept BECOME as 
part of its semantics must mean that concept formation in the Language of Thought and 
lexical labelling are two different things.  Concept formation happens in the Language of 
Thought-component, which as said throughout is inaccessible to introspection. 
Consequently, complex concepts are constructed from the simple ones automatically and 
without conscious control99.  Acquisition of lexical items in the sense of labelling of 
concepts, on the other hand, takes concepts as its input material.  It is a matter of 
attaching local, language-particular labels to concepts constructed in the universal 
Language of Thought.  Its language-particular form has to mean that labelling occurs 
under the influence of triggering experience. Now, in one’s early experience, the 
particular, direct and concrete (FATHER, KILL) is plausibly more immediate and salient 
than the more general or abstract (MALE, PARENT, BECOME). That is why “Children 
know about fathers long before they know about males and parents.” (Fodor 1987: 161).  
It is the semantically less complex concepts which are less particularized and hence 
harder to discover in (or recover from) our Language of Thought. In view of all this, it is 
only natural that the complex concepts, for which there is environmental triggering early 
on, are the first to get a lexical label100.  
 
                                                          
97 IPC= Intensional Predicate Calculus. 
98 As in our own analysis, English words in capital letters are used to designate a simple or 
complex concept.  A simple concept belongs to “a stock of universal semantic components from 
which all languages draw in constructing the concepts their lexicons label” (Chierchia & 
McConnell-Ginet 1990: 352); a complex concept is such a composite construct made from simple 
concepts. 
99 Possibly, the nature of the complexity which complex concepts represent is somehow “received 
from without through the medium of the senses”, but then only in a triggering sense,  “because 
certain exterior things contain or express more particularly the causes which determine us to 
certain thoughts” (Leibniz 1902, § XXVII). In any case, all the material needed to have the 
knowledge, i.e. the primitive concepts and the composition principles must already be in the head. 
Without innate inner resources nothing from outside could cause any concept to coagulate. 
100 Note that once concepts are labelled, they become objects which are consciously controlled and 
freely selected for syntactic concatenation. They are even open to introspection for the purpose of 
linguistic science (as in the present lexical decomposition context).  
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The relevance of this acquisition fact to and and or is that there are a number of studies 
(Braine & Rumain 1981, Braine & Rumain 1983, Sacco et.al. 2001, Garcia-Madruga et 
al. 2001, Yang & Johnson-Laird www.ccm.ua.edu/pdfs/238.pdf) reporting that 
acquisition of disjunction is later and/or more difficult than that of conjunction.  
 
“our results show the following trend of difficulty among connectives in both 
the Abstract and the Pragmatic Protocol: conjunction is easier than 
disjunction and biconditional, and the latter are easier than conditional.” 
(Sacco et.al. 2001: 879) 
“With particular reference to disjunction, the findings from several studies 
are interpreted as showing that only the truth conditions associated with 
exclusive-or are available to young children (e.g., Beilin and Lust 1975; 
Braine and Rumain 1981, 1983; Paris 1973). There is a related claim, that 
even when children respond as if they have access to a broader range of truth 
conditions, namely those associated with inclusive-or, children's adult-like 
responses are the result of a failure to distinguish or from and (Paris 1973).” 
(Gualmini, Meroni & Crain, 1999) 
 
To my knowledge, the opposite claim, i.e. that and is harder to acquire than or, has never 
been made. If (a) disjunctive lexical operators are harder to acquire than conjunction and 
(b) acquisition of conceptually less complex lexical items is harder, the two add up in 
support of our general line: or is lexically less complex and more general than and. 
 
Recently, however, the claim that disjunction is acquired later has come under attack. 
Gualmini et al. (1999: 247) report that Chierchia et al. (1998) ran a series of experiments 
“which revealed children’s adult-like knowledge of logical connectives, including 
disjunction.”. Note, however, that under our conception, with a difference between LOT 
and labelling, the two results are not incompatible and it need not be surprising that 
children can assign the inclusive-or interpretation early on.  It actually confirms our 
conviction that the relevant concepts are available and active in LOT long before 
children speak, probably innate.  That does not, however, preclude the possibility that 
acquisition of the labelled lexical item or and conscious access may still settle later than 
use of and.  Bearing in mind the distinction between concepts and full lexical items, the 
reported findings need not be in conflict with one another.   
A further important point is that if difficulty of acquisition and conceptual complexity 
are not proportional (there is even a tendency towards inverse proportionality), it follows 
that tying the non-lexicalisability of the O-corner operator purely to a higher number of 
steps in its composition is not likely to be the right approach.    
 
4.6.2.2 Reconstructing the meaning of or and and on empirical grounds 
 
As a starting point in the present reconstruction of the meaning of or and and, the basic 
meaning of or is taken to be inclusive: AT LEAST ONE OF P AND Q HAS TRUTH 
VALUE 1  (cf. § 4.4.3.1.3, esp. (162)). This is a standard conception, and it suffices to 
have a look at column 2 in truth table (162) to see that at least one value has to be 1 for a 
set of situations to be in the shaded area of or.   
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So then let us focus on differences between or and and to identify on empirical grounds 
what differentiates the latter from the former semantically:  
 
(228) 
 
a. The Russians, who used to buy the 
skins, are broke and so are the Chinese, 
whose demand for wool has dried up. 
(The Times, Dec. 5 1998) 
b. * The Russians, who used to buy the 
skins, are broke or so are the Chinese, 
whose demand for wool has dried up. 
 
The so in the second conjoin of (228) a. expresses that the predicate which asserts that 
the first conjoin is a true statement is taken to apply to the subject of the second conjoin 
as well. It expresses that the subjects of the two conjoins are alike relative to the 
predicate, in other words, the two conjoins are asserted to have equivalent truth values.  
This is a semantic feature that or does not possess, witness the ungrammaticality of 
(228)b. 
 
This empirical observation squares well with the hypothesis that the meaning of and is 
that of or with an additional element of meaning to make it more highly specified.  
Informally put, the intensional meaning of and comes out as:  
 
(229) AT LEAST ONE OF P AND Q HAS VALUE 1 & P AND Q HAVE THE 
SAME VALUE.  
 
The second specification, which makes and more specific than or, is in fact an 
equivalence requirement imposed on the two conjoins. The two conjoins have to yield 
the same truth value at the level of the proposition when predicated over. Given the AT 
LEAST ONE OF P AND Q HAS VALUE 1 specification, the equivalence requirement 
can only amount to imposing that both P and Q have truth value 1.  Or stated in the 
negative terms of our decomposition analysis (227): (ii) NEITHER P NOR Q HAS 
TRUTH VALUE 0.   
Further examples supporting the postulation of an equivalence requirement for and but 
not for or are the following.  
 
(230) 
 
(a) John bought a book and Bill did 
the same. 
(a’) * John bought a book or Bill did the same. 
(b) John bought a book and Bill 
bought one too. 
(b’) * John bought a book or Bill bought one 
too. 
 
The well-formed cases contain and in combination with a word or phrase expressing 
equivalence of the second conjoin to the first, namely the same and the so-called adverb 
of addition too, respectively. The latter are overt manifestations of the “same value” 
requirement imposed by and on its two arguments. Once again, such sentences with 
OPERATORS IN THE LEXICON 
 
138 
overt manifestation of the requirement of truth value equivalence do not allow 
counterparts with or101. 
 
The &-symbol of (229), finally, has to be a case of conjunction as the two specifications 
on either side of it have to be fulfilled simultaneously for the meaning of the complex 
construct to be that of and. In negative terms, this means that neither of the two 
specifications is false. This is of course the conjunctive semantics of ET (in casu (iii)).  
On the whole, this makes (229) identical to (227) and confirms the decomposition 
analysis (cf. (203), (204) above) – cf. (231) below. 
 
On the whole, the claim that the meaning of and is the result of a conjunction of the 
meaning of or and an equivalence specification is supported by factual evidence. This in 
turn renders support to the earlier hypothesis that a lexical decomposition approach to 
non-pivotal hubs in general (not only the visibly complex hubs n-or and n-one, but also 
and and all) makes sense.  It also supports the hypothesis that the complexity of the hubs 
increases in the direction away from the pivot: in the case of the morphologically 
complex ones the complexity is achieved by means of negation of the pivot and in the 
case of the monomorphemic complex hub and by means of the operation of conjunction 
ET applied to the pivot. 
 
(231) 
 
(i): OR (P,Q) (iii):  ET ((i), (ii)) (ii): ET (P,Q) = AND (P,Q) 
at least one of P and 
Q has truth value 1 
ET neither P nor Q have 
truth value 0 
= AND (P,Q) 
 
P   Q 
 
(i)  (ii) 
 
P    Q 
 
 
P   Q          P   Q 
    
 
P   Q        P    Q 
 
4.6.3 Semantic Evidence for Conjunction ET from the Predicate Calculus  
 
The aim of this section is to provide further evidence that the meaning of the entailer all 
is more complex than that of its pivotal counterparts (any/some; either, (at least) one) 
and, more specifically, that it is the result of a conjunction (ET (iii)) of the meaning of 
the pivot (i) AT LEAST ONE (Fx, Fy) and (ii) ET (Fx,Fy) as claimed in (214) and (215), 
repeated here. So, while pivots consist of a single semantic specification (i), entailers are 
dyadic: a conjunction of two semantic specifications (i) and (ii). 
 
 
                                                          
101 As a final remark about the equivalence specification in the meaning of and we note that 
identity of value relative to the predicate crucially does not imply semantic identity of the conjoins 
themselves but only of their value. Identity of conjoins is even excluded in principle: Jan en Jan 
gingen weg always involves two different Johns, in compliance with Binding Condition B, in 
essence a Principle of Disjoint Denotation. 
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(232) 
 
 
 
 (233) 
 
(i) AT LEAST 
ONE (Fx,Fy) 
(iii)  ET (ii) ET (Fx,Fy) = ALL (Fx, Fy) In terms of 
the restrictor 
DP AT-LEAST-
ONE OF Fx or 
Fy 
ET NO Fx or Fy 
NOT 
= ALL (Fx,Fy) 
In 
propositional 
terms 
at least one of 
(Fx is G) or (F y 
is G) has truth  
value 1 
ET Neither any( Fx 
is G) nor any (F 
y is G) has truth 
value 0 
= ALL (Fx,Fy) 
Bar-codes (i) = 
 
Fx G  Fy G 
(iii) = 
 
(i)   (ii) 
(ii) = 
 
Fx G   Fy G 
 
 
Fx G  Fy G  Fx G  Fy G 
    
 
Fx G  Fy G  Fx G  Fy G 
 
To find fresh support for this hypothesis, we start from the Generalized Quantifier 
Theory (GQT) conception of quantifiers as two-place higher order predicates, i.e. as 
predicates over pairs of sets R(estrictor) and M(atrix predicate). To represent this 
perspective on the meaning of quantifiers the following generalized Venn diagram will 
be used.  It contains four cells which can in principle be relevant to determine the 
denotation of a particular determiner D, i.e. to determine whether particular instances of 
D (R, M) such as ALL (F,G): all  flags are green, AT LEAST ONE (F,G): at least one 
flag is green, etc. are true or false.  
 
(234) 
(i) F ⋂ G 
(ii) F  - G 
(iii) G - F   
(iv) 1 – (F + G) 
 
AT LEAST ONE (Fx,Fy)     ET (Fx,Fy) 
ALL(Fx,Fy) 
ET 
(i) (ii) 
(iii) 
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4.6.3.1 Restrictions on the denotation of GQs  
 
What has been established in GQT is that there are considerable restrictions on the range 
of admissible denotations of quantifiers and that “natural language determiners (at least 
“simple” or “normal” ones) (…) do not require the checking of all four areas” (Szabolcsi 
1997: 10) of (234). Consider sample (235) and the description of the determiner 
denotations in the set-theoretic terms of the four-cell Venn diagram above102.  
 
(235) 
 
Boethian 
corner 
Sentences 
D (F,G) 
 Size of 
Domain 
(i) 
F ⋂ G 
 (ii) 
F  - G 
I-corner 
Pivot 
a. At least one F 
G 
is true iff  │(i)│  ≥ 1   
I-corner 
Pivot 
b. Either  F G (in 
negatives and 
interrogatives) 
is true iff │F│=2; │(i)│  ≥ 1   
I-corner 
Pivot 
c. Any  F G (in 
negatives and 
interrogatives) 
is true iff  │(i)│  ≥ 1   
A-corner 
Entailer 
d. {Every/all}  F 
G 
is true iff  │(i)│  ≥ 1 and │(ii)│ = 0 
A-corner 
Entailer 
e. Both  F G is true iff │F│=2; │(i)│  ≥ 1 and │(ii)│ = 0   
E-corner 
Contradictor 
f. No  F G 
= Not one/any F 
is G 
is true iff  │(i)│  = 0, 
i.e, it is not 
the case 
that │(i)│  
≥ 1 
  
 g. Most  F G is true iff  │(i)│>│(ii)
│ 
  
 
These descriptions show that the largest part of the Venn diagram that matters for 
checking (for these and the overwhelming majority of quantifiers) is the restrictor set F, 
                                                          
102 GQ definitions have been provided by many: Barwise and Cooper (1981), Zwarts (1983), Van 
Benthem (1986), Keenan & Stavi (1986),, De Hoop (1992), Szabolcsi (1997), Seuren (1998), 
among many others.  
(i) 
R=F M=G 
(ii) (iii) 
(iv) 
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i.e. cell (i) and sometimes also cell (ii)103. This is the property of conservativity (Van 
Benthem 1986, Keenan and Stavi 1986, Szabolcsi 1997: 11). 
 
(236) D is conservative iff D (F) (G) = D (F) (F ⋂ G) 
 
What is even more surprising, however, is the fact that there is a perfect match between 
the definitions of (235) and our decomposition analysis in terms of complexity. Thus, for 
the pivots at least one, either and any i.e. (235) a.-c., just a single cell is relevant, namely 
the intersective cell (i) F ⋂ G. What the definition of the pivots in question stipulates is 
that there is at least one element in the intersection of F and G: some (=x) or other (=y) 
element that belongs to the set of flags is also a member of the set of green entities, 
precisely what is also expressed by the bar-codes. Note that this description leaves it 
open whether there are or aren’t elements in (ii), i.e. flags which are not green.  
 
(237) 
 
Boethian 
corner 
Sentence (i) = F ⋂ G;   (ii) = F  - G Link with bar-codes 
I-corner 
Pivot  
a. At least one  
F G  
 
b. Either  F G 
(│R│=2) 
 
c. Any F G 
 
 
 
(i) = ≥ 1: 
 
Fx G  Fy G 
at least one of (Fx is G) or (F 
y is G) has truth  value 1 
 
Entailers, i.e. (235) d.-e., for their part, are more complex in that the two cells of F have 
conditions imposed on them, i.e. both cell (i) F ⋂ G and cell (ii) F  - G. Moreover, these 
stipulations have to be complied with conjunctively (cp. (iii) ET in (233)). Note once 
more the surprising parallellism between the dyadic structure of the GQT description and 
the dyadic structure (namely, with two Fx G - Fy G selections) of the bar-codes, which 
can hardly be accidental. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
103 Possible exceptions involving many and few were brought up by Westerståhl (1985). 
(i) 
F G 
(ii) 
  ? 
│(i)│  ≥ 1   
OPERATORS IN THE LEXICON 
 
142 
(238) 
 
Boethian 
corner 
Sentence (i) = F ⋂ G;   (ii) = F  - G Link with bar-codes 
A-corner 
Entailer 
d. {Every/all}  
F G  
 
e. Both  F G 
(│F│=2) 
 
│(i)│  ≥ 1  and   │(ii)│ = 0 
(i) = ≥ 1: 
 
Fx G  Fy G 
at least one of (Fx is G) or (F y 
is G) has truth  value 1 
 
(ii) = 0: 
 
Fx G  Fy G 
Neither any (Fx is G) nor any 
(F y is G) has truth value 0 = 
Neither any (Fx is not G) nor 
any (F y is not G) has truth 
value 1 
    
 
 
Fx G  Fy G  Fx G  Fy G 
    
 
Fx G  Fy G  Fx G  Fy G 
 
While the pivots discussed in (237) (either, any, at least one) are intersective, there are 
certain pivots which are ambiguous between a simple intersective and a dyadic reading, 
more commonly referred to as a weak or cardinal and a strong or quantificational reading 
respectively (Milsark 1977): 
 
(239) Some Fplural  G : Some florists entered the garden   
 
The strong, stressed reading (also called proportional or partitive) can be paraphrased as 
“some but not all”: some florists entered the garden, others did not. The reading is 
quantificational, i.e. involves reference not only to cell (i) of (234) but also to cell (ii): 
there is a set of at least one element fitting the predicate florist but not the predicate 
entered the garden. The weak, unstressed reading, on the other hand, is purely 
intersective and cardinal: only the cardinality of florists who entered the garden, i.e. cell 
(i) matters to determine the truth of the sentence. This distinction can be accommodated 
both in GQT and in the bar-system as developed so far. 
(i) (ii) 
F G 
(iii) ET 
(ii) (i)  
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(240) 
 
Boethian 
corner 
Sentences 
D (F,G) 
 Reading (i) 
F ⋂ G 
 (ii) 
F  - G 
cardinal │(i)│  ≥ 2    I-corner 
Pivot 
Somepl F G is true iff
quantificational │(i)│ ≥ 2 ET │(ii)│ ≥ 1 
 
However the question whether this ambiguity is lexical or contextual is resolved (an 
issue which will be taken up in chapter 5), the means (bar-codes) to represent the two 
readings are available. 
 
To further illustrate the parallellism between the GQT definitions and the lexical bar-
code analysis, observe that contradictors such as (235) f. negate a pivotal interpretation, 
i.e. they deny the presence of any element in the intersective cell (i) F ⋂ G.  
 
(241) 
 
Boethian 
corner 
Sentence (i) = F ⋂ G;   (ii) = F  - G Link with bar-codes 
E-corner 
Contradictor
f. No  F G 
             │(i)│  = 0,  i.e. 
it is not the case that │(i)│  ≥ 1 
 
│(i)│  = 0: 
 
 
Fx G  Fy G 
 
Neither any (Fx is G) nor 
any (F y is G) has truth 
value 1 
 
 
 
Example (235)g. illustrates that even though quantifier theory has to be generalized to 
other operators than those in the three corners of the Boethian Square (whence the term 
Generalized Quantifier Theory), checking tends to remain restricted to the restrictor set F 
throughout.  In the case of determiner most, the operator is proportional within F in the 
sense that the truth of the assertion is dependent on the proportion of green flags relative 
to the whole set of flags.  
 
(242) D is proportional iff D (F) (G) depends on (F ⋂ G) / F104 
 
On the whole, this section has provided evidence for the decomposition approach to 
predicate calculus operators by showing the striking parallellism between the structure of 
GQT definitions of the denotation of these quantifiers and their semantic 
                                                          
104 For a clear exposition and definitions of this and further restrictions (intersectivity, 
extensionality and quantity), cf. Szabolcsi (1997: 10) and De Hoop (1992: 5-7). 
G 
(i) (ii) 
  ? 
F 
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compositionality in the NEC-system.  From the GQT perspective as much as from the 
NEC-perspective, entailers such as all and every are semantically more complex than 
pivots such as at least one, any and either.   
 
4.6.4 A difference between and and all 
 
There exists a difference in lexical meaning between and and all which, though 
superficially seeming to disconfirm the parallel bar-codes proposed in this study, is on 
closer analysis predicted by the lexical structures introduced above and hence supports 
the decomposition.  Consider the following examples with and.  
 
(243) a.  P:John is in the garden and Q:Peter is in the garden. 
 b. P: Flag1 is green and Q: Flag2 is green. 
 
Saying that John and Peter are in the garden does not in principle bar the possibility that 
there are more people in the garden, but upon hearing (243) a. the hearer will often 
pragmatically conclude that the speaker did not mention more people because the whole 
set of persons in the garden was exhausted or the speaker had no knowledge of the 
presence of more people in the garden (cf. one of Grice’s submaxims of quantity: “make 
your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the 
exchange)” (Grice 1989: 27)). So, while strictly speaking (243) a. only asserts that at 
least John and Peter are in the garden, under normal falling intonation there is the 
implicature that nobody else is. Similarly, (243) b. asserts that at least Flag1 and Flag2 
are green. But though its asserted content remains agnostic about Flag3, etc. (if any), the 
standard implicature under normal falling intonation is that no other flag is green.  In 
both examples, however, the implicature is not part of the lexical meaning of and105.  
 
That what is involved is indeed an implicature, can be illustrated by applying three tests 
devised by Horn (1972: 39-40) to establish the presence of an implicatum: 
 
(244) a. Asserting the implicature: 
Just John and Peter are in the garden, not John and Peter and Henry106 
 b. Suspending the implicature: 
John and Peter are in the garden, {or even/if not} John and Peter and 
Henry. 
 c. Contradicting the implicature: 
John is in the garden and Peter is in the garden. In fact, John is in the 
garden (and) Peter is in the garden and Henry is in the garden. 
 
                                                          
105 The notion at least in the description of the lexical meaning of and is the overt expression of 
what Horn (1989) refers to as the property of “lower boundedness” (no less than one of P and Q is 
true) and “upward compatibility” (possibly more than one of P and Q is true) in his discussion of 
the lexical meaning of disjunction (P or Q). The difference with Horn is my claim that these 
properties are not restricted to disjunction, but (as illustrated in the text) apply to the conjunctive 
logical predicate equally as well. 
106 Examples with full propositions instead of NP conjunctions are hard to get in (244) a. and b., 
but the fact that propositions are fine for test c. and that NP conjunction works for the other 
implicature tests, is sufficient proof. 
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Now consider the predicate calculus correlate of and, namely all. 
 
(245) All flags are green 
 
In this case, there is no upward compatibility: when all flags are green, it is impossible 
for there to be any other flags, let alone more green ones.  While this difference between 
and and all superficially appears to cast doubt on the identical bar-codes proposed for the 
two operators, it actually confirms their correctness.  This is because the semantic 
difference is not generated by the bar-codes themselves, but is due to the different types 
of arguments the operators take.  Specifically, it is the effect of the choice of arguments 
on meaning component (ii) of the bar-code which generates the semantic divergence:  
 
(246) and 
 
 
(i) P: Flag1 is Green orincl Q: Flag2 is Green, i.e. at least one of F1 or F2 is G 
(iii) ET  
(ii) neither [P: Flag1 is not Green] nor [Q: Flag 2 is not Green]   
 
 
(247) all 
 
 
 
(i) Flagx is Green orincl Flagy is Green, i.e. at least one of Fx or Fy is G 
(iii) ET  
(ii) neither [Flagx is not Green] nor [Flag y is not Green], i.e. there isn’t any 
Flagx or Flag y that is not Green: no Fx or Fy is not G.   
 
In the case of and, nothing is stipulated for any flags beyond Flag1 and Flag2. A third, 
etc. flag existing and being or not-being green is not incompatible with the lexical 
content expressed. In the case of all, however, the rotation of the variables over flags due 
to x and y has the effect of making meaning component (ii) universal  (“neither [Flagx is 
not Green] nor [Flag y is not Green]”, i.e. there isn’t any Flagx or Flag y that is not 
Green: no Fx or Fy is not G.), which therefore lexically excludes upward compatibility.  
In sum, the semantic difference in terms of upward compatibility between and and all is 
predicted by the lexical decomposition proposed. 
stage 3. 
 
 
 
 P      Q        P    Q 
 
stage 3. 
 
 
 
FxG  FyG    FxG  FyG
 
(i) (ii) 
(iii) 
(i) (ii) 
(iii) 
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4.7 The difference between (i) in an entailer and (i) in a contradictor 
 
In the descriptions of the lexical decompositions of entailers and contradictors, attention 
was drawn to an asymmetry in that the pivotal meaning (i) is in both cases logically prior 
to the added feature of the other hubs.  For contradictors, this was pointed out in § 4.5, 
box (223), and evident from the fact that in n-or and n-one, the negative morpheme is a 
bound morpheme dependent on a free morpheme to attach to (cf. Löbner 1990).  For 
entailers and and all, the asymmetry consisted in the semantic fact that meaning element 
(ii) in an entailer configuration 
 
(248)  
 
 
 
was shown to be semantically dependent: it cannot denote a set of selectees on its own 
(cf. (193) in § 4.4.5.1), but can only narrow down the extension of a logically prior 
pivotal meaning (i) to yield the extension of the whole entailer.  This must mean that the 
conjunctive meaning element (iii) – a case of ET – is asymmetric and that its pivotal 
component (i) is logically prior to (ii). 
 
Notwithstanding the foundational nature of (i) for both E-corner and A-corner operators, 
there is also a difference between the status of (i) in a contradictor and an entailer. In a 
contradictor, (i) it is not presuppositional but only a provisional “null hypothesis” which 
is rejected by means of the application of NON which produces the E-corner operator. In 
an entailer, on the other hand, it is presuppositional and hence prior to (ii) if Seuren, 
Strawson and our version of their analyses are on the right track. 
 
4.8 The two-dimensional model and Löbner’s duality squares 
 
The aim of this section is to list the main differences between the /NEC/-decomposition 
of logical operators and Löbner’s (1990) duality approach.  Their effect is to make what 
remains of the Boethian square even more solidly asymmetrical.  The first issue that will 
be touched is the pivot/non-pivot asymmetry. Secondly, a feature of Löbner’s 
Asymmetry Hypothesis, according to which pivots (Type 1) are less marked than 
entailers (Type 2), contradictors (Type 3) and O-corner operators (Type 4), will be 
criticised. Specifically, Löbner considers the conceptual complexity of an operator to be 
an important criterion for its place in the hierarchy, but from our viewpoint that is 
incorrect.    A final difference concerns the meaning structure of the entailer, which is 
more complex in my proposal on account of the structural presence of the pivotal 
meaning as subpart (i) in the meaning of an entailer.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
(i) (ii) 
(iii) 
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4.8.1 The pivot/non-pivot asymmetry 
 
By defining the nature of all set-demarcation in Boolean algebraic terms as the repeated 
application of a single binary operator NEC, the first expressible operator that emerges 
from subtractive operations on the Universe 1 is inescapably the I-corner operator. Its 
pivotal status is thereby established as a necessary property.  Given all the other features 
of operators which fall into place (their relationship, the fact that the same operator can 
connect them all, the different epistemological drive they generate, etc.) when the NEC-
hypothesis is adopted, the pivotal status of the I-corner has come to be grounded on even 
more solid foundations than before. 
 
4.8.2 The basic operator and binary negation 
 
The pivot is composed by means of exactly the same operation that is behind all the 
other derivational steps needed to generate the whole system. This constitutes a 
considerable reduction of primitives. Indeed, only one of the three types of negation 
distinguished by Löbner (outer negation, inner negation (= subnegation) and dual 
negation) is a primitive, namely outer negation, which is really the same selection variety 
NON of the binary operator NEC.  The other two varieties of negation are both complex 
constructs definable in terms of NEC. Given that the pivot is itself entirely composed by 
means of NEC, it is much less of a mystery now why it is more basic and why the other 
operators can be constructed by means of the same NEC operator in the different forms 
of negative appearance that characterize duality squares.  
 
4.8.3 The symmetry-asymmetry contrast and processing effort 
 
Duality groups are as a rule symmetrical: “Die Dualitätsgruppe ist durchgängig 
symmetrisch.” (Löbner 1990: 71). Given their definition, the three operations of outer, 
inner and dual negation are indeed idempotent: two consecutive applications of each type 
of negation always lead back to the original operator: 
 
 (249)  
Q = quantifier; S= Subnegation (inner negation); N= Negation (outer negation); 
D = Dualnegation (dual negation) 
 
S(S(Q))   =   Q daher Q ¬ ¬ ↔ Q 
N(N(Q))   =   Q daher ¬ ¬ Q ↔ Q 
D(D(Q))   =   Q daher ¬ ¬Q ¬ ¬ ↔ Q 
(Löbner 1990: 71) 
 
If you apply dual negation D to Type 1 in (250), you get Type 2; next reapply D to type 
2 and you end up with Type 1 again, etc. 
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(250)  
Duality Square 
Three symmetrical relations 
                  
                  Type 2:                                    Type 3:   
                  ¬ ∃ ¬     ¬ ∃  
                  all                          no(ne) 
  
 
 
                 
                   
                    
      
                 
 
        
      Type 1:                            Type 4: 
                  ∃                 ∃ ¬ 
         Some                  *nall  
 
 
With the corners of the square so symmetrically related to one another, the entire burden 
of asymmetry between the operators comes to rest on their own internal conceptual 
complexity, given Löbner’s view that “Die komplexere Bedeutung is die Ursache für die 
höhere Verarbeitungskomplexität” and thereby also the cause of higher markedness on 
the Type hierarchy (Löbner 1990: 105). But are complexity of meaning and processing 
effort indeed proportional? Consider the entailer (Type 2) and the contradictor (Type 3).  
Both in traditional terms and in terms of NEC, outer negation – which generates the 
contradictor – is a less complex operation than dual negation107. To me, this can only 
mean that the internal structure of a contradictor is less complex than that of an entailer, 
so that if Löbner were right it should be less marked on the markedness hierarchy. 
Empirically speaking, Löbner’s markedness ordering entailerT2 - contradictorT3 is of 
course well-motivated. It is easy to see that affirmative corners are invariably lexicalized 
while negative corner lexicalizations are much rarer. And when the latter do occur, they 
are morphologically or syntactically more complex than the affirmatives. But given these 
considerations there is a problem for Löbner’s claim that processing effort is 
proportional to complexity if T2 is configurationally more complex than T3.   
Under the NEC-conception, however, no such problem arises. Internal conceptual 
complexity is in certain cases even inversely proportional to processing effort.  Indeed, 
recall that though the pivot word or has a less complex meaning structure than and, 
acquiring it requires more effort. So the conceptual complexity generated by the number 
                                                          
107 Max criticizes Löbner for postulating three different negations. For him (and us), outer negation 
stands for the operation “put a negation in front of the entire expression” (Max 1995: 164));  dual 
negation: “put a negation both in front of the entire expression and in front of each argument of the 
operator” (Max 1995: 164) 
Outer 
negation 
Inner 
negation 
Inner 
negation 
Dual 
negation 
Dual 
negation 
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of applications of NEC does not add much (if anything) to processing complexity, it is 
the result of comparatively cheap underground activity.   
A more important and better measure for processing difficulty and position on the 
markedness hierarchy, so I postulate, is the impact a derivational step has on the 
denotation of an operator.  Starting from the I-corner pivot (say /OR/) with its three 
unshaded cells and a single shaded one, the step towards the entailer results in a reversal 
of the values for cells S2 and S3, which are switched from 1 to 0, i.e. two value switches 
in all. Assuming that the I-corner has switch level 1 (ignoring the underground stages), 
the entailer then has switch level 1+2=3 and is for that reason more marked. 
 
(251)  
  
/OR/ /AND/ 
1 1+2 = 3 
 
The step from the pivot to the contradictor, for its part, involves a reversal of the values 
of all four cells. It switch level is consequently 1+4=5.  
 
(252)  
  
/OR/ /NOR/ 
1 1+4= 5 
 
It is in this straightforward sense that coming from a pivot, the step towards the 
contradictor (Type 3) is more marked and takes more processing effort than the step 
towards the entailer (Type 2)108.  Counting this way, NAND is at switch level seven from 
the pivot, hence more marked (Type 4) than all the rest, as required109. In sum, the above 
measure of processing effort yields the right Type asymmetry in a plausible and simple 
way. 
 
                                                          
108 Löbner’s explanation for the T2-T3 order is part of his analysis of aspectual adverbs and 
ultimately rests on an assumption for which as far as I can see no proof is provided, namely that a 
reversal of a presupposition (e.g. between already and still) is less marked than a reversal of 
polarity (e.g. between already and not yet).  
109 In chapter 6, it will be argued that O-corner lexicalisations are impossible (at least for the 
calculi considered in this study). 
S4 S3 S2 
S1 
P Q P Q 
S1 
S3 S4 S2 
S4 S3 S2 
S1 
P Q P Q 
S1 
S3 S4 S2 
OPERATORS IN THE LEXICON 
 
150 
There is interesting further confirmation for this line of thinking.  Suppose one followed 
the normal path from the pivot to the entailer, but then chose to take a step toward the E-
corner: since two cells change their value from the A-corner to the E-corner, namely S1 
(from 0 to 1) and S4 (from 1 to 0), we add +2 to the switch value of the entailer in (251), 
namely 3, and consequently end up at switch value 5 for this two step operation. That is 
exactly the same switch level as the single step from /OR/ to /NOR/.  If, as I have been 
arguing, the number of steps is not a relevant criterion but switch level is, then the 
prediction of this equal switch level result for two derivational paths is that E-corner 
lexicalisations should vacillate between lexicalisations based on the pivot and 
lexicalisations based on the entailer.  Now that is precisely correct.  That E-corner 
lexicalisations are often directly based on the pivot has been amply illustrated (n-or, n-
one, etc.), but A-corner based lexicalisations are not so hard to come by either, witness 
the following cases:   
 
(253) a. Latin Ne-que (or Nec), literally “not-and” 
 b. Dutch n-immer, literally “n-always” 
 
Although these two different A-corner based lexicalizations are formally negations of an 
A-corner operator and might therefore at first sight be viewed as O-corner items, they are 
not.  The negations in question are really inner negations: Lat. Neque does not express 
the O-corner meaning “not and” but rather the E-corner meaning “nor”; and Dutch 
nimmer does not express “not always” but rather the E-corner meaning “always not”, i.e. 
“never”, with always scoping over negation.  
There is an even more surprising example, namely Old English nalles, which at first 
glance looks very much like the missing O-corner item we have been looking for.  But 
again, appearances deceive: its meaning is not “all not”, but again the E-corner meaning 
“not”, “not at all”. So, as Hoeksema (1999) writes:  
 
"Even in cases that look very promising (like Old English, which has an item 
nalles, derived from alles "all" by adding the negative prefix ne- - the same 
that is used in words like never, naught, nor, neither), we end up empty-
handed. Nalles does not actually mean "not all" or "not everything", but "not 
at all" (Horn 1989: 261)." 
Hoeksema (1999) 
 
The combination of the degree of markedness as determined by the switch level count 
and the fact that in terms of acquisition entailers may be easier to acquire than pivots (at 
least for conjunction vs. disjunction this is the case) provides a plausible account why a 
two-step E-corner operator based on an entailer, namely with internal negation, is quite 
common across languages.  
 
4.9 Conclusion 
 
The point of departure of this chapter was the two basic relations of the logical 2D 
Cartesian Coordinate System. Our analysis of them was a standard deductive one, which 
defined the relationships between the pivot and the other operators in terms of entailment 
and yielded the static relations CD and ENT between propositions containing the 
operators in question. Since lexical items are listed in long term memory and 
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sentences/propositions stacked in a discourse domain upon the process of their 
production, there can be nothing against such a ‘static’ approach postulating 
relationships among stored products.   
 
Deductively oriented system 
PIVOT relation  
CD NONE 
NOR 
SOME/ANY/ONE 
OR 
Entailment ALL 
AND 
 
A look at the properties of logical operators qua lexical items led to an additional 
perspective.  On grounds of morphological and semantic complexity of the non-pivotal 
lexical items, a pivot-based system with asymmetric operations was proposed, 
identifying the lexical form of contradictors and entailers as constructed from the pivot 
by means of the operations negation (NON) and conjunction (ET), respectively. The 
latter are two variants of a negative operator NEC. 
 
Inductively oriented system 
Input operation Output 
Negation 
NON 
contradictor 
 
NONE  
NOR 
pivot SOME/ANY/ONE  
OR 
Conjunction 
ET 
entailer 
 
ALL  
AND 
 
As the linguistic facts have to dictate the analysis, empirical evidence was sought for this 
hypothesis that entailers and contradictors are composite lexical items, decomposable 
into the meaning of the pivotal input and an additional meaning feature added by means 
of the dynamic operation.  For contradictors, morphological evidence made it 
transparently clear that this is the right approach: n-or, for instance, is visibly more 
complex than or. Semantic arguments pointed in the same direction. For entailers, no 
similar morphological evidence was found, so the idea that they are more complex than 
pivots had to be motivated on semantic and epistemological grounds. To that end, the 
relationship between and and or was tackled. This could be done in empirical detail, as 
strong evidence (involving the same, too, and so) was readily available. The claim that 
all has a complex semantic structure which has the same bar-code representation as and 
was defended on the grounds that it provided a solution to the problem of existential 
import.  
 
The analysis of the propositional operator and posed an interesting problem regarding 
the notion “conjunction” that needed solving: if AND, i.e. the meaning of the lexical item 
and, was to be viewed as a “conjunction” of the meaning of or and something else, then 
the conjunctive operation involved had better not be identical to AND and as complex as 
AND itself. This led to the postulation of a difference between the lexical item and on the 
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one hand, and the less complex, abstract conjunctive operator ET.  The latter was 
independently needed, as it does not enter only into the lexical specification of the 
meaning of the lexical item and, but also into the lexical decomposition of the predicate 
calculus operator all.   
 
It is the hypotheses that emerge from the decomposition analysis which will constitute 
the guiding intuitions for the next chapter: logical operators are interrelated lexical items, 
their lexical properties are the source of differences between the operators themselves, 
amongst others differences in morphological and semantic complexity. At the level of 
the lexical items that function as operators in the predicate calculus, the most primitive 
one is the pivot, and the rules of Negation and Conjunction are the sources of the two 
derived hubs.  They are the operations whose effect at the level of the entire propositions 
is to establish the two basic ‘static’ relations of CD and entailment of Aristotle’s 
predicate calculus and the Stoics’ propositional calculus. While the two relations are 
different from one one another, the two operations NON and ET that were proven to 
generate them are variants of a single negative-disjunctive operator NEC, to which the 
whole system consequently reduces.   
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5 THE PIVOT OF THE 2D CARTESIAN 
COORDINATE SYSTEM 
 
5.1 Why are pivots pivotal? 
 
In our quest for a minimalist natural logic, three steps have been taken.  In chapter 2, the 
Boethian Square of Oppositions was reduced to a two-dimensional system turning on the 
relations of entailment (ENT) and contradictoriness (CD). Chapter 3 provided an 
analysis in which these basic relations were postulated to obtain in the first place 
between lexical items, i.e. proposition types, in the natural language lexicon and only 
derivatively between the concrete propositions in which the operators are used (cf. 
(254)a below). In view of this, the attention gradually shifted from the logical relations 
between sentences containing logical operators to the lexical content of the operators 
themselves. They were decomposed in such a way that the meanings of the non-pivotal 
focal points – the entailer and the contradictor – are based on that of the pivot (cf. the 
direction of the arrows in (254)b). The rules by means of which the complex non-pivots 
are composed from the meaning of the less complex pivot were identified as negation 
(NON) and Conjunction (ET), two variants of the negative-disjunctive operation NEC. 
These are Language of Thought operations below conscious control in natural language 
acquisition.  The resulting picture adds substance to the view that IN-logic is a two-
dimensional Cartesian coordinate system, as it identifies the least complex pivotal I-
corner as the Cartesian “origin” of IN-logic. It is the point of intersection where the 
quality relation (NON) leading to the contradictor and the quantity relation  (ET) leading 
to the entailer meet. 
 If correct, this makes the pivot the “odd one out” in that its meaning is (a) less complex 
than those of the two non-pivots and (b) a subpart of both of them. 
 
(254) 
 
                  
                  A :                                     
                  and           
                  all                           
  
 
 
2.├ ENT 
        
     
                 
 
 
      I:                              E :   
                   or                            nor  
                   some                       no(ne) 
            
                 
            A :  ENTAILER          
                   and                          
                   all                 
  
 
 
2.ET      
   
   
                 
 
       
I: PIVOT      E :CONTRADICTOR  
or                          nor 
     some                    no(ne)     
 
1.CD 1. NEG 
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Concretely, the following Peirce-style decomposition was argued to represent the lexical 
content of the propositional calculus triad and, or, nor. It is stated in a bar-code which 
represents a universal code as part of the Language of Thought. The codes show clearly 
how the meaning of the pivot is indeed less complex than those of the two non-pivots, 
while at the same time entering into both. This is not a code-specific phenomenon and 
therefore not an artefact of our notation – other more traditional formalizations would 
produce the same differences in elaborateness between the pivot and the other two hubs. 
 
 (255) 
 
  
 
  P  Q          P   Q 
 
   
  
 
 
  P  Q           P   Q  
 
entailer 
 
 
and 
 
 
 
 
   
  
         
 
    
  
 
 
 
         P   Q 
 
 
 
 
 
 
pivot 
or 
NON 
 
 
 
 
 
P  Q 
 
 
 
contradictor 
nor 
 
 
Auspiciously, not only the bar-code analysis supports the claim that entailers and 
contradictors are lexically more highly specified than pivots.  Lexically more highly 
specified items are expected to leave fewer possible situations in the extensional universe 
of discourse which are still compatible with their more elaborate, hence more restrictive 
description. In our case, the prediction then is that if indeed entailers and contradictors 
are intensionally more complex than pivots, they should have comparatively more cells 
excluded in their Venn-diagram representation.  This is precisely what obtains (and is 
standardly recognized).  Recall the proposition calculus, set-theoretic and algebraic 
operations which the three corners of the 2D Cartesian coordinate system represent and 
the corresponding Venn-diagrams, with the number of excluded cells indicated. 
 
 
 
 
 
ET  
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(256) 
 logic set-theory algebra 
conjunction intersection multiplication A-corner 
(and) X∧Y X ⋂ Y XxY 
disjunction union addition I-corner 
(or) X∨Y X ⋃ Y X+Y 
negation of 
disjunction 
complement of 
union 
universe minus 
addition 
E-corner 
(nor) 
¬ (X∨Y) X ⋃ Y 1-(X+Y) 
 
A-corner 
Entailer 
intersection 
/P/ ⋂ /Q/ 
 
I-corner 
pivot 
union 
/P/ ⋃ /Q/ 
 
E-corner 
contradictor 
complement of union 
/P/ ⋃/Q/ 
 
3 cells excluded 
Only 1 cell unshaded 
1 cell excluded 
3 cells unshaded 
3 cells excluded 
only 1 cell unshaded 
 
The logical relations perspective (ch. 1 & 2), the bar-code decomposition (ch. 3) and the 
set-theoretic exclusionary outlook all converge to the same conclusion:  a pivot is 
systematically different from non-pivots by being lighter in lexical content: 
a. it is the ‘origin’ of the 2D Cartesian Coordinate System, on which both CD and ENT 
are defined; 
b. it is the intensionally least specified item of its operator triad (cf. bar-code); 
c. it is the extensionally least exclusive item of its operator triad (cf. three non-excluded 
cells). 
 
The entailer is even more radically different from the pivot than the contradictor.  It has a 
dyadic internal structure (with two different successive twin selections) whereas the pivot 
and the contradictor have a monadic structure (a single twin selection or at most multiple 
same-selections which then get conflated and leave a single twin selection representation 
in the end), as can be seen in (255). This difference, more specifically the semantic 
contribution of the second twin selection (ii) (chapter 4, (248)), is the source of a well-
known asymmetry of entailers relative to pivots and contradictors, namely that entailers 
are not convertible, i.e. all F are G does not imply all G are F.  Pivots and contradictors, 
for their part, are convertible – some F are G implies that some G are F, and no F are G 
implies that no G are F. This ‘convertibility’ or ‘symmetry’ (Barwise and Cooper 1981) 
was “taken by Aristotle and his followers to belong to the basic logical facts about the 
square of opposition” (Westerståhl 2005: 3).  Among the convertible operators, the 
affirmative one, the pivot, is the least marked, given that it has fewer bars and is hence 
derivationally less complex than the contradictor, a final asymmetry. 
 
/P/ /P/ /P/ /Q/ /Q/ /Q/ 1 1 1 
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To find empirical evidence for the pivot-nonpivot, the nonconvertible-convertible and 
the pivot-contradictor asymmetries, the present chapter will be entirely devoted to the 
third question that was raised in § 2.3: 
 
What are the main semantic features of the element which functions as the 
pivot of a formal calculus of entailments in natural language and how does it 
differ from the other two hubs? 
 
5.1.1 Pivots versus non-pivots 
 
The nature of the difference between pivots and non-pivots will be addressed in § 5.2. Its 
main observation is that pivots are more variable in meaning than non-pivots and its 
main assumption is that this can be tied to their lexical “lightweight” status. Specifically, 
since the entailer and contradictor have their extension sets narrowed down to a single 
cell in the Venn-diagrams of (256), there is little room for contexts to cause further 
modification. By contrast, the sparser intrinsic lexical content of pivots means that their 
lexically specified extension set is larger (three cells unshaded), which leaves more room 
for further cell exclusion by context110.  Take the following sentence pair:  
 
(257)  
 
a. Have you met John or Mary? 
(“John or Mary or both?”) 
inclusive 
b. She met John or Mary. 
(“John or Mary, but not both”) 
exclusive 
  
                                                          
110 The general point that is here instantiated in pivots is that less intension (lexical content) leaves 
more extension and hence more room for context-determined variation. That this generalization is 
much more generally valid, can easily be illustrated by means of reputedly lightweight functional 
categories such as the verbs be, go, etc., the preposition/infinitival particle to, the preposition of, 
etc., all of which can get different readings in different contexts (cf. Gruber 1965, 1976; 
Jackendoff 1983, ch. 10). 
 
(i) 
a. The car is at the corner (spatial) 
b. The meeting is at twelve noon (temporal)  
c. Elisabeth is bright (identificational) 
d. The book is Elisabeth’s (possessional) 
 
(ii) 
The car went to Bill (= it moved; spatial) 
The car went to Bill (= change of owner; possessional) 
/P/ /P/ /Q/ /Q/ 
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The difference between the lexical meaning (3 cells unshaded) and the extensionally 
smaller exclusive reading (2 cells unshaded) correlates with the difference between an 
interrogative and an affirmative context. 
 
Aside from the inclusive-exclusive variation of (257), further chameleonic behaviour of 
pivots will be shown to come in two categories. First, there are cases of pivots in 
different languages which have over time acquired a contradictor corner reading, in 
which case they become semantically indistinguishable from lexical E-corner operators. 
This will be called I→E-shift and can be illustrated here for the French temporal adverb 
jamais. Originally, its meaning was purely that of an existential pivot (“ever”) as in 
(258)a., but it developed an additional contradictor reading (258)b (Grevisse (1980: 
1053)).  
 
(258) a. I-corner (jamais = “ever”):  
Si JAMAIS vous changez d’avis  
“If ever you change your mind” 
 b. E-corner (jamais =“never”):  
Vous avez toujours été orateur, JAMAIS philosophe (Fén., Dial., 33 ; 
quoted from : Grevisse 1980: 1053) 
  “You have always been an orator, never a philosopher.” 
 
Secondly, in certain syntactic contexts several pivots can get a reading akin to that of an 
entailer, an interpretation that will be called I→A-shift111.  
 
(259) a. I-corner:   If you see anybody, give me a ring (existential) 
 b. ≈A-corner:  Any man can do that (quasi-universal: ≈ Every man can do 
that) 
 
Entailers and contradictors, for their part, are quantificationally less malleable. A-corner 
operators which acquire E-corner interpretations or vice versa, are to my knowledge not 
attested. 
 
 
 
A-corner 
Entailer 
 I-corner 
pivot 
 E-corner 
Contradictor 
every 
always 
both 
And 
 
 
any 
ever 
either 
or 
 
 
no(ne) 
never 
neither 
nor 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
111 The pivot some is an exception to the I→A-shift in English. 
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5.1.2 The lexical meaning of a pivot 
 
If pivots are variable in meaning due to low lexical content, it is important to be clear 
about the core lexical meaning that underlies them all. Our starting point in this respect 
will be the semantic component that was identified for the PROPC operator or in the 
decompositional bar-code and the equivalent Venn and placemat diagrams, namely (AT 
LEAST) ONE OF P AND Q HAS VALUE 1.  
 
(260)  
 
 
 
 
 
P   Q 
 
 
 
 
/P/ /Q/ 
1 1 
1 0 
0 1 
0 0  
Exclusion 
(=highest bar) of 
what is neither P 
nor Q; rest selected 
1 cell excluded, namely that of 
neither P nor Q; rest selected 
1 cell excluded, namely 
that of neither P nor Q; rest 
selected 
 
It was observed that there is a certain correspondence between this pattern and a 
semantic feature of pivots in APC, namely that when some flags are green, there exists 
at least one member of the class of flags: there is at least one flag. It is the common 
denominator of these two descriptions, namely a notion (AT LEAST) ONE that is also 
traceable in other pivots. Since these pivots obviously have different meanings, the 
element in question is a substrate that enters into them, but does not constitute their 
whole meaning.  The aim of § 5.3 is to illustrate the presence of the substrate for the 
different pivots on the basis of their common sense lexical meaning descriptions in 
dictionaries and to tie it to the negative bar code (cf. (219) in § 4.4.6), the placemat 
diagram (§ 3.3.2) and the valuation space of or.  
 
5.2 Shifts away from the I-corner  
 
A good indication that I-corner operators are lexically less specified than the other 
operators is that their meaning can be affected in a number of ways which even turns 
them into E-corner operators at times or makes them very similar to A-corner operators. 
 
5.2.1 The I→E-shift 
 
Morphological evidence (or, n-or; ever, n-ever; either, n-either) was appealed to in 
chapter 3 to conclude that E-corner operators are derived from pivots by application of 
negation. Those facts are sufficient proof of the foundational nature of the pivots relative 
to contradictors for the purpose of the lexical decomposition analysis.  But there is 
/P/ /Q/ 
/OR/ 1 0 0 1 1 1 
0 0 
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another unidirectional I-to-E phenomenon which lends further support to the same 
conclusion, namely cases where I-corner operators get an E-corner operator 
interpretation in particular syntactic contexts.   
 
Take the following examples from Grevisse (1980: 636): 
 
(261) a. Penses-tu qu’aucun d’eux veuille subir mes lois? (Boil., Ep., 2.) 
 b. Aucun de nous ne serait téméraire…(Corn., Rod., IV, 1) 
 c. Lui connaissez-vous des ennemis ? Aucun. (Ac.) 
      (Grevisse 1980 : 636, § 1270) 
 
In conformity with its etymological origins (< popular Lat. *alicunus, from the Latin 
pivots aliquis (“someone”) and unus (“one”)), the meaning of the pronoun aucun was 
pivotal “someone” until the 17th century (Grevisse 1980: 636).  While the original 
meaning no longer survives in modern French, except in phrases such as “d’Aucuns ont 
dit que…”  (Grevisse still mentions interrogatives such as (261) a., but they are no longer 
used in modern French) aucun normally has a universal negative interpretation 
nowadays, primarily in negative contexts like (261) b. Grevisse (1980 : 636) observes : 
“Le plus souvent aucun  est accompagné de la négation ne : ainsi, par contagion, il a pris 
la valuer négative de nul.”112 While the observation is correct, the precise nature of this 
“contagion” remains to be made precise. In any case, what is important for our purposes 
is the directionality of the process: a pivotal I-corner category can acquire an E-corner 
meaning over time. Moreover, whether the lexical item that has acquired an E-meaning 
can still have its original I-meaning in the current stage of a language is immaterial to the 
observation.  Thus, instead of aucun, for which the I-reading is obsolete, one could 
consider jamais (cf. (258) above) or personne, for instance, where the same I-E-shift has 
occurred, but where the original meaning still survives independently. 
 
A description of what underlies the“contagion” referred to above is given by Jespersen 
(1924: 334) where he discusses the original English negative morpheme ne113, which he 
takes “to be (together with the variant me) a primitive interjection of disgust consisting 
mainly in the facial gesture of contracting the muscles of the nose.” (…) “When the 
negative has become a mere proclitic syllable or even a single sound, it is felt to be too 
weak, and has to be strenghtened by some additional word, and this in turn may come to 
be felt as the negative proper” (Jespersen 1924: 334). Such reinforcement or 
strenghtening typically comes from I-corner elements like ā-wiht, ō-wiht, meaning 
“something, anything” (ā (ever)-wiht (thing)) or “a small thing (not a bit, not a jot, not a 
scrap, etc., Fr. ne…mie, goute, point, pas) or by an adverb meaning ever (OE. na from ne 
+ a = Goth. ni aiws, G. nie)…” (Jespersen 1924: 336). Jespersen’s emphasis on the 
nature of the strengthener as an I-corner element, adopted here, is more supportive of our 
analysis than the position of van der Auwera & Neuckermans (2004: 460-461), who 
consider a contradictor (their quantifier negator) as a more natural strengthener114:  
                                                          
112 Note however that universal negative aucun also occurs in elliptical sentences (261) c.  
113 To be precise, several languages have two negators, e.g. Vedic Sanskrit has ná in clause-initial 
and preverbal position, and prohibitive mā in imperative contexts. (Horn 1989: 447) 
114 For the terms predicate negation and quantifier negation, cf. van der Auwera & Neuckermans 
(2004: 475), who mention that predicate negation is also often referred to as sentence negation; 
quantifier negation as constituent negation and negative concord. 
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“First of all, the element that strengthens the original negator and that will 
grow into the new negator may be a quantifier negator. There is no necessity, 
though. French pas ‘step’ or Latin oenum ‘one’ are not quantifier negators. 
Dutch niet, on the other hand, or English not are. Their original meaning was 
‘nothing’.”   
(van der Auwera & Neuckermans 2004: 460-461) 
 
Semantically, however, it is pivots like pas and oenum which which get inserted to play 
this strengthening role because they have the effect of turning the negation (“not”) into a 
more emphatic but extensionally equivalent universal negative (“not a single 
one/anything”). The same type of strengthening is observed in German and Dutch by 
means of I-corner icht/ocht, again meaning ‘something’. This was followed in many (but 
not all) languages by negation copying on the particular affirmative quantifier and 
dropping of the weak predicate negation, yielding the following version of Jespersen’s 
cycle: 
  
(262) a. ‘ik ne ga’ (predicate negation) 
 b. ‘ik ne ga icht. (reinforcement of predicate negation by an I-corner element 
meaning “something/anything/at least one thing”) 
c. ‘ik ne ga (ne)-icht’ (optional quantifier negation on top of predicate negation 
as a “double”/”multiple”, but without negative force since the interpretation 
is not that of a double negative, but a case of negative concord) 
d. ‘ik ne ga ne-icht’ (bipolar negative concord, i.e. quantifier negation and 
predicate negation) 
e. ‘ik (ne) ga ne-icht’ (quantifier negation gradually takes over from predicate 
negation) 
f. ‘ik ga ne-icht/n-iet’ (dropping of ne) 
 
In Scandinavian, no quantifier negation was added after the original ne was strengthened 
by additions and its morphological expression finally ousted by these, hence the current 
negative ikke, which at first had no negative meaning but now does: a clear I→E-shift. 
(Jespersen 1924: 335).   
 
Do E/I-shifts exist as well?  Looking at the bipolar negative concord stage in (262) d. in 
isolation, one could still argue that the item ne-icht might represent a case of E/I-shift 
rather than vice versa, on the assumption that ne-icht is a contradictor, but acquires 
pivotal meaning for the combination with the sentence negative to result in a universal 
negative.  Both the diachrony of Jespersen’s cycle as the following facts with a 
morphologically explicit I-corner item pas (a minimal amount) prove, however, that no 
E/I-shift can be involved.   
 
(10)  1 jeo ne dis 
2 je ne dis (pas) the negator is strengthened 
3 je ne dis pas the strengthener bleaches and becomes part of the negator 
4 je (ne) dis pas the original negator loses ground 
5 je dis pas 
(van der Auwera & Neuckermans: 459) 
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In the case of bipolar negative concord, I-corner icht is historically prior to the form with 
the negative copy ne-icht, hence the shift was I→E, not the other way around.  In the pas 
example, though the strenghtener “bleaches” into part of the negator, it was originally, as 
its etymology betrays, an undeniable I-corner element: passus = minimal amount “(at 
least) one step”. 
 
The description just given leads to the conclusion that, diachronically, items like aucun 
and ikke used to have only the type of meaning that we identified for current pivots in the 
previous section. The later acquired universal negative meaning was then attributable to 
the effect of the negative operator NEG in its syntactic context, (which may but need not 
be morphologically realized (ne, n’, en)). 
 
(263) 
 
Former lexical meaning of aucun: 
Pivot meaning 
Effect of negation (ne): 
Contradictor meaning 
 
a. Penses-tu qu’aucun d’eux veuille 
subir mes lois? (Boil., Ep., 2.) 
 
union 
/P/ ⋃ /Q/ 
 
 
b. Aucun de nous ne serait téméraire…(Corn., 
Rod., IV, 1) 
 
complement of union 
/P/ ⋃/Q/ 
 
 
The diachronic I→E-shift analysed in this section reinforces the conclusion drawn from 
the morphological evidence for the pivotal role of I-corner elements relative to E-corner 
operators, this time on the basis of the effect of negation in syntax on a lexical pivot, 
causing the kind of “contagion” alluded to above. Its effect is to turn an I-corner pivot 
into an E-corner contradictor. 
  
5.2.2 The I→A-shift 
 
Turning from the CD leg of the 2D Cartesian Coordinate System to its entailment leg, 
we note that pivotal I-operators in certain contexts acquire a reading akin to that of an 
entailer in the A-corner. Thus, any functions as an existential (=I-corner) when used as a 
negative polarity item (NPI)115 – also called polarity sensitive any (PS).  
                                                          
115 Van der Wouden (1994: 5) defines them as “expressions which can only appear felicitously in 
negative contexts”.   The contexts involved do not just include negatives, but also  “nonassertive 
speech acts (questions, imperatives, exclamatives), the protasis of conditionals, the scope of strong 
intensional verbs like want and hope, and the restriction of certain universal quantifiers”  
/P/ /Q/ 
1 
/P/ /Q/ 
1 
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(264) a. I do not have any solutions. (NPI-any; nonaffirmative negative) 
 b. Has he said anything interesting? (NPI-any; nonaffirmative interrogative) 
 
But it can also acquire a free choice (FC) reading (Kadmon and Landman 1993: 353), 
which has been argued by many to be a universal quantifier (Horn 1972; Carlson 1981), 
hence an A-corner item.  
 
(265) a. Any beaver builds dams. (FC-any) 
 b. Every beaver builds dams. (universal quantifier) 
 
In this section, this I→A-shift will be illustrated for a range of pivots.  
 
A first case involves indefinites, which get a particular reading in the same contexts in 
which any is existential and shift to a generic reading in those contexts where any is free 
choice. 
 
(266) a. A beaver builds dams (generic) 
 b. John saw a beaver (particular) 
 
This gives us reason to believe that indefinites are pivots, a point to which I return in 
(280) and § 6.3.1. 
 
The domain of quantification of the quantificational pivot either in (267) is a two-entity 
universe. While it has a pivotal I-meaning (“a or b or both a and b”) in negatives and 
interrogatives, it has an interpretation akin to an A-reading (“both a and b”) in the 
affirmative sentences of (267) b. 
 
(267) a. Have you seen [either] of them? (I: “a or b or both a and b”) 
     I haven’t met [either] of them. (I: “a or b or both a and b”) 
 b. There are trees on [either] side (A: “both sides”) of the river. 
      [either of them] can fill you in. (A: “both of them”) 
 
The fact that the I→A-shift occurs in (267), in the realm of quantification in the two-
element universe of APC2, suggests that it might well show up in the propositional 
calculus too, since we have seen before that the properties of the two-element predicate 
calculus and the proposition calculus are very similar.  And indeed, Horn (1972) and 
Kamp (1973), Zimmermann, (2001), Chierchia (2001, 2004) have all observed that in the 
same contexts where FC any is allowed, or gets a free choice interpretation (referred to 
as FC disjunction or conjunctive disjunction), and becomes semantically akin to a 
conjunction:   
 
(268) a. Have you talked to [Henry or Bill]? (I: Henry, Bill, or both?) 
                                                                                                                                               
(Giannakidou 1998: 8). Notwithstanding these insights in the nature of the contexts, the precise 
nature of the licensing principle (syntactic, semantic/pragmatic and/or both) and the question 
whether it is an independent principle is still under debate (cf. Horn and Kato 2000: 9). 
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 b. [Henry or Bill] could tell you that (A: “conjunctive disjunction”: Henry and 
Bill can tell you that, so the choice is yours116) 
 
Chierchia (2001, 2004) has extended the observation to other operators.  In (269), it 
occurs with the locational adverb anywhere. Once more, there is an I-reading in 
interrogatives and negatives, but an A-reading in some other environments. In (270), the 
I→A-shift involves pivotal adverb ever 
 
(269) a.  Have you seen him [anywhere] ? (I: place x, place y, or more places) 
      I haven’t seen him [anywhere]. (I: place x, place y, or more places) 
 b.  [anywhere] the wind blows. (A: “place x and place y”) 
 
(270) a.  I haven’t [ever] met her. (I: at time x, at time y, or at time x and y) 
 Won’t they [ever] learn? (I: at time x, at time y, or at time x and y) 
b. The most remarkable president [ever] (A: of all times x and y) 
 
With respect to the I→E-shift, it was observed that there is no inverse shift. The question 
whether the I→A-shift has an inverse A/I-variant is a harder one to resolve, since the 
situation for the propositional operator and is mixed. Thus, in a sentence 
 
(271) I have not seen Johan and Guido today 
 
the meaning expressed is that of a joint falsehood: I have seen neither of them. But that 
would seem to entail that in this context and has to be disjunctive. Only then can the 
combination with negation result in a universal negation (neither…) nor.  This would 
mean that an A-corner element and can shift to an I-corner disjunctive interpretation. I 
believe the question can be resolved by claiming that the conjunction remains what it is, 
but scopes over rather than below negation, which gets distributed over the conjuncts, as 
in the Dutch sentence below. In that case, the higher operator has to be a regular 
conjunction to yield a joint falsehood: 
 
(272) Ik heb geen van beiden gezien – [[ Johan niet] en [Guido niet]] 
 I-saw-neither-(of both)  [[Johan-not]-and-[Guido-not]] 
 
For predicate calculus operators, however, the situation is unambiguous: there is no A/I-
shift.  While pivotal existential operators can acquire universal readings, the opposite 
                                                          
116 Carlson (1981: 17) gives further examples of conjunctive or in FC any environments.  
 
(i)   John likes cats or dogs = John likes dogs and John likes cats (on one reading). 
(ii) For Bob or Bill to do that is a nuisance = For Bob to do that is a nuisance and for Bill to 
do that is a nuisance. 
 
He notes that the set of environments in which or is interpreted as equivalent to and “goes beyond 
the FC any environments to include a goodly portion of the affective contexts as well (LeGrand 
(1975), Ladusaw (1980))”. I do not agree, as will is e clear from (268)a.: in affective contexts like 
interrogatives (negatives, the protasis of conditionals, etc.) the interpretation is that of an inclusive 
disjunction, not a conjunction. The fact that the disjunction in such contexts includes the inclusive 
part (or both) is why it is felt to be close to a conjunction.  
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does not occur: universal operators cannot get a contextually determined existential 
reading (in interrogative contexts, for instance): 
 
(273) 
 
universal quantification 
∀ 
*existential quantification 
*∃ 
All doctors can tell you that. 
Everything will be well. 
Always ready to shoot trouble 
Everywhere the wind blows 
Both of them can fill you in. 
*Have you got all complaints? 
*Has he said everything interesting? 
*When will they always learn? 
*Have you seen him everywhere? 
#Have you seen both of them? 
 
If the basic assumption that we are defending is correct, namely that A-corner operators 
lexically include the meaning of I-corner operators, but have an additional meaning 
feature that narrows down the extension set from a union to an intersection (cf. (256)), 
the facts of (273) are not surprising.  To turn lexically specified universal quantifiers into 
existentials would require canceling part of the lexical meaning of the former to widen 
the extension set, in other words, canceling information originally drawn in from the 
lexicon, which goes against the informativity constraint: the role of new intensional 
information (except for a disjunction) can only exclude, narrow down the extension set, 
not widen it.  What would be the point of first pulling in information from the lexicon if 
one then has to annul it by syntactic means afterwards? It would then clearly have been 
much more economical to simply select the lexically less specified item, the pivot, so 
that no superfluous information is entered into the derivation in the first place which then 
has to be removed again. 
 
Critical readers might object at this point that the variability of universal operators is 
being downplayed, since there certainly is a lot of semantic variation among them 
(Vendler 1967, Gil 1991, (for Dutch) Dik 1975). For instance, all can get both a 
collective and a distributive interpretation, while each and every are exclusively 
distributive: 
 
(274) a. All men kissed a girl/gathered 
 b. Every man kissed a girl/*gathered 
 c. Each man kissed a girl/*gathered 
 
The crucial point for our discussion, however, is that this variation does not affect the 
domain of quantification, which remains universal throughout, but only its set-theoretical 
organisation.  Whatever the reading, the domain of quantification is invariably the set of 
all men, so the operators never shift away from the A-corner. In this sense, universal 
operators are less malleable than pivots, whose I→A-shifts represent genuine shifts 
affecting the domain of quantification. 
 
A final comparative point that needs to be made is that the I→A-shift illustrated here is 
different in character from the diachronic I→E-shift described in § 5.2.1. In the latter 
case, the I-corner meaning has disappeared entirely and the shift is a case of change of 
lexical meaning over time.  The I→A-shift, however, is rather a case of enrichment of 
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lexical meaning in a given context, whereby the lexical meaning does not disappear. 
That is why many have emphasized that the result of I→A-shift is a meaning ‘akin to’ 
but not identical to that of an entailer.117 The following example pair illustrates the 
correctness of the claim that I→A-shift is not to be identified with a pure A-corner 
universal.   
 
(275)  a. I→A: John will say anything 
b. A: John will say everything 
 
In (275)a., divulging one or other thing (= I) that is adequately representative of 
everything (= A) that could be said, is enough to make the sentence true. In other words, 
the I-corner meaning does not disappear. In (275)b., however, John has to divulge the 
whole range of things relevant to a certain domain of discourse (= A).  
 
The same conclusion is valid for I→A-or versus A-corner operator and, as is illustrated 
by the following contrast: 
 
(276) a. A: I don’t think [employers and union leaders] can meet on Friday. 
 b. I→A: I don’t think [employers or union leaders] can meet on Friday.  
 
While the real conjunction in (276)a. can result in a collective reading whereby 
employers and union leaders meet one another in a single meeting rather than each group 
having a separate gathering, only the latter reading is available in (276)b., which shows 
that the meaning of or, though “conjunctive”, i.e. “akin to a conjunction”, is not identical 
to that an A-corner conjunction.  Its lexical I-corner meaning, which is never collective, 
is not undone by the shift.  But what then is that core meaning of pivots?  
 
5.3 Pivots and (AT LEAST) ONE 
 
In this section, it will be shown that although pivots are semantically variable, there is 
nonetheless a common core. Notably, the semantic notion (AT LEAST) ONE keeps 
reappearing.  This joint feature of pivots will be described for each case and represented 
by means of similar placemats and corresponding valuation space diagrams as were set 
up for or. 
 
For a first case, observe that there is a striking resemblance between numerals and the 
operators analysed in the second chapter. If two flags are green, this entails that one flag 
is green, a conclusion which is analogous to the conclusion that (i) if John and Peter are 
in the garden it follows that John or Peter is in the garden; (ii) if all my friends are here, 
it is also true that there are some of my friends here. The relation between these 
propositions with 2 and 1 is thus a well-behaved quantity relation (entailment). And 
affirming that zero flags are green is analogous to saying that (i) neither one nor any 
other flag is green or (ii) no flags are green. In other words, the relation between 
                                                          
117 . Cf. Carlson (1981: 8; my underline, DJ) with respect to the pivot any: “English any is 
ambiguous, (…) instantiating an existential quantifier as well as something akin to a universal 
quantifier, the latter henceforth referred to as “free-choice” any.” Cf. also Löbner’s (1990: 27-29) 
“Homogene Quantor”.  
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propositions with 1 and 0 represents the same quality difference identified earlier for the 
other triads : contradictoriness. The numeral triad {0, 1, 2} can therefore easily be added 
to the triads of propositional {and, or, nor} and predicate calculus operators {all, some, 
no(ne)} in the scheme below. The relationships between the elements are the same ones, 
and while 1 is a pivot, 2  is an entailer and 0 the contradictor of 1.   
 
 
AND 
ALL 
 
2 
entailer 
 
  
OR 
SOME 
 
1 
pivot 
 
  
NOR 
NO 
 
0 
contradictor 
 
 
 
 
├ 
ENTAILMENT 
QUANTITY 
  
 
CONTRADICTORINESS 
QUALITY 
 
 
This perspective on numerals is inspired by their inclusion by Horn (1989: 232) as scalar 
values belonging to sets of semantic concepts ordered on a pragmatic relative 
informativeness scale.  Horn gives the examples in (277), which do not only include 
numerals, but also the other quantifiers we are studying in this work (and more): 
 
(277) 
<all, most, many, some>; <always, usually, often, sometimes>; <and, or>; <6, 5, 
4, 3, 2, 1>; <must, should, may>; <necessary, (logically) possible>; <certain, 
{probably/likely}, possible>; <obligatory, permitted>; <boiling, hot, warm>; 
<freezing, cold, cool, (lukewarm)>; <beautiful, pretty, attractive>; <hideous, ugly, 
unattractive, plain>; <adore, love, like>; <loathe, hate, dislike>; <excellent, good, 
ok>; <{terrible/awful}, bad, mediocre>; <no(ne), few, not all>. 
 
The ordering in such scales is from strong to weak, and entailment relations among the 
elements of logical operator scales are the same as in the 2D Cartesian Coordinate 
System and standard logic: the stronger scalar value entails the weaker one, e.g. nobody 
has come entails not all have come. In pragmatics, scalar orderings are crucial for 
drawing invited inferences, i.e. implicatures: when a speaker chooses to utter a sentence 
with a weaker value, the hearer will conclude that the speaker wishes to express that s/he 
either has no evidence that the stronger value obtains or is certain that it does not. On the 
assumption that the speaker is both well informed and cooperative, the hearer of not all 
my brothers have come to Brussels will infer as an implicature that the stronger value 
none of my brothers have come to Brussels is not the right one and hence that at least 
someone has come. Not all will consequently be interpreted as “not all, but not nobody 
either”. Not to let the whole onus of explanation rest on pragmatic principles, however, 
the relevant relations will be tied to the 2D Cartesian Coordinate System. That is a first 
reason why the number triad is treated on a par with the other operators.  
 
Another source for the inclusion of numerals among the triads studied so far is the 
hypothesis in Montague grammar and formal semantics more generally that the basic 
ON THE NEGATIVE LOGIC OF NATURAL LANGUAGE 
 
167
meaning of one is ‘at least one’. This is none other than the numerical realm counterpart 
to claiming that the basic meaning of or is inclusive, e.g. Have you seen A or B? (‘at 
least A or B, i.e. A, B or A and B’).  And the fact that in John has one book on 
linguistics and sentences with one more generally  the ‘at least’ reading is blocked by a 
more restrictive one (‘one but not more’, i.e. ‘precisely one’) is similar to the fact that the 
inclusive reading of or is more often than not blocked and narrowed down to the 
exclusive interpretation (‘A or B, but not A and B’)118.  
 
Using the valuation space approach and abbreviations of earlier chapters, the extension 
of propositions with the three basic numeral predicates can therefore be modelled after 
those of propositions with the propositional operators (and predicate calculus 
quantifiers).119 
 
(278) 
 
/P∧Q/ is written as /AND/ 
/P∨Q/ is written as /OR/ 
/¬(P∨Q)/is written as /NOR/ 
/2  F are G/ is written as /2/  
/1 F is G/ is written as /1/   
/0 F is G/ is written as /0/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These diagrams indicate for the numeral-propositions that the set of possible situations in 
which two flags are green is true is a subset of the set of possible situations in which at 
least one flag is green is true, and the relation of the latter and zero flags are green is one 
of contradictoriness.  
 
For the propositional operators above the truth tables were related to valuation space 
diagram by means of a placemat-construction (§ 3.3.2).  Given the two-argument nature 
of the operators (P and Q, P or Q, P nor Q) and the two values true and false, the number 
of possible value combinations was 2n = 22 = 4.  Thus conceived, the diagram with two 
arguments, i.e. binarity or twin selection (i.e. P and Q) turned out to be both necessary 
and sufficient to set up the triad.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
118 The relationship is more complicated, but that issue will be ignored for the moment. 
119 As before, the extension of P is the set of possible situations in which P is true and is called the 
valuation space of P, represented as /P/ (Van Fraassen 1971, Seuren 1998: 331, Seuren et al. 
2001). 
/OR/  /¬OR/ 
     =  /NOR/ 
/AND/ 
/1/  /¬1/ 
     =  /0/ 
/2/ 
SIT 
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                                     ∨ = /ORincl/ = ‘at least P or Q’ 
  
    
 ∧ =/AND/          1     1  
        1      0  ∨x = /ORexcl/   
        0      1  
¬∨= /NOR/         0       0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the basis of the analogies between logical operators and numerals, a version of the 
placemat analysis developed for the operators can therefore be transferred to the numeral 
triad. Again, twin selection of two arguments and hence 2n = 22 = 4 combinations are 
precisely what is necessary and sufficient to generate the triad: 
 
(279) 
                                      /ONEincl/ (= ‘at least 1’)  
    
 /TWO/         1     1  
        1      0    
        0      1  
/ZERO/         0       0  
 
/OR/ 
  1  0 
  0  1 
 /¬OR/ 
     =  /NOR/         0  0 
/AND/ 
  1  1 
SIT 
P Q 
  /ONEexcl/  (= ‘precisely 1’) 
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On further inspection, the semantic element (AT LEAST) ONE is a surprisingly 
recurring feature of the content of pivots and can even serve to extend the set brought up 
so far. Thus, the entry for the word one in Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary 
(1913) contains a reference to the morphologically more complex pivot any, but also 
(and here is the extension) to a new pivot, the indefinite article a. 
 
One \One\, a. [OE. one, on, an, AS. ["a]n; akin to D. een, OS. ["e]n, OFries. 
["e]n, ["a]n, G. ein, Dan. een, Sw. en, Icel. einn, Goth. ains, W. un, Ir. & 
Gael. aon, L. unus, earlier oinos, oenos, Gr. ? the ace on dice; cf. Skr. ["e]ka. 
The same word as the indefinite article a, an. [root] 299. Cf. 2d A, 1st 
{An}, {Alone}, {Anon}, {Any}, {None}, {Nonce}, {Only}, {Onion}, 
{Unit}.] 
Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913) 
(emphasis mine, DJ) 
http://smac.ucsd.edu/cgi-bin/http_webster?one 
 
The connection with any confirms earlier attribution of pivotal I-corner-status to the 
latter, while the link with the indefinite article a correctly predicts that the latter can get 
the (AT LEAST) ONE reading too, in fact both the inclusive version with AT LEAST 
(280)a. and the exclusive variant (280)b without120.  
 
 (280) a. AT LEAST ONE: Have you talked to [a student] yet? (‘at least student x or 
student y, i.e. x, y or x and y, with x and y variables’). 
 b. ONE:  John bought [a book on linguistics]. (‘one but not more’, i.e. one or 
other book, but not more: ‘precisely one’) 
 
From a cross-linguistic viewpoint too, the inclusion of the indefinite article a among the 
(AT LEAST) ONE pivots is warranted, given that the words for the numeral 1 form one 
of the few sources from which indefinites are derived cross-linguistically (the other two 
                                                          
120 The specific presuppositional reading with QR of the bracketed DP is left out of consideration 
here.  Since it involves QR, the original lexical meaning is further affected by the movement, but 
in a way that would lead me away from the general line of thought in the text.  
/ONE/ 
  1 0 
        0 1 
    /¬ONE/ 
     =  /ZERO/       0  0 
/TWO/ 
  1  1 
SIT 
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sources are interrogative pronouns and generic ontological-category nouns such as 
person, thing, manner, place, time, etc. (Haspelmath 1997: 26)). 
 
And for a historical example: the same element (AT LEAST) ONE characterizes the 
pivotal operator ullus which Aquinas used to formulate the linguistic puzzle that started 
our quest. Ullus is a combination of  unus (“one”)+-ulus (diminutive), i.e. unulus (“little 
one”) > ullus (Ernout-Meillet 1960).  Once again, it is the numerical unit word unus (in 
its diminutive cloak) which occupies the I-corner. This fact adds some historical backing 
to the idea that its cognates a, any and one have a common ingredient (AT LEAST) 
ONE, not just formally, but also in their standard dictionary definitions. 
 
In view of the facts above, extension of the usage of the terms inclusive (=AT LEAST 
ONE OF x AND y HAS VALUE 1) and exclusive (= (precisely) ONE OF x AND y 
HAS VALUE 1) to other pivots than or is not metaphorical language, but motivated by 
the hypothesis that the same Boolean placemat is a common feature of all of them. That 
is what the data indicate.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter was devoted to proving that I-corner operators are the pivots of their 
paradigms.  This was done by showing that they are the operators of the triads which 
easily acquire A-corner(like) and/or E-corner interpretations in different contexts. These 
semantic properties were explained by postulating that their basic meaning is set-
theoretically that of the union of two sets. By being placed in certain restrictive syntactic 
contexts or by genericity, however, that meaning can be affected, resulting in a 
denotation which has (quasi-)universal force, set-theoretically either intersective 
(linguistically “conjunctive”) or the complement of the union of two sets.  In other 
words, in certain syntactic contexts existential quantifiers acquire “akin-to”-universal 
affirmative quantifier readings and behave very much like lexical A-corner operators, in 
other contexts they acquire a universal negative reading and thus become semantically 
indistinguishable from lexical E-corner operators. These facts support the hypothesis that 
rather than having three operators on an equal footing in logical triads, there is relief: the 
pivot is the most versatile and hence by hypothesis the lexically least specified item and 
the meanings of the two other corners are functions of its meaning: the entailer can thus 
be viewed as a combination of the meaning of the pivot and an additional specification – 
say pivot-plus -; the contradictor is the result of applying the complement function to the 
pivot – say non-pivot. 
 
(281) 
 
A-corner  E-corner 
entailer = 
pivot+ 
 
 
 
 
I-corner 
contradictor = 
pivot 
 pivot  
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Besides the pivotal role of I-corner operators in the system, the present section has also 
established how tightly the operators cohere. For one thing, as table (282) expresses, the 
steps away from the pivot to the other operators are always cases of adding intensional 
information to the pivot, thereby affecting the extension set of the pivot by (a) exclusion 
of more cells in a second step (ii), a negative canceling operation (cf. (282) below), 
which yields the entailer; (b) a set-complement switch which yields the contradictor.  
The fact that the entailer is created by means of two specifications, makes it dyadic and 
non-symmetrical. The switch to the contradictor happens by means of same-selection 
and conflation and consequently results in a monadic lexical structure. Because of this, 
the meaning of the contradictor is symmetrical, like that of the pivot. In this respect, the 
entailer is the odd one out.   
 
The present conception also permits a more general statement of informativeness than so 
far.  Up to this point, the informativeness requirement was viewed as a requirement that 
each step in the derivation has to produce a nonnull subset of the denotation at the 
preceding stage.  It was observed that this notion of informativeness is only valid for the 
entailer-leg of the logical system.  Note however, that a nonnull subset requirement on 
the quantitative entailer-leg always amounts to a reduction of the set of cells of the 
universe.  If we take the latter perspective as what is behind informativeness, it is easily 
seen that the contradictor leaves fewer cells open than the pivot, so that in that respect it 
is also more informative than the pivot.  All in all a simple but efficient generalization of 
informativeness to the qualitative E-corner leg of the logical system. 
 
Though less exclusionary and hence less informative than the rest, pivotal elements 
themselves also have an undeniable exclusionary effect (1 cell excluded) on the Universe 
SIT (= 1) of possible situations: John is in the garden or Bill is in the garden excludes 
the possibility that neither of them are. That was the real reason for our adoption of the 
exclusion device /NEC/, not only as the key operation required to relate the universals to 
the pivots, but in effect also as the generator of the pivot itself from the universe SIT (= 
1) by two-step subtraction (cf. chapter 4) and hence of the whole triadic system.   
 
On the whole, the pivot-level is more basic than that of entailers and contradictors as 
indicated by the two types of shifts. Yet, it is not rock bottom (see the two shaded 
underground stages in (219)). /NEC/, the operator operative at the prelexical level is the 
most basic category, given that decomposition of a pivot in terms of it and derivation of 
entailers and contradictors by repeated application of the same /NEC/-operation was 
carried out successfully in chapter 4.   
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(282) 
 
Entailer 
Intersection 
And, all, 2 
/P/ ⋂ /Q/ 
 
 Contradictor 
complement of union 
nor, no(ne), 0 
/P/ ⋃/Q/ 
 
 Pivot 
Union 
Or,some/any,1 
/P/ ⋃ /Q/ 
 
 
 
3 cells excluded from 
Universe 1 
Dyadic 
asymmetrical 
 
1 cell excluded from 1 
 
Monadic 
symmetrical 
 
3 cells excluded from 
Universe 1 
Monadic 
symmetrical 
 
 
/P/ /P/ /Q/ /Q/ 1 1 
/P/ /Q/ 1 
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6 THE VARIABLE MEANING OF PIVOTS 
 
 
The present chapter will shift the perspective from the common semantic core of all 
pivots to factors which are the source of variation among pivots. To begin with, a lexical 
distinction will be drawn between more flexible pivots such as or and more rigid pivots 
such as its counterpart either in APC2.  The latter are restricted to negative polarity-
contexts (cf. § 5.2.2), whereas the former are not subject to that constraint: 
 
(283) a. Henry is talking to [Mary or Bill] at the moment 
 b.*Henry is talking to [either of them] at the moment 
 
Aside from the flexible-rigid distinction, stress too plays an important role in the 
variability of the meaning of pivots, an issue which will be discussed in § 6.2.   
Finally, a concrete illustration of the effects of the flexible-rigid difference and the role 
of stress will be given in § 6.3 by means of a close comparison of the indefinite article a 
and the existential quantifier any.  On the theoretical front, that section will remove all 
possible doubt that IN-logic really is a 2D Cartesian Coordinate System.  
 
The overall goal of this chapter is to provide sufficient empirical evidence that because 
pivots are the lexically least specified items, they are therefore also the semantically 
most variable operators of natural logic triads.  
 
6.1 Flexible and Rigid Pivots 
 
The description of pivots in chapter 5 suggested that they can all get both an inclusive 
AT LEAST ONE- reading and an exclusive ONE-reading.  This is however not quite 
accurate.  There is a bifurcation between those operators which can get both, the flexible 
pivots, and operators which can get only one of these interpretations, the rigid pivots. 
Specifically, the propositional calculus pivot or, the indefinite article a and the predicate 
calculus operator some can get both, whereas either, ever and any are more restricted.  
The relevance of this difference is double. First of all, it testifies to the degree of 
variation that is found among pivots. Secondly, the fact that a and or are more flexible 
than items such as either and ever correlates with the fact that the former are functional 
categories while the latter are lexical categories, which are generally thought to be richer 
in intrinsic lexical content.  This correlation confirms the less-lexical-content/more-
variation generalization introduced in § 5.1.1. Let us consider the flexible and rigid types 
in turn in example sentences.  
 
Or and a get an inclusive interpretation in (i.a.) the protasis of a conditional, as in (55)a. 
and b. They can often (though they need not always121) get an exclusive reading in 
affirmative sentences, as in (55)c. and d.  
                                                          
121 The crucial distinction is not affirmative – nonaffirmative. Thus “Every man loves a woman” is 
affirmative, but does not impose an exclusive reading on a woman, given the plausible 
continuation “but no man is monogamous”. A better characterization is in terms of a distinction 
“veridical-nonveridical” (Giannakidou 1994, 1995, 1997;  Zwarts 1995). Applied to the example 
above, the timeless/habitual nature of “loves” does not pin the predicate down as referring to a 
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(284) a.  If [P: Mary is in the garden or Q: Bill is in the garden]], John will be there 
too : P, Q, or both (inclusive) 
b.  If [you meet [a girl] at the party], ask her to dance : girl x or girl y, i.e. x, y 
or x and y, with x and y variables’: inclusive. 
a. [Mary talked to John or Mary talked to Bill]: to John or to Bill, not to both 
(exclusive) 
b. Henry talked to [a doctor]: doctor x or doctor y, but not more: exclusive 
 
The crucial contrast between these two sentence types concerns the constituents in 
square brackets. In (55)a. and b. those constituents – i.e. both the event in the protasis 
and the characters involved in it – have an irrealis construal (Palmer 2001 , Jackendoff 
2002: 403; for the notion irrealis context, see also Haspelmath (1997: 40, 108-109) and 
Croft (1983)). The bracketed constituents in affirmative sentences (55)c. and d., on the 
other hand, have a realis construal. 
 
For the kernel difference between a realis and an irrealis construal and the referential 
dependence between events and their characters, consider the following pair:  
 
(285) a.  [Did [a woman] 1 buy [a car]2 ] 3?  
 b.  [[A woman]1 bought [a car]2]3. 
Jackendoff (2002: 399) 
 
In question (285)a., the irrealis context, there is no claim that a buying “event took place; 
rather the speaker wishes the hearer to assert whether or not it did” (Jackendoff 2002: 
399).  In the absence of the claim that an event3 actually occurred, a woman1 and a car2 
have no established existential force either: “we need not be able to identify either of 
them.” (Jackendoff 2002: 399)122. In our terms, they are inclusive on the placemat. The 
semantic equivalent of that is a lack of existential commitment with respect to the 
individuals N in the NPs.  Since there is no individuation from AT LEAST ONE to 
ONE, there can be no existential commitment. In (285)b., the realis context, the 
existence of a past event is asserted, which has an important consequence for a woman 
and a car. “If the event is conceptualized as having taken place, then its characters are 
conceptualized as existing.” (Jackendoff 2002: 400) In other words, the characters of an 
event in a realis construal cannot have an irrealis construal themselves.   
 
Giannakidou  (1994, 1995, 1997) and Zwarts (1995) have provided a formal 
characterization of irrealis, non-referential environments and corresponding operators, 
which they define as non-veridical123 (Zwarts 1995, Giannakidou 1997): 
 
(286)  
“Let Op be a prepositional operator.  The following statements hold: 
                                                                                                                                               
single, actual event, but rather to a multitude of virtual, non-veridical or irrealis events. It is 
because of the non-episodic nature of the predicate that “a woman” can easily get an inclusive, 
non-veridical reading. The concept of (non)veridicality will be detailed in (286) below.   
122 Jackendoff  attributes this notion of referential dependence between an event and its characters 
to Csuri (1996) and Erteschik-Shir (1998). 
123 The notion veridical is Montague’s (1969, 1974).  
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(i) Op is veridical just in case Op p → p is logically valid.  Otherwise, Op is 
nonveridical. 
(ii) A nonveridical operator Op is antiveridical just in case Op p →¬ p is 
logically valid.” 
(Giannakidou 1998: 8) 
 
“An operator is nonveridical if we don’t know whether the embedded 
proposition is true or false. Adverbs like possibly and modal verbs are typical 
nonveridical operators: 
 
 a.  Paul has possibly seen a snake-/→ Paul saw a snake 
 b. Paul may hit Frank -/→ Paul hit Frank 
 
Disjunction is also nonveridical (see Zwarts 1995, Giannakidou 1997 for 
more details). Other nonveridical environments include negation, 
nonassertive speech acts (questions, imperatives, exclamatives), the protasis 
of conditionals, the scope of strong intensional verbs like want and hope, and 
the restriction of certain universal quantifiers.  PIs are generally grammatical 
in these environments.124” 
(Giannakidou 1998: 8, with her example (30))125 
 
Now compare a and any in such non-veridical and veridical contexts context 
respectively: 
 
(287) a. If [you make [a/any mistake]], you’ll be punished : mistake x or mistake y, 
i.e. x, y or x and y, with x and y variables’: inclusive.  
 b. [Henry talked to [a/*any doctor]] 
 
Both get a grammatical inclusive reading in nonveridical contexts. In (287)b., however, 
characters in the talked-event lose their freedom of referential commitment: they have to 
be conceptualized as referential, as actually existing. This is reflected in the exclusive 
interpretation of a, more traditionally referred to as a particular, existential reading. A, 
though inclusive lexically, is no longer interpreted as an inclusive phrase in this context.  
 
(288)        Aincl (= ‘at least 1’) 
    
          1     1  
        1      0    
        0      1  
NO         0       0  
 
                                                          
124 PI= Polarity items. Underscore mine [DJ]. 
125 The formal definition of nonveridicality as given in Zwarts (1995) runs as follows. 
(i)  (Non)veridicality (Zwarts 1995:287) 
Let O be a monadic sentential operator. O is said to be veridical just in case Op ⇒ p is logically 
valid. If O is not veridical, then O is nonveridical. A nonveridical operator O is called averidical 
iff Op ⇒ ∼ p is logically valid. 
  Aexcl  (= ‘precisely 1’) 
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 For any the consequences are more serious: it cannot be salvaged in such a context at 
all, which must mean that as opposed to regular indefinites, it is a rigid pivot, i.e. a 
necessarily inclusive one (= inherently modal, non-referential or irrealis126) which cannot 
be made exclusive by context. In other words, it completely resists a veridical construal 
with referential commitment.  
  
(289)                                 ANYincl  
  
    
          1     1  
        1      0    
        0      1  
NO         0       0  
 
The strictly nonveridical contexts in which it occurs are either non-affirmative sentences 
– where any is usually NPI-any – or affirmative irrealis contexts, where any has its free 
choice interpretation (FC-any).  As observed in § 5.2.2, the interpretation of any in these 
contexts is never uniquely universal, but only “akin” to it (Carlson 1981: 8). We now 
know why if any is indeed a rigid pivot: the inclusive nature cannot be undone and 
remains the indelible lexical contribution to its final interpretation. Any is inherently I+A 
(= a union of I and A-meaning). The polarity of the syntactic context may single out the 
lower-end I-part of any’s meaning (NPI) or its upper-end A-part (FC), but the inclusive 
lexical meaning is never deleted. In other words, NPI-any is also ‘akin to’ to an 
exclusive I-reading, but certainly not to be identified with it, since its semantic scope 
includes the whole scale. This is where the present proposal connects with the concept of 
scalarity as developed by Fauconnier (1975a,1975b, 1979)127. Applied to the case above, 
on a scale of alternatives (in casu the inclusive scale I + A) the more informative 
endpoint on the non-reversed scale is the A-corner since A entails I.  Therefore, singling 
out the A-corner suffices to entail the whole inclusive scale, as required by any’s rigid 
lexical specifications.  On the reversed scale the more informative endpoint is not-I, 
which entails not-A (cf. the law of contraposition in logic), hence keeps the whole 
inclusive scale as part of the final interpretation.  
 
Either and ever are like any: rigidly “inclusive” (cf. Higginbotham (1991) for either; 
Israel (1997) for ever128).  Due to this, they too are ungrammatical when an exclusive 
ONE reading is enforced by a realis context, as in sentences (290) and (291).129   
                                                          
126 Israel (1997: 37) uses Fauconnier’s term phantom indefinite “to designate the peculiar way 
these forms seem to designate an instance which, in some sense, isn’t really there [= irrealis, DJ].  
Phantom indefinites do not refer directly – they cannot, for example, introduce a new discourse 
referent to a mental space.  Rather they pick out an arbitrary and schematic “ghost” of an instance 
and thereby trigger inferences to the set of all other possible instances in a category (cf. Israel 
1995: 164).” (Israel 1997: 37) 
127 Cf. also Haspelmath (1997: 117) and a formal proposal for scalar any in 6.3.1.4 below. 
128 Cf. also http://www-linguistics.stanford.edu/semgroup/archive/abstracts-97-98/israel.txt , where 
an abstract of Israel’s paper states “Ever functions in the temporal domain much like any in the 
nominal domain. In the paradigm of temporal adverbs, ever occupies the same position as does any 
in the paradigm of nominal quantifiers: as always is to all, usually to most, often to many and 
  *ANYexcl (= ‘precisely 1’) 
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(290) either: 
a. Affirmative episodic sentences: *(Yesterday,) John played with [either of 
them]130 
b. Existential constructions: *There was [either of these books] on the desk 
c. Progressives: *He is reading [either book] at the moment. 
d. Epistemic attitude intensional verbs: *She believes that we bought [either 
car] for her birthday 
 
(291) ever: 
a. Affirmative episodic sentences: *John [ever] played with them 
b. Existential constructions: *There [ever]were three books on the desk 
c. Progressives: *He is reading a book [ever]. 
d. Epistemic attitude intensional verbs: *She believes that we [ever] bought 
car for her birthday 
 
Where no reference to a single event is involved, on the other hand, as in the negative 
sentences of (57), they are grammatical as predicted: 
 
(292) a. Jules does not speak either language (neither language x, nor language y, nor 
languages x and y (in a two-unit universe)) 
 b. Marita has not ever been to South Africa (not at moment x, nor at moment y, 
nor at moments x and y, with x and y variables) 
 
In many usage contexts, any and some are complementary in interpretation: while any is 
invariably rigidly inclusive as stipulated by its lexical properties, cf. (289), some is 
mostly “exclusive” (in the sense of non-all-inclusive) in interpretation (293),  
 
(293) Some flags are green (flags x or flags y, but not all of x and y) 
 
(294) I haven’t got any problem: not a problem x, nor a problem y, nor problems x 
and y, with x and y variables 
 
As a consequence of its lexical meaning, any is excluded in the same sentence types that 
do not tolerate either and ever, e.g. (5).  
 
(295) any: 
a. Affirmative episodic sentences: *Yesterday, John played [any game]. 
b. Existential constructions: *There was [any article] on the desk 
c. Progressives: *He is reading [any book] at the moment. 
                                                                                                                                               
rarely to few, so is ever to any.”  It is in terms of the valuation space diagrams in placemat format 
that I try to bring out the parallelism.  
129 These types of actual, single-event contexts were identified by Giannakidou (2001: 677). 
130 Higginbotham (1991: 145) observes that this type of sentence, e.g. any/either of them worked is  
“strictly speaking […] not ungrammatical, but has uniquely an interpretation as a generic in the 
past tense, as in “In those days, any/either of them worked.”  
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d. Epistemic attitude intensional verbs: * She believes that we bought [any 
car] for her birthday 
 
Though some is mostly exclusive, it is generally viewed as a flexible rather than a rigid 
pivot. The main reason for this stance is to do with data involving weak some, e.g. in 
existential sentences, where the meaning of some is not the proportional/ exclusive 
reading “some but not all”.   
 
(296) There are some rabbits in my garden. 
  
Clearly, the description of their lexical meanings is only a fraction of the full story for 
some and any.  Whether they are stressed or not is an important factor.  That topic will be 
taken up in the next section § 6.2, which will thereby pave the way for the comparison of 
a flexible pivot (the indefinite article) and a rigid one (NPI-any and FC-any) in § 6.3. 
 
On the whole, the data analysed in this section warrant the conclusion that there is a 
basic division within the set of pivots between flexible pivots and rigid pivots.  They also 
showed that in context and due to stress further meaning can supervene on lexical 
meaning and hence affect interpretation.  That is the topic we now turn to. 
 
6.2 The role of stress 
 
Consider the following set of examples, which illustrates that some and the negative 
polarity item any are parallel in that they can bear stress or not and have their lexical 
semantics affected by it.   
 
(297)   
 
a. NPI-any i’.Did he DRINK anything? 
(indefinite, non-emphatic NPI) 
ii’.Did he drink ANYthing (at 
all)? 
(emphatic NPI) 
c. some i. There are sm MEN 
in the garden (weak)  
ii. SOME flags are 
green (strong) 
 
b. ¬NPI-any  i’.Didn’t he DRINK anything? 
(indefinite, non-emphatic NPI) 
ii’.Didn’t he drink ANYthing 
(at all)? 
(emphatic NPI) 
d. 
¬some= 
no(ne) 
i.There are no MEN / 
aren’t any MEN in the 
garden (weak) 
ii. NO man / Not ANY 
man is in the garden 
(strong) 
 
When stressed, NPI-any is called emphatic – a term borrowed from Haspelmath (1997: 
125) -, when not it is called indefinite or non-emphatic. Unstressed some is called weak, 
stressed some strong (Milsark 1977). In these paragraphs, it will be shown that such 
stress differences have implications for the semantics of pivotal some and any. In 
particular, stress adds meaning to the lexical meaning of the pivots in question.  In § 
6.2.1. the focus is on any and the emphatic-non-emphatic contrast, in § 6.2.2. on some 
and the difference between weak and strong readings. 
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6.2.1 Emphatic and non-emphatic any 
 
In the previous chapter, it was observed that the sparser intrinsic lexical content of pivots 
means that their lexically specified extension set leaves more room for modification by 
context factors.  In this section, the factor involved is stress and its effect on the pivot  
any. The phenomena discussed contribute both to the conclusion that there is a lot of 
variation among pivots and to the idea that logic and language (i.c. stress) are 
inextricably intertwined.  
 
6.2.1.1 The presence/absence of a comparison base 
 
The difference between the emphatic/stressed NPI and the non-emphatic/unstressed NPI 
in (297) a.-b. involves the presence versus absence of a comparison base, in this case a 
comparison base of scalar alternatives. Emphatic NPIs express the low endpoint on a 
scale (Did he drink ANYthing = the least bit), whereas non-emphatic NPIs do not131.  
Actually, they cannot: “constituents have to bear sentence accent in order to be 
interpreted as scalar endpoints.” (Haspelmath 1997: 123). Note the parallel with the 
weak vs. strong reading of some, where the accent of the strong reading also comes with 
the comparison base of the proportional reading. This link between stress and the 
activation of a set of alternatives not only brings strong readings and emphatic NPIs 
together, it is also strongly reminiscent of how a set of alternatives is made available by 
focus accent (Rooth 1985). Actually, this link is established in Lee & Horn (1994), who 
analyse the lexical meaning of NPI-any as an indefinite combined with an incorporated 
scalar focus particle even (cf. paraphrase (299) for (298)), thus explicitly connecting NPI 
any and focus. 
 
(298) There isn’t any replacement drive available right now. 
(299) There isn’t even a single/even one replacement drive available right now.  
 
The presupposition introduced by even ranks the proposition that even is added to along 
a scale, in this case a quantitative scale of alternative propositions: there aren’t two 
replacement drives available right now, there aren’t three replacement drives available 
right now, etc. On this scale, the proposition there isn’t one replacement drive available 
right now makes the strongest, most excluding statement (“even sets consisting of a 
single replacement drive are not available, let alone sets of two, three, etc. replacement 
drives”) and hence outranks the set of alternatives.  
 
6.2.1.2 Formal and semantic differences between emphatic and non-emphatic 
any 
 
Formally speaking, many languages use different lexicalisations for unstressed and 
stressed NPIs corresponding to English any, as illustrated by the following sample of 
non-emphatic (a.) vs. emphatic (b.) forms from Haspelmath (1997:  125-126). 
 
 
                                                          
131 There is a long tradition of analyses of any as involving the endpoint of a scale, including 
Schmerling (1971), Fauconnier (1975a,b), Krifka (1994), Lahiri (1995).  
OPERATORS IN THE LEXICON 
 
180 
(300) French 
a.   Si quelqu’un vient, réveille-moi. 
If someone    comes, wake-me 
‘If anyone COMES, wake me up.’ 
b.   Si qui que ce soit vient, réveille-moi. 
If  anyone            comes,  wake-me. 
‘If ANYONE comes, wake me up.’ 
 
(301) Polish  
a. Jeżeli co-ś   zobaczysz,  odrazu   mnie obudź. 
 If      what-INDEF see:2SG  immediately me wake:IMPV 
 ‘If you SEE anything, wake me up immediately’ 
b. Jeżeli co-kolwiek  zobaczysz,  odrazu   mnie obudź. 
 If what-INDEF see: 2SG immediately me wake:IMPV 
 ‘If you see ANYTHING, wake me up immediately.’ 
 
(302) Hindi/Urdu 
 a.  Agar  koii  fon kare, mujhe bataanaa. 
 if  someone phone calls I:DAT tell:IMPV 
 ‘If anybody CALLS, tell me.’ 
b. Agar  koii bhii fon kare, mujhe bataanaa. 
  If      someone INDEF phone calls I:DAT tell:IMPV 
  ‘If ANYBODY AT ALL calls, tell me.’ 
 
(303) Chinese  
a.  Wǒ bù  xiangxin  shénme rén  lái  le. 
 I      not think what man come PFV132 
 ‘I do not think that anyone CAME.’ 
 b.  Wǒ bù  xiangxin  rènhé  rén  lái  le. 
 I      not  think any man come PFV 
 ‘I do not think that ANYONE came.’ 
 
Haspelmath (1997: appendix A) provides further pairs from Russian, Hungarian, 
Bulgarian and Italian.   
 
On the semantic side, Haspelmath considers the difference between emphatic and non-
emphatic NPIs like any “very subtle” and “not easy to identify across languages” and 
believes that they are “emphatic and non-emphatic indefinites without a difference in the 
truth conditions” (Haspelmath 1997: 125). While the semantic difference is indeed 
subtle, it has nonetheless been argued that there is a difference in truth conditions 
(Linebarger 1980, Heim 1984, Kratzer 1989, Rullmann 1996). The difference can be 
brought out by embedding any in sentences expressing accidental and non-accidental (or 
causal) generalizations (Heim 1984: 104-106; Kratzer 1989; examples from Rullmann 
1996: 346) 
 
(304) a. Everyone who ate anything got sick. 
                                                          
132 PFV: perfective 
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 b. Everyone who ate anything was actually wearing blue jeans. 
 
Sentences like (304) a. can be used to express a non-accidental generalization: there can 
be a causal connection between eating something and getting sick.  A causal link 
between eating something and wearing blue jeans, however, is unlikely, and (304) b. 
therefore normally expresses an accidental generalization.  Heim (1984: 104), basing 
herself on a contrast noted in Linebarger (1980), notes that certain NPI’s – all scalar – 
are not licensed in statements normally expressing accidental generalizations while they 
are ok in non-accidental generalizations: 
 
(305) a. ?? Everyone who ate a single bite was actually wearing bluejeans. 
 b.  Everyone who ate a single bite got sick 
 
The oddness of (305) a. (with a minimizer133 NPI (Bolinger 1972: 121) a single bite) is 
due to the nature of the NPI, which invites the reading that the link between eating 
something and wearing blue jeans is causal134. Now crucially, emphatic NPI’s behave 
exactly like a single bite: 
 
(306) a. ?? Everyone who ate ANYthing (at all) was actually wearing bluejeans. 
 b.  Everyone who ate ANYthing (at all) got sick. 
 
No causality-restriction affects non-scalar, non-emphatic unstressed any, witness (304), 
repeated here. 
 
(307)  a. Everyone who ate anything got sick. 
 b. Everyone who ate anything was actually wearing blue jeans. 
 
Rullmann concludes that this non-emphatic item is equivalent to the unstressed indefinite 
pronoun “iets” (“something/anything”) of Dutch and defines non-emphatic any as “an 
indefinite determiner (in English, a(n) or ∅), the only difference being that in its 
distribution any is restricted to downward entailing environments.” (Rullmann 1996: 
348).  Note, however, that the latter qualification does indicate that something is still 
amiss in Rullmann’s analysis, as pointed out by Israel (1997: 41): 
 
“The plain implication of this [Rullmann’s, DJ] claim is that sentence pairs 
like those (23-(…)) must be semantically and pragmatically synonymous. 
 
 a. Glinda doesn’t eat seafood.  
 b. Glinda doesn’t eat any seafood. 
 
I must confess that this conclusion runs counter to my own intuitions. (…) 
Pace Rullmann, even without stress, these forms do make a contribution to 
                                                          
133 A minimizer is an NPI referring to a minimal quantity, situated at the lowest point of a scale. 
134 The claim that emphasis comes with the postulate of a causal link does not reveal anything 
about actual causality in extralinguistic reality.  The causal link is established in the speaker’s 
mind and there is no telling what causal links an individual can think up. Note that it is easy 
enough to conjure up a story context in which people who eat a single bite suddenly turn into 
bluejeans-wearers. 
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sentence meaning and their contributions are, if not identical, at least very 
analogous.” 
(Israel 1997: 37-38) 
 
Since I have claimed that any is a rigid pivot, I am in agreement with Israel. 
 
On the whole, the correspondence between Rullmann’s analysis and Heim (1984) is that 
while emphatic NPIs can be described in Lee and Horn’s terms as NPIs with an inherent 
scalar focus particle even (even-NPIs), non-emphatic NPI’s have no similar emphasis on 
scalar alternatives. It is because of this that their meaning stays very close to that of an 
indefinite.  Stress affects interpretation in that it comes with a causal interpretation, 
scalar alternatives and focus. It emphasizes the full lexical meaning content of pivot any 
as specified in (289). The way in which stress thus affects lexical meaning will now be 
explained in the section on weak and strong readings. 
 
6.2.2 Weak and strong readings  
 
The difference between weak and strong readings of /(¬)SOME/  in (297) c. and d. 
figures prominently in Milsark (1977). Postal (1966) and Milsark provide the following 
sentence to illustrate it: 
 
(308) Some unicorns appeared on the horizon 
 
The strong, stressed reading (also called proportional or partitive) can be paraphrased as 
“at least two135 but not all”: some unicorns appeared, others did not. The reading is 
quantificational, i.e. involves reference to a set of relevant alternatives fitting the 
predicate unicorns that functions as a comparison base. The weak, unstressed reading, on 
the other hand, is purely cardinal: only the cardinality of unicorns that appeared matters. 
Whether there are other unicorns who did not appear on the horizon does not enter into 
the equation and, hence, neither can the proportional relationship between the unicorns 
that appeared and the unicorns, if any, that did not. In the previous chapter, the 
difference was described as the difference between an intersective (=cardinal, 
symmetric) and a dyadic (=quantificational, proportional) reading. The label “dyadic” 
signifies that the meaning involves both cells of the restrictor set B, i.e. (i) and (ii))136.   
 
(309)  
  Reading (i) 
B ⋂ G 
 (ii) 
B  - G 
cardinal │(i)│  ≥ 2     Somepl B G is true iff 
quantificational │(i)│ ≥ 2 ET │(ii)│ ≥ 1 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
135 “Two”, because unicorns is plural, not singular. 
136 For the corresponding /NEC/-bar codes, see § 4.6.3.1. 
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(310)  
Cardinal/intersective/monadic Quantificational/proportional/dyadic 
(i) = B ⋂ G;   (ii) = B  - G (i) = B ⋂ G;   (ii) = B  - G 
   
 
Since the dyadic reading is the one with more specifications, the natural hypothesis in 
our framework is to assume that the intersective reading is the lexical meaning and that 
the additional specification is and added contribution, either by context or by stress, 
which has an exclusionary effect and narrows the extension down to a smaller, hence 
more informative set.   
 
The more basic nature of the intersective meaning is naturally describable in terms of an 
epistemological procedure, more particularly the way in which induction generalizes 
from particular knowledge (some boys are in the garden or more briefly some B are G) 
to universal or general knowledge (all boys are in the garden: all B are G or no boys are 
in the garden: no B are G)137. Let us have a look at the nature of this (idealized) 
procedure by which one arrives at epistemological conclusions with some to illustrate 
how the meaning of strong some differs from weak some.   
 
Let G(x) be the matrix predicate function and the range of the substitutional variable x be 
restricted to the restrictor set B = {a, b, c, d, e}, i.e. an (in casu finite) set of boys. G(x) is 
then a function from the set of boys B to propositions with a truth value 1 or 0, since 
each insertion of a boy name in the position of the substitutional variable will produce 
one of those two values.  Before any checking starts, the initial situation of ignorance is 
embodied in a neutral and/or the emphatic yes/no question:  
 
(311) Are (=1) there any boys in the garden? (neutral) 
‘ARE (=1) there any boys in the garden (or are there ‘NOT (=0))? (emphatic) 
 
Given the stress, the emphatic yes/no question drags in the complement set of situations 
as a comparison basis, i.c. “are there ‘NOT (=0)”?  Both the fact that questions signal 
(partial) ignorance and that the set of alternatives is introduced by means of the I-corner 
                                                          
137 Thanks to Pieter Seuren for crucial help with this procedure. The link with Peirce, the en route 
notion and its elaboration in terms of the intersective vs. dual lexical structure of operators are my 
own. The procedure bears resemblance to Van Benthem’s (1987) analysis of first order quantifiers 
as regular “semantic automata” and Löbner’s “Berechnung des Quantifikationsergebnisses” (1987: 
190-197). 
 
│(ii)│  ≥ 1  │(i)│  ≥ 2   │(i)│  ≥ 2   
(i) (i) (ii) 
G G B B 
(ii) 
  ? 
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disjunction or indicate that questions (as opposed to affirmatives and negatives) are yet 
another incarnation of an I-corner item relative to affirmatives and negatives.  The triadic 
structure is too obvious to be ignored and matches the triadic nature I believe to 
characterize epistemology. 
 
(312)  
 
A-corner I-corner E-corner 
 - Disjunction (P or not-P?) 
- “knowledge is incomplete” (De Morgan) 
- Epistemological doubt (Peirce) 
-“what we know we don’t know” (Bromberger 
1992) 
 
affirmative interrogative negative 
+ ? - 
 
Clearly, in this pattern too there is an epistemological drive away from the I-corner. 
Recall Peirce (1877): “doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle 
to free ourselves”.   This means that in the triad above the disjunctive unresolved state of 
the interrogative is the engine that sets the desire and quest for reduced ignorance (of the 
A- c.q. E-corner type) in motion.  The reason is as always the conviction that reality is 
determinate (+ or -), not unresolved (?). 
 
The checking procedure that can settle the issue for (311), now, is about BEING IN THE 
GARDEN (and in the emphatic question also the comparison base NOT-BEING IN THE 
GARDEN), and the set of elements which are in the running is restricted to the set B (= 
property of conservativity; cf. § 4.6.3.1.). At this initial point all the boys are still 
selectable for garden-presence or garden-absence, which is as usual represented by 
means of light shading of the selectable-but-not-yet-selected restrictor set.  
 
(313)  
 
Take a statement of the type Ga to represent the particular empirical knowledge after 
insertion of a in the position of the substitutional variable that “boy a is in the garden” 
and Gb the particular empirical knowledge that “boy b is in the garden”.  When one has 
such particular empirical knowledge, a provisional answer can be given to the initial 
question, this time an emphatic affirmative:  
 
(314) There ARE sm boys in the garden (=│(i)│  ≥ 2).   
 
  ?   ? 
B G 
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The meaning expressed is both intersective and has an at least-interpretation. This is 
crucially to do with the fact that (314) is an answer to the question. Compare: 
 
(315) a. There are two boys in the garden 
b. ARE there two boys in the garden? – Yes, there ARE (two boys in the 
garden) – there are even four. 
 
While the a. sentence, if volunteered as a piece of information without preceding 
question context, normally gets the interpretation “precisely two”, the at least 
interpretation is perfectly legitimate in the emphatic yes/no-question context (cf. Gazdar 
1979: 138, Scharten 1997: 71-76; Seuren 1998: 409)138.  In our theory, this is to be 
explained semantically (not pragmatically) in terms of the veridical-nonveridical contrast 
and the inclusive lexical meaning of pivots such as two, some, a.  The question raised is 
whether there is a set of two boys in the garden.  Given its occurrence in a question 
environment, the NP two boys has a nonveridical, inclusive interpretation: is there one or 
other or who knows more than one set of two boys (cf. (287) above). This means that the 
intended reading is “at least two boys”.  The answer yes to the question is a confirmation 
that there indeed exists at least one set of two boys in the garden. In the more highly 
specified affirmative realis context of (314) a., on the other hand, the direct affirmation is 
the "exclusive” one that there is one or other set (hence not more) of two boys in the 
garden (cf. (288)), yielding the precisely two reading139. While the “at least” reading 
brings out the lexical meaning, the “precisely two” reading is a narrower interpretation 
due to the realis nature of an NP in an affirmative context (as opposed to its irrealis 
nature in a yes/no-question and a confirmation).   
 
The criterion reading (“at least”) of (314) has the epistemological status of an interim 
report on the basis of partial evidence: so far it has been established that there are two 
boys in the garden, whether there are more is not determined yet (and maybe not even 
relevant). This is the reading when the variable x of G(x) has not been rotated over the 
whole set of boys, and the idealized checking procedure is still en route: there might be 
discovered to be 2, 3, 4 or 5 boys in the garden upon further checking. The “at least” 
reading of this type of weak some, is indicated by the three dots in the description of the 
incomplete extension of the propositional function:  
 
(316)  ║G(x)║ = {<a,1>, <b,1>, …} 
 
                                                          
138 This reading is also known as the criterion-reading, as in the situation where anybody with three 
children meets "welfare benefit eligibility criteria” (Gazdar 1979: 138).  In such a context, the at 
least reading is true in the truth-conditional sense:  
(i) Who has three children? – I do, in fact I have four 
(ii) Does John have three children? Yes, he has four. 
139 The theoretical hypothesis/assumption has been throughout that what is in the A-corner (i.c. an 
affirmative) is more highly specified and hence extensionally more restrictive/informative than 
what is in the I-corner (i.c. an interrogative). This is confirmed by the interpretation of the NPs: an 
(inclusive) irrealis denotation is less restrictive than an (exclusive) realis interpretation. As will be 
clear from this remark, the systematicity of the I-corner vs. non-I-corner contrast is remarkably 
uniform across calculi. 
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Since so far there is no boy who has been identified as not being in the garden, no 
information is available about cell (ii).  It is still possible that at the end of the checking 
procedure either all the boys or just some, but not all of the boys turn out to be in the 
garden.  At this en route stage, however, knowledge is still incomplete. As usual, the I-
corner feeling of incomplete knowledge (here incarnated as weak intersective some) will 
cause irritation if the desire is for the entire truth (Peirce 1877) and it gives the urge to go 
on checking and try to settle belief by arriving at more complete information. Observe 
that the present description of this intermediate en route stage of the epistemological 
procedure and its association with an I-corner quantifier clearly confirms our general 
hypothesis that the I-corner is prior to the A-corner: en route  some is prior to and more 
basic than posterior A-corner all in the epistemological checking procedure140. 
 
Now imagine that the third boy checked for garden-presence yields a negative value: 
 
(317) ║G(x)║ = {<a,1>, <b,1>, <c,0>,…} 
 
This is a new situation: we now know that there is at least one boy in cell (ii) (=│(ii)│  ≥ 
1) , so that it is no longer possible to arrive at the conclusion that all the boys are in the 
garden.  Whatever the values for boy d and e will be during the rest of the checking 
procedure, the conclusion will remain the same: “some, but not all boys are in the 
garden”.  This is the proportional meaning of strong some, as in ‘SOME boys are in the 
garden.  As the informal characterisation “some, but not all” betrays, its semantic 
structure is dyadic: │(i)│  ≥ 2 ET │(ii)│  ≥ 1.   
 
Alternatively, imagine that the third boy checked for garden-presence still yields a 
positive value: 
 
║G(x)║ = {<a,1>, <b,1>, <c,1>,…} 
 
Since the set B is finite, the checking can go on till the final stage when the last element 
is checked. This can result in two possible conclusions: (strong) some but not all B are G  
(namely when either d or e or both yield a zero value), or the universal all B are G, 
namely when d and e have value 1 like the other elements.  Note that in each of these 
two possible scenarios, the quantifier bears stress, is quantificational, and is dyadic in 
that it involves both (i) and (ii).  A final diagnosis at the end of checking cannot but yield 
a dyadic interpretation, the whole restrictor set B having been run through:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
140 The distinction en route (incomplete) vs. final diagnosis (complete) is the quantificational 
counterpart in the realm of predicates of the I-corner vs. A-corner distinction among quantifiers: 
some episodes of the checking procedure defined by the predicate have been run through vs. all of 
them.  In other words, the Boolean placemat used earlier for quantification over individuals in 
quantifier NPs also enters into the meaning of predicates.  This is in accordance with Bach’s 
(1986) and many others’ defense of a Boolean algebraic approach to quantification over events. 
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(318) 
 
Boethian 
corner 
Sentences 
D (B,G) 
 Size of Domain (i) 
B ⋂ G 
 (ii) 
B  - G 
A-corner 
Entailer 
all  B G is true iff
 
│(i)│  ≥ 1  and │(ii)│ = 0 
I-corner 
Pivot 
SomeplB G is true iff │(i)│ ≥ 2 ET │(ii)│ ≥ 1 
 
Returning to sentences with the numeral two, note that the difference between the weak 
“precisely”-reading of (315) a. and a proportional reading (“two of the boys”) is that in 
the former case it is irrelevant whether at least one boy is absent from the garden or not: 
attention remains restricted to the garden and the precisely reading is the result of the 
realis nature of the sentence. The empirical fact that attention remains restricted to the 
subset of boys in the garden in such cases is to do with the nature of a there-insertion 
sentence, which generally resists proportional, strong quantifiers in the indefinite NP 
position: 
 
(319) a. *There are all (of the) boys in the garden. 
 b. *There are most (of the) boys in the garden 
 
I believe this has to be accounted for in terms of the property of conservativity, which 
was defined as restricting the part of the universe that matters for some/all/… F are G to 
the restrictor set F.  When applying conservativity to a there-insertion sentence  
 
(320) There are two boys in the garden 
 
it should be borne in mind that there are actually two restrictor subjects: (a) the 
postposed indefinite subject two boys, which restricts the part that matters for checking 
to the set B and (b) the dummy subject there, which arguably marks the scope of matrix 
predicate G ( ≈ the garden has two boys in it) and thereby restricts the part of the 
universe that matters to G by conservativity. The combination of (a) and (b), now, has 
the effect of narrowing the part of the universe that can possibly matter for checking 
down to the intersection of B and G and hence bars any non-intersective, dyadic 
quantifiers from the indefinite subject position.  This means that non-intersective 
operators such as all, most, which are crucially dependent on information about cell (ii) 
are excluded from there-sentences.   This is also why the strong, dyadic proportional 
reading “two of the boys are in the garden” is barred from there-insertion sentences, as it 
requires that the checking procedure reveal that at least one boy be outside the garden.   
 
The most important overall observation so far, is that the pivotal quantifier some has just 
one lexical meaning, the intersective “at least” meaning, and that the two other possible 
readings, namely the “precisely” cardinal reading and the proportional quantificational 
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reading are cases of enrichment: they are a function of context (veridical) and stress 
(comparison basis) respectively. This testifies to the chameleonic nature of pivotal 
operators. 
 
As opposed to some, all is lexically dyadic according to the lexical decomposition in 
chapter 4: its use in all B are G  embodies the claim that not only (i) there is at least one 
boy in the garden, but also (ii) that there is none that is not.  
 
(321)  
(i) B ⋂ G  (ii) B  - G 
│(i)│  ≥ 1   and │(ii)│ = 0 
 
That this meaning is lexical can be proved by means of cases of so-called inductive 
leaps. Image a checking procedure in which set B is infinite or too large to be checked in 
its entirety and all checked cases have so far proved to be G. An inductive leap will 
occur at a certain point, which is really the addition of the cell (ii) conclusion │(ii)│ = 0 
(i.e. “there are no boys who are not in the garden”) to the (necessarily) partial cell (i) 
knowledge │(i)│  ≥ 1  (“there are one, two, three, … boys in the garden”)  gathered up to 
that point. This time, the second part (ii) of the dyadic structure of all does not yield 
certain knowledge at the end of exhaustive checking of the elements of B, but rather 
constitutes an inductive “leap of faith” that occurs at a certain stage of en route checking, 
calling the procedure off since it is endless or too long and everything points in the same 
direction anyway. The fact that the word all is indeed used both in utterances about a 
finite set of individuals and for infinite-cum-induction procedures supports the claim it 
has the dyadic lexical content specified. 
 
no(ne) (= ¬some) is the final operator that has to be given its place in the epistemological 
system and the weak-strong pattern. Recall the basic assumption of our whole analysis of 
logic, namely that the I-corner is pivotal and the two other corners derived.  For 
epistemological procedures this implies that they always start in the I-corner with an 
initial weak hypothesis: (weak) some (= at least one) B are G.  If the first step of the 
checking procedure immediately gives a negative result, the hypothesis has to put on 
hold and the new weak knowledge is that no boys are in the garden so far (= en route).  
As long as the epistemological procedure has not run its course and the results that come 
in keep being negative the semantic status of no(ne) remains that of an en route weak 
reading. The hypothesis is at this point still reversible into strong some (but not all) B are 
G if suddenly a boy should be detected in the garden. If that does not happen and the set 
of entities in question, in casu boys, is finite, the epistemological procedure can run its 
course without changing the negative hypothesis.  If the set to be checked is infinite, 
there is once again an inductive leap, with the usual risk involved. 
 
This description of the epistemological checking procedure for no(ne) is a perfect match 
for the intersective meaning description given earlier: the weak pivotal hypothesis │(i)│  
≥ 1 is consistently rejected, either en route or as a final hypothesis, so that │(i)│  = 0:  
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(322)  
 
E-corner 
Contradictor
f. No  B G 
= Not one/any 
B is G 
is true iff  │(i)│  = 0, 
i.e, it is not 
the case that 
│(i)│  ≥ 1 
  
  
For the strong reading “none of the boys are in the garden”, there is the added knowledge 
that cell (ii) is not empty, but that is once again independent of the lexical meaning of 
no.141 
                                                          
141 The present footnote is added to complete the picture of the epistemological procedure and its 
relation to Peirces ideas about the irritation of  doubt and partial knowledge. It does not affect the 
text proposal for the meaning of the operators themselves, which is why it has been relegated to 
this note.   
While an all-sentence attains general knowledge of the type that is useful in causal deductive 
‘theories’, a strong some-but-not-all-sentence remains pivotal, though different from a weak at-
least-some-pivot.  Its pivotal status, i.e. the nature of its indeterminacy, is of a different nature than 
before. Peircean irritation no longer concerns an incomplete checking procedure as with weak 
some, but rather the imperfection of the irreversible knowledge attained: it turns out that some 
boys are in the garden and some not, but why is the end-result so mixed? How can better general, 
causal knowledge about the set B be reached? The only option at this point is to try one or more 
new predicates instead of either B or G, since due to the mixed results (“some but not all B are 
G”), general knowledge in the form of a universal proposition is no longer attainable without a 
change of predicate. Alternative hypotheses which could be checked could for instance be about 
darkhaired boys being in the garden, or boys being at the party. Such changes of the restrictor 
or/and matrix predicate could in principle yield better results: 
 
(i) all dark-haired boys (=DB) are in the garden 
(ii) all the boys are at the party (=P) 
 
This is clearly the point where the principle of abduction has its place in the epistemological 
model: it is dependent on how creative someone is in selecting new, different predicates whether 
general knowledge becomes attainable in a new checking-procedure. The new predicate can be 
either a conjunction of a prior one with a new one (DB instead of B), or an entirely new predicate 
(P instead of G).  The conjunctive new predicate DB has a smaller extension set than B and may 
therefore yield a better description and a new possibility that general knowledge as expressed by 
(i) might be attainable. An entirely new predicate P may shed different light and can thus possibly 
lead to entirely new general knowledge. Good choices of enriched or different predicates will 
make good theories, with general knowledge, as desired in causal deductive ‘theories’. Human 
beings seem to be driven to acquire knowledge of this universal, causal type instead of partial 
pivotal knowledge.  Moreover, they seem to have an instinct for making relevant choices, which is 
why Charles Sanders Peirce (1957: 253) ventured the hypothesis that humans are all innately 
endowed with a sense of abduction, which “puts a limit on admissible hypotheses” and provides 
man with “a natural adaptation to imagining correct theories of some kind” (Peirce 1957: 238; 
quoted from Chomsky 2000: 80).   
Together, this sense of abduction and the earlier-mentioned sense of induction constitute the two 
points of uncertainty and hence creative decision in an epistemological system.  The former is the 
source of bold but creative choices of new predicates.  It may be successful and lead to general 
knowledge or it may misfire. The latter, induction, is risky and creative too. A good and 
responsible inductive leap when an infinite set is involved always involves choice and may misfire. 
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6.2.3 The parallelism summarized 
 
On the whole, there is a parallel between weak and strong readings and non-emphatic 
and emphatic NPIs. Weak forms and non-emphatic NPIs are purely cardinal and their 
interpretation is independent of a comparison base. Strong readings and emphatic NPIs 
are dyadic in the sense that they invoke a scalar comparison base, which results in a 
proportional or partitive interpretation in the case of strong readings and in a scalar focus 
reading in the case of NPI-any. A scalar model to describe the latter will be worked out 
as part of the case study comparison in § 6.3 of the rigid pivot any and its flexible 
counterpart, the indefinite article. Overall, this section has provided evidence that pivot 
meanings show great variation, but that the variation is not lexical.  The lexical meaning 
of pivots is the one with the widest extension and the fewest intensional specifications.  
Variation on the basic lexical pivotal meaning is generated by context (affirmative vs. 
interrogative) or stress.  
 
6.3 Flexible a and rigid any 
 
This section will take the fact that flexible a and rigid any are both pivots and hence 
related as its starting point. Its focus, however, is on the main difference between the 
two.  Consideration of that difference will lead to a formal model for for any whose 
purpose is to account for its emphatic FC- and NPI- readings as well as its non-emphatic 
interpretation. My proposal is inspired by the analysis provided by Kay (1990) for the 
focus particle even, which was proven by Lee & Horn (1994) to be an inherent 
component of the lexical meaning of NPI-any142. I will show that Kay’s analysis of even 
can be used for any provided a modification is made. The resulting scalar model is a 
version of the 2D Cartesian Coordinate System that is the running thread of this study.  
Thus this section will render additional support to the theoretical core of this work and at 
the same time flesh out further the nature of the semantic variability of pivotal meaning. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
While abduction involves the choice of predicate and is a qualitative leap, induction involves the 
infinite range of the argument variable and represents a quantitative leap into the uncertain. Yet 
without such types of uncertainty, no creative and daring hypotheses and hence really new 
knowledge would be possible. 
142 Sir William Hamilton’s 19th century characterisation of the lexical meaning of any (quoted from 
Horn 2000a: 159) already contains an explicit reference to the focus particle even: 
 
 “Our English “any” (aenig, anig, Ang.-Sax.) is of a similar origin and signification 
with the Latin “ullus” (unulus), and means, primarily and literally (even) one, even the 
least or fewest.” 
(Hamilton 1858: 615) 
 
Maybe surprisingly, Hamilton’s descriptions (even) one and  even the least or fewest have survived 
to this day as the lexical meaning of the NPI part of any. They have been taken up and given more 
theoretical and formal substance in Lee and Horn’s (1994) analysis of NPI any as “equivalent to 
one”, more specifically, as denoting a minimal element on a quantity scale, meaning “even a 
single/the least bit”.  The basic features were apparently recognized early on: the link with pivotal 
one, the claim that any incorporates even, the role of superlatives (the least or fewest) and hence 
implicitly also of scales. 
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6.3.1 Any as a rigid and widened indefinite 
 
Describing the difference between the readings of any as context-determined 
modification of a single basic lexical meaning (see § 6.2.1) brings any in the same 
theoretical fold as indefinites, whose various readings are now also generally regarded as 
highly dependent on their context of appearance (cf. Lewis 1975, Kamp 1981, Heim 
1982; Diesing’s (1992) Existential Closure143). Recall that their meaning was claimed to 
be pivotal in § 5.3.  It is the semantic variability of both any and the indefinite article a 
and the distributional analogy between their different readings that led Jespersen (1924), 
Perlmutter (1970), Carlson (1981), Kadmon and Landman (1993), and others to 
postulate the existence of a close relationship. 
 
Thus, in a discussion of the generic singular, Jespersen (1924: 203) writes that in “a cat 
is not as vigilant as a dog; the article may be considered as a weaker any”, and expresses 
the idea that in generic readings “one (“a”) dog is taken as a representative of the whole 
class”.  Jespersen’s remarks, however brief, contain the basic elements which are crucial 
for a good understanding of any and a: (i) there is a difference between them: the 
indefinite is weaker than any; but (ii) there is also a close relationship between them:  a 
and any are both characterized by an existential(I)- universal(A) connection in parallel 
contexts. More specifically, in those contexts they are existentials which have universal 
import: “one (“a”) dog (∃) is taken as a representative of the whole class (∀)”144. This is 
an instantiation of the more general phenomenon which I have called I→A-shift in § 
5.2.2, where the emphasis is on the A-side interpretation.  In other contexts, the emphasis 
is more on the particular I-side 
 
(323) A:   
 a. [An owl] hunts mice 
 b. [Any owl] hunts mice 
(324) I: 
 a. I don’t have [potatoes] 
 b. I don’t have [any potatoes] 
 
Kadmon and Landman’s (1993) outlook on any as an emphatic indefinite takes the same 
distributional analogy as its empirical starting point: any gets a free choice (FC) 
interpretation, i.e. a reading “akin to” a universal, in precisely those contexts where an 
ordinary indefinite gets a generic interpretation. It gets an existential NPI reading, 
however, in contexts where ordinary indefinites are non-generic indefinites (cf. 
Perlmutter 1970, Carlson 1981). 
 
(325) a. generic: [An owl]GEN hunts mice 
 b. free choice: [Any owl]FC-∀ hunts mice 
(326) a. non-generic: I don’t have [potatoes]non-GEN 
                                                          
143 For Dutch, the case for this conception was made by Postma (1994) (and later also by Bennis 
(1995)) who developed a contextual dependency description of the semantically diverse nature of 
the Dutch interrogative / indefinite pronoun wat. 
144 Underscore and added symbols mine [DJ]. For this hybrid existential/universal-meaning, see 
also Carlson (1981) and Löbner’s (1990: 27-29) “Homogene Quantor”. 
OPERATORS IN THE LEXICON 
 
192 
 b. NPI: I don’t have [any potatoes]NPI-∃ 
 
 
But as said, there is also an important difference between indefinite a and any, namely 
that the indefinite article “is a weaker any”, as Otto Jespersen (1924) put it. In a sense, 
Kadmon and Landman (1993: 357) turn this observation on its head and affirm that any 
is an enriched or stronger a, witness their definition: 
 
(327)         any CN = the corresponding indefinite NP a CN 
with additional semantic/pragmatic characteristics 
(widening, strengthening) contributed by any 
 
One of the main objectives of their article is to spell out in detail the precise nature of the 
“stronger” meaning of any and hence of these “additional semantic/pragmatic 
characteristics”. A core notion in their analysis is the notion of widening. I will give 
evidence that their conception of the notion needs to be modified.  First their definition 
will be given and illustrated, after which the problem with it will be brought to light and 
solved.  That will pave the way for a formal model for the semantics of any. 
 
6.3.1.1 Kadmon and Landman’s notion of widening 
 
(328)      Widening 
In an NP of the form any CN, any widens 
the interpretation of the common noun 
phrase along a contextual dimension. 145 
 
Kadmon and Landman (1993: 359) illustrate this notion of widening by comparing 
examples with any and examples with the generic use of indefinite article a and 
indefinite bare plurals, as in (329)-(331). 
 
(329) a. I don’t have potatoes 
 b. I don’t have any potatoes 
(330) a. Every man who has matches is happy 
 b. Every man who has any matches is happy 
(331) a. An owl hunts mice 
 b. Any owl hunts mice 
     Kadmon and Landman (1993: 359) 
 
In all of these pairs, it is felt that the b. examples express reduced tolerance of exceptions 
relative to the a. examples. Kadmon and Landman begin their explanation by pointing 
out that a context of utterance sets up a “local” domain of quantification, from which all 
sorts of things are excluded.   
 
“For example, in a given context, rotten potatoes or sick owls may be 
excluded as irrelevant.  For that reason, you can accept (26) a [= (329) a., DJ] 
                                                          
145 The first detailed analysis of any stressing its systematic “no-matter-which”-widening effect, 
was Vendler’s (1967) description in terms of the notion blank warranty. 
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as true even if you know that I do in fact have a few rotten potatoes in the 
back yard, and you can accept (28)a. [= (331) a., DJ] as true even if you 
don’t think that sick owls hunt mice. The effect of any in the (b) sentences, 
expecially when it carries main or emphatic stress, is to indicate that even 
things that could previously be regarded as irrelevant (in a given context) are 
no exception to the claim being made.  Thus I don’t have ANY potatoes may 
imply: not even the rotten ones; ANY owl hunts mice may imply: even a sick 
one – the use of any indicates that even rotten potatoes or sick owls (which 
might otherwise have been disregarded) are no exception”  
(Kadmon and Landman 1993: 359). 
 
On the whole, this means that the effect of any “is to widen the previously given domain 
of quantification”, as the normal interpretation of the following conversation from 
Kadmon and Landman (1993: 360) illustrates.   
 
(332) YOU: Will there be French fries tonight? 
 ME: No, I don’t have potatoes. 
YOU:  Maybe you have just a couple of potatoes that I could take and fry in 
my room? 
 ME: Sorry, I don’t have ANY potatoes… 
 
The use of any here widens potatoes from larger to small quantities as well (a couple of). 
Kadmon and Landman emphasize that such widening always involves a restricted 
contextual dimension, here large vs. small quantities, to account for the fact that the 
conversation could naturally proceed as follows: 
 
(333) ME: …unless you want that rotten potato over there. 
 
Though use of any widens potatoes from larger to smaller quantities in (332) and thus 
reduces tolerance of exceptions, all sorts of potatoes – like rotten potatoes – may well 
continue to be exceptions to the statement. They fall outside the contextual dimension 
determining the domain of widening (i.c. quantity) in (332). In sum, tolerance of 
exceptions is reduced by any but in most cases does not reach zero tolerance. 
 
Though contextualization to a particular dimension correctly makes widening a relative 
(“reduced tolerance”) rather than an absolute notion (“zero tolerance”), even this more 
restricted notion is too strong.   
 
6.3.1.2 The problem with Kadmon and Landman’s widening 
 
A first objection to the Kadmon and Landman’s version of widening was raised by Lee 
and Horn (1994), who observed that Kadmon and Landman’s account cannot explain 
why the following two sentences are equally odd: 
 
(334)  a. #I don’t have a pen to write with, or at least not enough. 
b. #I don’t have any pen to write with, or at least not enough. 
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If the domain of quantification of any pen is wider than that of a pen along one or other 
dimension, as Kadmon and Landman would contend, it is predicted that (334) a. should 
be at least somewhat better than (334) b., quod non.  The lesson Lee and Horn draw from 
this factual observation is that widening, though possibly well-suited for FC any, which 
involves a kind or quality scale (even the Asuperlative X)) cannot be an essential feature of 
NPI any, which denotes a minimal element on a quantity scale (even a single X).  
 
“Our analysis predicts that there is no difference in the domain of 
quantification between a CN  and any CN if a denotes the minimum quantity 
and any CN is associated with a quantity scale. As discussed in §3.2, in the 
case of a quantity scale, the least likely quantity of CN for which the 
proposition schema holds happens to be the minimum quantity, which is 
exactly the semantics of a:  It is the lexical property of a which makes any 
CN the low point of the quantity scale, and whatever implicature any CN 
induces by being the low end of the scale, its counterpart a CN (in which the 
quantity feature of a is salient) induces as well.”   
         (Lee and Horn 1994: §3.4) 
 
Krifka (1995) signals yet another context where Kadmon and Landman’s notion of 
reduced tolerance of exceptions runs afoul.  
 
For example, we can say, referring to a particular sequence of numbers: This 
sequence doesn't contain any prime numbers. It seems implausible that any 
prime numbers induces a widening of the precise concept ‘prime number’ 
here, or even a contextual widening from ‘small prime number’ to ‘small or 
large prime number’. 
             Krifka (1995: 5) 
 
On Lee and Horn’s (1994) account one could conclude: since any denotes a minimal 
element on a quantity scale here, it has the same semantics as a, so there is no 
widening146. 
 
And yet, in light of (335), Lee and Horn’s solution cannot be the full answer.  
 
(335) a. I don’t have a car. 
 b. ?I don’t have any car. 
 
When uttered without a special context, b. is clearly felt to be slightly awkward, the 
reason being that replacement of a by any introduces the counterintuitive interpretation 
that people normally or stereotypically have more than one car and that I violate 
expectations by being an exception to that rule. In other words, the car-quantity I have 
widens or extends the extension of the expectation generated by the stereotype to the 
smallest quantity possible: a single car. This can only mean that Lee and Horn’s idea that 
NPI-any never involves widening only holds true at the level of the objective domain of 
                                                          
146 Cp. my analysis for the uncertainty about the A-part of any’s rigidly non-referential lexical 
meaning in non-emphatic weak reading contexts in § 6.2.2.  That is the context in which any is 
very similar to a.  
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quantification, not at the level of the subjective domain of quantification governed by 
expectations.  
 
Note that exactly the same expectation-based widening effect as in (335) is present in the 
even paraphrase147:  
 
(336) ?I don’t even have a single car. 
 
The oddness of both (335) b. and (336) is that they run counter normal expectations 
about car possession by suggesting that the normal situation is for people to have more 
than one car. Now compare car possession to car selling, where standard expectations are 
different and where we get the following perfectly natural pair: 
 
(337) a. CAR SALESMAN: I haven’t sold any car today. 
 b. CAR SALESMAN: I haven’t even sold a single car today. 
 
The stereotypical perception of car salesmen being that they sell as many cars as possible 
and preferably more than one a day, it is in this context quite normal to find one of them 
disappointed at having sold not even a single car on a particular day.  
 
Though this analysis confirms Lee and Horn’s (1994) analysis of any as incorporating 
even, it adds a crucial feature, which is to “subjectivize” widening and define it relative 
to an expectation. The oversight of  Kadmon and Landman (1993) is that they approach 
widening as operating exclusively on an objective domain of quantification rather than 
on a subjective “expected” one148. 
 
Observe that the expectation-based analysis also captures Krifka’s objection to widening, 
which is really an objection to widening of the objective domain of quantification only.  
Suppose someone is given a huge list of numbers, which is presented to him as a 
randomly selected sequence.  Under those circumstances and with common sense 
intuitions about chances and maths, the receiver of the list will normally expect the list to 
contain prime numbers.  Against the background of that expectation, s/he will probably 
and rightfully be surprised when the actual domain of quantification turns out to be 
different from the anticipated one, namely extended from a larger quantity (more than 
one) to the smallest quantity (even a single):  
 
(338) a. This sequence doesn't contain any prime number. 
 b. This sequence doesn’t even contain a single prime number. 
 
Krifka’s objection that the precise concept prime number cannot be widened is thus 
correct for the objective domain of quantification, but it dissipates when the domain of 
quantification is taken to be the subjective or expectation domain.  
 
                                                          
147 This parallellism is striking confirmation of Lee and Horn’s overall perspective on any as 
incorporating the semantics of even. 
148 In Lee and Horn’s (1994) case, it is just a “local” oversight: in his own analysis of even, Horn 
(1969, 1971) does invoke expectation violation.  Cf. also Fillmore (1965), Karttunen and Peters 
(1975, 1979) for an expectation-based perspective on even. 
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6.3.1.3 Kay’s scalar model for even minimalised  
 
In view of Hamilton’s (1858: 615) and Lee and Horn’s (1994) insight that any is 
“indefinite plus even”, this section turns to an analysis of even to help solve the problem 
of how to formalize subjective widening for emphatic any.  The theoretical tool used is a 
variant of the type of scalar model developed by Fillmore, Kay and O’Connor (1987) 
and elaborated by Kay (1990) for even. A modified version of his model will be 
proposed to capture the essence of the subjective widening contributed to the meaning of 
a sentence by even. In § 6.3.1.4, that model will be transferred to any-sentences.  
Crucially, the logical structure of this model is that of a two-dimensional Cartesian 
coordinate system, so that a link with our triadic logic can be established. 
 
For Kay, a scalar model (SM) “is taken empirically to contain a set of propositions which 
are part of the shared background of speaker and hearer at the time of utterance.” (Kay 
1990: 63)149 Such background conditions have to hold for a sentence with even to be 
used felicitously.  For instance, to utter even John did it felicitously, the speaker needs to 
have scalar background information about John and others which s/he does not need to 
use the proposition John did it felicitously. To illustrate its structure, Kay sets up a two 
dimensional example of a scalar model, with multiple values on each axis. Thus the 
model 
 
“might include a set of jumpers ordered with respect to jumping ability and a 
set of obstacles ordered with respect to difficulty.  In a given state of affairs 
we may not know which, if any, jumpers can jump which, if any, obstacles, 
but we do know that if any jumper can jump any obstacle then the best 
jumper can jump the easiest obstacle.  Similarly, if there is any jumper who 
can’t jump some obstacle, then the worst jumper can’t jump the hardest 
obstacle.” 
       (Kay 1990: 63) 
 
The scalar model is represented in Kay’s Figure 1, where the so-called “origin” of the 
whole argument space for the template X can jump Y is the point of the two scales closest 
to the intersection of the abscissa and ordinate of the two-dimensional Cartesian 
coordinate system, i.c. the best-jumper/easiest-obstacle n-tuple. It is the bottom-left point 
o in the argument space Dx “such that for any state of affairs if the proposition 
corresponding to any point in Dx is true then the proposition corresponding to o is true.” 
(Kay 1990: 64) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
149 For formal definitions, see Kay (1990: 63-70) 
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In such a scalar model, there is a system of entailment relations:  
 
“if we know for a given state of affairs that a particular cell has a ‘1’, say that 
jumper 27 can jump obstacle number 35, then we know that in that state of 
affairs for any jumper X who is better than jumper 27 and for any obstacle Y 
that is easier than obstacle 35, X can jump Y. Similarly for the negatives: if 
jumper 28 can’t jump obstacle 36, then no jumper worse than 28 can jump 
any obstacle harder than 36. This pattern of entailment in a scalar model is 
indicated in the diagram by the arrows pointing leftward and downward from 
the cell <27, 35> and rightward and upward from the cell <28, 36>.” 
              (Kay 1990: 65) 
 
From this it follows that the ‘1’ entries “form an unbroken cluster around the origin of 
the space” (Kay 1990: 65) and also that informing the hearer that jumper 27 can jump 
obstacle number 35 is more informative than telling him that, say, jumper 20 can jump 
obstacle number 15, given that the former statement entails more other propositions than 
the latter.    This pattern of entailment relations leads Kay to define “the Gricean notion 
of informativeness, that is, what the Maxim of Quantity tells us to optimize.” In 
particular, “given a scalar model SM containing two distinct propositions p and q, p is 
more informative than q iff p entails q.” 
These tools suffice to state Kay’s basic analysis of even: “even indicates that the sentence 
(or clause (…)) in which it occurs expresses, in context, a proposition which is more 
informative (equivalently ‘stronger’) than some particular distinct proposition taken to be 
already present in the context.” (Kay 1990: 66)  The even sentence he calls the “text 
sentence or text proposition (tp) and the taken for granted, less informative proposition 
the context sentence or context proposition (cp)”.  Even is felicitously used when the tp 
entails the cp in the scalar model.  So, if the sentence is Even John went to Spain, this 
means that for the template X went to Spain there is, over and above the most 
informative proposition tp John went to Spain, an outranked alternative true proposition 
cp expressing a more likely situation (say someone other than John went to Spain) 
entailed by the tp.  
 
Kay stresses the pragmatic nature of his scalar model and illustrates its workings by 
means of two multi-valued scalar dimensions (jumpers and obstacles).  I will try to prove 
that the logical structure of the system is not pragmatic but much more deeply ingrained 
1 0 
o 
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in the cognitive system. Moreover, the multi-valued nature of Kay’s scalar dimensions 
hides the fact that it is really a binary system which is at the root of his model and does 
the work. Thus, Kay’s system turns on two dimensions, and on the distinction between 
the two propositions cp and tp, binary contrasts. Though that basic system is clearly 
often embedded in larger scales with multiple values on each dimension, its core does 
not itself exceed binarity and is arguably not pragmatic in its logical structure150.  
 
Regarding Kay’s dimension binarity, observe that in even an ignoramus can pass the 
exam, there is a clash between prior expectation and actual reality. The clash concerns 
the set of people for whom the template X can pass the exam is expected to yield the 
value true, and the set for which it does in actual reality.  The speaker’s expectation, 
embodied in the cp which he takes “for granted”, is that geniuses (and a number of more 
moderately gifted minds too) can normally pass exams. Ignoramuses, however, who are 
less than moderately gifted, are not normally expected to belong to the set for which X 
can pass the exam is true. This set of expectations generates an expectation entailment. If 
an ignoramus manages to pass the exam (without cheating), this is entails the expectation 
that all geniuses have managed to pass too. What the speaker has come to discover in 
even an ignoramus can pass the exam, is that in this case the set denoted by X can pass 
the exam in actual reality is larger than the set which constituted the background (normal 
or stereotypical) expectation. In breach of expectation, ignoramuses are actually 
included in the set of those who passed.   
 
This reality vs. expectation two-dimensionality fits a version of our 2D Cartesian 
Coordinate System. Its x-axis will be used to express reality, i.e. the binary contrast 
between the set of possible situations for which the propositional function X can pass the 
exam yields the value actually true (1) and the set for which it yields actually false (0). 
The y-axis will be used for (necessarily virtual) presuppositional expectations, i.e. the 
binary contrast between the set of possible situations for which X can pass the exam was 
expected to be true (1) and the set for which it was expected to be false (0). Since the 
reality set and the expectation set do not coincide in even-sentences, there is a system 
with four Cartesian quadrants: 
 
(a) the set of situations in which X can pass the exam is actually false and was also 
expected to be false: 0  0; 
(b) the set of situations in which X can pass the exam is actually true and was also 
expected to be true: 1 1; 
(c) the set of situations in which X can pass the exam is actually true and was expected 
to be false: 1 0; 
(d) the set of situations in which X can pass the exam is actually false and was 
expected to be true: 0 1; 
 
 
 
                                                          
150 Such “bare minimum systems” sometimes surface in the functional categories of a language. 
Thus, alongside the upwardly recursively infinite scale of the natural number series, for instance, 
there is APC2 with its basic binary oppositions between neither(0 ) and either(1) on the x-axis and 
between either(1) and both(2) on the y-axis. APC2 illustrates the core of the cardinality system 
without any recursion, the natural number sequence shows the effect of recursion on the y-axis. 
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(339) 
2D Cartesian Coordinate System for even 
x-axis: reality 
y-axis: expectation 
                             
  
 
        
X can pass the exam:  
      Expectation 
              2.├ ENT   
                 
                                       X can pass the exam: 
                                                 Reality 
                                                  1. CD 
    
 
Above it was said that expectations come with an entailment relation: if an ignoramus 
manages to pass the exam (without cheating), the entailment in one’s expectations is that 
geniuses should have managed to pass too. This makes the y-axis not only the 
presuppositional subjective leg but also the entailment-(ENT)-leg of this system.  The 
contrast between 1 and 0 on the x-axis, for its part, is the polarity contrast between the 
complementary notions actually true and actually false: this makes the x-axis both the 
objective and the CD-leg of this system.  The parallel with the 2D Cartesian Coordinate 
System developed for logical operators is striking. 
 
The parallel with the logical triadic system can be made even stronger, as the following 
any- and even-data  from Horn (2000b) illustrate. They bring in an ambiguity involving 
the logical corners A (universal) and I (existential). 
 
(340) a. I don’t think that anyone∀/∃ can pass the exam. 
 b. I don’t think that even {an ignoramus∀/a genius∃} can pass the exam. 
 
(340) a. is ambiguous between the quasi-universal reading “I don’t think that just 
anyone∀  (≈ everyone/even an ignoramus) can pass the exam” and the existential reading 
“I don’t think that there is anyone∃, a single student/even a genius who can pass the 
exam”.  
To capture this phenomenon, the 2D Cartesian Coordinate System of (339) is enriched 
with labels for its three corners: the origin of the system, where the CD abscissa and the 
entailment ordinate of the structure intersect and on which the two relations CD and ENT 
are predicated, is the pivotal I-corner of the Boethian logical structure as usual.  On the 
abscissa we find the second focal point: the E-corner item ¬∃. The abscissa is therefore 
the quality or polarity axis, i.e. the axis where the CD relation between the set denoted 
by x can pass the exam (1) and the set denoted by x cannot pass the exam (0) is 
represented.  The universal affirmative A-corner, for its part, is on the y-axis where 
subjective expectations and entailments between them are represented. For instance, the 
set of possible situations in which the A-corner sentence All the students (including 
1
1
0
0 
(b) 
1 1 
(c) 
1 0 
(d) 
0 1 
(a) 
0 0 
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ignoramuses) passed the exam is true is expected to be a subset of the set denoted by the 
I-corner sentence that some students passed the exam151.  The former proposition entails 
the latter and is therefore more informative and higher on the y-scale. Clearly, the y-axis 
ordinate is the quantity axis of the system, where inferential set-subset relations among 
scalar expectations are determined.  I take it to be the order axis where our general 
expectations about student performance and entailments between them are represented in 
a minimal linear scalar ordering of set-subset relations152.  
 
(341)  
  
 
 
 
 
        ├        
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
The quadrants (a) and (b) represent those situations in which actual ability and expected 
ability are not in conflict: situations where ignoramuses cannot pass and geniuses can 
pass the test.  The propositions (b) and (a) expressing these situations will function as the 
expected background cp-s for expectation-violating (d) and (c), respectively. 
 
(342) (a): an ignoramus∀ cannot pass the exam: 0 0 (actually unable; not expected to 
be able) 
 (b): a genius∃ can pass the exam: 1 1 (actually able; expected to be able) 
(c): even an ignoramus∀ can pass the exam: 1 0 (actually able; not expected to 
be able) 
(d): even a genius∃ cannot pass the exam  (or: not even a genius∃ can pass the 
exam):  0 1    (actually unable; expected to be able). 
 
This captures the fact that (c) and (d) are comparatively less expected, more informative 
situations: situations with ignoramuses who can pass the test and geniuses who cannot.  
It is for these latter situations and the propositions expressing them that speakers resort 
to even to express the distinction between the less informative cp alternative and the 
                                                          
151 Crucially, talk is about the number of situations, not the number of participants in situations. 
152 As will be shown in § 6.4, the y-axis is also involved in partial ordering, which is why the label 
order is preferred to the more specific labels scalarity or linear ordering. 
ORDER 
Entailment 
Quantity 
Ordinate 
CD I: ∃ E: ¬∃ 
A: ∀ 
POLARITY 
Contradictoriness 
Quality 
Abscissa 
(b) 
1 1 
(d) 
0  1 
(a) 
0 0 
(c) 
1  0 0  
1  
 ignoramus∀ 
 genius∃
0  
1  
1  0  
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more informative tp.  In each case, the tp is more informative, ‘stronger’ than the cp, 
given that (and here is the connection with our modification of Kadmon and Landman 
(1993)) it functions as a subjective widener extending the expected domain of 
quantification (boldface arrowed 1 and 0) to the less expected. Thus (c) extends the 
subjective domain of quantification from the normally expected (b) situations to (c), 
which entails (b). In negative contexts, we get the usual reversal of entailment relations, 
with (a) the less informative alternative (the cp) and (d) the more informative text 
proposition (tp) which entails its alternative.  Subjective widening and resulting 
entailment from (c) to alternative (b) and (d) to alternative proposition (a) is expressed 
by even and has the following Kay-type representation.  
 
(343)  
  
 
 
 
 
        ├        
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
 
 
 
Note that both affirmative and negative widening with even has the effect that the 
subjective domain of quantification is extended from an expected quarter (cp) to a less 
expected, hence more informative half (tp) of the argument space.  
 
6.3.1.4 Any and subjective widening 
 
Adopting Lee and Horn’s (1994) insight that the semantics of any incorporates that of 
even, the subjective widening by expectation violation that any expresses comes out as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCALARITY 
Entailment 
Quantity 
CD I: ∃ E: ¬∃ 
A: ∀ 
POLARITY 
Contradictoriness 
Quality 
(b) 
1 1 
(d) 
0 1 
(a) 
0 0 
(c) 
1 0 0  
1  
 ignoramus∀ 
 genius∃ 
0  
1  
1  0  
1  
0  
cp0  
tp0  
cp1  
tp1   EVEN
 EVEN…NOT 
NOT EVEN 
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(344) I don’t think that 
v
ANyone∀/`ANyone∃ can pass the exam. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
        ├        
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
 
 
 
Not only in the case of even but also in the case of any the same lexical morpheme is 
employed to effect both the positive A-widening (cp1 to tp1) and the negative I-widening 
(cp0 to tp0).  But not only on the formal side but also on the semantic side we find an 
unambiguous core: the intrinsic semantic content of the emphatic widening operation 
itself, namely extension of the subjective domain of quantification from cp to tp, is 
always the same throughout, only the polarity-based directionality can change.  
 
In sum, what emphasis and attendant subjective widening add to the rigid meaning of 
any is a focus-type presupposition-reality opposition, where the presuppositional cp is 
subjectively or emphatically widened to the more informative expectation-violation.  
Depending on polarity, the widening will give rigid any an FC-profile or an NPI-
profile153.   
                                                          
153 Note the interesting correlation between having a cp-tp meaning and being a polarity item.  This 
is not only true for the negative polarity item any,  but also for positive polarity items such as the 
Dutch aspectual particles al, nog.  Indeed, the two-dimensional Boolean system outlined here can 
be extended to many other well-studied particles which involve a distinction between an 
expectation and an assertion axis, including the aspectual adverbs already, not yet, no longer, still 
in English and in several other languages (for Dutch al, nog niet, (al) niet meer, nog see 
Vandeweghe (1992); for German cp. Löbner (1990), who opposes two-dimensional treatments 
however).  
With a few changes, the set-up of (344) is what is needed for (affirmative) still and (negative) no 
longer. The y-axis is now a temporal axis and embodies the presupposition of a phase shift (cf. 
Löbner 1990: 117) from 1 to O, i.e. from a time interval during which, say, John is in the garden to 
a phase when John is not in the garden  and an expectation about a point in time at which the shift 
will take place. Extension of the temporal domain of quantification from an expected quarter (cp1) 
to a less expected, hence more informative half (tp1) of the space will on the affirmative side 
capture the meaning of still: for a longer stretch of time on the y-axis than up to the point at which 
the presupposed shift from 1 to 0 was expected, the value for John is in the garden actually 
SCALARITY 
Entailment 
Quantity 
CD I: ∃ E: ¬∃ 
A: ∀ 
POLARITY 
Contradictoriness 
Quality 
(b) 
1 1 
(d) 
0 1 
(a) 
0 0 
(c) 
1 0 0  
1  
 ignoramus∀ 
 genius∃
0  
1  
1  0  
1  
0  
cp0  
tp0  
cp1  
tp1  
 
v
ANYone∀
 `ANyone∃
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6.3.2 The meanings of any  
 
The lexical meaning of the predicate calculus quantifier any was identified as that of a 
rigid pivot.  When used in emphatic contexts, any acquires a scalar profile which puts 
emphasis on either the lower end or the upper end of its scale.  The former situation 
obtains in non-affirmative irrealis contexts and is called NPI-any.  The latter occurs 
primarily in non-episodic affirmative modal contexts and is called FC-any.  When non-
emphatic, any gets a weak reading. This variability testifies to the general property of 
pivots that has been highlighted in this chapter, namely that their lexical content is 
comparatively sparse, which enables contextual enrichment by stress and influence of the 
nature of the predicate on its ultimate interpretation. 
 
(345) a. NPI: I haven’t seen ANYbody today. 
 b. FC: ANYbody can tell you that 
c. Non-emphatic weak: There aren’t any unicorns in the garden. (neither some 
unicorns x, nor some unicorns y, nor more) 
 
6.4 Singulars are pivots 
 
In chapters 4 and 5 it has been established that the pivot is special in that it is the origin 
of the 2D Cartesian Coordinate System. The latter is a very minimal system which has 
no more than three focal points: the pivot, the E-corner on the quality (polarity; CD) leg 
and the A-corner on the quantity (scalar; ENT) leg.  This much suffices to account for 
the operator-sets studied so far, all triads.  
 
entailer 
AND 
ALL 
2 
 
 
 pivot 
OR 
SOME 
1 
 
 
 contradictor 
NOR 
NO 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
├ 
ENTAILMENT 
QUANTITY 
SCALARITY 
  
 
CONTRADICTORINESS 
QUALITY 
POLARITY 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
remains 1 (= 1 0 in (344) (c)); for no longer the presupposition and expected point of phase shift 
on the y-axis are the same, but the extension is downward from cp0 to tp0, expressing that the 
asserted shift from 1 to 0  occurred before the expected transition point and is consequently 
ordered before the latter on the temporal y-axis.  
Just reverse the presupposition on the y-axis to a shift from 0 to 1 (i.e. from John is not in the 
garden to a phase when John is in the garden (Löbner 1990: 117)) and a downward extension on 
the affirmative side will yield already, an upward extension on the negative side not yet.  The 
present system of representation illustrates clearly Löbner’s point that these four items – though a 
single duality group – cannot be captured in a (single) Aristotelian Square on account of the 
pairwise different presuppositions.  
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In this section I will provide a final argument for the claim that pivots stand out and are 
more basic than the other focal points. The argument involves the fact that the 2D 
Cartesian Coordinate System can be expanded on the entailment leg to yield multiple 
entailers. By contrast, there can only be just one pivot in a calculus154.  This point will 
first be made for the number system. Then, it will be shown that there is a relationship 
between the unique pivot/multiple entailer contrast in the number system and a 
corresponding contrast in the domain of grammatical number (singular versus plural). In 
view of this parallelism, the singular will make its appearance as our final newcomer 
pivot to the same type of Boolean 2D Cartesian Coordinate System that underlies logical 
operators and numbers.  
 
6.4.1 Generating Linear Scales  
 
Consider the numerals scale, which is a linear ordering. In the minimal model, the pivot 
is the lower endpoint of a Horn scale <2,1> and there is one other value, the A-corner 
entailer value 2. But if we look again at the Horn scales (1989: 232) in (277), partly 
repeated here, with pivots in italics and underlined: 
 
(346) <all, most, many, some>; <always, usually, often, sometimes>; <and, or>; <6, 
5, 4, 3, 2, 1>; <must, should, may>; <necessary, (logically) possible>. 
 
we find that the numerals scale included there is not just <2,1>, but the larger linearly 
ordered scale <6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1>.  As before, the pivot is the lower endpoint of the scale. 
                                                          
154 A similar point can be made about the contradictoriness leg of the system in terms of the 
opposition between a unit and fractions, but that would lead me too far afield (and the special 
status of 0 would have to be discussed).  Moreover, when the contradictoriness leg functions as a 
polarity leg where 1 stands for truth and 0 for falsehood (cf. the scalar model developed for any in 
§ 6.3), the claim I am driven to for my analysis of the special status of the pivot to be correct, 
namely that there is only one truth buth that there can be more than one falsehood has already been 
proved by Seuren (2001b: 221).  On the basis of the following sentences, he distinguishes between 
‘radical’ and ‘minimal’ falsehood: 
 
(i) The present king of France is bald. 
(ii) Rosemary’s favourite lover is bald. 
 
Sentence (i) is “radically false when said now, or in Russell’s day, since there is no really existing 
individual in the world answering to the description ‘present king of France’ (nor was there one in 
1905)” (Seuren 2001b: 221). Sentence (ii), “said of a person with a hirsute scalp, is minimally 
false, and its minimal negation (…) is true and entails both the existence of the man spoken about 
and the fact that he has hair on his head” (Seuren 2001b: 221).   “Radically false sentences are 
made true by the radical negation, which is represented by an emphatically accented not in 
canonical negation position (for English: with the finite verb form), and preferably accompanied 
by a specification of the presupposition which is violated.” (Seuren 2001b: 221)  Seuren gives the 
following example (his (17) b.): 
 
(iii) The present king of France is NOT bald: there is no king of France! 
 
Since Seuren’s analysis proves there is more than one type of falsehood, and since there is only 
one truth, his analysis supports the claim that pivots stand out. 
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This time, however, it is special in another respect. First, it is the only element that is 
entailed by all other elements on the scale. Secondly, it is the only value on the scale that 
does not itself entail a number, given that the relation between 1 and 0 in the 2D 
Cartesian Coordinate System is not on the scalarity leg of the system (hence no 
entailment), but a contradictoriness relation on the polarity leg.   
 
This special status of the pivot on the entailment leg can be expressed by specifying how 
the minimal model developed so far can be extended to accommodate extra values 
beyond 2.  What has to be found is a way to make infinite recursion possible, since the 
linear number scale obviously does not stop at 6.   
 
A solution to this problem is to view the Boolean placemat introduced earlier as a 
recursive rule set (s1)-(s4) consisting of instructions to form the union of X and Y, and 
recursive in that the output set can be used to reapply the same rule:  
 
(347)  
                                   /ONEincl/ (= ‘≥ 1’) 
  
    
 /TWO/ (= ‘≥ 2’)        1     1 (s4)  
       1      0 (s3)   
       0      1 (s2) 
/ZERO/155        0      0 (s1) 
 
Consider a three-entity universe156 with elements a, b, and c as possible members of the 
sets to be demarcated.  (s1) is an instruction to form the union of an X and an Y, where 
neither contains an element from the universe. This yields the null set, whose cardinality 
is 0 (zero). However often the output is used for reapplication of this rule, the result does 
not change. The extension of zero is the set of all sets with no members, which is just the 
null set. 
 
(348) 
     │output set│ 
/ZERO/  Ø   0 
 
(s2) and (s3) yield unions where one or other entity from the universe is a member, but 
not more than one. This yields singletons: cardinality of membership is 1.  Here again, 
recursion is to no avail in the sense that it cannot increase the membership.  
 
(349) 
     │output set│ 
/ONEexcl/   
(= ‘precisely 1’) 
{a} {b} {c} (s2-s3) 1 
 
                                                          
155 Zero, but also synonyms restricted to specific contexts: nil, naught, love, o, … 
156 As before, all cognitively realistic set demarcation occurs within a universe of discourse. 
 /ONEexcl/  (= ‘precisely 1’) 
Y X 
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 A first application of (s4), finally, forms the union of two sets, each with a single 
(different) element from the universe, say {a} and {b},yielding two-member sets, i.c. 
{a,b}.  This time, using the output in a recursive reapplication of the rule does get one 
further: the union of {a,b} and {c}, for instance, yields {a, b, c}, a three-member set 
 
(350)  
      │output set│  
  {abc}  (s4) 3 
 {ab} {ac} {bc} (s4) 2 
 {a} {b} {c} (s2-s3) 1 
  Ø  (s1) 0 
 
It is clear how the system can go on when operating on a universe with more entities. In 
principle it could go on indefinitely; in reality life is too short of course and only an 
inductive leap can bring in ∞ (infinity).   
 
At this point, a remark has to be made from a cognitive viewpoint.  First of all, recall that 
the Boolean placemat used here is actually generated by the negative-disjunctive 
Peircean bar-system introduced in § 4.4, so to get a fully cognitively realistic (hence 
negative) description, what I have stated here in terms of a positive recursive rule set, has 
to be translated into that negative bar-code and employ conjunction for recursion as 
follows, to get the entailers beyond 2.   
 
(351) 
  
Logic Bar-code cardinality 
¬(P∨Q)  
/P/ /Q/ 
 
0 
P∨Q 
 
 
/P/ /Q/ 
 
≥ 1 
P∧Q  
/P/ /Q/ /P/ /Q/ 
 
≥ 2 
P∧Q∧R  
 
 
/P/ /Q/ /P/ /Q/   /R/         /P/ /Q/ /P/ /Q/      /R/ 
 
≥ 3 
 
This via negativa is more accurate too. Thus, in the positive rule set, the “exclusive”, 
singleton sets (‘precisely’ one) are generated separately from the higher cardinalities.  
What actually happens in the cognitively realistic negative bar-code system, is that after 
the null set, one first gets by NON to all the sets with cardinality  │≥ 1│(“inclusive”), 
after which that set is narrowed down to its subset with cardinality │≥ 2│ by further 
fractioning exclusion, and so on.   So, in the cognitively realistic bar-code version, the 
extension of one is the set of all sets with at least one member, the basic meaning I have 
systematically attributed to pivots throughout this study. The extension of the lexical 
predicate two is a smaller set: the set of sets with at least two members, the extension of 
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three the set of sets with at least three members, and so further and so on, a standard 
interpretation in formal semantics. 157   
 
The nature of the cognitively realistic process illustrates a general point about the 
negative-subtractive theory defended in this study. When an entailment scale is enriched 
from its binary opposition I-A to a larger set of values, those values are always added “in 
between”, i.e. by fractionizing the I-A scale into intermediate values, not by literally 
extending the scale. In a negative subtractive system, you cannot add anything since you 
start from the universe, but you break up what you have into ever finer bits. This 
conception matches the factual observation that enrichment of the quantifier scale yields 
intermediate values between some/any and all (such as many, most, etc.) and nothing 
beyond all.  
 
The same conclusion obtains for the polarity leg of the 2D Cartesian Coordinate System, 
where the perspective outlined here can give Boole’s (1854 [1958]: 2) traditional 
distinction between a Logic of Classes and a Logic of Probabilities a natural place. The 
system as sketched so far (e.g. the Kay-type scalar model) worked with no more than the 
basic binary opposition true (1)-false (0) on the polarity axis and thereby represents the 
binary Logic of Classes. But the binary polarity opposition can be made quantificational 
and fuzzified by means of fractions representing transitional values between 0 and 1. 
Such an introduction of quantity relations and a quantificational approach to the 
contradictoriness axis turns the binary Logic of Classes into the Logic of Probabilities 
and (though differently158) fuzzy sets: the predicate is no longer unequivocally true or 
false, but borderline fractional cases are introduced, which makes transitional values (1/2 
true, 1/3 true, etc.) inevitable. The fact that a Logic of Probabilities is generally felt to be 
a complication of the binary Logic of Classes thus finds a natural and intuitively correct 
characterization. While the polarity axis is the axis of set-complement set relations (CD) 
– simple (i.e. binary) or complex (fuzzy/intermediate values) –, the scalarity axis is the 
axis of entailment (ENT), simple (i.e. binary A-I) or complex  i.e. with multiple entailers 
and recursive inferential set-subset relations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
157 The reason why I have used the positive approach too, is double.  First of all, it enables me to 
illustrate clearly that the negative-subtractive theory has greater cognitive reality. Secondly, the 
positive picture will simplify discussion of the singular-plural distinction in the next section.   
158 The logic of probabilities and fuzzy logic (Zadeh 1965) are of course not the same.  Take the 
following two examples: 
 
(i) (He is a pensioner) He’s 30% likely to be bald.  
(ii) He is 30% bald. 
 
While the first statement is the result of a calculation of probabilities in a population, the second is 
about partial membership of a set: it fuzzifies the predicate bald itself and hence the boundary 
nonbald-bald.  The similarity between probabilities and fuzzy logic which is relevant to the text 
proposal is that they both become identical to binary Boolean logic if all the partial memberships 
are either 0% or 100%.  
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6.4.2 The singular-plural distinction and partial order  
 
In this section, it will be illustrated that singulars are another (and final) category of 
pivots with AT LEAST ONE meaning. They stand out relative to plurals in the same 
way in which all other pivots relate to entailers.  
 
Chierchia (2003) showed that an algebraic perspective is very fruitful for the description 
of the meaning of bare semantic predicates, e.g. the denotation of the noun table and its 
plural form tables159. In Chierchia’s (2003) words: “The role of lexical nouns (without 
the determiner) is that of singling out a class of objects (which will have common traits: 
they may share a form, a function or what have you).  Plural morphology (-s, in English) 
turns nouns that apply to singularities into nouns that apply to groups.” Take a universe 
of discourse INDp (in formal semantics often referred to as the domain E of 
entities/individuals in the model of discourse) with five individuals a, b, c, d, e. 
Assuming that only a, b and c are tables, the lexical noun table singles out this class of 
atomic objects between the lowest angles in the following representation160:  
 
(352)  
 {abc}  
{ab} {ac} {bc} 
   
a b c 
 
Since a, b and c are tables, it “follows inexorably that a, b and c taken together are also 
tables; and also for instance b and c taken together are tables.” (Chierchia 2003) 
According to Chierchia, this is something we know a priori: “Once we individuate 
through a singular noun a set of atoms, all of the groups (of various size) made up of 
those atoms will be something the corresponding plural is true of.”  But the next question 
is then what the precise nature and structure of this a priori knowledge is. What generates 
the pattern? This is where the negative twin selection placemat comes in and adds an 
interesting touch to proposals like Chierchia’s, namely by specifying how and by which 
means the partitioning of the denotation of a count noun into singularities and pluralities 
of ascending cardinality comes about. Concretely, the pattern resulting from twin 
selection (tablex, tabley,) and its 2n = 22 = 4 possible value combinations looks as follows. 
 
 
 
                                                          
159 In the past decade, several people have worked out the hypothesis that an algebraic approach 
should be adopted to the meaning of NPs, e.g. Scha (1983), Link (1983), Krifka (1986), Landman 
(1989), Schwarzschild (1996), Doetjes (1997), Winter (1998), Chierchia (2003)). 
160 The curly brackets round the non-atomic combinations are borrowed from set-theory, but 
Chierchia does not take sides in the debate whether plural entities are really sets. In view of the 
analysis developed in this study, I am forced to view singularities and pluralities all as sets. 
Singularities or atoms too are viewed as (singleton) sets (pace Chierchia, who leaves out the curly 
brackets). The difference between singular and plural is then a sort distinction between singletons 
and non-singletons and not a type difference (pace Bennet (1974), Winter (1999:6)).  Opinions are 
divided, but if the same set-forming Boolean algorithm used for other set demarcation is active 
here, I believe I am driven to the set-position. 
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(353) 
                                 tableincl (│≥ 1│) 
     tx    ty 
    
table-s (=│≥ 2│)         1     1 (s4) 
        1      0 (s3) tableexcl  (= ‘precisely 1’) 
        0      1 (s2) 
¬table         0       0 (s1)161 
 
Interpreting (s1)-(s4) as a recursive rule set, we get: 
 
a. (s1): twin selection yields a set with neither one, nor any other table: 0 0. Hence 
the predicate does not apply (but non-table does). 
b. (s2-s3) John has one or other table, i.e. twin selection yields one (0 1) or other 
(1 0) singularity, but exclusively: not more than one table at once. 
c. (s4) John has table-s. Twin selection yields one and another table (1 1), e.g. two 
tables {ab}. On the earlier assumption that s4 can be thought of as an 
instruction which applies recursively to its output, we can now take {ab} as a 
first argument for a new application of the same (1 1) rule and combine it by set 
union with a second argument {c}, which means that recursive reapplication of 
(1 1) now results in {abc}. 
 
(354)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Merging the denotation of table vs. tables as conceived by Chierchia with our placemat 
analysis, we get the following partial ordering162: 
 
(355)  
                                                          
161 S1 = all sets of type 1, i.e. all sets of non-tables (neither one nor any other table) in the domain 
of discourse (physical objects) over which the predicate table ranges.  How set demarcation by 
means of /NEC/ turns the Boolean algebra including this set into the final description of the 
predicate as a join semi-lattice (with S1 cut off) was explained in chapter 4, §4.3. 
162 The order is partial because while there is vertical ordering (set-subset), the horizontally 
juxtaposed sets of each cardinality are not ordered relative to one another. 
/table/ 
  1 0  (s3) 
  0 1  (s2) 
  /¬table/ 
                             0  0   (s1) 
/tables/ 
  1  1  (s4) 
INDp 
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     /table/ (│≥ 1│)   
  {abc}    
/table-s/ (=│≥ 2│) {ab} {ac} {bc} (s4)  
      
/tableexcl/  (= 
‘precisely 1’) 
{a} {b} {c} (s2-s3)  
      
 
First of all, the binary placemat version of the underlying algebraic structure used 
imposes a partial ordering separating out the denotation of singular and plural forms of 
the noun with finite means, exactly as required by Chierchia’s analysis.  While the rule 
system that generates this partial ordering is a very small finite algorithm, there is no 
limit in principle on the cardinality of the pluralities. It does not really matter how large 
the universe of discourse INDp (= the domain IND of individuals in the model of 
discourse) that s1-s4 operates on is, though a realistic conception of it will keep it finite. 
At the same time our system maintains a link between singular and plural in the sense 
that the pluralities (s4) are still conceived of as part of the denotation of the basic, 
underlying “inclusive” (│≥ 1│) predicate /table/. This conception of the nature of the a 
priori knowledge is empirically more justified than one which restricts /table/ to the 
singular, as a singular form does not always apply to atoms only, witness the following 
non-referential negative and interrogative contexts: 
 
(356) a. I haven’t got a table. (neither one, nor more than one) 
 b. Have you got a kitchen table? Yes, I have two. 
 
This is different from Chierchia’s position when he says that the “role of plural 
morphology is that of turning something that applies only [italics mine, DJ] to atoms into 
something that applies to the corresponding groups”.  The present modification seems 
empirically more correct (cf. (169)), and it also makes it possible to incorporate 
Chierchia’s results in the negative-disjunctive Peircean algorithm developed in this 
study. If I am on the right track, the meaning of a singular such as table incorporates the 
notion AT LEAST ONE (cf. § 5.3) and is in that sense a regular pivot.  Plurals, for their 
part, are semantically more complex and derived from the singular by a morphological 
procedure that excludes part of the meaning of the singular, analogous to the way in 
which entailers more generally relate to pivots.  And a singular, like other flexible pivots, 
can be inclusive or exclusive in meaning.  And as with other A-corner I-corner relations, 
plurals entail singulars, i.e. the set of all sets with more than one x is a subset of the set 
of all sets with at least one x. Singulars, however, cannot entail in this sense.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
The basic contrast that pervaded this chapter is the distinction between flexible and rigid 
pivots, the latter of which are confined to nonveridical contexts.  For the flexible pivots, 
the distinction between veridical and nonveridical contexts yielded different readings.  In 
addition to the lexical bifurcation and the semantic variability of flexible pivots 
depending on the (non)veridical nature of their environment, futher variation is induced 
by the difference between stressed and unstressed pivots. In a final section, it was 
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illustrated how partial orderings are generated by Boolean means and how the set of 
pivots can be extended to include singular Ns. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS  
 
7.1 IN-Logic and the *nand-puzzle 
 
The main objective of this study has been to find evidence for the hypothesis that the 
foundations of logic are to be sought in the mind. The general programme was described 
in the first sentence of Boole’s The Calculus of Logic (Boole 1848: 183) as “the 
application of a new and peculiar form of Mathematics to the expression of the 
operations of the mind in reasoning”.  Evidence was collected for the hypothesis that 
logic in general and logical operators in particular betray their true nature in natural 
language, i.e. in the material expression of thought.     
The path traversed in our quest will be summarized briefly. That will be done, however, 
with special emphasis on the puzzle triggering it (why neither *nand nor *nall?) and 
proposals that have been advanced for the O-corner problem.  It will be shown how the 
original question became a different one as our model developed.  More importantly, a 
solution to the *nand-riddle is now within reach. 
 
7.1.1 The O-corner problem and the 2D Cartesian Coordinate System 
 
On the first pages of the present study, a small logical calculus devised by Aristotle (384-
322 BC) and referred to as APC (Aristotelian Predicate Calculus) was presented in a 
didactic format introduced by the late Roman statesman and philosopher Anicius 
Manlius Severinus Boethius (480-524 BC). As said there, Boethius labelled the four 
sentence types of APC A, I for the AffIrmative propositions and E and O for the negative 
(“nEgO”) statements (Seuren 1998: 306): 
 
(357)  
type A: All F is G type E:  All F is not G / No F is G 
type I:  Some F is G type O:  Some F is not G / Not all F is G 
 
For the benefit of his beginning students, Boethius cast the four types into a geometrical 
figure: the Square of Oppositions (Seuren 1998: 306-307).  A surprising linguistic 
feature of this Square observed by Thomas Aquinas and many others since was that 
while the A, and I corners have single word lexicalisations in language after language, 
there is variation with respect to E-corner lexicalization, and the O-corner systematically 
resists lexicalisation. There is no *nomnis, *nall, etc. This has led to a spate of proposals, 
some of which have sought a “robust” exclusion in terms of innate linguistic principles 
(Huybregts 1979), while others do not rule out O-corner lexicalization a priori, but claim 
that “it would have to be a rare phenomenon” (Hoeksema 1999: 6).  In this respect, my 
own proposal is on Huybregts’ side, though different in its content.  By and large, the 
proposals made come in two categories: there are “blocking” (Huybregts 1979, Barwise 
& Cooper 1981, Horn 1989) solutions and “geometrical” solutions.  To illustrate each 
type, a very simple representation of the Square will be used, namely with no more than 
the labels A and I of the affirmative lefthand axis, and negation (external negation before 
the letter, internal negation behind it): 
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(358)  
 
Huybregts’ proposal is the following universal lexicalisation principle: 
 
(359) Lexicalization Principle: 
 Lexicalisation of ¬Q is possible just in case lexicalization of Q¬ is impossible 
 
This rules out lexicalization of the O-corner (¬A) if A¬ is lexicalized, which is the case 
in English, Dutch and many other languages.  As pointed out by Hoeksema (1999), the 
generalization fails for many Asian languages (Japanese, Hindi, etc.), where there are no 
single word lexicalisations for negative quantifiers at all.  In those languages, the fact 
that lexicalisation of E-corner operator A¬ is impossible should make lexicalization of 
the O-corner available, contrary to fact163. 
 
Horn’s (1989) blocking proposal is that lexicalization of O-type quantifiers is blocked by 
lexicalized I-type quantifiers due to pragmatic equivalence.  Though I and O quantifiers 
are logically different, they implicate each other: 
 
(360) a. I:  some boys are in the garden; implicature: not all of them are; 
b. O: not all boys are in the garden; implicature: some boy is.   
 
Thus, though they are not logically equivalent, they are pragmatically equivalent.  On the 
additional assumption that affirmation is unmarked and negation marked, the blocking of 
O is explained. A major problem for this analysis, however, is that pragmatic 
equivalence does not always obtain, as remarked by Hoeksema: 
 
“In contexts where the speaker has only partial knowledge, there is not even 
pragmatic equivalence.  If I say that some of my students are gay, one should 
not infer immediately that not all my students are gay.  Perhaps I am unaware 
of the sexual preferences of the remainder. But if I and O are often not even 
pragmatically equivalent, because the conditions for the Gricean implicatures 
are not met, then why should O be superfluous?” 
(Hoeksema  1999: 4) 
 
                                                          
163 For discussion of Barwise & Cooper’s blocking principle, namely their “monotonicity 
correspondence universal”, cf. Hoeksema (1999:2) 
I 
O 
E 
¬I  ≡  A¬ 
A ¬A  ≡  I¬   
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For this reason, but also because more tangible, formal aspects of language such as the 
distinctions flexible-rigid, veridical-nonveridical, presuppositional-nonpresuppositional 
and stressed-unstressed can help account for the facts in question, an account in semantic 
terms, wherever possible, is to be preferred over a purely pragmatic one. 
 
This is the only reason why H. P. Grice (1913-1988) has not been mentioned more often 
in this study. In many ways, Grice was the first to systematically analyse “divergences in 
meaning” between “formal devices” in logic and “their analogs or counterparts in natural 
language” (Grice 1975, 1978, 1981, 1989) and a version of his concept of 
informativeness and other notions (e.g. implicature) play an important role in the present 
account.  But certain concepts of his theory are problematic, namely his “Cooperative 
Principle”. Implicatures - which refer to something implied by the speaker in the 
conversation but not stated - are taken to be effects of people obeying (or deliberately 
flouting) an ethical code of cooperative verbal conduct.  I believe, however, that at least 
in the case of the logical operators studied here a Gricean appeal to such social-ethical 
communicative principles should be replaced by the individual-epistemological principle 
hinted at on several occasions and embodied in Peirce’s “irritation of doubt”: our 
individual search for causal knowledge and patterns in reality drives us away from 
particular I-corner statements to universal statements of the affirmative A-corner or the 
negative E-corner variety.  It is this drive which is not only behind the phenomenon of 
(sometimes unwarranted) leaps of induction to A or E, but also behind the orientation of 
the I→A and I→E shifts detailed earlier and behind the implicature that when we make a 
particular I-corner statement such as some flags are green, it can safely be assumed that 
more informative knowledge is not available. If we had had more satisfying information, 
we would no doubt have supplied it given our epistemological preferences for A and E-
expressions. It is only because we don’t have better information that we are forced to 
make do with the epistemologically disappointing conclusion that some (implicature: 
“but (irritatingly enough) not all”) flags are green. The advantage of such a Peircean 
individual-epistemological principle is that the distinction that it revolves around is 
already incorporated in the logical system, namely the categorial I-corner versus 
universal corner distinction. It seems much harder to me to tie Grice’s cooperative 
principle and maxims to a concrete feature of the logical apparatus.  A mentalist IN-
principle (individual, internalist, intensional) like Peirce’s irritation of doubt and 
attendant “flight from the pivot” whenever possible seems to me to be more promising 
and more accurate than a social-ethical set of principles and maxims of verbal conduct. 
 
On the geometrical front, alternative quadrangular schemes (Löbner 1985, 1987, 1990) 
to that of Boethius and all kinds of representations with more corners (five, six, etc.) 
have been proposed (see van der Auwera 1996).  A number of scholars (including De 
Morgan 1858: 121; Jespersen 1924: 324-325; Horn 1989: 253; Seuren (2002, 20-21)) 
dropped Boethius’ Square for a triangular representation, either (a) collapsing the O-
corner with the I-corner or (b) dropping the O-corner altogether, leaving a basic Triangle 
of Oppositions. 
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(361) a.         b. 
 
  
 
The collapsed construct (Jespersen 1924) was shown in § 2.2.5.1 to fail both 
theoretically and empirically. The O-deletion triangle, for its part, just erases the fourth 
corner, and is therefore, crudely put, an attempt to solve the question by “dissolving” its 
appearance in the geometrical figure. While the representation has changed, the original 
question survives unscathed. In slightly reformulated terms it now becomes: why could 
not there be a fourth corner? Surely, the meaning it expresses is not logically 
inaccessible: by combining the meanings of not and all into the phrase not all the 
required meaning is easily obtained.  
 
The first model to propose a two-legged system rather than a triangle was Löbner’s 
(1990) account in terms of the two relations of (outer) negation and dual negation (cf. § 
2.2.5.2 and § 4.8). Our own attempt to find an economical system stayed within the 
confines of Aristotle’s calculus in chapter 2, but nonetheless succeeded in producing a 
system which is more minimalist than a triangle. It derived all relations of Boethius’ 
square from two arguably foundational relations, namely contradictoriness between I-
corner propositions and their negation in the E-corner on the one hand and entailment 
between A-corner propositions and the I-corner propositions they entail.  As this turned 
out to be possible, the O-corner was thereby reduced to the status of a non-basic corner 
of the system and the triangle lost one of its sides, namely the (derived) contrary 
relationship between A and E, leaving a two-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system.  
But the lexicalization issue was not conclusively settled yet: why cannot a non-basic 
corner be lexicalised as a single word?  Or more fundamentally: even if one admits that 
the logical system is a two-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system with CD and ENT 
as its axes, why then cannot the system be built on the O-corner just as well as on the I-
corner? Why this positive-negative asymmetry? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I 
E 
¬I  
E 
¬I  I & ¬A    
A A 
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         A:ALL         O:*NALL NEGATIVE 
 
 
 
 
                            2. ├ 
         
 
 
    POSITIVE     I: SOME        E: NONE 
 
The issue has two sides: (α) proving that the 2D Cartesian Coordinate System is 
undeniably based on the I-corner, not the O-corner, (β) finding a reason why on top of 
not being a hub of the system, the O-corner resists lexicalization as well. While the latter 
task has been saved up till this conclusion, chapters 2-4 were devoted to (α).  
 
7.1.2 The I-corner as the positive pivot of the 2D Cartesian Coordinate System 
 
In the third chapter the two relations CD and ENT were approached in set-theoretic and 
algebraic terms and the claim was developed that they are relations between items in the 
lexicon rather than directly stated at the level of complete propositions.  Both relations 
were argued to be of an internalist nature and a cognitively realistic theory of set 
demarcation was worked out. Furthermore, an account for unnatural entailments was 
provided in terms of a principle of informativeness.   Though this chapter provided no 
answer to the lexicalization question, it did pave the way for progress by bringing in set-
theory and algebra and by providing a lexical anchoring for the discussion.  
 
The fourth chapter, then, consisted of a semantic decomposition of the lexical meaning 
of the focal points of logical calculi. These decompositions were carried out in terms of a 
basic negative operator. In the logical literature, two candidate negative binary operators 
had already been established to which all others can be reduced (so in that sense we did 
not have to do the really tough base work). One possible candidate was Sheffer’s stroke, 
whose meaning is identical to that of the non-existing O-corner element *nand, a 
negative conjunctive operator. The second candidate was Peirce’s dagger, expressing E-
corner “joint falsehood” (nor) and hence a negative disjunctive operator.  For several 
reasons, Peirce’s negative-disjunctive approach turned out to be the correct choice and 
superior to Sheffer’s (also historically later) alternative:  
(i) our excursion into set-demarcation had taught us that the latter is effected via twin 
selection, which involves set-theoretic union, hence logical disjunction164, not 
intersection/conjunction;  
                                                          
164 As mentioned a number of times, from the viewpoint of Boolean algebra there are models of 
the set-theoretic, arithmetical and logical type, which can be mapped onto each other. Set theoretic 
union, for its part, maps into addition and disjunction respectively  (⋃ ≈ + ≈ ∨) 
1. CD 
1. CD 
2. ├ 
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(ii) union and its algebraic counterpart addition are procedurally less complex165 – hence 
by assumption also more primitive - operations than conjunction and its algebraic 
counterpart multiplication; 
(iii) in Peirce’s system the most basic lexicalised operator is the particular affirmative 
one (or, some) and the two which are derived in a single step from the pivot are the 
universal operators (affirmative and negative respectively). From the viewpoint of 
informativeness, that makes sense: the two universal, hence more informative notions are 
constructed from the less informative particular one. No such symmetry and sense in 
Sheffer’s system. Since it is based on a nand-operator, the pivot of a Sheffer-based 
system – i.e. the operator reached at stage 2. after two applications of Sheffer’s stroke - 
is the universal affirmative operator in the A-corner. Consequently, in a birelational 
system the two operators that would then have to be derived in a next step are the 
particular affirmative on the one hand, the universal negative on the other. Not only are 
these a mixed bag (they differ both in quantity and in quality), the resulting orientation of 
the system does not make sense from the viewpoint of informativeness. Its pivot (the 
universal affirmative A-corner item) is more informative than one of the derived 
operators (the particular affirmative I-corner item) and equally as informative as the 
other derived operator (the universal negative E-corner item).  
 
So Peirce’s operator as generator of all the focal points had to be adopted and the 
operator was rebaptised /NEC/ to emphasize that from our mentalist perspective it is not 
just a logico-mathematical object in a Platonic realm like Peirce’s dagger, but arguably 
an operator with cognitive reality, an innate a priori feature of the mind.  Operating on a 
selectable universe of possible situations, which is a positive concept (represented by 
means of 1), the exclusionary activity of /NEC/ gives a purely negative and 
nonlexicalizable result at stage 1.  A second application of /NEC/ yields a first 
lexicalizable result, which is both positive and of the I-corner variety, thereby 
establishing the pivotal role of I in a logical calculus as a matter of inescapable 
theoretical principle166, as well as the marked nature of operators derived from them, 
including the negative operator (stage 3.) in (362).  These points are illustrated in the 
following sequence for the propositional operators or and nor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
165 The adverb procedurally is crucial: there is of course no difference in denotational complexity, 
the difference is only in constructional complexity. 
166 That is: if /NEC/ is the only primitive operator, then the I-corner operator is necessarily the 
pivot of the logical system.  This is where the present proposal manages to “anchor” the pivot 
theoretically. 
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(362)  
 
Stage 0. Stage 1. Stage 2. Stage 3. 
    
+ - + - 
 
 
 
From a theoretical angle, that is enough to decide issue (α) above, namely proving that 
the 2D Cartesian Coordinate System is based on the positive I-corner (i.c. or), on which 
the non-pivotal hubs (here the E-corner operator nor; for and, see § 4.4.5.1) are based.  
But another theoretical argument emerged: there is a difference in epistemological status 
between the operators. Operators of type A and E are general (universal in APC) while 
only I-corner pivots are used in propositions that provide particular empirical 
knowledge.  
 
Empirical evidence compiled in chapters 4 and 5 confirmed the theoretical analysis, 
including the relief pattern in logical triads by which the I-corner stands out.  The search 
for confirmation for the meaning of pivots as developed in the decomposition analysis 
led to linguistic evidence that indefinites and singulars are in the class of pivots too. On 
the basis of a comparison of the features of the indefinite article and the pivotal predicate 
operator any, it was found that the pivotal I-corner is not only more basic than the rest, 
but also more malleable: I-corner operators can get different contextually enriched 
interpretations.  Being more basic was consequently identified as being intensionally less 
specified as a lexical item. This rendered conclusive support to our cognitive restyling of 
Peirce’s decomposition. It proved that the two universals incorporate the meaning of the 
less highly specified pivot, which is the positive origin of the calculus. 
 
7.1.3 Non-lexicalization of the O-corner: why neither *nall nor *nand? 
 
In this section, the final question will be addressed: why is it impossible to have lexical 
items such as *nand and *nall in natural language?  So far, all we have is a plausibility 
argument: if the 2D Cartesian Coordinate System has the I-corner as origin and there is 
no fourth hub, it is not unexpected that lexicalization of Boethius’ O-corner is 
problematic. However indicative, this does not of course decide the issue.   
 
7.1.3.1 The problem 
 
Our account will take the analysis for all as its starting point and determine why 
application of negation to all cannot result in morphologically complex single word 
lexicalization *nall. 
 
 
 
S4 S3 S2 
S1 
P Q 
S4 S3 S2 
S1 
P Q 
[or] 
P P Q Q 
S1 S1 
S3 S3 S4 S4 S2 S2 
[n[or]] 
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(363) ALL = 
“(i) Flagx is Green orincl Flagy is Green, i.e. at least one of Fx or Fy is G 
(iii) ET  
(ii) neither [Flagx is not Green] nor [Flag y is not Green], i.e. there isn’t any 
Flagx or Flag y that is not Green: no Fx or Fy is not G.   
 
 
 
In view of this decomposition structure of all and the nature of the operation NON as 
developed so far, there is at first sight no problem whatsoever to change the lexical item 
all (at stage 3) into stage 4. nall by application of NON, witness NEC-flowchart (364). 
Application of NON (= 1-…) to stage 3. constitutes a switch from all to its complement 
set.  But if this switch is so easily obtained, why then is the corresponding label *nall not 
attested? 
 
(364)   Stages:  1. (1-( FxG+FyG)) 
2. (1-(1-( FxG+FyG)) [+ (1-( FxG+FyG)))] 
3. (i) (1-(1-( FxG+FyG))) [+ (1-(1-( FxG+FyG))))]  (ii) (1-(1- FxG) + (1-
FyG)) 
4. 1- stage3 
  
 0. 
SIT 
= 1 
1. 
 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
4. 
1- stage3 
FxG FyG 
cell 
structure 
of the 
universe value value value value value 
1 1 S4 1? 0 1 1 0 
1 0 S3 1? 0 1 0 1 
0 1 S2 1? 0 1 0 1 
0 0 S1 1? 1? 0 0 1 
 
      /SOME/   /ALL/ [all] [*n[all]] 
 
Mere technical application of the 1-…-device apparently cannot prevent the generation 
of *nall. But there is an element of the analysis provided in chapter 4 whose effects have 
not yet been fully acknowledged in the presentation so far, namely the (F-class) non-
emptiness presupposition that is carried by the universal quantifier  (Strawson 1952: 
174-176; Seuren 2002: 31). It is this property which will be shown to cause the 
impossibility of *nall. To reach that end-result, the following steps will be taken. First, 
the nature of a presupposition will be briefly described (§ 7.1.3.2). The next sections are 
devoted to the effect of negation on a presupposition (§ 7.1.3.3) and the way in which 
stage 3. 
 
 
 
FxG  FyG    FxG  FyG 
 
(i) (ii) 
(iii) 
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presuppositions can be represented by means of valuation spaces (§ 7.1.3.4). It is at that 
point that the question Why no nall? can be answered and the conclusion can be 
transferred to *nand (§ 7.1.3.5). A few final arguments in favour of a presupposition 
approach (§ 7.1.3.6 and 6 7.1.3.7) will wrap up the discussion. 
 
7.1.3.2 Presuppositions 
 
(365) a.   All flags are green   
 PRESUPPOSES  the set of flags is non-empty,  i.c. there exist flags 
b.   All gnomes are fictitious   
 PRESUPPOSES the set of gnomes is non-empty 
 
The effect of a presupposition is to make its carrier sentence (i.c. all flags are green and 
all gnomes are fictitious) ill-suited for use in any context in which the presupposition 
does not already hold. Since green is normally an extensional G-predicate – it has 
existing entities in its extension set –, the non-emptiness presupposition amounts to a 
presupposition of existence and makes all flags are green ill-suited for use in a context 
where the set of flags is empty (cf. Seuren 2002: 34).  Fictitious, for its part, is an 
intensional G-predicate, i.e. a predicate with no existing entities in its extension set. 
Consequently, no strengthening from a bare set-theoretical nonemptiness presupposition 
to an ontological claim is warranted. But the purely set-theoretical non-emptiness 
presupposition itself stands nonetheless: the thought-up set of nonentities described by 
gnomes is presupposed to be non-empty. The assertive content which is added is that not 
a single element of the non-empty set described by gnomes is outside the set described 
by the adjective fictitious, again a set that contains no existing entities, but only virtual, 
intensional elements.  In sum, no existing entities are involved at all in the two sets that 
are related in this sentence, yet set theory and the set-theoretical non-emptiness 
presupposition operate as usual. 
 
7.1.3.3 The Effect of Negation 
 
Since our interest is in the impossibility to derive *nall from all by negation, we need to 
be in the know about the effect of negation on presuppositions.  
 
In some cases, sentential negation with emphasis on not can cancel the presupposition: 
 
(366) All flags are NOT green, there ARE no flags. 
 
In most cases, however, no such cancelling can occur (Seuren 1985: 260-266), a point of 
immediate relevance for our concerns. Let us look at sentences with an intensional F-
predicate gnomes and an extensional G-predicate be married.  The latter imposes a 
presupposition of existence on the F-class167. But since the former is purely intensional 
or virtual, the conflicting requirements cause an intensional-extensional clash.  For this 
reason, sentences like those in (367) are the clearest cases to show where presupposition-
cancelling can and cannot occur.  
                                                          
167 Cf. Seuren’s (2002: 34) remark that it is not quantifiers which have existential import, but that 
the latter is derived “from the extensional character of extensional predicates”. 
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(367) a. All gnomes are NOT married, there are no gnomes! (True)  
PRESUPPOSITION CANCELLED  
 b. All gnomes are unmarried (Spurious/radically false)  
   PRESUPPOSES  the set of gnomes is non-empty 
     i.c. there exist gnomes 
 
Only sentential negation with emphatic tone (367) a. is presupposition-cancelling.  When 
the negative is a bound morpheme, as in (367)b, the F-class non-emptiness 
presupposition survives. In the present case, it is a presupposition of existence due to the 
extensional nature of the G-predicate. There being no gnomes in this world the 
presupposition does not correspond with reality and hence, the sentence in question is 
spurious (or radically false). 
The case that is crucial for *nall, is (367)b.: n- is a bound morpheme (as is un-), and 
those cannot cancel the non-emptiness presupposition. This means that in *nall, the 
presupposition of non-emptiness associated with all remains active. It is this fact which 
will turn out to be the source of the impossibility of *nall. But how precisely?  To 
answer that question, we first set up a valuation space representation for presupposition.   
 
7.1.3.4 Presuppositions and valuation spaces 
 
Consider the following joke: 
 
(368)  
“A hippie walks down the street; friendly person remarks: 
- Young man, you’ve lost a shoe. 
- Oh no, I’ve found one.” (Gullberg 1997: 219) 
 
This joke illustrates that the friendly man’s use of lose came with a hidden 
presupposition: namely that the man had the shoe before.   
 
(369) Q: The hippie lost a shoe        PRESUPPOSES  P: The hippie had that shoe 
 
In other words, proper use of the carrier sentence Q is confined to a context which is 
already restricted by the information embodied in the presupposition P which is part of 
the lexical meaning of the predicate lose.  In valuation space terms, what the above 
means is that the domain for demarcation of the set /Q/ - i.e. the set of possible situations 
in which Q is true – is not the complete universe of possible situations SIT, but its proper 
subset /P/, even though P is never explicitly asserted, but rather contained as a 
presupposition in the lexical item lose.  Such domain restriction to a narrower section of 
the universe SIT is what the presupposition brings about, a point which has been made in 
discourse terms by several people (Gazdar 1979; Heim 1982; Seuren 1985, 2000).  
 
7.1.3.5 Neither *nand nor *nall 
 
Transferring this hypothesis to sentences with all, we are driven to the following picture: 
the nature of the non-emptiness presupposition is such that it confines the interpretation 
of all to a subset of the full universe SIT. Concretely, the presuppositional part (i) of 
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(363) has the effect or restricting the universe SIT to the domain S2-S4, so that the 
further demarcation of the assertion part (ii) of the meaning of all occurs within that 
domain, rather than within the whole universe SIT (S1-S4). In other words, any NEC-
operations beyond stage 2. occur within the subset S2-S4 of the universe SIT and cannot 
involve S1 anymore.  
 
(370) Stages:  1. (1-( FxG+FyG)) 
2. (1-(1-( FxG+FyG)) [+ (1-( FxG+FyG)))] 
3. (i) (1-(1-( FxG+FyG))) [+ (1-(1-( FxG+FyG))))]  (ii) (1-(1- FxG) + (1-
FyG)) 
4. 1- stage3 
  
 0. 
SIT 
= 1 
1. 
 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
4. 
1- stage3 
FxG FyG 
cell 
structure 
of the 
universe value value value value value 
1 1 S4 1? 0 1 1 0 
1 0 S3 1? 0 1 0 1 
0 1 S2 1? 0 1 0 1 
0 0 S1 1? 1? 0  * 
 
      /SOME/   /ALL/ [all] [*n[all]] 
 
Now, if the domain for stages 3. and 4. is indeed restricted to S2-S4 because cell S1 is 
excluded by presupposition and hence no longer available, then further application of 
negation to stage 3. can never result in selection of S1-S3 anymore, i.e. the intended 
meaning content of *nall. In sum, due to the domain restriction contributed by the 
presuppositional part (i) to the meaning of all, the S1-S3 meaning of *nall does not 
represent an accessible meaning in natural language. 
 
Recall that in Russell’s Modern Predicate Calculus, all is taken not to have existential 
import and hence does not incorporate a Strawsonian non-emptiness presupposition.  If 
that were correct, not only would the sentences of (367)b.-d. all have to be judged true, 
counter to natural language intuitions, but it would also be a mystery anew why *nall 
(with the meaning S1-S3) is impossible.  This indicates that Russell’s hypothesis is 
foreign to IN-logic and natural language.   
 
But the account is not fully satisfying yet.  Why cannot *nall be used in a 
presupposition-preserving way to express the meaning S2-S3?  Here the answer is lexical 
blocking: the relevant meaning is identical to that of (exclusive) some, which – being a 
pivot (in an appropriate exclusive context) – is a stage 2. item and hence less complex 
than stage 4. *nall in our bar-notational system. Consequently, the latter is blocked.   
 
Note that a phrasal version of the meaning S2-S3 is available in the form not all. To 
explain this, there are two possible avenues. One might attribute the grammaticality of 
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not all to it being phrasal, so that lexical blocking cannot exclude it.  One could then 
claim that not all is a functionally useful addition to some when large quantities are 
involved: it covers the large quantities approaching all, leaving the smaller quantities to 
some.  But there are some data from Horn (1989) which indicate that another explanation 
is more accurate.  
 
(371)  a. All that glisters is not gold. 
b. Not all that glisters is gold 
c. Tout ce qui reluit n’est pas or. 
d. *Pas tout ce qui reluit est or 
 
Not only is English (382) b synonymous with (382)a, the French equivalent  of the term 
negation is ungrammatical (Horn 1989). This indicates to me that the not in (382)b. is a 
case of sentential negation which shows itself via negative copying on the term, rather 
than actual term negation. If so, the French facts are more revealing and direct negation 
of the universal term is impossible throughout. English not all merely looks like term 
negation.  Support for this conception comes from the corresponding phrase in the 
proposition calculus: *not and, which is ungrammatical. Not accidentally, I think, the 
sentential negation escape route is not available for this phrase (and is not a term in a 
proposition).  In sum, the claim that direct negation of an entailer lexical item is 
impossible throughout is probably correct. 
 
Let us now turn from all to and. Since the first part (i) of the meaning of all was 
identified as the presuppositional non-emptiness condition in the predicate calculus, the 
corresponding part (i) of the meaning of and is bound to represent the corresponding 
non-emptiness presupposition contributed to AND(P,Q) by OR(P,Q) in the realm of the 
propositional calculus.   
 
In the present case, this means that the demarcation of the meaning of part (ii) of 
AND(P,Q) occurs within the restricted domain S2-S4 that is contributed by the 
presuppositional part (i) (= OR(P,Q)) and hence not within the whole universe SIT (S1-
S4).   
 
(372) natural language and; no natural language *nand 
 
Stages:  1. (1-(P+Q)) 
2. (1-(1-(P+Q)) [+ (1-(P+Q)))] 
3. (i) (1-(1-(P+Q))) [+ (1-(1-(P+Q))))]  (ii) (1-(1-P) + (1-Q)) 
4. 1- stage3 
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 0. 
SIT 
= 1 
1. 
 
 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
4. 
 
P 
 
Q 
 
cell 
structure 
of the 
universe 
Value value value   
1 1 S4 1? 0 1 1 0 
1 0 S3 1? 0 1 0 1 
0 1 S2 1? 0 1 0 1 
0 0 S1 1? 1? 0  * 
 
     /OR (P,Q)/   /AND (P,Q)/ [and]     [*nand] 
 
Once again, the domain for stages 3. and 4. is restricted to S2-S4 and hence cell S1 is no 
longer available. Consequently, further application of negation to stage 3. can never 
result in selection of S1-S3 anymore, i.e. of the meaning of *nand. In sum, due to the 
domain restriction contributed by OR(P,Q) to the meaning of AND(P,Q), the intended 
meaning S1-S3 of *nand does not represent an accessible meaning in natural language.   
 
Note that if Russell’s analysis of Modern Predicate Calculus entailer all is transferred to 
and, and hence strips it of its presuppositional part (i), then  nand is perfectly accessible 
(like nall was). It then has precisely the S1-S3 meaning so useful in a number of 
scientific contexts (e.g., nand-gates). This is yet another indication that the Russellian 
solution is an EX-logical one, with great value for science and engineering, but – if our 
analysis is correct – inaccurate as an analysis of entailers in natural language.  Natural 
language words and scientific terms are different categories. 
 
(373) science terminology: and and nand 
  
Stages:  1. (1-(P+Q)) 
2. (1-(1-(P+Q)) [+ (1-(P+Q)))] 
3. (i) (1-(1-(P+Q))) [+ (1-(1-(P+Q))))]  (ii) (1-(1-P) + (1-Q)) 
4. 1- stage3 
 0. 
SIT 
= 1 
1. 
 
 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
4. 
 
P 
 
Q 
 
cell 
structure 
of the 
universe 
Value value value   
1 1 S4 1? 0 1 1 0 
1 0 S3 1? 0 1 0 1 
0 1 S2 1? 0 1 0 1 
0 0 S1 1? 1? 0 0 1 
 
     /OR (P,Q)/ [and]       [nand] 
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On the whole, the Strawsonian  approach in terms of a non-emptiness presupposition for 
all – and by extension for and – is not only empirically more satisfying for natural 
language, but it also predicts that S1-S3 meanings can not be naturally acquired as 
lexical items, but only crafted artificially for scientific purposes. They are EX-logical 
constructs rather than part of natural IN-logic. 
 
7.1.3.6 A Final Argument 
 
There is an additional argument that a presupposition approach to the internal semantics 
of entailers is on the right track. When the notion ET was introduced in chapter 4, it was 
argued that it cannot be directly applied to the universe SIT to yield and (4.4.5.1).  It is 
however crucially needed at stage 3. as part (ii) of the formula for and. Our account why 
ET cannot be applied at the initial stage was based on the assumption that exclusion (1?-
…) can only apply successfully to an initial cell if there is something that can be 
excluded. (This is in line with the general observation that negatives needs something 
positive to apply to). I adopted this hypothesis and applied NEC and ET respectively to 
the initial values for P and Q. The NEC sequence (194) came out fine, since S2-S4 all 
have at least one positively specified (boldface) item P or Q, so that 1? – 1 yielded 0 as 
required.   
 
(374) 
  
universe 0. 
SIT 
= 1 
1. 
(1-(P+Q)) 
 
 
P 
 
Q 
 
cell 
structure 
of the 
universe 
value Value 
1 1 S4 1? (1? – 1 =) 0 
1 0 S3 1? (1? – 1 =) 0 
0 1 S2 1? (1? – 1 =) 0 
0 0 S1 1? (1? – 0 =) 1? 
 
But sequence (193) failed, because there is no positively valued P or Q in S1 for 
subtraction to yield 1?-1=0, which is however needed for successful application of ET. 
Indeed, the latter requires that S1 end up with a zero value, given the formula (1-((1-
P)+(1-Q)). In sum, under this conception application of ET to the initial stage is 
impossible because S1 fails to be excluded. 
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(375)  
 
universe 0. 
SIT 
= 1 
1. 
*(1-((1-P)+(1-Q)) 
 
 
P 
 
Q 
 
cell 
structure 
of the 
universe 
Value Value 
1 1 S4 1? 1? 
1 0 S3 1? (1? – 1 =) 0 
0 1 S2 1? (1? – 1 =) 0 
0 0 S1 1? *(1? – 0 =) 1? 
 
Now note that if the Strawsonian hypothesis about the restriction of the universe at stage 
3 to the presuppositional part S2-S4 is correct, ET can suddenly apply unproblematically 
at that stage, since the recalcitrant cell S1of sequence (193) is no longer part of the 
computation at stage 3. Hence all cells with a zero value for P or Q, namely S2 and S3, 
can now be excluded (as required by the formula (1-((1-P)+(1-Q))) because the other 
value of S2 and S3 is always 1 so that subtraction (1? – 1 =) 0 takes place. 
 
In sum, the arguments in favour of universe restriction by presupposition are solid, as is 
their desirable effect that they exclude *nall and *nand.  This conclusion is most 
welcome, since the pattern behind the *nall and *nand problem is very general. Recall 
the predicate table from § 6.4.2.  It is easy to think of a predicate such as the S2-S4 
predicate table and of an S1-predicate for its complement: non-table. Yet, it is hard and 
unnatural work to conceive of a S1-S3-predicate, say *ntable, that unites every singular 
table and anything that fits the predicate non-table in a single set as opposed to all 
pluralities of tables.  The latter would be the nominal counterpart of *nand and *nall, 
and it is clearly felt to be as unnatural as the latter. In other words, the solution to the 
nand-puzzle is more widely useful than for logical operators alone.  
 
(376)             
        tx    ty  tableincl (│≥ 1│)     
    
table-s (=│≥ 2│)         1     1 (s4) 
        1      0 (s3) tableexcl  (= ‘precisely 1’) 
        0      1 (s2) 
¬table         0       0 (s1) 
 
7.2 The negative logic of natural language  
 
The shift of perspective in this study from a purely mathematico-logical to a cognitive 
logical approach has had some consequences for our implementation of Peirce’s 
derivation of all propositional operators from joint falsehood. For expository purposes 
and transparency, a more manageable bar-notation representation was introduced.  While 
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easier to work with, the resulting bar-codes still looked far less “user-friendly” than the 
simple separate words that are the existing manifestations of the lexical meanings at the 
linguistic surface.  But that was no great cause for concern: from a minimalist 
perspective, mental underground computation works with an algorithm with as few 
primitives as possible. This keeps the algorithm optimally small and economical, which 
is the kind of simplicity that is important in a computational system (cp. the underlying 
binarity of computation in a computer). But we do not of course converse in straight 
universal mentalese.  One of the roles of the lexicon in natural language was argued to 
make the repetitive underlying elaborateness (i.c. of the bar-codes) of the lexical 
semantic structures expressible at the linguistic surface. Thus, lexicalisation in the sense 
of matching a complex underlying semantic configuration with a single designated 
surface label (PF-features) was claimed to make the underlying meanings expressible in 
a more language-particular format. Luckily, such encapsulation of information 
occasionally leaves traces. Compact lexicalisation does not always completely erase 
underlying semantic compositionality – the case of bimorphemic n-or was mentioned 
several times.   
     At the underlying computational level, the postulated interrelatedness of the universal 
bar-codes for the different operators achieved an important result: it accounted for the 
intuition that operators are semantically cognate elements united in a single paradigm.  It 
also predicted that conjunction, disjunction, joint falsehood have a robust core meaning 
across languages, whatever variation may be latched on to the basic meanings in 
particular languages. 
     The solid patterns which were found were argued to be located in a realm of grammar 
below the lexical level. This level is below awareness in normal language use and hence 
closed to conscious interference in such contexts.  It was argued that logical rules have 
their ultimate home in that realm and that logical primitives and operations are hard and 
fast and inviolable at that level. This provided an answer to a paradox that has haunted 
attempts to make logic natural and internalist since Kant raised it: if logic is an aspect of 
human psychology, so the problem went, one would not expect the rules to be violable at 
all.  Our answer was that they actually are not at the underground level of natural 
concepts. In the realms of morphology, syntax and discourse rules, however, they are 
violable because their application involves conscious choice. Still, such violations are 
experienced as transgressions of a rule, which confirms the existence of the stable logical 
substrate in the Language of Thought. 
     Throughout the study, emphasis was put on the nature of cognitively realistic set 
demarcation.  This line of thought confirmed the core idea that the procedure employed 
had to be of a negative nature, as is expressed in the subtractive exclusion of cells from a 
Venn-diagram.  Part of the set-theoretic excursion was the insight that in order to be able 
to generate sets from a single operator, the latter has to be binary, i.e. to involve twin 
selection, disjunctive and negative. These features of set-demarcation and logical 
operations more generally accounted for the binary nature of most operators and had no 
problem explaining the unary nature of negation at the linguistic surface either.  In light 
of all the above, the conclusion to which I am led is that standard logical operators are 
regular lexical items and that the natural logic of language is negative.  
 
hie sî der reden ein ende 
“Let this be the end of the story” 
Hendrik van Veldeke, Eneide,12th century, Spalbeek. 
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Samenvatting in het Nederlands 
 
Dit proefschrift beoogt een beschrijving te bieden van de lexicaal-semantische 
eigenschappen van de Engelse woorden and, or, nor en hun Nederlandse equivalenten 
en, of, noch, alsook van all, some/any, none en alle, enkele, geen. In de geschiedenis van 
de logica en vervolgens ook in de formele semantiek werd aan deze woorden, de 
standaardoperatoren van de propositie- en de predikatencalculus, vaak een speciale status 
toegekend. Daardoor verschilden ze wezenlijk van andere woorden en werden op een 
aparte manier (syncategorematisch) geïntroduceerd. Het theoretische uitgangspunt van 
onze studie is dat het lexicale elementen betreft die eigenlijk net zo benaderd moeten 
worden als de rest van het talige lexicon.  
 
Het empirische startpunt van het onderzoek is de vaststelling in hoofdstuk een dat er een 
gat zit in de lexicaliseringsmogelijkheden van dit type logische operatoren in natuurlijke 
taal. In wellicht alle talen ter wereld bestaan er woorden voor de universeel-affirmatieve 
en de particulier-affirmatieve kwantoren, in het Nederlands resp. alle en enkele.  
Woorden voor universeel-negatieve kwantoren, zoals geen in het Nederlands, zijn 
zeldzamer dan de affirmatieve vormen, maar komen niettemin in een minderheid van 
talen voor. Er is echter nog geen enkele taal gesignaleerd waarin een particulier-
negatieve kwantor met één enkel woord wordt gelexicaliseerd. Een vorm als *nalle met 
de betekenis “niet alle”, bijvoorbeeld, kan weliswaar kunstmatig worden aangemaakt als 
een soort gelegenheidswoord, maar in natuurlijk verworven woordenschat wordt het met 
de bedoelde betekenis nooit aangetroffen.  
 
Dat hier een systematisch gat in het geding is, kan voor het Engels geïllustreerd worden 
door de bovenvermelde reeks all, some/any, none uit de aristotelische predikatencalculus 
(APC) te vergelijken met de overeenstemmende hoeveelheidwoorden in een domein met 
slechts twee elementen (APC2) en vervolgens met corresponderende operatoren uit de 
propositiecalculus. Als alle vlaggen zijn groen (all flags are green) waar is, maar het 
domein vlaggen F blijft expliciet beperkt tot twee vlaggen, dan zeggen we: beide vlaggen 
zijn groen (both flags are green). En als beide vlaggen (vlag1 en vlag2) zijn groen waar 
is, kunnen we ook zeggen: vlag1 is groen en vlag2 is groen (flag1 is green and flag2 is 
green). Dezelfde redeneertrant kan worden toegepast op de particulier-affirmatieve 
kwantoren (zij het in een negatieve context168): als I do not think that any flag is green 
waar is en het domein F bestaat uit twee elementen, dan zeggen we I do not think that 
either flag is green en daarmee stemt in de propositiecalculus I do not think that flag1 is 
green or flag2 is green overeen. Gelijkaardige beschouwingen voor de universeel-
negatieve en particulier-negatieve kwantoren leveren het volgende patroon van 
correspondenties op.  
 
(377)  
 logische types APC APC2 PROPC 
a. universeel affirmatief all both and 
                                                          
168 De negatieve context is nodig omdat either, net als any,  beperkt is in zijn 
gebruiksmogelijkheden en niet zomaar in alle contexten kan worden ingevoegd. 
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b. particulier affirmatief some/any either or 
c. universeel negatief no neither nor 
d. particulier negatief  *nall *nboth *nand 
 
De vier logische types a.-d. berusten op kruising van twee basisopposities: een 
kwantitatieve oppositie (universeel–particulier) en een kwalitatieve oppositie 
(affirmatief-negatief). De vormen in (377) d. zijn echter onmiskenbaar en systematisch 
artificieel: ofwel bestaan ze helemaal niet, ofwel alleen in een heel gespecialiseerde 
wetenschappelijke context.  Wat dit laatste betreft: de term nand komt inderdaad voor in 
de elektrotechniek voor de beschrijving van digitale logische schakelingen. Het bestaan 
van die wetenschappelijke term zet het beginraadsel over het lexicale gat in natuurlijke 
taal evenwel niet op de helling. Wetenschappelijke termen worden immers niet op 
dezelfde natuurlijke wijze verworven als alledaagse taal, maar “artificieel” – je moet 
ervoor naar school of op zijn minst een doelgericht, bewust leerproces doorlopen. Ze 
behoren dan ook niet tot wat Chomsky “natural language” of I-taal noemt, een relatief 
stabiele toestand – de zogenaamde “steady state” – van de moedertaalkennis in de 
individuele menselijke geest (= intern, intensioneel, individueel), maar veeleer tot wat hij 
E-taal noemt, die als extern, extensioneel en sociaal wordt gedefinieerd169.  Vermits het 
doel van dit taalkundige proefschrift de begrenzing is van lexicalisering in natuurlijke 
IN-taal, betekent de doorbreking van die grenzen in artificiële EX-taal helemaal niet dat 
het oorspronkelijke raadsel vervalt. Integendeel, de internalistische aard ervan is nu nog 
preciezer omschreven. En de precisering onderstreept tevens de hier voorgestane 
individueel-psychologische, mentalistische benadering van de logische intuïtie die in 
natuurlijke taal wordt uitgedrukt (cf. Macnamara 1986, Seuren 1998, Ludlow (in prep.)).  
Die “IN-logische” benadering is niet nieuw: ze stemt grotendeels overeen met de 
opvattingen van George Boole in The Laws of Thought (1854).  Hij toont zich in dat 
boek met zijn expliciet mentalistische titel een cognitiewetenschapper avant la lettre (cf. 
Grattan-Guinness 1982 en Devlin 1997), zonder echter te vervallen in het door Frege en 
Husserl zo gelaakte psychologisme (Richards 1980: 30).  
 
Het vastgestelde lexicale gat springt nog het meest in het oog wanneer de aristotelische 
logische relaties tussen zinstypes geometrisch worden weergegeven in het bekende 
Oppositievierkant van Boëthius (480-524).  De hoekpunten aan de affirmatieve kant 
kregen bij Boëthius de labels A (universeel) en I (particulier) mee van AffIrmo, de 
negatieve hoeken de labels E (universeel) en O (particulier) van nEgO.  De vier zijden 
en de twee diagonalen leveren samen zes relaties op, maar slechts vier soorten oppositie, 
resp. contradictoir (= CD: P en Q kunnen noch gelijktijdig waar, noch gelijktijdig 
onwaar zijn), subalternantie/entailment170 (= ├: als P waar is, is Q noodzakelijk ook 
                                                          
169 In wat volgt worden de afkortingen IN-taal en EX-taal gebruikt voor dit Chomskiaanse contrast 
omdat de labels I en E al voor een ander, historisch veel ouder contrast vereist zijn. 
170 Er is sprake van entailment (= logische gevolgtrekking) wanneer men de verhouding bekijkt 
vanuit de universele zin P en stelt dat de particuliere zin Q een logisch gevolg is van P. De term 
subaltern wordt gebruikt als men de relatie bekijkt vanuit Q en stelt dat die particuliere zin de 
“ondergeschikte andere” (“sub-altern”) is t.o.v. de universele zin P.  De relatie tussen de twee 
zinnen is evenwel in beide gevallen dezelfde. 
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waar), contrair (= CR: P en Q kunnen niet gelijk waar zijn, maar wel gelijk onwaar) en 
subcontrair (= SCR: P en Q kunnen niet gelijk onwaar zijn, wel gelijk waar).  
 
(378)           A:ALL171        5.CR         E:NO(NE) 
  
 
           
 
        
 
               I:SOME       6. SCR     O: NOT ALL  (*nall) 
 
In hoofdstuk twee wordt bewezen dat als de in (378) vetgedrukte CD-relatie tussen I en 
E en de entailment van A naar I als enige basisrelaties worden beschouwd de rest van het 
vierkant helemaal kan worden afgeleid en op aristoteliaanse wijze kan worden 
gedefinieerd in termen van onmiddellijke gevolgtrekking (├; = entailment (ENT)). Dit 
betekent dat de O-hoek, de hoek van het lexicaliseringsgat, alleszins geïsoleerd kan 
worden en dat het meest economische IN-logische systeem niet het uitzicht heeft van een 
vierkant, maar van een tweedimensionaal cartesiaans assenstelsel, hier met de I-hoek 
SOME als “oorsprong” en logische “spil” (pivot). De dubbele taak voor de overige 
hoofdstukken van het proefschrift bestaat erin de aard van de assen te beschrijven 
(hoofdstuk drie) en de uitzonderingspositie van de I-hoek zowel theoretisch te 
verankeren (hoofdstuk vier) als empirisch verder te onderbouwen (hoofdstukken vijf en 
zes). De theoretische verankering van I als spil is broodnodig, want een 
tweedimensionaal systeem dat op CD en ENT draait, zou in principe immers ook 
opgezet kunnen worden met de O-hoek als oorsprong en de relaties 3.CD en 4.├ in (378) 
als assen.  
 
In hoofdstuk drie worden de twee gepostuleerde basisrelaties CD en ENT diepgaand 
bestudeerd, niet alleen vanuit een logisch perspectief, maar ook vanuit een 
verzamelingtheoretisch en een booleaans algebraïsch oogpunt. Dit gebeurt in de eerste 
plaats om na te gaan of een variant van deze relaties gedefinieerd kan worden op het 
lexicale vlak om aldus de relaties tussen lexicale items als all, some en none of and, or 
en nor rechtstreeks in het lexicon te kunnen beschrijven en niet via de omweg van 
volledige proposities. Die strategie biedt tevens een eerste inkijk in de semantische 
binnenbouw van die lexicale items. Het verzamelingtheoretisch perspectief levert 
namelijk het basisinzicht op dat het afbakenen van een verzameling altijd vertrekt vanuit 
een domein of universum van mogelijke leden en dus noodzakelijk een negatief 
exclusiegebeuren is. Daarbij wordt het universum (in algebraïsche termen: 1) afgeslankt 
tot het uiteindelijke aantal effectieve leden door uitschakeling van een aantal 
oorspronkelijke kandidaat-leden. Dit is de kernreden waarom een negatieve aanpak de 
meest aangewezen werkwijze is om de lexicale betekenis van standaardoperatoren en 
hun onderlinge relaties te ontleden.  
                                                          
171 All F is G wordt verkort weergegeven als ALL; Some F is G als SOME; No F is G als NO; Not 
all F is G als NOT ALL. 
1.CD 
4.├ onmiddellijk gevolg 
(subaltern negatief) 
3.CD 
2. onmiddellijk gevolg├  
(subaltern affirmatief) 
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De verzamelingtheoretische en algebraïsche kijk worden daarnaast ook gehanteerd om 
na te gaan hoe geschikt de twee gepostuleerde basisrelaties zijn als fundamenten van de 
natuurlijke IN-logica. Vooral voor de relatie entailment leidt dit tot een verfijning in de 
vorm van een bijkomende informativiteitsconditie. Die heeft als gevolg dat onnatuurlijke 
entailments (ex necessarie falso sequitur quodlibet, verum sequitur ad quodlibet en 
entailment tussen twee identieke proposities) passend als EX-logisch kunnen worden 
gebrandmerkt en aldus buiten de stringentere logica van de natuurlijke taal belanden. 
 
In hoofdstuk vier wordt de lexicale decompositie uitgewerkt vanuit een binaire visie op 
de afbakening van verzamelingen en de Peirceaanse “joint falsehood” operator NOR (= 
↓). Die laatste is een binaire operator waarvan de betekenis de versmelting (merger) is 
van externe negatie en disjunctie  ¬∨. Met behulp van dit instrument en de wetten van de 
tautologie (P  ≡ P∨P)172, dubbele negatie (P  ≡ ¬¬P) en De Morgan (P∧Q ≡ ¬(¬P∨¬Q))) 
bewees Peirce dat  één primitieve operator  volstaat voor de klassieke propositielogica, 
een inzicht dat we willen benutten. 
 
(379) 
  
 Gebruikte middelen Stappen in de conversie 
a. NOR    
Merger 
¬(P∨Q) 
P ↓ Q 
b. NOT  
Tautologie 
Merger 
¬P  
¬(P∨P) 
P ↓ P 
c. OR  
Dubbele Negatie 
Merger 
Tautologie 
Merger 
P∨Q 
¬¬(P∨Q) 
¬ (P ↓ Q) 
¬ ((P ↓ Q) ∨ (P ↓ Q)) 
(P ↓ Q) ↓ (P ↓ Q) 
d. AND  
De Morgan’s Law 
Merger 
Tautologie (tweemaal) 
Merger 
P∧Q 
¬(¬P∨¬Q)) 
¬P ↓ ¬Q 
¬ (P∨P) ↓ ¬ (Q∨Q) 
(P ↓ P) ↓ (Q ↓ Q) 
e. NAND  
De Morgan 
Merger 
¬( P∧Q) 
¬(¬(¬P∨¬Q))) 
¬(¬P ↓ ¬Q) 
                                                          
172 ≡ = equivalentie 
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Tautologie 
Merger 
Tautologie ( viermaal) 
Merger (viermaal) 
¬(¬P ↓ ¬Q) ∨ (¬P ↓ ¬Q) 
(¬P ↓ ¬Q) ↓ (¬P ↓ ¬Q) 
(¬(P∨P) ↓ ¬(Q∨Q)) ↓ (¬(P∨P) ↓ ¬(Q∨Q)) 
((P ↓ P) ↓ (Q ↓ Q)) ↓ ((P ↓ P) ↓ (Q ↓ Q)) 
 
In een aantal opzichten moet de Peirceaanse analyse aangepast worden om dienst te 
kunnen doen voor de logica van natuurlijke taal. Een eerste belangrijke inhoudelijke 
aanpassing bestaat erin dat de basisoperator niet opgevat wordt als een reeds 
gelexicaliseerde woordvorm, maar als een prelexicale cognitieve operator waarvan de 
activiteit zich situeert op het niveau van de conceptuele structuur. Het is om de abstracte, 
universele aard van deze onderliggende operator weer te geven dat de onderstreepte 
Latijnse naam NEC wordt gebruikt in het proefschrift. Met deze aanpassing en een 
vereenvoudigende streepjescode zien de structuur van NEC en het ermee opgebouwde 
OR eruit als volgt:  
 
(380)  
 Peirce’s 
notatiesysteem 
Streepjes- 
code 
 
a. NEC  
 
P ↓ Q 
 
 
P   Q 
 
b. OR 
 
(P ↓ Q) ↓ (P ↓ Q) 
 
 
 P   Q     P   Q 
 
Er worden argumenten aangevoerd voor de stelling dat een hiërarchie van minstens twee 
toepassingen van NEC vereist is om een eerste uitdrukbare lexicale operator te 
verkrijgen, waardoor de I-hoekoperator or, met de semantische structuur OR van (380)b. 
er als meest elementaire lexicale operator uitkomt. De formule voor de lexicale operator 
n-or moet wegens de niet-lexicaliseerbaarheid van NEC  complexer zijn dan de 
Peirceaanse in  (379)a. en ook complexer als die van or, hetgeen trouwens blijkt uit de 
zichtbare morfologische structuur van het woord. Ook voor de lexicale operator and 
worden argumenten verschaft die leiden tot de conclusie dat zijn conceptuele structuur 
complexer is dan die van or. Meer bepaald wordt betoogd dat de betekenis OR als 
presuppositie aanwezig is in die van and. Vervolgens wordt die asymmetrieanalyse 
verruimd van de lexicale operatoren van de propositionele calculus naar de 
predikatenlogica, hetgeen noopt tot een behandeling van het probleem van de existentiële 
import. Op deze wijze wordt de meer elementaire status van operatoren in de I-hoek ten 
opzichte van die in de A- en de E-hoek theoretisch verankerd. 
 
In hoofdstuk vijf wordt de spilstatus van operatoren in de I-hoek geïllustreerd aan de 
hand van twee asymmetrische processen van betekenisverschuiving, die respectievelijk 
I→A-shift en I→E-shift worden genoemd.  Zo heeft de I-hoekoperator any een 
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existentiële I-lezing in (381)a., maar een quasi-universele A-lezing in (381)b. De 
temporele I-hoekoperator jamais (“ooit”) in (381)c., van zijn kant, heeft in de loop van 
de tijd een E-hoekvariant met de betekenis “nooit” gekregen. 
 
(381) a. I:   If you see anybody, give me a ring (existentieel) 
 b. ≈A:  Any man can do that (quasi-universeel: ≈ Every man can do that) 
 c. I : Si JAMAIS vous changez d’avis (existentieel) 
“als je ooit van idee verandert” 
d. E:  Vous avez toujours été orateur, JAMAIS philosophe (universeel 
negatief) 
(Fén., Dial., 33 ; quoted from : Grevisse 1980: 1053) 
  “Je bent altijd een orator geweest, nooit  een filosoof.” 
 
Het feit dat any nooit helemaal identiek wordt aan een universele operator in 
uitdrukkingen als (381)b. en de etymologische samenhang ervan met de particuliere 
betekenis “one”, wijzen erop dat de I-hoeklezing de basis blijft en de quasi-universele 
lezing daarop geënt is.  Voor de I→E-shift geldt een soortgelijke asymmetrie: historisch 
gezien zijn de operatoren die dit type shift hebben ondergaan steeds oorspronkelijke I-
hoekoperatoren, nooit omgekeerd.  Deze twee shifts worden geïllustreerd voor een hele 
reeks betekenisverschuivende I-hoekoperatoren.  
 
In hoofdstuk zes wordt de spilstatus van I-hoekoperatoren op nog een andere wijze 
benaderd: als woorden minder semantische specificaties bevatten, vertonen ze namelijk 
doorgaans meer contextuele betekenisvariatie. Dit geldt in niet geringe mate voor I-
hoekoperatoren. Op lexicaal vlak bestaat er een systematisch verschil tussen I-
hoekoperatoren zoals or en het onbepaalde lidwoord a enerzijds en hun lexicaal meer 
gespecificeerde tegenhangers either en any.  Terwijl de eerste categorie zich flexibel 
aanpast aan zowel veridicale als non-veridicale contexten (cf. Zwarts 1995, Giannakidou 
1997; zie voorbeelden (382)a.-d.), zijn either en any rigider: ze gedijen alleen in non-
veridicale contexten (382)a. en (382)c. 
 
(382) a. If Henry is talking to [Mary or Bill/either of them] at the moment, he will be 
punished.  
 b.  Henry is talking to [Mary or Bill/*either of them] at the   moment.  
 c.  If [you make [a/any mistake]], you’ll be punished.  
 d. [Henry talked to [a/*any doctor]]  
 
Na een illustratie van de invloed van klemtoon op de interpretatie van I-hoekoperatoren 
wordt een formeel model ontworpen om het betekenisonderscheid tussen het flexibele 
lidwoord a en de rigide operator any adequaat te vatten. Dat model blijkt identiek te zijn 
aan het tweedimensionale cartesiaanse assenstelsel van de voorgaande hoofdstukken. 
 
In het zevende en laatste hoofdstuk wordt de afgelegde weg kort samengevat, waarna het 
O-hoekraadsel wordt opgelost. De oplossing rust op twee hypothesen. Ten eerste de in 
hoofdstuk 4 beargumenteerde stelling dat A-hoekoperatoren de betekenis van de 
corresponderende I-hoekoperator als presuppositie bevatten; ten tweede de stelling dat 
negatie in de vorm van een gebonden morfeem een presuppositie niet ongedaan kan 
maken (Seuren 2002). Als die twee stellingen kloppen, kunnen operatoren met O-
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hoekbetekenissen niet op natuurlijke wijze ontstaan, vermits die betekenis strijdig is met 
de presuppositionele inhoud van de A-operator. Ze kunnen hooguit worden aangemaakt 
als artificiële constructen, met bewuste doorbreking van de natuurlijke grenzen van de 
IN-logica.  
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